

an explanation, to that extent will there be an inclination to endow it with the honourable status of natural law.

This position is at least complementary to the Hempelian position, hence the value of this film in helping students understand Hempel's covering law theory and the logical relationship between prediction and explanation: If X is deducible from Y (a higher-level hypothesis), X is recognized as a law of nature and Y is said to explain X.

What appears to be a metaphysical dispute—Braithwaite's nominalism vs. Babulys' realism—soon is revealed to involve "illegitimate" questions which one should decline to answer. Students learn the distinction between making a discovery about the world and a proposal about our use of language. Touched upon are the logic and limitations of scientific explanation, both Braithwaite and Baublys agreeing that it is the nature of science not to be able to produce ultimate explanations.

A discussion by the class of the issues raised in this film affords the instructor the opportunity to distinguish between facts, hypotheses, laws and theories, between induction and deduction, and between truth by correspondence, truth by coherence and pragmatic truth.

So clear is the presentation that the instructor should not be surprised if in the course of the discussion students quickly pick up a basic inconsistency or tension in Braithwaite's position. The problem revolves around whether generalizations at the top of the deductive system, e.g., the Kinetic Theory of Gases, can be called laws of nature. Braithwaite argues they cannot inasmuch as they are not themselves deducible from other higher-level hypotheses. On the other hand, Braithwaite affirms that any *explanans* of a lower-level hypothesis, e.g., Boyle's Law, can be called a law of nature. This results in the curious situation that by the first

criterion the Kinetic Theory of Gases is a theory, not a law of nature, while by the second criterion the Kinetic Theory of Gases is a law of nature, not a theory, since it is the *explanans* of Boyle's Law.

— Darrell R. Shepard

Wittgenstein and the Problem of Universals. Open University Film Series. Color, 16mm, 25 min. \$275 purchase; \$20 rental.

"Problems of Philosophy: A Third Level Arts Course."

The title moves toward the viewer until the "o" in "of" turns into a pink oval and the other letters fade away. A pink question mark appears above the pink dot. Question marks in other colors encircle the dot and then fade to leave the original pink question mark.

Dissolve to an academic building which, we later discover, is on the campus at Cambridge University. Title over: "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Universals." "Introduced by Godfrey Vesey, Professor of Philosophy." Cut to another campus setting. A man, who we assume is Professor Vesey, stands against a backdrop of lush green. It is sunny. It is not winter. Professor Vesey speaks: "This program's about the problem of universals, sometimes called the problem of the one and the many. There are many beautiful things, say, but there is one thing, beauty, which they have in common or share or manifest or something." He goes on to say that the problem is to explain how the many particulars are related to the one universal they share. This film will consider whether Wittgenstein says anything that helps. Even those who disagree with Wittgenstein agree that he was influential. One who disagrees is Stephan Korner of the University of Bristol and Yale University. He will discuss Wittgenstein with Renford Bambrough. They will be debating in Bambrough's rooms in St. John's College.

Dissolve to outside of St. John's College. It is still sunny and serene. Zoom in. Cut to Vesey in Bambrough's rooms: "We'll discuss this passage in the *Blue Book*:

We are inclined to think that there must be something in common to all games, say, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general term "game" to the various games; whereas games form a *family* the members of which have family likenesses.

Vesey alludes to another passage, in the *Brown Book*, and asks Bambrough, "Do you agree with Wittgenstein?" Bambrough says he does and that what Wittgenstein says is important since it takes a new approach to a question so old even Socrates asked it. After Bambrough speaks briefly, Vesey summarizes Wittgenstein's position and, with a subtle touch, includes philosophy in the examples of games which are unified by family resemblances, not by a common essence.

Vesey then turns to Korner: Does Wittgenstein's point about games apply to other concepts? Are there exceptions? Korner says Wittgenstein was on the right road, but registers two objections. (1) Wittgenstein thinks *all* concepts are family resemblance concepts, but there are lots of systematic conceptual connections which are not like family resemblances. For example, "integer" and "to the left of" and "greater than" are not concepts structured by family resemblances. (2) Even Wittgenstein's analysis of family resemblance concepts themselves is incomplete. There are borderline cases for family resemblance concepts, as there are not for concepts such as "integer". Consideration of the structure of the "borderlines" reveals that the situation is much more complex than Wittgenstein lets on. After a brief recapitulation by Vesey, Korner introduces his notion of "continuous connection." On either side of the borderline of family resemblance

concepts, there are clear cases which fall inside or outside the application of the concept. These cases on either side of the border are connected through "continua" which may be one-dimensional or many-dimensional, depending on the concept.

From this point on, the discussion meanders between Korner's ideas and Wittgenstein's, and eventually some time is devoted to "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Universals," but not much. By the time Bambrough gets the opportunity to develop Wittgenstein's views, it seems almost beside the point since the preceding discussion presupposes familiarity with them. In the end, one is left with the feeling that the film does a better job of conveying Korner's views than Wittgenstein's. This is partly because Korner is present in person to offer his ideas. It is also because an extensive exchange about Korner's views comes early in the film, and we discover that he is not as interested in disputing Wittgenstein's approach as he is in modifying it with his own theory of "continua". We are sidetracked from considering Wittgenstein's contribution by having a new issue introduced, namely Korner's own contribution to the problem of the one and the many.

What is the film supposed to accomplish? From the tone of Vesey's introductory comments, we expect an elementary presentation and discussion of Wittgenstein. But we get something else, something which might be used as a interesting supplement to a study of Wittgenstein and the problem of universals. I think the most likely consequence of the film so used would be to induce the viewers to read Korner. If the point of the film is to confront directly Wittgenstein's ideas about universals, it would have been better to select as Bambrough's interlocutor someone more ardently and specifically opposed to Wittgenstein's

basic approach. Or alternatively, to utilize a method other than filming a discussion to get the ideas across.

