

Experience for the necessity of causality.

Kant: Free Will and Determinism. In this sequel to the preceding discussion Vesey interviews Geoffrey Warnock on the Kantian reconciliation of free-will with determinism. Warnock gives a straightforward account of Kant's noumenal/phenomenal distinction and the distinction between causal (deterministic) explanation and explanation in terms of reasons for action. He then goes on to criticize Kant's attribution of reasons to the noumenal self: What prevents the ascription of reasons and free action to all noumena, and how can it be that the will is noumenal, hence a-temporal, while the phenomena of will (actions) are temporal? Further, Warnock argues, Kant cannot in this way account for the efficacy of free human reason. Finally, given that for Kant noumenal properties are inaccessible to reason, Warnock doubts whether hypotheses concerning noumena can even be made intelligible to human understanding.

2861094 *Key Concepts in the Moral Law.* Kant's *Moral Law* is the subject for Hanfling's interview with A. Phillips Griffiths. Griffiths extends Kant's doctrine to claim that since deliberation over rational action requires treating others as rational agents there cannot be any rational ground for ethical egoism. He then turns to define and briefly discuss Kant's concepts of objectivity and autonomy and concludes with some speculations concerning Kantian responses to contemporary moral problems. The upshot here is that while Kantian ethics does not provide answers to these problems, it shows that their character as moral problems arises from conflicts among the prescriptions of universalizable principles.

Kant: Free Will, Reason and Desire. This tape is more specifically designed to set the stage for discussion of the

relation of reason to free action. Hanfling uses selections from Hobbes' *Leviathan* and from Hume's *Treatise* to present reason as subservient to motives and desires, then contrasts this with Kant's theory of the autonomy of reason through recognition of the categorical imperative. Finally, selections from Sartre's *The Age Of Reason* are used to question whether following a moral law may not actually be an abandonment of freedom.

—Kenneth Ray

Book Reviews

G.M.A. GRUBE. *Plato's Republic*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1974. Pp. vii, 263. \$12.50, hardbound; \$1.75, paperbound.

To express what Plato *said*, in the most direct and least possibly misleading English prose: what translator has not set himself such an unimpeachable objective in tackling the *Republic*? Yet what has been produced by translators over the years has proved notoriously confusing to readers of all levels of philosophical and literary sophistication. Whatever Plato set out to write in the *Republic*, and however he set out to write it, either Cornford has missed his drift badly, or Bloom has (to take admittedly extreme cases), or perhaps both have — but at any rate one of the two Platos undoubtedly does not exist. Somewhere between these polarized interpretations lies a host of intermediate positions, of which one is that taken by Grube. In his determination to translate *all* of what Plato says he comes near to Bloom; no attempt is made to follow Cornford in synopsisizing or even omitting passages that in their virgin state might prove problematic to English-language readers. In his desire

to translate the dialogue into a *known* language — English — he veers in the direction of Cornford (who, unlike Bloom, did not allow himself to forget that Plato had written a brilliant, readable piece of prose in a *known* language — Greek). The result is about as reasonable a compromise as one is likely to get, given the inevitable inadequacies in any translation. As a piece of prose it reads gracefully and easily (thanks not least to the master-stroke of simply omitting the several hundred “he said”s of the dialogue, and signalling their presence by an unobtrusive dash), and more often than not successfully avoids jargon. Quasi-technical terms are translated appropriately, according to context: *eidos*, for example, is a “class” at 511a, a “Form” at 596a, a “part” at 435bc. Time-honoured translations of basic concepts are jettisoned if they are thought misleading; “wisdom,” for example, is a great improvement over “prudence” for *phronesis*, and “moderation” is a big improvement over “temperance” for *sophrosyne*. (The source of the original error is clear: Moerbeke’s “prudencia” and “temperantia” were excellent Latin translations in their day — and precisely because they did *not* mean “prudence” or “temperance”; the meaning-shifts that went with transliteration are post-Renaissance.) Particularly troublesome terms (e.g. *arete*) get a footnote. And each book gets a short introductory synopsis.

Students particularly interested in Platonic metaphysics and epistemology will find the Grube translation largely satisfactory, though inevitably it must be supplemented by sophisticated commentaries if it is not to mislead in certain passages, such as 5. 476ff., 6. 505ff. However, they should be warned at the outset of a number of slips. At 509a Grube has unaccountably omitted to translate the phrase *ten hexin*, and

(more importantly) at 509b has passed over the phrase *to einai*; whether Plato distinguished essence and existence or not, there is something in the Greek here that might seriously suggest it, and Grube has simply failed to translate a crucial piece of the evidence. At 477aff. he talks of that to which knowledge and opinion are “directed,” but it seems more likely that Plato has a military-cum-gubernatorial metaphor in mind: knowledge “has as its province” a certain specified field of objects, etc. (see LSJ-9, s.v. *ἐπὶ*, B III 6). And at 510d Plato is surely talking of the “inner agreement” of the steps of a carefully formulated argument, rather than a specified objective that investigators are “agreed upon.”

But these slips are a small matter, in view of the general accuracy and readability of the whole. It is an unassuming, sensitive, and sensible translation that can be safely recommended to teachers and students alike.

— Thomas M. Robinson

FREDERICK G. WEISS, ed. *Hegel: The Essential Writings*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974. Pp. xx, 346. Paperbound.

Some claim Hegel cannot be taught. The reason they frequently give is that Hegel cannot be thought. Others claim to teach the *Science of Logic* to large bands of admiring disciples. The current book is for neither group of extremists. It is designed to introduce students to Hegel’s thought with as little pain as that difficult task can be accomplished. The selections are not uniformly easy—little in Hegel is—but they are well-adapted to giving the student an adequate first grasp of what may well be the most difficult philosophical system ever devised.

Those of us who have used Loewenberg’s *Hegel Selections* in the Scribner’s series or Friedrich’s volume in The