ON THE UNITY OF INTELLIGIBILITY IN HEIDEGGER

AGAINST DISTINGUISHING THE PRACTICAL AND THE DISCURSIVE

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In his recent book on *Being and Time*, Taylor Carman claims that Heidegger differentiates between a practical and a discursive intelligibility.[1] These two different intelligibilities, Carman argues, are identified by the fact that there are two different dimensions to the normative structure of significance: a normativity that governs practical activity and a normativity that governs our expressive-communicative activity (235). In highlighting a second dimension to intelligibility, Carman criticizes the pragmatist reading of Heidegger for what ought to be seen as one of its more striking limitations, namely, an overemphasis on Heidegger's treatment of Dasein's dealings with equipment. In this regard, Carman's gesture of paying more attention to what Heidegger says about interpretation and discourse is welcome, but I will argue that the claim that there are two types of intelligibility in *Being and Time* is implausible, as is the reading of interpretation and discourse on which it is based. By positing a second kind of intelligibility to supplement the first, Carman retains the narrow and restricted view of the practical that characterizes the pragmatist reading, and thus preserves the mistaken view that the practical is essentially non-discursive in Heidegger. It can be concluded, then, that Carman's attempt to correct for the pragmatist neglect of disclosedness does not go far enough, and the characterization of interpretation and discourse in terms of practices misses what is most central to Heidegger's notion of disclosedness, namely the fact that the world is always already illuminated for us as a space of meaning.[2]

I

In explaining why he thinks that there are two types of intelligibility in *Being and Time*, Carman maintains that there are two types of norms that govern our activity. The general idea in linking intelligibility to norms is that one's actions are intelligible or can be made sense of in relation to these norms. The first dimension of normativity is practical. Our practices are governed by norms which lay out what one ought to do if one wants to accomplish certain pragmatic ends (215). Obviously, the content of these norms will vary with the practices involved, but those variations do not affect the overall form of the normativity here. The second dimension of intelligibility has to do with a second normativity, which is concerned with norms that govern how we express ourselves about those practices or about what we do. For Carman, this second set of norms pertains to how we express our understanding of the practically intelligible. They govern "*how* things are to be made properly manifest or explicit" (215) and "how to comport oneself so as to highlight salient aspects of those practices" (215). The idea here is that when I express myself, I am understood insofar as I conform to the norms governing some sort of communicative expression. On this view, discourse is the locus of these norms. So, to summarize Carman's position, we are justified in distinguishing between a practical and a discursive intelligibility because we can distinguish between a practical and a discursive normativity associated with nondiscursive and discursive practices, respectively. Practical normativity is concerned with the intelligibility of what we do, while discursive normativity has to do with the intelligibility of what we say or otherwise express about what we do.[3]

The claim that there are two types of normativities and practices is itself based on the way Carman interprets the difference between understanding and interpretation. For Carman, understanding is a practical "knowing how" to be contrasted with a "knowing that" (207). On this

reading, then, understanding is an understanding of practical intelligibility. It is the understanding of equipmental contexts and the norms governing our dealings in them that allow us to accomplish our practical ends.[4] Since Heidegger characterizes interpretation as a development of understanding and a making explicit of what the understanding understands, Carman holds that interpretation must be a kind of "showing how" (210), an expression of the know-how of understanding.[5] Thus, interpretation is a kind of demonstrative practice.

One might think that if interpretation consists in demonstrating what the understanding understands, then interpretation might occur in practical comportment itself, i.e., in circumspective concern. Though Carman initially sounds sympathetic to this idea, it becomes clear that he believes that interpretation involves a different kind of expressiveness. In particular, it must involve bodily postures and facial expressions that communicate one's attitude to others (211–12, 215).[6] In making this claim Carman rejects the idea that performing an action demonstrates or makes explicit the understanding. Such acts might express understanding in some sense, but they cannot properly be construed as interpretation because they are not expressive acts undertaken with the goal of communicating anything. They do not feature as acts within a demonstrative communicative practice governed by discursive norms. This move is crucial for Carman's goal of establishing that expressive acts are governed by a different set of norms than those that govern practical actions. By insisting upon reading interpretation this way, Carman distinguishes his account of interpretation and discourse from more pragmatist readings that hold that interpretation occurs in practical comportment itself.[7]

