

## **Discussion**

### **Pro and Con Discussion Regarding the Tenets of the Hermeneutic Philosophy of Science**

Since the late 1960s studies in the hermeneutic philosophy of science have been gaining currency. In looking at this development from a historical perspective, one can today recognize an independent philosophical tradition. Scientific research is committed to the universe of interpretative phenomena – so the tradition's guiding tenet goes – since it is itself a hermeneutic process. To put it in an extended formulation, those phenomena which philosophical hermeneutics unveils in the being of history, language, and art can also be identified in natural science as a particular mode of being-in-the-world. This is a radical claim that provokes a double confrontation. On the one hand, the hermeneutic philosophy of science opposes the mainstream philosophical picture of science which is spelled out predominantly in terms of objectivism, epistemological representationalism, and cognitive essentialism. On the other hand, a conflict with traditional philosophical hermeneutics is inevitable. On this traditional

enterprise, a constitutive view of interpretation might be integrated into a theory of scientific communication, but by no means into a theory of scientific research and knowledge. Due to this double confrontation, the hermeneutic philosophy of science brings into play several interesting debates of general philosophical importance. This tradition is a target of criticism from positions as different as neo-scholastic ontology and neo-positivist epistemology. The publication of Professor Arvin Voss's article documents our desire to initiate on the pages of the *Balkan Journal of Philosophy* an ongoing pro and contra discussion regarding the tenets of the hermeneutic philosophy of science. To be sure, Professor Voss's elegant criticism of the hermeneutic view about the status of science's theoretical objects as well as his rehabilitation of essentialism concerning the constitution of scientific knowledge will meet a counter-criticism devised by the exponents of an interpretative turn in the philosophy of science.

## **ON THE STATUS OF THEORETICAL OBJECTS IN SCIENCE ACCORDING TO COGNITIVE EXISTENTIALISM**

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In recent work Prof. Dimitri Ginev has been developing a view of the nature of science which he calls "Cognitive Existentialism." These subtle and detailed analyses call for much more extensive comment than I could possibly make here. Accordingly, I am going to limit myself to examining a single, fundamental issue: the status of theoretical

objects in science. As Ginev states, the "doctrine about the status of science's theoretical objects constitutes the kernel of cognitive existentialism" (Ginev 2009, 382). Again, he elsewhere states that his goal is to describe "the 'immanent transcendence' of science's theoretical objects" (Ginev 2006, pp. 124–131). Both the immanence and the transcendence of