

students by shoving before them and analysing the latest speech on American foreign policy by the Secretary of State. If you think this cannot be done successfully, I suggest you look closely at the aforementioned book by Kahane. Such books, in my opinion, are and should be the wave of the future. It would be interesting, in such a course, to use Wilson's book—as a subject in the great hunt for fallacies.

— Alan Hausman

Audio-Cassettes

The cassette tapes described below are supplementary materials to the Open University Problems Of Philosophy course, plus a few tapes concerned with the history of philosophy that are included from the Humanities and the Age of Revolutions courses. Usually about twenty minutes per side, the tapes cover a wide range of topics and utilize a number of different formats. In many cases a well known philosophical text or exchange has been re-written as an imaginary dialogue between the historical figures involved: thus, the dramatization in "The Princess and the Philosopher" of Descartes' correspondence with Princess Elizabeth, and Maurice Cranston's "Liberty: An Imaginary Conversation Between Voltaire and Rousseau," which is concerned with Rousseau's conception of freedom in the *Social Contract*. In other tapes Godfrey Vesey or Oswald Hanfling of the Open University either interview or chair discussions with well-known British philosophers on central questions in the philosophy of mind, ethics, and the philosophy of language. There is also a lecture by Imre Lakatos concerning the demarcation of science from pseudo-

science, and a reproduction of the 1948 Russell-Copleston debate on the existence of God. In many cases the discussion centers on some recent published work or material included in an Open University text, and whenever possible the relevant bibliographical references have been included in the following descriptions. There is however very little in the way of new contributions to the treatment of the problems that are discussed.

Taped interviews and discussions such as these may be very helpful in focusing group discussions, or as the basis for a follow-up lecture in which the issues are more fully developed. Often, in fact, the philosophical discussions progress so smoothly and easily that some follow-up discussion is necessary to bring out the complexity in the issues that are involved. Students who have had some introduction to the philosophical material either through their course work, or through a short prefatory lecture by their instructor, should find the discussion to be at an accessible level.

The following descriptions briefly characterize the content of each discussion and should help indicate the instructional use to which a particular tape is suited. Except for the philosophy of religion cassette, each cassette contains two recordings, one on each side. The cassette numbers will identify which recordings are together. Current prices for the cassettes are \$12.50 each, except for the philosophy of religion cassette, which is \$10.

Godfrey Vesey has edited a paperback entitled *Philosophy in the Open* (Open University Press, 1974) comprising transcripts from eleven of these tapes along with the transcript from the Open University film, "What Use is Moral Philosophy?" The tapes included in this collection are indicated by the note "Vesey PO" following their description.

2861268 *Body and Mind: A Dialogue from Malebranche*. This dialogue, composed by Oswald Hanfling out of Malebranche's *Metaphysical and Religious Conversations* gives an introductory characterization of Descartes' interactionist thesis and Malebranche's response to it. The first half of the tape sets up the Cartesian dualism, arguing that sensations are immaterial because unextended. The hypothesis of a causal relation between material and immaterial substance is formulated, then rejected in the second half of the dialogue. Malebranche's own theocentric hypothesis of a divinely ordained regularity between bodily states and sensations is presented as the concluding position of the dialogue, but no positive argument or discussion of Malebranche's position is included. (Vesey PO).

In Two Minds: An Imaginary Dialogue between Russell and Wittgenstein: The body of this dialogue has been imaginatively set by Stanley Eavesly as the dream of an harrassed lecturer the evening before his tutorial. The dialogue itself recasts some of Wittgenstein's remarks on the problem of other minds, especially remarks 244ff., 265, 271, and 281 of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Russell is portrayed mainly as the ownership theorist that is Wittgenstein's interlocutor throughout these sections of the *Investigations*.

2861276 *Personal Identity*. Derek Parfit recapitulates for Vesey the discussion from parts I and II of his 1971 *Philosophical Review* article "Personal Identity". Parfit uses the case of bodily bi-section to argue that puzzles concerning personal identity arise only when we think of identity as a further fact over and above what he terms "psychological continuity". The solution to these puzzles is to reform our intuitions concerning identity so that in the standard case of one individual psychological continuity is

sufficient for personal identity, whereas in the non-standard cases such as bodily bi-section judgment of personal identity are no longer appropriate though we may still speak of psychological continuity and personal survival. Parfit later develops a continuum of cases for understanding the concept of psychological continuity as a matter of degree and suggests that this may be a basis for the determination of criminal responsibility. These ideas are further developed in Parfit's article 'Later Selves and Moral Principles', in Montefiore (ed.) *Philosophy and Personal Relations*, London, Routledge, and Kegan Paul, 1973. (Vesey PO).