This view of interpretation is doubtful, but Carman is committed to it because of how he reads Heidegger's notion of discourse. He introduces his interpretation, which we'll call the expressive-communicative model, as an alternative to the linguistic and pragmatic models of discourse (220–32). The linguistic model interprets discourse more or less as language, and Carman objects to it on the grounds that Heidegger clearly distinguishes these when he claims that language is founded on discourse.[8] The pragmatic model attempts to avoid this confusion by divorcing "the concept [of discourse] from anything even remotely resembling grammatical or illocutionary structure" (227), and reduces it to a sort of differentiating between things in practical comportment.[9] Thus, the pragmatist model commits the same mistake with discourse that it did with interpretation; it doesn't sufficiently distinguish between the knowing how of understanding and the showing how which expressing that know how must involve. In other words, the pragmatist view neglects the 'expressive-communicative' dimension of discourse that Heidegger highlights when he refers to discourse in terms of a kind of communicative interaction (228f.). In order to preserve this feature without going so far as to reduce discourse to language, Carman proposes the expressive-communicative model of discourse. If interpretation is based on discourse, then discourse must involve the norms governing interpretive practice, and since interpretation on Carman's view involves expression that takes the form of bodily and facial gestures and movements, discourse will turn out to consist in the norms that govern such expression. He writes that we need to "know how to respond to and deal with appropriate and meaningful interpretive gestures themselves appropriately and meaningfully" (235). That is, we have to be familiar with the norms governing interpretation so that we can read expressions and express ourselves. Since these expressions amount to the showing how of the know how of understanding, the norms for that showing are norms for "mak[ing] manifest the purposive structure of intelligibility" in our "interpretative expressions and gestures" (235). Discourse gives us these norms.

This reading of discourse also strikes me as doubtful, but here we can see that Carman's commitment to locating discourse between the space of language on the one hand and the space of practical comportment on the other is related to his claim that interpretation consists in bodily gestures and facial expressions. If Carman construed interpretation as something performed in the doing of an act itself, his view would not dif-

fer from the pragmatist account that he rejects. Thus, he must read the 'expression of understanding' that interpretation entails in a stronger, narrower sense to refer to expressive acts. These acts Carman identifies as discursive, unlike the acts of practical comportment that they accompany. Thus, his rejection of the pragmatist account of both interpretation and discourse not only influences the development of the expressive-communicative model, but is importantly connected to his claims about the need to distinguish between a practical and a discursive intelligibility.

II

There are a number of problems with Carman's account. He is right that interpretation must be discursive because discourse underlies interpretation for Heidegger (SZ 161), but it is not clear why interpretation must involve discursive acts of the sort Carman describes. Heidegger never suggests that interpretation concerns facial expressions or bodily gestures that aim at communicating something to someone else. Instead he indicates that interpretation occurs in circumspection. Heidegger writes: "In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we 'see' it *as* a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge" (SZ 149). This passage is typical. I interpret something when I take it as something, and I do that in my practical engagement with it. Heidegger never suggests that the taking as of interpretation pertains to expressing my attitudes about things, nor does he suggest that discourse has to do with norms for acts so described.

Since I think that interpretation does occur in circumspection, it might be thought that I support the pragmatist, but I do not for reasons that I will explain shortly. But it is worth pointing out another difficulty with Carman's view. If we accept his claim that interpretation is a demonstrative practice involving expressive-communicative acts, then a second puzzle arises. Why should we think that the normativity of discursive practice is different from that of nondiscursive practices? On Carman's view discursive practices must be governed by a different kind of normativity than practical comportment. This is what justifies making the distinction between two kinds of intelligibility in the first place. Clearly there are norms governing how we can express ourselves about what we do, but it is not clear why these norms are different in kind than the practical norms that govern practical comportment. In discursive practice I have a pragmatic end, namely to communicate something, and I have to follow the norms that govern that activity in order to accomplish that end, and my behavior is intelligible in relation to those norms.[10] It is not obvious why we need to distinguish discursive practice from other practices.[11] It might be argued that discursive practice is a different practice from a practice like woodworking, but this will not do because on Carman's account a wide range of different practices are governed by practical normativity. So difference alone is not sufficient to establish difference in kind. This particular difficulty suggests that the term "practices," though perhaps appropriate for characterizing Dasein's dealings with the ready-to-hand, may be of limited use in helping us make sense of Heidegger's account of disclosedness.

