Fripp draws several parallels between religion and science in order to highlight how they might cooperate. He asserts that "an age when mass and energy are equivalent gives significant scope for wonder. That includes rediscovering something of the wonder of religion" (185). He notes that the debate about dark matter sounds like the search for heaven (187), and that aspects of quantum mechanics support the concept of free will (188). He sees the physicists' notion that certain laws pertain to all space and time as a derivative of the concept of one omnipotent God. He views God's omnipresence as parallel to "the cosmological principle, which states that the universe is the same everywhere and has no center" (189).

All of these points lead to Fripp's plea for the reader to act:

> If we are to heal the biosphere of which we are a part, the human species must pool its resources. Together, religion and science have much to offer. The patient in our care needs treatment, as much by our right spirit as by the healing touch of human technology (190).

This point of cooperation is the central theme and purpose of the book. For Fripp, the world is in such a state that science can no longer be pitted against religion, and debates about creation or evolution are wholly misguided. The human race must unite its greatest thinkers in order to heal the damage we have inflicted upon the world.

This book is a combination of scientific overview with a few sermonic flurries. It is indeed educative and, in some places, quite inspiring. The book seems to be deliberately presented in a format easy to read and is more appropriate for a nightstand than a classroom. However, *Let There Be Life* does raise a significant question about how science and religion should cooperate in order to heal the world. Most notably, by creating a new Genesis text, Fripp prompts the reader to consider the extent to which religion has its own voice in modern debates. If religious texts need to be rewritten for modern audiences, will they not lose something of their character? Can the "spirit and sense" of Genesis be communicated in a manuscript that reads more like a science textbook than a biblical pericope? Is not something always lost in translation? At issue here is whether one sacrifices Genesis 1 in order to bring its message in part to people who have long dismissed it, or whether one sacrifices a larger audience in order to bring the full message of Genesis to modern discussions.

Perhaps, in the end, there is another option that Fripp had in mind. Many biblical scholars today speak of Genesis 1 as an addition to the earlier creation account of chapter 2 ff. This addition, thought to be penned by the priestly writer in the sixth century, was composed as an introduction to the older creation account. Genesis 1 intends to highlight significant theological points for a people confounded by the experience of devastation and exile who are struggling to make sense of their new situation. Perhaps Fripp is doing nothing more in *Let There Be Life* than what the priestly writer did for his audience. Perhaps Fripp's biggest contribution is that he provides an introduction and window into Genesis for readers living in a world dominated by science.

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Kreeft, Peter. *Three Approaches to Abortion: A Thoughtful and Compassionate Guide to Today's Most Controversial Issue.* San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002. 134 pp.

Of the possible solutions that can be applied to the abortion issue, using reason to thoughtfully and compassionately convince one side that it is wrong is the hope of Dr. Peter Kreeft in this work. As the title indicates, the book has a threefold division: The Apple Argument against Abortion, Why We Fight: A Pro-Life Motivational Map, and A Typical Pro-Life/Pro-Choice Dialogue.

Cutting through the haze of this allegedly "difficult" and "complex" issue, the author goes to the heart of the matter in part I by establishing the crucial question: what is the unborn? Kreeft methodically proceeds through fifteen steps to argue for the pro-life conclusion, with the takeoff point for the argument being the self-evident truth that as human beings we really know what an apple really is. The one objection to this rather obvious premise is a universal skepticism, and Kreeft does a fine job of highlighting its self-refuting nature. Hence, once this obvious starting point is admitted, Kreeft argues that because we know what apples are, we can know what things are, and thus we can know what human beings are.

Kreeft's next insights are quite pertinent: morality is grounded in the being of things. Things have rights because of *what they are*; parents have parental rights because they *are* parents; the handicapped have rights because they *are* handicapped, and human beings have rights because they *are* human. This is what the author calls the "Three-R Principle: Right Response to Reality"(21). If morality and rights are not based on being, then the only alternative is rights based on power. Either human beings have rights because of their being human, or they have rights simply because someone else grants them. Legal positivism asserts the latter and provides an insubstantial foundation for human value, for whoever grants rights can also revoke them. Founding rights based merely upon human will is a dangerous option indeed, and Kreeft convincingly reduces this alternative to absurdity.

At the pinnacle of the argument, Kreeft corrects the misuse of the distinction between human beings and persons by noting that personhood language has been notoriously used in the past to sequester one group of human beings from the protection accorded to others. His pro-life position is summarized with three premises: the life of all animal species begins at conception, all humans have an inherent and inalienable right to life, and the law must protect the most basic human rights. These scientific, moral, and legal premises establish the pro-life case. To be pro-choice one must deny the three premises, a denial that Kreeft maintains betrays scientific, moral, or legal ignorance.

