

tions, not long-settled doctrines. Hence, this book is highly recommended for interdisciplinary "sciences-and-humanities" programs, and for introductory level courses in the philosophy of science (especially those normally followed by specialized studies in the philosophical problems of physics, biology, or the social sciences). It is even suitable for some survey courses at the community-college or high-school level (depending on the interests of the audience). Furthermore, the text permits great flexibility in creating a more narrow or advanced philosophy of science seminar, because it could easily be employed as a profitable background reader to supplement some other, highly-focused, treatise or collection of the instructor's choice. Gerald Holton's *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought* (physics), Ronald Munson's *Man and Nature* (biology), or T. L. Beauchamp's *Philosophical Problems of Causation* come quickly to mind as possible companion volumes.

— T. R. Girill

JAMES W. CORNMAN And KEITH LEHRER. *Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction*, Second Edition. New York: Macmillan, 1974. Pp. 554. Hardbound.

PAUL J. OLSCAMP. *An Introduction to Philosophy*. New York: Ronald Press, 1971. Hardbound.

What distinguishes these texts from other introductory texts and makes them both admirable works, is that they present philosophy in a rigorous way, actually formalizing many important philosophical arguments, strictly applying formal logic to questions of their validity and consistently introducing and applying the latest methods and findings of philosophical analysis, criticism and counterexample to the determination of the truth-values of the premises. The texts are largely similar in contents, methods, and aims, but differ somewhat in styles of writing and

conclusions obtained.

Both texts begin with sections on logic and techniques of critical philosophical analysis. These sections both cover the nature of argument, the deductive/inductive distinction, validity and the nature of induction and various other concepts such as definition, the *a priori*, and analyticity. Olscamp's presentation is more extensive and detailed: he introduces the symbolism of propositional and predicate calculi, truth tables, exemplary deductions with a few examples of elementary valid inference patterns and the four rules of quantification. He has more on meaning and truth than do Cornman and Lehrer. But Cornman and Lehrer have material on inductive cogency and the lottery paradox Olscamp lacks. They introduce only a few valid patterns in propositional calculus and syllogistic logic and formalize most of their arguments throughout the book as valid arguments of the propositional calculus, leaving for discussion only the truth of the premises. This may seem a Procrustean bed for the range of arguments they deal with, yet it proves surprisingly comfortable. And it seems that Olscamp hardly makes much use of the symbolism he introduces at the beginning.

Cornman and Lehrer's book (hereafter referred to as PPA) is also dialectical and problematic in construction, while Olscamp's *Introduction to Philosophy* (ITP) is more expository, consisting occasionally of long stretches of historical narrative, *e.g.*, the beginning of chapter eight on moral and legal justice. To interest people in philosophy it seems to me that PPA's problematic approach is the best: it presents philosophy as conflict, *e.g.*, between the beliefs that we have some certain knowledge and skepticism, between free will and determinism, between the various theories of the mind-body relation and the difficulties of each. Philosophical interest begins in wonder, and wonder is much more stimulated by the presentation of conflict than, *e.g.*, by historical narrative. (Olscamp's, too, it

should be noted, *begins* this way, though less explicitly.

In PPA there are five long problem chapters on knowledge and skepticism, freedom and determinism, the mind-body problem, arguments for the existence of a God, and justifying an ethical standard. Olscamp's content chapters, on the other hand, are organized by subject areas of philosophy and cover a significantly broader range: nine chapters on metaphysics, causality, epistemology, ethics and meta-ethics, political philosophy, three arguments for the existence of God, some theories of aesthetics, philosophy of science, and types of philosophy. Both texts are cumulative: results argued for in one chapter may be relied upon in arguments found in later chapters. The same is true of philosophical tools introduced at given points.

While on the subject of content I should perhaps inform readers of some of the notable conclusions the authors come to. In the second edition of PPA they come to the conclusions 1) that skepticism is justified, after all, even with respect to our perceptual beliefs, 2) that compatibilism is more tenable than determinism or libertarianism, 3) that a "Neutral Identity Theory" of the relation between sensations and brain processes is more tenable than the standard Dualistic Interactionist theory, 4) that ". . . the evidence provided by the existence of evil . . . is sufficient, nevertheless, to tip the scales of total available evidence in favor of the hypothesis that God does not exist . . . and, because he can neither be created nor destroyed, he never did and never will exist" (p. 407), and 5) that a certain ethical standard containing both Kantian and Utilitarian elements can be justified. (I have quoted the conclusion about God because I believe it to be one of the most forthright and courageous statements I have ever seen in a textbook.)