The problem here lies in the attempt to distinguish the practical and the discursive, which results from a failure to see that for Heidegger so-called 'practical comportment' is always already discursive. This is a difficulty that is typical of the pragmatist interpretation of Heidegger as well. Carman realizes that discursivity is part of Being-in-the-world and tries to correct for the limitations of the pragmatist view by offering an analysis of it. But he offers an "additive" account in which practical comportment taken alone is not discursive but must be supplemented by a layer of discursivity. Thus, both Carman and the pragmatist share a view of the practical which is too thin, thinner than Heidegger means it to be.

The pragmatist along with Carman mistakes the sequential ordering of topics in Heidegger's argument for a logical ordering. They seem to conclude erroneously from the fact that Heidegger discusses practical comportment first in his analysis that it represents a more basic phenomenon to which the further phenomenon of disclosedness, along with discourse, is added.

But this is incorrect. Disclosedness is the more primordial phenomenon. Without it, dealings with the ready-to-hand would not be possible. The structure of Heidegger's argument is to begin with the phenomenon that is most immediately accessible, and then to move to what underlies those dealings and makes them possible, namely a prior disclosedness. This prior disclosedness is necessary if I am to understand the totality of significations that I must negotiate in my comportment.

Encountering anything ready-to-hand requires that it be freed for its involvement. Heidegger's account of what this means and how precisely it occurs is actually rather detailed, but for our purposes it suffices to say that something ready-to-hand is freed for its involvement when it is disclosed in relation to its "reference" or *Verweisung* (SZ 83–84).[12] Heidegger says that all equipment has a reference, a way in which it is assigned or referred to other bits of equipment or other components of the equipmental context. When I understand something's reference, I am directed to these other components. Further analysis reveals that references are not limited to equipment in the strict sense, but include all of the components of the equipmental context such as the work to be accomplished, the larger objective to be achieved in doing it, the material to be used, the people for whom the work is being done, and so on. Heidegger's point is that equipment is never encountered in isolation, but exists in relation to other things and is situated in a particular web of relations within which it has its proper place. Thus its reference exists within and is understood with respect to a totality of references (*Verweisungs zusammenhang*). Obviously, one must have a certain competence with respect to the equipmental context and a totality of references to be able to do anything. No one who discusses practical comportment would deny this. For Carman and for the pragmatist, however, the understanding of the equipmental context and of how to work within it is a practical know-how involving no discursivity. This is the claim that I dispute. Dealings with the ready-to-hand depend upon discursive intelligibility because such dealings depend upon negotiating the totality of references. But the totality of references is a totality of significations, which is in turn articulated by discourse. Thus, when I engage in practical comportment, I am already expressing an understanding, not just of practical intelligibility, but of the discursive articulation of my situation.

It is at this juncture that we can begin to see what is at stake in how one interprets interpretation and discourse and why Carman's rather idiosyncratic reading misses the mark. Carman's view of discourse as consisting in the norms for expressing or interpreting practical intelligibility makes discourse extrinsic to the intelligibility of what we do. But on my view, this intelligibility is always already discursive. To see how this is so, the connection between reference, signification, and discourse must be clarified. Heidegger explicitly links the concept of reference to that of signification. References establish relations between one thing and another which involve directing the attention to something. In *Being and Time* he says that the relational character of these references is one of signification.[13] In the text Heidegger hyphenates the term *be-deuten*, suggesting that *verweisen* is related to *bedeuten* through *deuten*," the most relevant sense of which here seems to be to indicate. So, a reference indicates what it points to or directs one to, and in this regard could be said to signify it.[14]

A reference exists within a totality of references (*Verweisungszusammenhang*) and is discoverable on the basis of an understanding of this totality. But this totality of references isn't just a sum of references; it is an ordered whole in which each component refers to the others in a structured web of relations. The world is this structured whole. If references signify, then we can consider the totality of references to be a totality of significations, and the structure of the world to be the structure of these significations (SZ 87). But this structure has an order, a sense, and we can say that *verweisen* means *bedeuten* because the overall order of references constitutes a sense in terms of which it becomes possible for any particular thing to have the reference it has and thus to signify.