An interlocutor wishing to avoid this conclusion may reject that we know what the unborn is and project this ignorance on all parties; e.g., since no one knows with certainty when human life begins, abortion should not be restricted. Kreeft anticipates this objection and his rejoinder succeeds; even if the objection were true and we pretend we do not know the essence of the unborn (or what an apple is for that matter), unknowability is not an argument *for* abortion, it is an argument *against* it. Only knowledge can morally justify abortion, to kill what *might* be a human, is, in every other instance, criminal negligence.

In part II, Kreeft lists fifteen motivations for being pro-life and discusses issues such as honesty, the meaning of life, moral obligation, civilization, etc. There are a few instances where Kreeft's objective of being "compassionate" may be questioned (such as referring to pro-choice candidates as "little Hitlers" (56), but for the most part Kreeft is enlightening here. He skillfully articulates in motivating fashion what many in the pro-life movement intuitively accept in less polished form. Reading Kreeft's elucidation will help solidify one's own pro-life impetus, and hence, has the additional power to breathe new life into such a previously acknowledged understanding.

Reading like a Platonic dialogue, the discussion in the fictional discourse of part III encompasses a broad range of issues pertinent to the debate. Kreeft is fair in his representation of the opposition, providing better-stated pro-choice arguments than often delivered by abortion advocates. In typical Socratic fashion, Kreeft portrays how pro-life and pro-choice argumentation play out in a "real life" dialogue between opposing views with the dynamic give-and-take of intellectual exchange, and thus makes available a useful "case study" for effectively presenting the pro-life view in the public square.

Overall, Kreeft's work would be more persuasive if it elaborated on a couple of points. First, there is no *argument* for the

humanity of the unborn but only an *assertion*. Science is alluded to in a couple of places, but although we are given arguments that we can know essences, we do not get from Kreeft explicit argumentation for the humanity of the unborn. Granted that we can know essences, what reasons are there for recognizing the essence of the unborn as human? This is such a crucial point that its omission seems remiss. Secondly, the more common "what if" pro-choice arguments were not addressed. In spite of the clarity of Kreeft's case, one ought not to assume that the layman can connect the dots between Kreeft's points and an abortion advocate's appeals to the "back alley coat-hanger" abortion, rape, or life-of-the-mother arguments, etc. It would have been an improvement for the author to direct his precision and clarity also towards these more popular objections and connect them with his broader case.

Once these oversights are corrected by supplementation (and they easily can be), Kreeft's philosophy is convincing in what it does address. We are given credible and clear-cut reasoning into a host of relevant topics regarding the abortion debate. Kreeft's book is a great gift to the pro-life apologetics community; seeing how the pro-life position can effectively interact with opposing views greatly assists the pro-life advocate in spreading the Gospel of Life within the secular marketplace of ideas.

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Lavastida, José I. ***Health Care and the Common Good: A Catholic Theory of Justice.*** **Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 2000. 358 pp. Bibliography.**

In the great trial scene of *A Man for All Seasons*, Cromwell accuses Thomas More of twisting the law to avoid exposure in its light. More replies: "The law is not a 'light' for you or any man to see by; the law is not an instrument of any kind. The law is a causeway upon which, so long as he keeps to it, a citizen may walk safely."

Like Cromwell, even benevolent social theorists are tempted to think of the law as an instrument, a device for getting desirable things done. While legislation may be such a device (e.g., Congress decides to spend one million dollars fixing a monument), the law—*ius* or *nomos*, as opposed to *lex*—is greater than and prior to it. Thus we call people *lawless*, not when they lack legislation, but when they act without regard for any order of justice. Likewise, tyranny is *lawless*, not for want of edicts, but for want of lawful or just order. To say the law, *ius*, is a "causeway" is to emphasize its role as a stable, intelligible, and impartial order in which we are at liberty to pursue our own goals. Without the law there is no freedom, as we are liable to be shanghaied by the first stronger man who comes along.

It bears repeating that the instrumentalist outlook on law tempts and corrupts not only the wicked, but the good. In J.I. Lavastida's *Health Care and the Common Good*, we have an instance of capitulation to just such a temptation. Lavastida clearly has good intentions: he wants people to enjoy the benefits of modern medicine, and he does not want poverty to hinder health. His precise argument, however, is that U.S. medical costs and disparities in "access" are such that justice demands the establishment of "a national health service providing insurance for all Americans under a single-payer system" (307). This monopoly, as envisioned by Lavastida, need not be an arm of government (284), but would have to enjoy fiscal and regulatory powers sufficient to fix the quality and quantity of medical resources