

time to stop and think about something which has occurred on the screen. The images move inexorably on. Also, unlike a lecture or a discussion, a film does not provide the audience an opportunity to question the source(s) of ideas. Recognizing these limits, much could still be done, despite the importance of reflective thought and interaction in philosophy. One idea which comes to mind is that an excellent introduction to philosophy could be presented in film along the lines of Jacob Bronowski's "Ascent of Man" series. In those superb films, Bronowski proves that the drama of human ideas can be presented with a high degree of excitement and intelligence by someone with enough courage and energy to make a *film*.

One final question about the ponderous academic atmosphere of "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Universals," which it shares with many films of its type. Why repeat the classroom when you have at your disposal a window on the universe? Is philosophy a thoroughly academic endeavor best practised by well-schooled academic experts? If I bought the film rights to *Philosophical Investigations*, I couldn't have in mind shooting the thing in St. John's College.

— T. Binkley

Open University Books

Body and Mind. Prepared by Oswald Hanfling. Bletchley, Bucks, G.B.: Open University Press, 1971. Pp. 60, \$3.75, paperbound.

Body and Mind comprises Units 1-2 of the Open University Problems of Philosophy Series, and deals with classical theories of the nature of the

mind and of the mind-body relation. Professor Hanfling devotes nine of the thirteen chapters to various traditional forms of dualism, and totally ignores the currently fashionable sorts of physicalism (such as Eliminative Materialism and Functionalism). This seems to me a wise approach, since dualism can easily be made attractive to the neophyte by arguments of very simple sorts, and then in turn made doubtful by only slightly more theoretical considerations; in this way, the student is led quite naturally away from bare reliance on crude intuitions and preanalytical prejudices, and through a process of refining those intuitions in response to more penetrating inquiry. Given Hanfling's subject-matter, his choice of Antony Flew's anthology, *Body, Mind and Death* (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1964) as an accompanying "set book" of course readings is a good one. The principal selections discussed are taken from St. Augustine, Descartes, Ryle, Moore, Ayer, Leibniz, T.H. Huxley, and Shaffer.

Hanfling's style is engaging and pleasantly colloquial. (I believe it is particularly important for an introductory text to avoid ponderous, pompous or declamatory prose, in order to illustrate to the student that any intelligent person can engage in philosophical workmanship without antecedently having cultivated "academic" habits or jargon.) In spots Hanfling does give in to a slight preachiness, but I see no way in which he could have helped this.

He takes pains to give the student a good deal of helpful methodological advice along the way, particularly concerning dialectical procedure (e.g., "... state as clearly and as forcefully as you can any view that you are going to criticize" (p. 15)). This advice is illustrated in the accompanying readings from the Flew collection. I would perhaps have made even more of

these methodological points and explained them in more detail, in the light of an explicit formulation of the goals of philosophical discussion; but I suppose that is a matter of taste.

The book's format, I think, is about as conducive as it could have been to the student's learning to ask himself the right questions and to answer them on his own. Roughly once a page, Hanfling suggests some questions raised by the "set" readings or by his own remarks, and there immediately follows a colored horizontal line which he calls the "singal to 'stop, think, and write'." The student is thereby directed to return to the relevant source reading, think through the suggested questions, and then write out his answers and further thoughts on the subject. When he has done so, he turns back to the text and compares what he has written to Hanfling's own remarks immediately following the horizontal line.

Having set up the procedure in this way, Hanfling faces a difficulty. How is the student to evaluate his own written work, in comparing it to Hanfling's preferred answers to the same set of questions? It would be misguided (and quixotic) to require that the student have produced exactly the same answers; although many of the questions are simple exegetical ones, many more call for some original criticism on the student's part, and there is no guarantee that the student might not think of an even more trenchant criticism than that which Hanfling wants to single out for study. In such a situation, the student will need outside feedback. Anyone seeking to use *Body and Mind* as a text outside of a formal university structure will have to find a way of providing such feedback through two-way correspondence or tutoring.

In response to this problem, Hanfling contents himself with reassuring the student from time to time that the student's answers need not coincide with his. For

example:

Now it may happen that after [re-reading the relevant passages] you still disagree with my answer. Disagreement is one of the characteristic features of philosophizing. But when you disagree with someone in philosophy, try to make sure that you really *understand* the disagreement—understand what the other person is saying and what your reasons are for objecting to it. (p. 16)

This sort of remark, though entirely sound so far as it goes, just leaves the reader hanging, for it gives no hint as to how philosophical disagreement *would* be resolved if the participants were in a position to talk with each other (though auxiliary correspondence or tutoring would help here); nor does Hanfling offer criteria that the student could use to tell whether he "really *understands* the disagreement," or whether his reasons are good reasons or even *clear* ones. Still, it would be hard to formulate criteria that the student could apply with confidence in the absence of professional supervision.

What concerns me more is that Hanfling is so conscientious about not forcing his interpretations or criticisms upon the student that the student may come to see philosophy as an aimless sort of verbal activity, and fail to acquire a sense of philosophers' striving towards truth. He may even be led to assume that philosophical disagreements are not matters of truth and falsity at all. Some of Hanfling's remarks, I am afraid, may tend to encourage this:

Scientific writings become superseded. Someone writes a new treatise and then the older work is out of date. New discoveries are made which falsify previously held theories. But in philosophy the situation is not at all like this. (p. 22)

There is, of course, a (somewhat elusive) sense in which this is true. But in letting the matter rest here (as he does), Hanfling suggests a false contrast between philosophical and scientific inquiry, and hints, perniciously though I

daresay unwittingly, that philosophy does not *progress*. It a student takes this hint, he will probably be at a loss to supply himself with a convincing rationale for doing philosophy in the first place.