The totality of significations is itself articulated by discourse. Heidegger is clear on this

point: "The intelligibility of something has always been articulated, even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it. Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called 'meaning.' That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the 'totality-of-significations.' This can be dissolved or broken up into significations" (SZ 161). So, discourse articulates the totality of significations, and that totality can be further broken up into individual significations, which are related, as we have seen, to references. The passage also tells us that the articulation performed by interpretation is possible on the basis of the prior articulation of the whole totality of significations effected by discourse. This shows that the intelligibility of practical comportment is not separable from the intelligibility of discourse because the dealings that make up practical comportment express a familiarity with a totality of significations articulated by discourse. The articulation performed by discourse does not come after practical comportment, it is a condition of it. The engagement with things demonstrated in circumspection is based on a prior discursive articulation of the totality of significations. Nothing in Heidegger's discussion suggests that the articulation of intelligibility effected by discourse results in a second intelligibility. Indeed, it seems as though practical comportment is the interpretive expression of discursive intelligibility.[15] That is, I show how I have understood the discursive articulation of my situation, i.e., that I grasp discursive intelligibility, by doing something.

Recall that Carman is led to distinguish between practical and discursive intelligibility in the first place because of his reading of Heidegger's notion of interpretation, which is in turn related to his expressive-communicative model of discourse. For Carman, discourse provides the norms for discursive acts which are essentially interpretive acts. So discourse stipulates which expressions or gestures are appropriate to express some attitude in a certain context, and interpretations articulate by way of expressing these attitudes. But why should we think that articulation has to do with expression in this sense? My suggestion is that discourse articulates by parsing intelligibility into meaningful bits, thereby making it possible for interpretation to carve out one of those bits. If interpretation carves at the joint, discourse identifies where the joints are.[16] This is what I think Heidegger means when he says that the totality of significations is articulated by discourse, and then further broken up into significations. Carman would claim that the passages I cite support the pragmatic model,[17] but in fact I think they support a modified version of the linguistic model. Discourse should be understood as the logos that produces conceptual frameworks by identifying where the "joints" of intelligibility are such that interpretation can carve out and make explicit a meaningful bit. Carman is right that Heidegger distinguishes discourse from language, but we need to keep in mind Heidegger's point in saying this. He wants to insist that language follows meaning and not the other way around. The point is that meaning is existentially grounded. This is what I think he means when he says that "to significations, words accrue" and that "language is a totality of words" (SZ 161). Thus, I think that when Heidegger talks about language being founded on discourse, he is talking about natural languages, and this leaves open the possibility that discourse refers to language in the sense of some sort of logical/conceptual framework in the way that philosophers of language sometimes speak of it. Heidegger's account of discourse could then be understood by way of an analogy with language, if not as reducible to any particular language.[18]

Discourse for Heidegger is basically logos. It is about carving up overall intelligibility into categories of signification (SZ 165). If Heidegger discusses discourse in terms of communicative interaction in section 34, it is because the "joints" of intelligibility get worked out in this kind of discursive exchange. Heidegger's point is once again to emphasize the existential ground of logos in contrast to the tradition's view of logos as assertion, which he discusses and critiques in

section 33. Although he eschews the categories such as we have inherited them from a tradition that understands being as presence-at-hand, Heidegger does not in *Being and Time* reject the idea that phenomenological ontology might uncover categories. Indeed, he thinks that "the doctrine of significations is rooted in the ontology of Dasein" (SZ 166). Discourse provides us with these categories, which is why Heidegger says that "the task of *liberating* grammar from logic requires *beforehand* a *positive* understanding of the basic *a priori* structure of discourse in general as an *existential*" (SZ 165), and why he thinks that "whether [the doctrine of signification] prospers or decays depends upon the fate of this ontology" (SZ 166).