A Debate on the Existence of God. This is an excerpt from the 1948 Russell-Copleston debate on the existence of God. After an introduction by Stuart Brown, Copleston presents his version of the cosmological argument and the notion of a necessary being. Russell attacks the meaningfulness of necessary existence and finds that Copleston has committed the fallacy of composition in inferring to the existence of a cause for a given series of contingent events. The dialogue breaks off at an impass in the discussion of this latter question. (Vesey PO).

2861284 *Moral Philosophy in Practice*. D. Z. Phillips and H. O. Mounce, in conversation with Vesey, discuss their article "On Morality's having a Point" (*Philosophy*, 1965). The chief object of attack is Phillipa Foot's ethical naturalism. Phillips and Mounce both argue that moral issues may never be reduced solely to questions of matters of fact, for the relevancy of certain facts can only be determined in the context of some antecedent "moral tradition". The discussion then turns to consider the diversity of possible moral traditions, and whether there may be a non-trivial criterion for that concept. Phillips concludes by emphasizing his view that moral decisions cannot be determined

through philosophical reasoning.

Morality and Reason. R. S. Peters and John Benson discuss the possibility of giving an account of moral education within the framework of a Piagetian developmental psychology. Piaget's theory of developmental stages postulates a higher stage of the reflective, critical understanding of rules, to which a child progresses but which he or she cannot be taught. Peters and Benson discuss whether this account can be generalized to include moral rules and if it provides a basis for the analysis of moral autonomy. Peters' main point here is that there are some moral principles, associated with the character or virtue of an individual, whose adoption cannot have been rationally or critically chosen. Benson then differentiates Peters' claim for the non-rational inculcation of moral virtue from moral indoctrination, and the discussion closes after some cursory remarks concerning 'strength of will' and its relation to the development of moral autonomy.

2861292 *Don't Ask for the Meaning, Ask for the Use.* Here Hanfling has put together a dialogue of remarks from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* and from Zettel. He uses remarks 1-13, 28-35, 65-69 from the *Investigations* and remarks 9, 10, 21, 22, and 314 from *Zettel*. (Vesey PO).

Cause and Effect. This discussion between Hanfling and three students of the Open University course opens with a brief distinction between the philosophical and the practical problems associated with the use of a given concept. The discussion then proceeds with students' questions concerning Hume's account of causality. Hanfling's understanding of causal explanation, and especially of causal counterfactuals, follows quite closely the treatment in R. B. Braithwaite's *Scientific Explanation*. The main interpretative point of the tape is that Hume's account

of a causal relation as a relation of constant conjunction is too weak to have any counterfactual implications, and in amending Hume, Hanfling recounts what is essentially Braithwaite's own theory of counterfactual conditionals.

2861300 *Freedom and Knowledge: A Dialogue between Leibniz and Arnauld.* G. H. R. Parkinson has written this dialogue, based on Leibniz's *Discourse on Metaphysics* and the Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence, concerning the problem of human freedom and divine preordination. Leibniz lays out the concept of an individual substance and argues contra Arnauld that the divine creation of an individual substance is compatible with free action, since the agent can never know beforehand the determination of the individual substance. Leibniz and Arnauld argue further whether this sense of freedom can be a basis for moral responsibility. (Vesey PO).

Science and Pseudo-science. This tape is a lecture by Imre Lakatos introducing the problem of demarcation between science and pseudo-science. Lakatos begins by isolating "experimental reasoning" as a criterion for science and recapitulates the historical analyses of the concept. He first contrasts experimental reasoning with 18th century conceptions of the probability of scientific hypotheses. Arguing that an inductive-probabilistic conception of scientific reasoning is both too strong and too weak, Lakatos then discusses Popper's falsifiability criterion as an account of experimental reasoning in science. Popper's criterion is criticized as too strong, but Lakatos equally criticizes Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions as too weak to provide a criterion of demarcation. Lakatos finally introduces his own methodology of scientific research programs as the solution to the criteria levelled at Popper and Kuhn. In closing he stresses the relation

of moral and political criticism to the institutionalization in societies of a conception of scientific vs. non-scientific reasoning. (Vesey *PO*).

