

# HUSSERL'S PROTEAN CONCEPT OF AFFECTIVITY

## FROM THE TEXTS TO THE PHENOMENA THEMSELVES

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What does the term "affection" refer to in Husserl? Even a preliminary survey reveals that this notion is multivalent, functioning differently during different periods, within different attitudes, at different levels, and in different spheres of investigation.<sup>1</sup> This makes it quite difficult to offer a definitive historical account of the way Husserl appropriates and exploits the concept, since older notions persist alongside transformed ones. Attempting to produce a coherent systematic account of his diverse uses of the concept can be equally challenging, however, for there are simply too many tensions and ambiguities. In short, there is no easy way to categorize the shifting nuances that emerge as he continually expands its range and enriches its sense. Thus here—as with other phenomenological notions—Husserl's appropriation of a concept does not leave this concept unchanged, for he is describing dimensions and distinctions that the received language simply fails to recognize.

Yet there is a core methodological principle that can help us to find our footing in such a situation: To understand the notion of affectivity in Husserl, one must not only place previous meanings of the term in brackets, but also suspend (or at least defer) the search for a single global definition. Instead, one must give each passage a local reading and determine the sense of the term by turning to the experiential evidence pertaining to the passage in question, so that the evidence (re)defines the term rather than vice versa. This has the advantage, first, of giving us an evidential basis upon which to confirm or correct Husserl's analyses; and second, of presenting us with a range of examples across which we can identify at least two keys to understanding the multifarious meanings of the term: affection is always a moment within a more complex whole<sup>2</sup> (although the role it plays will vary with the type of whole), and it is what may be called a hinge-concept, situated

in between yet joining two other concepts—often traditional pairs that have been conceived as mutually exclusive opposites. A hinge-concept is a very valuable resource for Husserl, since he is committed to honoring experiential evidence, yet frequently brings to light matters that cannot readily be accommodated within the dualistic categories of European philosophy, including, for example, intellect-emotion, subject-object, active-passive, reason-sensibility, and mind-body. In what follows, I will first offer a brief sketch of some of the ways in which Husserl's work on affection alters these received conceptual topologies before demonstrating how his protean notion of affectivity can help us to address a particular register of experience.

The first question is how Husserl comes to use a term associated with "emotion" as a title for a moment in the passive syntheses pertaining to the constitution of the perceptual objects and processes that we experience in the natural objective attitude.<sup>3</sup> In what he later calls "old, still pre-phenomenological manuscripts," probably from around 1893,<sup>4</sup> Husserl refers to the received distinction between two sides of our "mental nature," an intellectual side and an emotional side, and reserves the word "affective" for the emotional side.<sup>5</sup> He nevertheless sees certain parallels between them; for example, we can become immersed in either one, allowing it to play the dominant role while the other recedes, and either can become a habitual disposition.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, they are structured in similar ways: There is something like an "energy of interest" on the intellectual side that is akin to, but not identical with, "pleasure" on the emotional side, and each of these can display various degrees of intensity.<sup>7</sup> Interest is accordingly understood as an energetic tension that presupposes something that "incites" it.<sup>8</sup> This account prefigures the later terminological expansion such that "affection" refers

not only to the realm of what may be called “affective tone”—including more general moods and dispositions as well as specific emotionally-tinged feelings<sup>9</sup>—but also to the realm of what may be termed “sensuous affection,” i.e., the ultimate sensuous moments, the core sensuous contents, within the passive syntheses carried out in objectivating consciousness.<sup>10</sup> However, the contrast between what I am calling “affective tone” and “sensuous affection”—a distinction that Husserl himself later makes by contrasting “*feeling-affection*” with “*objectivating affection*”<sup>11</sup>—does not preclude a further parallel such that in both cases, a particular, temporally individuated “affection” can function as a moment within a larger whole. In the case of “feeling-affection,” what is at stake is the unfolding of a feeling,<sup>12</sup> which in turn may wind up resonating with the affective “atmosphere” that forms the constant background of subjective life and coalescing into the unity of a particular mood,<sup>13</sup> while in the case of “objectivating affection,” it is a matter of sensuous saliences functioning as ultimate moments within the passive syntheses of perceptual objects as objects of cognitive interest. Thus in the latter case, the moment of affection is integrated into a nexus of constitutive performances whose correlate is an abiding transtemporal unity/identity offering further possibilities of exploration, explication, and enrichment.<sup>14</sup> And the inherited topology of subjective life that contrasts an “intellectual” side with an “emotional” side is reconfigured insofar as cognitive life too is seen as pervaded with its own energetic dynamics.