Some of Olscamp's conclusions are: 1) that there are at least two kinds of knowledge, private and public, and that the one is not reducible to the other, 2) private

events and knowledge of them are not relevant to the determination of the truth of knowledge claims made about public events, 3) determinism as a theory about the world of public knowledge is not true when applied to the world of mental events, 4) teleological explanations do have a place in the sciences and reports of mental events should be accepted as evidence, 5) materialism and naturalism are insufficient for the explanation of human experience (p. 496). The first conclusion, out of which the others arise, itself arises out of Wittgensteinian analysis of pain sentences and criteria. Indeed, Olscamp's ways of proceeding and conclusions seem to be somewhat more influenced by the piecemeal treatment of ordinary-language philosophers like Ryle, Austin, Wittgenstein and Malcolm, while those of Cornman and Lehrer seem to show slightly more influence of a systematic approach found in Ayer and other logicians.

Now for some criticisms: it can be claimed with some degree of justice that the logic presented in the introductory chapters is inadequate for the analysis of the philosophical arguments presented. But then again it may be pointed out 1) that there are some philosophical arguments which are too complex to be properly analyzed by an existing system of logic and 2) that logic itself is not a fixed, immutable arbiter of validity but one which, rather, can change with progress in philosophical logic. I believe that the Ontological Argument (which both texts deal with), in Anselm's version, is an example of the first point and that the debate between the proponents of the Objectual Interpretation of the quantifiers and the proponents of the Substitution Interpretation illustrates the second. I doubt that the Ontological Argument can be properly symbolized without a "logic" of a special operator for conceivability similar to epistemic or doxastic logic, overlaid on top of a logic containing modal operators, special predicates for existence and perfection, together with a correct (*i.e.*, substi-

tutional) interpretation of the quantifiers. And a lot is not yet clearly settled even about modal logic. It seems to me, for example, that the status of Becker's axiom is unsettled but that Olscamp's 5 through 9 (cf. pps. 358f.) may not be applications of it. It seems to have to do with iterated modalities rather than these matters. Furthermore, in answer to Olscamp's question whether the introduction of tense operators is justified, one must say that it is justified all by itself as a strategy to test whether Becker's axiom has counter-intuitive applications quite independently of any false or confused notions on the part of proponents of the Ontological Argument about the concept of God. Another example of an unsettled logical matter is this more minor one: in dealing with Richard Taylor's defense of Fatalism, Olscamp says: " 'the naval battle which did not take place' is not a definite description!" (p. 117). I disagree. Suppose a TV news announcer was reporting that a predicted sea battle say, between Arab and Israeli naval forces in the Gulf of Aqaba, with such and such ships and weapons, did not take place. He might well say, "The sea battle which did not occur would have involved ship-to-ship nuclear missiles." How would one symbolize "The sea battle which did not occur" other than as (ix)  $(\phi x)$ ? It does not fail to be a definite description; rather, "E! (ix)  $(\phi x)$ " fails to be true in this case.

With the dialectical form Cornman and Lehrer occasionally have to strain to incorporate all of the points they regard as important. For example, in the chapter on free will and determinism Sartre's point that whether a man finds something a reason to act might depend entirely on choice occurs under the heading of incompatibilism but at the top of a passage (p. 211 ff.) arguing for determinism! A careless student could easily get the impression that Sartre was a determinist. But perhaps the worst passage in either book occurs in Olscamp's, as a result of spreading himself too thin and covering too many subjects. In chapter eight on political philoso-