2861318 *Hylas Fights Back*. Vesey has re-written the heat-pain argument from the opening of Berkeley's *Three Dialogues*, so that Hylas shows Philonous' argument to be invalid. The substance of the dialogue has grown out of Vesey's articles in the *Philosophical Review*, 1960, and *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 1963. Hylas argues that sensation words like 'hot' and 'cold' have a dual use, as descriptions of how we may feel and as descriptions of how an object may feel to us. Thus we may describe a material object as having a particular sensible quality (by the latter use) without the object being a subject of sensation (by the former use). Hylas closes the dialogue with the suggestion that there is only a contingent relationship between these two uses, so that a sensation word like 'hot' is used to describe some particular bodily sensation only because that sensation is characteristically present when we sensibly feel that a part of our body is hot. (Vesey *PO*).

General Words and Justification. Here Vesey interviews Anthony Manser concerning the distinction between the objectivity of judgments and their justification. Manser's central point is that the objectivity of basic judgments, such as judgments of color, is not supported by practices of justification or of giving the reasons for making a particular judgment. This leads to a discussion of Wittgenstein's notion of the agreement in judgment that is presupposed by the use of language. Manser then develops out of this discussion some criticisms of the problem of universals: realists are wrong in thinking that every classificatory use of language needs justification, while nominalists are wrong in thinking that lack of justification implies arbitrariness or

lack of objectivity. Vesey concludes the tape with the suggestion that skepticism of other minds rests on the same mistaken demand for justification in the use of language.

2861326 *Surprises in Scientific Time*. Astro-physicist Davis Sciama's purpose in this tape is to confront our own common sense beliefs concerning space and time with some of the evidence for relativistic theories. He carefully explains the meson clock experiment and the twin paradox, arguing that a physical theory of space/time must relinquish many pre-relativistic concepts such as simultaneity. Sciama also outlines how certain more speculative cosmological models, involving cyclical, rather than linear, temporal relations, may lead to revisions in the conception of causality as well.

Liberty: An Imaginary Dialogue between Voltaire and Rousseau. Maurice Cranston has focused his imaginary dialogue between Rousseau and Voltaire on Rousseau's conception of freedom in the *Social Contract*. Through his characterization of Rousseau Cranston develops an interpretation of positive freedom as rational participation in the enactment of law. Cranston uses this interpretation to explain why for Rousseau men must be forced to be free, then has Voltaire lead into a discussion of parliamentary democracy and the legislator of Rousseau's *Social Contract*. Here Rousseau argues against parliamentarianism in favor of universal participatory democracy, which, he argues, is consistent with the role of the legislature in formulating law. (Vesey *PO*).

2861334 *Philosophy of Religion*. Stuart Brown and Oswald Hanfling discuss whether Wittgenstein's thesis of the autonomy of language implies that religious belief does not stand in need of justification. Brown begins by identifying religious skepticism as a demand for

a foundation for the use of religious language. Hanfling offers his interpretation of Wittgenstein's autonomy thesis (c.f. Zettel, Par. 542) and concludes that Wittgenstein's thesis refutes religious skepticism only if the use of religious language may be assimilated to the use of 'simple' terms of language—such as color vocabulary—whose use cannot be further characterized in terms of other concepts. Brown argues that in fact religious language does have an "esoteric" character that precludes explanation in non-religious terms, so that some religious language is "simple" and hence autonomous. (Vesey *PO*).

2860096 *Which Was Socrates?* The purpose of this talk is to illustrate the diversity and complexity in accounts of Socrates' life and character with excerpts from Plato's dialogues and from Xenophon; hence there is little philosophical content to this tape. Considerable time is also spent on an elaboration of the Socratic method, providing a superficial introduction to the notions of *elenchus* and Socratic irony. The tape closes with the "midwife" excerpt from Plato's *Theaetetus*.

Socrates and the Search for Universals. Vesey discusses with Renford Bambrough what is meant by Aristotle's reference in the *Metaphysics* to 'seeking the universal'. Bambrough contends that, whereas all that the historical Socrates meant by a 'universal' was a general definition, Plato's theory of universals offered a theoretical explanation for possibility of giving such definitions. Thus Socrates, as opposed to Plato, has no interest in metaphysics. Bambrough's criticisms of Plato are confused because of his failure to distinguish the issues of Plato's realism from essentialism (see Bambrough's "Universals and Family Resemblances", in Pitcher: *Wittgenstein*, Anchor Books, 1966). He has included an account of Aristotle's own nominalist objections to

Plato and cast these as precursory to Wittgenstein.