Yet even where affection is primarily taken as the core of perception rather than as a matter of mood or emotional tone, the word “affection” points in two further directions. On the one hand, it refers to an *ichfremd*,<sup>15</sup> material-contentual moment filling out the formal structure of inner time-consciousness.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, however, it also comes to mean the living event in which the I itself is “affected,” an event that not only presupposes the passive constitution of the stream of lived experience,<sup>17</sup> but functions in turn as the presupposition for the I’s engagement with what affects it, first of all by turning to this affective incitement.<sup>18</sup> When the passive syntheses pertaining to perception are taken as the paradigm case,

then the moment of affection occurs at the mutual boundary between “subjective” and “objective,” not only simultaneously joining them and separating them, but effecting their very interarticulation insofar as the I is affected by something other than itself.<sup>19</sup> And there is a sense in which the event of affection is something we “undergo” rather than a matter of deliberate “doing.”

However, further investigation of the structure of this event brings to light a moment of “receptivity” that bridges the gap between “activity” and “passivity.”<sup>20</sup> This moment of receptivity functions as the condition of possibility for the actual moment of “adventence” in which the I is motivated to turn to what affects it prior to becoming actively engaged in any further way.<sup>21</sup> Here the main thrust of the notion of affection is motivation, with its twin moments of incitement and response,<sup>22</sup> and Husserl eventually expands the term “affection” even further to cover any event in which motivation plays a role, whether we are dealing with sensuous affection or affective tone; whether it is a matter of the original constitution of an object from primal sensuous moments, or of being affected by already-constituted objects; whether we are focusing on affection prior to adventence and attention, or during the course of further enjoyment and engagement; and whether that from which “rays” of affection stream are thoroughly practical objects, or highly refined theoretical matters.<sup>23</sup>

At the same time, however, there is also a terminological expansion with regard to “who” is being affected: although there are many references throughout Husserl’s writings to the I as the pole of actions and affections,<sup>24</sup> indications also emerge that the realm of the egoic in the broad sense extends beyond acts explicitly initiated by the primary, awake I and includes involuntary and habitual kinaesthetic movement.<sup>25</sup> In other words, Husserl’s elaborate investigations of the role of affection in the passive syntheses that provide the pre-predicative roots for predicative judgments<sup>26</sup> simultaneously roots the I of reason and reflection in a broader subjective life of sentient/sensitive motility—a life that may be further characterized as a kinaesthetic consciousness irreducible to the ontological divide between “mind” and “body.” Moreover, genetic-phenomenological research into affection also

suggests alternatives to a static model of founding-founded relations based on a method of progressive abstraction setting aside non-self-sufficient strata until an ultimate self-sufficient level is reached.<sup>27</sup> For example, in earlier, static-phenomenological accounts, feeling and valuing are taken to be founded in pregiven objectivities that function as substrates for “affective” acts (in the sense of affective tone): Object-consciousness founds feeling-consciousness.<sup>28</sup> But Husserl increasingly sees the primal sensuous moments to whose incitement we respond (objectivating affection) as pervaded with affective tone (feeling-affection) from the start, rather than providing a substrate for a further “layer” of feeling or value.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, rather than conceiving willing or acting as yet another stratum built on the first two, he sees the positive or negative affective valence as permeated from the very beginning with kinaesthetic tendencies “toward” or “away” that are always already incipiently partnering the affective incitement.<sup>30</sup> Thus sensing, feeling, and moving are mutually co-founding, mutually interpenetrating and interfunctioning moments, rather than stacked strata organized in terms of one-sided founding relations: The receptivity that partners the passively constituted salience is a kinaesthetic response whose degree of openness is already attuned to the positive or negative valence of the affecting incitement even before answering the latter’s call with explicit advertence, engagement, and action.<sup>31</sup>