Hanfling insists throughout the book (pp. 22-23, 28, 49) that scientific results are irrelevant to philosophical inquiry. This attitude may well be the byproduct of a strain of verificationism (see, e.g., pp. 51, 53) which Hanfling neglects to acknowledge as a (controversial and highly dubious) background assumption. This seems to me to short-change the student, though of course Hanfling never purports to be offering the reader philosophical *truths*.

Hanfling maintains the book's laudably conversational style only at a certain cost. He goes out of his way to avoid overtly technical terminology and unnecessary rigor. Other things being equal, this is fine; but two unwanted results ensue. First, the student does not get much of a sense of what it is to formulate someone's argument *crisply* and to subject it to penetrating and keenly analytical examination. Hanfling tends to present arguments colloquially, invite the student to consider them, and then move abruptly on to some new topic. Here, again, one must be sympathetic; readers of Hanfling's book, assumed to lack any prior philosophical experience, cannot be expected to revel in the formal and rigorous reconstructions of arguments for its own sake. But I would have liked to see more detailed and critical *treatment* of arguments once they had been stated.

The second problem occasioned by Hanfling's avoidance of technical jargon is that in place of explicitly technical terms there slip in phrases which look like ordinary expressions of English but which actually are being used in (sometimes highly) technical—and theory-laden—ways, causing either puzzlement or, what is worse,

misunderstanding of the points being made. For example: "I doubt whether the supposition of doing this *really makes sense*" (p. 9, italics mine); "History is not a *thing*" (p. 17); "[Descartes] went on to ask what must be the nature of this Self—its *essential* nature, that is . . ." (p. 18); "A person is *properly* said to understand something if he can do the right things . . . if and when the occasion arises" (p. 45, italics mine); ". . . there are no . . . *criteria* for deciding whether ['It's 5 o'clock on the sun'] is true or false" (p. 51, italics mine). I am sure some such usages are unavoidable. But if so, Hanfling ought to have acknowledged this and indicated to the student that the terms in question are being given at least a somewhat technical interpretation.

For some reason that is not readily apparent, quite a number of Hanfling's most cryptic and provocative remarks are immediately followed by a change of subject. Just as the student is asking himself, "What does the author mean by '____'," Hanfling abruptly introduces another philosopher or theory, instead of explaining. Pp. 17-18, on Moore, Descartes, and whether the mind "is a thing," are particularly obscure in this respect. In addition, Hanfling frequently introduces entirely new topics only to drop them a paragraph or two later, which is distracting; in some cases he concedes in so many words that he has raised a side issue "only in order to defer it" (e.g., pp. 18, 47). And an entire chapter (8: "Volition") seems to have little to do with the rest of the text, and to mix up two or three distinct issues as well; it is a confusing digression.

Aside from the difficulties and defects I have noted here, Hanfling's enterprise and the book itself are worthwhile. (Among other things, it is to be hoped that the book and the series in which it appears will point the way toward a much-improved future text

along similar lines.) Hanfling announces near the beginning of the book that his primary intention is to "get you thinking"; I am sure the text will accomplish at least that much, and that is all to the good.

— William G. Lycan

Philosophy of Language. Prepared by Oswald Hanfling. Bletchley, Bucks, G.B.: Open University Press, 1971. Vol. I, 68 pp., \$3.00, paperbound. Vol. II, 44 pp., \$3.25, paperbound.

These two booklets provide the basis for the introduction to the Philosophy of Language in the Open University's course on the Problems of Philosophy. In this section of the course, the later Wittgenstein's views on language receive careful scrutiny, with the *Blue and Brown Books* serving as the focus of attention. The central theme the booklets try to develop is Wittgenstein's attack on the view that "there is something there behind the use of words which explains how that use is regulated—some basic principle, or some relationship between things, or between things and words." (p. 33, II) Towards developing this theme, they examine, in turn, Wittgenstein's doubts about the picture theory, his views about language-learning, his attack on mentalistic theories of meaning, his account of the relationship between meaning and use, his notion of family resemblance, and his account of the rule-governed nature of language.

The format of the booklets usually involves a brief introduction to some topic in the philosophy of language; then the student is directed to passages in the *Blue and Brown Books* where the topics receive detailed attention. The body of the text is concerned to explain and develop the points raised in these passages. A variety of different tools are

employed—study questions, self-assessment tests, cartoons, diagrams, and philosophical dialogues. The result is a stimulating guide to the *Blue and Brown Books*, one that demands a great deal of the student but repays his efforts with a wide-ranging grasp of the later Wittgenstein's approach to problems in the philosophy of language.

What I find most remarkable about these booklets is their masterful pedagogy. They are clearly written and extremely well organized. Beginning with fairly elementary issues, the booklets work their way into progressively more difficult material. As I have suggested, they employ a wide variety of non-standard teaching techniques; but unlike the tricks and gimmicks of the "relevant" texts, these techniques are really effective. Cartoons aren't irrelevant exercises of the imagination; they actually succeed in providing *intelligent* illustrations of important points. The study questions don't call for boring regurgitation, nor do they recommend flights of non-philosophical fancy; they probe the student's understanding of Wittgenstein and deepen it. The dialogues may not always represent the highest in literary accomplishment; but they do an admirable job of clarifying the nature of various philosophical disputes about language; and, in the process, they exhibit the dialectical dimension of philosophical thinking.

The booklets were designed to meet the very special needs of the Open University, and there can be little doubt about their success in that context. Moving the booklets to a different educational environment might occasion some difficulty. The problem is that the booklets cover their material almost too well. Where the aim was merely to explain Wittgenstein's views on language, the teacher of a standard lecture course might be embarrassed to find that the booklets do too much of