2860138 *The Princess and the Philosopher.* Vesey draws from the correspondence between Descartes and Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, and also from Arnauld's objections to the *Meditations*, to bring out the difficulties in Descartes' dualistic interactionism. Descartes defends the causal interaction of body and soul by explaining how an immaterial soul may be united with a material body and yet exist independently of it. Elizabeth's questions then force Descartes to a further defense of his arguments for the soul's immateriality. The dialogue closes by drawing attention to the possibility of life after death for the Cartesian soul. (Vesey *OP*).

Descartes—The Father of Modern Philosophy. Vesey chairs this discussion between Bernard Williams and Anthony Kenny concerning Cartesian doubt and the "*cogito*". Williams opens by discussing the presuppositions of Cartesian doubt; Descartes' use of language ushers in many of the beliefs he has earlier claimed to doubt. Williams' remarks fasten on Descartes' notion of the self, and Kenny, reformulating the "*cogito*" so that there is no reference to the self, argues that Williams' critical remarks miss the heart of Descartes' position. After debating whether the "*cogito*" remains valid without reference to the first person, Williams and Kenny close with some general remarks on how the characteristic durability of philosophical problems distinguishes them from problems of science.

2861086 *Kant and Causality.* Vesey asks W. H. Walsh to discuss the epistemological status of determinism for Kant's contemporaries in order to develop a contrast for Kant's own understanding of causality. In the discussion that follows Walsh recounts Kant's theory in the second Analogy of

Experience for the necessity of causality.

Kant: Free Will and Determinism. In this sequel to the preceding discussion Vesey interviews Geoffrey Warnock on the Kantian reconciliation of free-will with determinism. Warnock gives a straightforward account of Kant's noumenal/phenomenal distinction and the distinction between causal (deterministic) explanation and explanation in terms of reasons for action. He then goes on to criticize Kant's attribution of reasons to the noumenal self: What prevents the ascription of reasons and free action to all noumena, and how can it be that the will is noumenal, hence a-temporal, while the phenomena of will (actions) are temporal? Further, Warnock argues, Kant cannot in this way account for the efficacy of free human reason. Finally, given that for Kant noumenal properties are inaccessible to reason, Warnock doubts whether hypotheses concerning noumena can even be made intelligible to human understanding.

2861094 *Key Concepts in the Moral Law.* Kant's *Moral Law* is the subject for Hanfling's interview with A. Phillips Griffiths. Griffiths extends Kant's doctrine to claim that since deliberation over rational action requires treating others as rational agents there cannot be any rational ground for ethical egoism. He then turns to define and briefly discuss Kant's concepts of objectivity and autonomy and concludes with some speculations concerning Kantian responses to contemporary moral problems. The upshot here is that while Kantian ethics does not provide answers to these problems, it shows that their character as moral problems arises from conflicts among the prescriptions of universalizable principles.

Kant: Free Will, Reason and Desire. This tape is more specifically designed to set the stage for discussion of the

relation of reason to free action. Hanfling uses selections from Hobbes' *Leviathan* and from Hume's *Treatise* to present reason as subservient to motives and desires, then contrasts this with Kant's theory of the autonomy of reason through recognition of the categorical imperative. Finally, selections from Sartre's *The Age Of Reason* are used to question whether following a moral law may not actually be an abandonment of freedom.

—Kenneth Ray

Book Reviews

G.M.A. GRUBE. *Plato's Republic*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1974. Pp. vii, 263. \$12.50, hardbound; \$1.75, paperbound.

To express what Plato *said*, in the most direct and least possibly misleading English prose: what translator has not set himself such an unimpeachable objective in tackling the *Republic*? Yet what has been produced by translators over the years has proved notoriously confusing to readers of all levels of philosophical and literary sophistication. Whatever Plato set out to write in the *Republic*, and however he set out to write it, either Cornford has missed his drift badly, or Bloom has (to take admittedly extreme cases), or perhaps both have — but at any rate one of the two Platos undoubtedly does not exist. Somewhere between these polarized interpretations lies a host of intermediate positions, of which one is that taken by Grube. In his determination to translate *all* of what Plato says he comes near to Bloom; no attempt is made to follow Cornford in synopsisizing or even omitting passages that in their virgin state might prove problematic to English-language readers. In his desire