This brings us to the fundamental problem with films like this one. The film was made by shooting the entirety of a discussion which may have lasted two hours or more. It was then edited down to half an hour. In this instance, the result of the procedure is a choppy collection of statements and remarks and reaction shots which neither hang together in a continuous line of thought nor develop according to the dynamics of discussion. Vesey appears to be an excellent moderator, but his talent is badly abused by the brutal editing. I don't mean to criticize the editing job *per se* (which is at least professional), but rather to cast doubt on the validity of the conception of the film. Part of the difficulty in making a film this way is that you don't know in advance how the discussion will develop—it might structure itself as if catering to the editor or, more likely, it might turn out being impossible to condense and edit coherently. My guess is that the Korner-/Bambrough encounter was inherently recalcitrant to the devices of editing.

This difficulty arises because film is being used in two rather inconsistent ways. Film can be used simply to record an event—a lecture, a discussion, whatever. Film can also be used more “creatively” to construct a filmic product which is not strictly a record of an event, but rather a whole new event, namely the event experienced in viewing the film. And this event is created by the filmmaker, not by what he films.

If the purpose of “Wittgenstein and the Problem of Universals” was to record an interesting philosophical discussion, it should have been longer and it should have been edited with the idea of conveying the sense and direction of the discussion, not of remolding it into something else, such as a montage of

claims. On the other hand, if the purpose of the film was to present the views of Wittgenstein (and of Korner) in a uniquely filmic product, it would have been much better to interview Bambrough and Korner separately and to edit the two interviews together with comments by Vesey as narrator. This would have produced a much more coherent and intelligible result. The point is that a discussion sets up certain relationships between the discussants which cannot be altered by the filmmaker, but only left in or cut out. Since most philosophical discussions, like the one between Korner and Bambrough, last considerably longer than an hour, it will usually be difficult to edit them down that much and still preserve any semblance of a coherent encounter between minds. Either the discussion has to be made shorter (and restrict itself to an adequately limited range) or the film has to be made longer. On the other hand, if the filmmaker is allowed to make a *film* and can draw from various sources for material (interviews, commentary, narration, . . . and anything else from newsreels to soap operas), the film can be structured according to filmic relationships and we will not be confronted with the frustrating task of trying to pack a two-hour discussion into a half-hour film.

This brings up the big question about the use of film in philosophy. Films can validly be used to record events of philosophical interest—lectures, discussions, debates, etc. What else? Well, films which are not explicitly philosophical can and have been used in much the way novels are used to encounter and study philosophical ideas. Beyond these rather limited uses, it is up to philosophers and filmmakers to discover the possibilities. I will be satisfied here to make some obvious observations which need to be taken into account. The first is that, unlike a book, a film does not allow the viewer

time to stop and think about something which has occurred on the screen. The images move inexorably on. Also, unlike a lecture or a discussion, a film does not provide the audience an opportunity to question the source(s) of ideas. Recognizing these limits, much could still be done, despite the importance of reflective thought and interaction in philosophy. One idea which comes to mind is that an excellent introduction to philosophy could be presented in film along the lines of Jacob Bronowski's "Ascent of Man" series. In those superb films, Bronowski proves that the drama of human ideas can be presented with a high degree of excitement and intelligence by someone with enough courage and energy to make a *film*.

One final question about the ponderous academic atmosphere of "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Universals," which it shares with many films of its type. Why repeat the classroom when you have at your disposal a window on the universe? Is philosophy a thoroughly academic endeavor best practised by well-schooled academic experts? If I bought the film rights to *Philosophical Investigations*, I couldn't have in mind shooting the thing in St. John's College.

— T. Binkley

Open University Books

Body and Mind. Prepared by Oswald Hanfling. Bletchley, Bucks, G.B.: Open University Press, 1971. Pp. 60, \$3.75, paperbound.

Body and Mind comprises Units 1-2 of the Open University Problems of Philosophy Series, and deals with classical theories of the nature of the

mind and of the mind-body relation. Professor Hanfling devotes nine of the thirteen chapters to various traditional forms of dualism, and totally ignores the currently fashionable sorts of physicalism (such as Eliminative Materialism and Functionalism). This seems to me a wise approach, since dualism can easily be made attractive to the neophyte by arguments of very simple sorts, and then in turn made doubtful by only slightly more theoretical considerations; in this way, the student is led quite naturally away from bare reliance on crude intuitions and preanalytical prejudices, and through a process of refining those intuitions in response to more penetrating inquiry. Given Hanfling's subject-matter, his choice of Antony Flew's anthology, *Body, Mind and Death* (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1964) as an accompanying "set book" of course readings is a good one. The principal selections discussed are taken from St. Augustine, Descartes, Ryle, Moore, Ayer, Leibniz, T.H. Huxley, and Shaffer.

Hanfling's style is engaging and pleasantly colloquial. (I believe it is particularly important for an introductory text to avoid ponderous, pompous or declamatory prose, in order to illustrate to the student that any intelligent person can engage in philosophical workmanship without antecedently having cultivated "academic" habits or jargon.) In spots Hanfling does give in to a slight preachiness, but I see no way in which he could have helped this.

He takes pains to give the student a good deal of helpful methodological advice along the way, particularly concerning dialectical procedure (e.g., "... state as clearly and as forcefully as you can any view that you are going to criticize" (p. 15)). This advice is illustrated in the accompanying readings from the Flew collection. I would perhaps have made even more of