There is no warrant to think that there are two kinds of intelligibility in Heidegger's text. Carman is right to reject the pragmatist view for having a too-restricted view of the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world, but this problem cannot be corrected by the sort of additive account that Carman offers because this approach forces a false distinction between the intelligibility of what we do and the intelligibility of what we say or express about what we do. The suggestion is inconsistent with the holism that Heidegger emphasizes in his discussion of Being-in-the-world. Furthermore, it seems to involve a misunderstanding of Heidegger's notion of disclosedness. Disclosedness refers to the phenomenon of the world's being intelligible, its being "lit up," "cleared," or meaningfully illuminated. Discourse, along with *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen*, is a mode of disclosedness and contributes to the Being-in of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. To talk of discourse as a set of norms governing interpretation transforms disclosedness into a practice comprised of acts of disclosing. This makes disclosure something Dasein does as opposed to something that it is. To think with Heidegger Dasein's Being-in-the-world, one has to engage with this more radical sense of disclosedness and appreciate its bearing on his account of "practical comportment."

NOTES

1. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1960); *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). Page references will be to the German pagination and cited as SZ. Taylor Carman, *Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in "Being and Time"* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 205–07, 215.
2. I am influenced in this choice of words by the work of Steven Crowell. See Steven Galt Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001).
3. "There are norms not just for *doing* . . . but also for *showing* and *saying*, and I believe Heidegger wants to insist that the latter cannot be reduced to the former" (Carman, *Heidegger's Analytic*, 235).
4. Understanding in Heidegger does not, in fact, primarily have to do with knowing how to do something (e.g. how to use a hammer or build a birdhouse). It has to do with knowing how to be. Heidegger is clear that understanding is disclosive of Dasein's Being-in-the-world (SZ 143–44). Thus, the characterization of understanding as a "knowing how" tends to restrict its scope to circumspection. This distorts Heidegger's position in a way that favors the pragmatist reading.
5. "If understanding in Heidegger's sense consists in knowing how, then interpretation—the explicitation of that understanding—must consist in manifesting, demonstrating, or *showing* the *how* that we know in understanding. If understanding is *knowing how*, interpretation must be a kind of *showing how*" (Carman, *Heidegger's Analytic*, 210).
6. "Thus, bodily postures and facial expressions are expressions in the wide sense since they show and convey something intelligible about us, our attitudes, and the situations we find ourselves in. Indeed, what facial expressions typically exhibit or demonstrate is something we already have some prior understanding of, or else something already manifest in our disposedness. Thus they afford an almost ideal example of what I think Heidegger has in mind when he defines 'interpretation' as the 'development' or 'cul-

tivation' (*Ausbildung*) of understanding (SZ 148) as the 'working-out (*Ausarbeiten*) and appropriation (*Zueignen*) of an understanding' (SZ 231). When I shrug my shoulders or wrinkle my nose, I make my attitude manifest and intelligible to anyone who sees my reaction, provided of course that we share the same general background understanding of the situation to begin with. Bodily postures and facial expressions are primitive instances of the elaboration and appropriation of understanding in overt demonstrative form, for they point up something understood *as* so understood" (Carman, *Heidegger's Analytic*, 212). I think Carman takes this position in order to preserve the idea that there are acts governed by discursive norms that are nonlinguistic so as to remain consistent with Heidegger's claim that discourse is not language. But I think that in claiming that these gestures are what interpretation amounts to in Heidegger, he leaves Heidegger behind. Carman claims that such acts are expressive of what essentially are our attitudes, and it is in this way that they make explicit our understanding. Heidegger gives us no reason to believe that this is what he has in mind by interpretation.