And perhaps it is here, in the dialogue of “call” and “response,” that one of the tensions shaping Husserl’s notion of “affectivity” can most readily be seen. Affection is clearly a double-sided concept, referring on the one hand to an “I-side,” where it takes the form of the lived experience of incitement and response, and on the other to a side that is alien to the I (*ichfremd*) and provides a specific content of some sort.<sup>32</sup> For Husserl, both “sides” are ultimately only abstract moments, twin primal presuppositions for the constitution of a world and its entities, twin primal sources that are inseparably one as they play out their respective roles within this continual constitutive performance.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, it is possible for a given investigation to emphasize the weight of one or the other side. On the one hand, “affectivity” can refer to the “affective power” of that which

affects the experiencer, whether we are speaking of primal impression as the original source of all affective salience;<sup>34</sup> or of a fully constituted object that “knocks on the door,”<sup>35</sup> as it were, summoning the experiencer and demanding a response; or of a particular “voice” emerging from an affective “chorus” calling out to us;<sup>36</sup> or of rival affections attracting us with greater or lesser insistence (i.e., different degrees of affective power), perhaps culminating in one “drowning out” the other(s);<sup>37</sup> and so on. Here “affectivity” names the world’s power to sing out, claiming our attention with, for example, a sudden gleam or a significant silence—a power of “interesting” us and setting up affective lines of force that stream toward us from the affecting element and exert a certain pull,<sup>38</sup> whether the outcome is a matter of resolutely ignoring the interruption that jostles us or of rising to the occasion offered by a newly tensed field of possibilities. Affectivity in this sense highlights affection as the impact of alterity upon an I that is always already exposed to its native power.<sup>39</sup> On the other hand, Husserl also points out that we must be willing to be vulnerable, to undergo, to be moved.<sup>40</sup> Thus just as saliences have varying degrees of affective power, so also the experiencer can vary in sensitivity<sup>41</sup>—and such tendencies form part of the history sedimented in one’s current style(s) of comportment. In other words, when something “knocks at the door,” there must be “someone home,” willing and able to open up to it and enter into some kind of engagement with it. But above and beyond one’s response on any particular occasion, there can be a sedimented general readiness not only to receive or to reject—to be open for the affective invitation or closed off from it—but also to be moved and to go along with the movement, or to refuse to do so. Affectivity in the sense of the experiencer’s ability to be affected in this double way is thus a practical condition of possibility for the affective power of the non-I to come to fruition in an actual affective event. And such affective readiness is neither a merely “mental” affair nor a matter of “thresholds” for the physical body’s reaction to “stimuli”: once again, we must recognize that the “who” of affectivity is a kinaesthetic consciousness that is not limited to the repertoire of the active, awake I, but refers to the broader domain of primal motility of which

the deliberate “I-can” is but an abstract moment.

Much more could obviously be said about Husserl’s protean concept of affectivity. But at this point, I will set aside my survey of the ways Husserl exploits the concept and turn instead to the phenomena themselves. Let us accordingly consider a specific example of affectivity in the sense of our ability to respond to an affective invitation, beginning with what each of us can sense directly, here and now, in our own lived bodies, in the full range of the somaesthetic register—including not only tactile sensitivity, but other *Empfindnisse* as well (such as feelings of tension and release),<sup>42</sup> and including both the moments of sensuous affective content and the affective feeling-tones interwoven with them. But it is not enough merely to specify the kind of phenomena that will serve as our example; we must also approach our task in the spirit of a commitment to evidence, which will involve actually generating the kind of phenomena we want to investigate, bringing them to life within our own experience<sup>43</sup>—and actually experiencing our experience rather than merely talking about it. Moreover, what we are dealing with here is a new, transcendental mode of experience, since we are no longer simply allowing the living intentionality to carry us along as we go about our everyday business;<sup>44</sup> instead, we are thematizing the performances that not only sustain this world-experiencing life, but make it possible in the first place.<sup>45</sup> Thus in the natural attitude we are concerned, for example, with the things we see, and not with our own kinaesthetic complicity in bringing them into view, whereas the phenomenological attitude casts a wider net and describes the implication of the perceiver’s own situated motility in both the perspectivity and the horizontality of the perceived. Of course, in the case of the somaesthetic feelings that we are dealing with here, it is a matter of an invisible rather than a visible realm. But our investigation must still embrace the kinaesthetic moment and describe the implication of the sensing in the sensed, considering not only the “how of the givenness” of our phenomena, but also the kinaesthetic “how of the receivingness,” whether we are kinaesthetically open to what we are feeling, or tensing up, trying to keep certain

