chosen,—and by several selections under each topic,—a kind of theme, which we shall take the liberty of characterizing as "what it means to be a person." Practically every contributor treats importantly the concept "personhood," or what is said has implications for developing such a concept. Consider the following: Roe vs. Wade (Abortion); Benn: "Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons"; Fried: "Privacy: A Rational Context"; Feinberg: "Legal Paternalism"; Grisez: "Abortion: Ethical Arguments"; Thompson: "A Defense of Abortion"; Warren: "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion"; Hill: "Servility and Self-Respect"; Baker: " 'Pricks' and 'Chicks': A Plea for 'persons' "; S. Hill: "Self-Determination and Autonomy"; Bertocci: "The Human Venture in Sex, Love, and Marriage"; Atkinson: "The Morality of Homosexual Behavior"; Wootton: "The Problem of the Mentally Abnormal Offender"; Morris: "Persons and Punishment"; Murphy: "Maxism and Retribution"; Garver: "What Violence Is"; Gray: "The Enduring Appeals of Battle"; Regan: "A Defense of Pacifism"; Wasserstrom: "The Laws of War." The net effect, moreover, of these well-chosen selections is to sensitize (radicalize?) one to search for what keeps people from being "persons" in today's complex society. Moreover, what is particularly valuable about this anthology is that it contains, as Wasserstrom puts it, "philosophical attempts to elucidate and assess what is to be said for and against particular ways of behaving with respect to particular moral problems." Thus, the selections show philosophers at work, dealing with highly important and difficult social issues and situations. Our interest is also heightened by the various colloquies and dialogues being carried on. The several selections may appeal both to the technical philosopher and the sociological reader; but the latter is warned that although some topics may be "popular," or even titillating, familiarity with basic ethical categories and techniques of argumentation is required to achieve the maximum benefit from the discussions.

While we cannot comment on all the selections, several of them merit mention, primarily because of their somewhat unusual subject matter and treatment. The selections under Racism and Sexism by T. Hill, Baker, S. Hill and I. Thalberg are lively discussions of largely unexplored aspects of the subject. In addition to the classic treatments with which we are familiar [Hart on Punishment; Wasserstrom and Rawls on Obligation to Obey the Law; Garver on Violence],the Morris-Murphy selections form an interesting contrast of *static* and *dynamic* theories of Punishment; the Gray selection on the "enduring appeals of battle," is not so much an *apologia* for war, as it is a prime use of empathetic understanding along with sociological and philosophical analysis; and although many may disagree with Peter Bertocci on (pre-marital) sexual abstinence, they will find his approach *engaging*, to say the least. A Selected Bibliography follows each section.

This is an excellent book to be used in an upper division course in sociological problems, as well as courses in ethics.

— Berkley B. Eddins and Essie A. Eddins

FREDERICK SUPPE, ed. *The Structure of Scientific Theories.* Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1974. Pp. 682. $22.50, hardbound.

If this were not a good book then much of contemporary philosophy of science would probably be rubbish. The editor was a co-organizer of a symposium on theories held at Urbana in March 1969.

All the participants were fairly well-known in the business and some of them were (and still are) our "best and brightest" stars. Fortunately, or perhaps obviously,, the book is excellent. It would not be a good book for beginners or lay readers, but it would be perfect for an advanced course on scientific theories. Suppe has provided the reader with a splendid overview of the issues and arguments, but I suspect it's beauty could only be apprehended by the initiated.

Following Suppe's overview, the book opens with a relatively short summary of Hempel's 1970 "On the 'Standard Conception' of Scientific Theories." This is followed by an essay by Patrick Suppes leading to the conclusion that it is false to hold that "an absolute causal account can be given of phenomena, the ultimate laws of a deterministic sort can be gleaned from natural phenomena, and that some rockbed of perceptual certainty is necessary to gain a firm knowledge of the world." (p. 283)

I.B. Cohen considers past and potential uses and abuses of historical examples in his essay, and the interrelation of perception and communication is stressed in Bohm's. Following these, Suppe summarizes the views Putnam aired at the symposium and then Kuhn has another go at straightening out his notion of a "paradigm." Shapere examines various functions of so-called "theoretical" and "observational" terms "as existence terms, as idealization terms, as simplifications, and so on," and finally, Toulmin suggests moving from a "static" to a "kinematic" view of the scientific enterprise.

Every essay is followed by a perceptive and lively discussion, e.g., Suppes says "My first response to Sylvain [Bromberger] is this. He says that nothing happens in my paper. I say of his commentary, 'Lots of smoke but no fire'." (p. 288)

I doubt that I could enter into the discussions in this volume without entering at great length to be fair to all sides. So I will not try. Instead, I will merely reaffirm my conviction that this is a book every philosopher of science will want to read and every student of the subject should read.

— *Alex C. Michalos*

WILLIAM GUSTASON and DOLPH E. ULRICH *Elementary Symbolic Logic.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. Pp. viii, 280. Hardbound.

This is a nicely constructed textbook for an introductory logic course somewhere between "baby" logic (using Copi's *Introduction to Logic* or Barker's *The Elements of Logic)* and symbolic logic with metatheory (Copi's *Symbolic Logic* or Mates' *Elementary Logic*). While the apparent decline in overall student ability is stimulating the relative demand for the former, it should also be eroding the demand for the latter in favor of just such a medium-level text as Gustason and Ulrich's. If my impression is correct that their book has not enjoyed the widespread use it deserves, I can only attribute it to declining absolute enrollments or to force of adoptive habit.

The main virtue of Gustason and Ulrich's textbook is its organization. It leaves us free to choose between truth tables and deduction as our initial approach. The two approaches are developed independently as parallel but alternative explications of deductive validity or logical implication. Besides the latitude thereby accorded the teacher, this format builds up in the student an awareness of the significance of semantic completeness. I consider this an important lesson to get across to the beginning student, if it can be