phy he badly mistreats Marxism by limiting himself to the formalization and discussion of an argument from *The Communist Manifesto*. He claims that the four points of Marx's argument about class struggle (p. 302) are "supportable" only if (a) determinism is true, (b) the economic interpretation of history is the only viable interpretation, (c) dialectical materialism is sound and (d) the class struggle is not limitable. "Supportable" is vague and it seems to me that none of the four presuppositions are logically necessary to the argument. Nor does Olscamp point out that proving them false would still not falsify the points in the argument. He attributes to Marx "the view . . . that man is politically concerned only to the extent of his own desires for self-enrichment" and adds that "anyone who believes that Churchill and England fought against Hitler's Germany for *purely* economic reasons simply has not read the history of World War II." (p. 304). He offers as examples of a class "surrendering its power 'without a bloody class struggle'" the Jacksonian era and the acceptance of the income tax by capitalists in the United States. He claims that, for Marx, only if the distribution of wealth were equalized, would the antagonism between capitalists and proletarians be overcome. Olscamp then objects that the manner of distribution is more important: it is not the case that everyone needs the same amount of wealth, but rather enough to satisfy his needs. But these examples are laughably un-Marxist and Marx maintained no such principle. In fact, in *The Critique of the Gotha Program* he explicitly asserts what Olscamp brings as an objection to him: the principle that a communist society would embody, "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." Anyone who makes statements like the above is obviously doing a hatchet job on a straw Marx. But this is the nadir of an otherwise excellent book and is mercifully quite brief.

Each text is equipped with a set of exer-

cises for each chapter. Cornman and Lehrer's exercises are consistently good discussion questions; Olscamp's are uneven, ranging from very easy expository, through moderately difficult, creative, or applicative, to occasionally inane or even misformulated (*e.g.*, p. 71 Q. 18). So care must be taken in assigning them.

In conclusion I should like to deal with the uses of these texts. Neither of them is a "Little Golden Book of Philosophy," philosophy made simple. Both contain pages of text practically every sentence of which is either a premise or a conclusion of an argument, with distinctions approaching in subtlety the writings of G. E. Moore, almost a new scholasticism. Professional philosophers can read these texts with profit and it may take even such skilled readers two or three readings of a section to grasp and evaluate the whole course of the argument. I teach at a large, rural state college in Pennsylvania. My students are intelligent, but I would say that either of these texts is too difficult for use in my introductory courses. If I were to use them there I would have to spend too much of my time asking recitation questions, making sure the students understood the text, and re-explaining it. They might be appropriate for introductory courses at "elite" institutions, and I find them useful in advanced electives for majors; courses such as "philosophical analysis" or "current problems in philosophy."

— Robert Cogan

WILLIAM H. BRUENING, ED. *Self, Society, and the Search for Transcendence*. Palo Alto, CA: National Press Books, 1974, pp. xi + 436 (double column), \$10.50 hardbound, \$6.95 paperbound. LC 73-93340; ISBN 0-87484-285-9 (paper), 0-87484-286-7 (hard). Distributed by Mayfield Publishing, Palo Alto, CA.

Most of the introductory texts in philosophy published in recent years are struc-

tured around readings; and this is probably desirable. According to William H. Bruening, of Purdue University, however, the readings in some of these texts are philosophical without being relevant, while those in others, although commendably relevant, are not philosophical. Bruening observes, with reference to his own text, that it avoids both Scylla and Charybdis, for its selections not only are seriously philosophical; they are also timely and relevant.

By and large, he is right, in two senses. 1) *Some* of the authors from whose writings he prints extracts bear impeccable philosophical credentials. Among these are Descartes, Kierkegaard, Marx, Mill, Dewey, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Sartre, Suzuki, Tillich, Marcuse, Norman Malcolm, Judith Thomson, Richard Wasserstrom, and Huston Smith. *Others* bear an unimpeachable badge of relevance. In this category are Albert Camus, Erich Fromm, Martin Luther King, Jr., James Michener, Theodore Roszak, and Alvin Toffler. Since some are unquestionably philosophical, and others are unquestionably relevant, the straits are in that sense navigated without disaster. 2) Ideally, however, each individual candidate for inclusion in Bruening's collection should be *both* philosophical *and* relevant. Some of the selections in fact meet this qualification to a high degree. Thus, many of the selections which are primarily relevant are also philosophical; indeed, it could well be argued that all of them are. But the primarily philosophical selections are not invariably relevant, if by "relevant" is meant: clear, down-to-earth, and revelatory vis-à-vis either the problem of how to live (cope) in contemporary society or how to orient oneself toward the general features of experience and reality, of truth, beauty, and goodness.

Take, for example, with regard to the latter complaint (that the philosophical items are not all relevant), the selection from Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* on Bruening's pp. 47 ff. It includes, in the first paragraph, the following passage,