7. The dominant pragmatist reading that Carman has in mind is Hubert Dreyfus's influential book, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
8. In discussing the linguistic model, Carman focuses on Charles Guignon's claim, developed in *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), that Heidegger holds to a constitutive as opposed to instrumental view of language. The passages that Carman cites in favor of the claim that discourse founds language seem decisive in supporting his point that world is disclosed through discourse not language, yet it might be argued that the quibble with Guignon is partially terminological. That is, it might be argued that what really constitutes world in Heidegger is meaning, which is what discourse articulates, and this could be what Guignon means by the "constitutive view of language."
9. The notion that discourse involves some sort of differentiation seems right, but the characterization of it as a sort of comportment, I think, is particularly misleading because discourse has the effect of differentiating entities toward which one then comports. The differentiation is in some sense a condition of the comportment, if only a background one.
10. This point, I think, raises another. Carman's position seems to be that a behavior is intelligible in relation to norms. It seems very fashionable these days to impose the language of norms and normativity on Heidegger, but I think it is worth noting that Heidegger simply doesn't use this language. The intelligibility of an equipmental context has to do with the disclosedness of the totality of significations and involvements that structure it. Some of these significations and involvements may adhere to norms and some may not, but it's not clear that the ones that don't are always unintelligible. For Heidegger something is intelligible in relation to how it fits in with its context. For instance, rolls of brown paper towels are for drying one's hands, and one typically finds them in restrooms. Their location in these settings and how they are used there is governed by a norm. But in my classroom, I use a roll of these towels to prop open the window on warm days because it won't stay open unless it is propped, and I have nothing else ready to hand to use for this purpose. The use of the paper towel roll here doesn't seem to be governed by a norm, but it is nonetheless intelligible because of its involvement with the other features of the equipmental context.
11. I think Heidegger would resist distinguishing linguistic or discursive practices from practical ones for the same reason that he resists distinguishing signs from the ready-to-hand. Signs are just a particular kind of equipment. The particular thrust of Heidegger's discussion of signs is to dispel the idea that signs are uniquely meaningful and signify while other things don't. The entire discussion of *Verweisung* in Heidegger is aimed at showing that there is a much wider conception of signification and that signs are to be understood within that context. Along the same lines, I would suggest that Heidegger would see little reason to separate off discursive practices from other practices. Interestingly, Carman sees Heidegger's discussion of signs as indicating the opposite point.
12. Reference expresses a sort of relation between two things such that the presentation of one leads one to the other. Among the uses of *verweisen* listed in the *Duden Stilwörterbuch*, there is one that seems most appropriate here: referring someone to something or someone. An example of the first case would be the way a footnote refers a reader to a source or to an-

other page in the text. An example of the second case would be the way a person is referred to another person if s/he has business that must be addressed by someone else. In both cases, the one who is referred or to whom the reference is given is directed somewhere. References direct.

13. "The relational character which these relationships of assigning possess, we take as one of *signifying*" (SZ 87). "Den Bezugscharakter dieser Bezüge des Verweisens fassen wir als *be-deuten*" (SZ 87). A similar passage may be found in *The History of the Concept of Time*: "The reference which we have in mind as a part of the structure of encounter belonging to world, we shall now more accurately designate as '*to mean*' [*bedeuten*]." Martin Heidegger, *The History of the Concept of Time*, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 210.
14. Heidegger certainly doesn't mean that the first term is a sign for the second in any straightforward sense. After all, the phenomenon described here is supposed to be more general than what is characteristic of signs. But the first term indicates and thus directs one to the second. That to which one is directed is somehow implied by that which does the directing or indicating, and this presumably would allow one to take something as a sign, though that is not required in order for the reference to have this signifying aspect.
15. This is an important difference from the pragmatist account. The pragmatist understands practical intelligibility as non-conceptual in nature, and is able to find discursive intelligibility in practical comportment only to the extent that discourse is understood as non-conceptual, which is not consistent with Heidegger's understanding of discourse. Thus, the pragmatist does not understand practical comportment as dependent on discursive intelligibility as I understand the term, although developing this point is beyond the scope of the present essay.
16. I am influenced in the use of this turn of phrase by both Macquarrie and Robinson's footnote in the English translation (195n1), and Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 215.
17. See Carman, *Heidegger's Analytic*, 209.
18. We would then be able to view Heidegger's various comments about discourse as referring basically to what Saussure had in mind by the distinction between *la langue* and *la parole*, where the former approaches language synchronically as a system, and the latter approaches it diachronically as a practice involving speakers and their communication.

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