feelings at a distance (or shut them out completely).

Moreover, if our task is to bring this kinaesthetic moment to lucid awareness, it is extremely helpful to adopt the style of experiencing proper to kinaesthetic consciousness, instead of attempting to gain access to our theme by way of a “ray of attention” modeled on visual experience. In other words, rather than casting a “mental glance” proceeding from a center of experience located somewhere “up here,” in my head, and directed toward something going on “down there,” somewhere else in my body, it is a matter of inhabiting the kinaesthetic performances themselves from within, lucidly living in, for example, the ongoing process of holding my head at exactly this angle, or the “I can” that allows my eyes to look now here and now there, or the “I could” that already knows—without actually having to do it—how to move one shoulder forward while the other moves back, and so on. In short, investigating the kinaesthetic moment of affectivity requires living-through the kinaesthetic performance *as an act* (rather than as a specific type of sensation) and *in the act* (rather than as the object of a subsequent act directed to it).<sup>46</sup>

Now let us create some further propitious conditions for our investigation by suspending the sedimented tendency to apprehend whatever we are feeling in this way as an adumbration of an object apperceived as “my own lived body.”<sup>47</sup> In other words, let us suspend (to whatever extent possible) the automatic efficacy of “objectivation” in order to carry out a radical reduction to the primal, streaming-standing living present<sup>48</sup> in which somaesthetic “salience” and kinaesthetic “stirrings” occur. These might include, for example, a glow of warmth, a sudden shiver, a tingle, a flicker of movement, and so on; these events emerge, jostle and replace one another, shift spontaneously, and fade away, weaving a living tapestry, a kind of work in progress that is always there whenever I tap into this register of experience, feeling whatever I am undergoing, here and now, in its ongoingness.

Maintaining the radical reduction to the living present, then, rather than an attitude directed toward the constitution of an enduring “object,” let us inquire still further into the style of experience proper to this “affective un-



dergoing.” In an often-cited passage from the C-manuscripts, Husserl writes:

Bleiben wir dabei, versuchen wir es, dass in der urhyletisch-immanenten Sphäre das Inhaltliche in seiner Konfiguration das Gefühl bestimmt. Das Inhaltliche ist das Ichfremde, das Gefühl ist schon ichlich. Das “Ansprechen” des Inhalts sei nicht Anruf zu etwas, sondern ein fühlendes Dabei-Sein des Ich, und zwar nicht erst als ein Dabei-Sein durch Hinkommen und Anlangen. Das Ich ist nicht etwas für sich und das Ichfremde ein vom Ich Getrenntes, und zwischen beiden ist kein Raum für ein Hinwenden, sondern untrennbar ist Ich und sein Ichfremdes, bei jedem Inhalt im Inhaltszusammenhang und bei dem ganzen Zusammenhang ist das Ich fühlendes. Fühlen ist die Zuständlichkeit des Ich vor aller Aktivität und, wenn es aktiv ist, in der Aktivität.<sup>49</sup>

The key to the passage lies in the words “*fühlendes Dabei-Sein*,” and first of all in the double sense of “*Dabei-Sein*” as not only “being-there,” but also “taking part,” recalling the inner structure of affectivity as involving not only the primal receptivity of being “therefor” and “open-to” the affective incitement, but also the primal partnering in which we allow ourselves to participate in the affective event by actually “being-moved” in the way proper to “feeling” (and perhaps even allowing the feeling itself to unfold more fully). However, in the case of feeling, the relation between the experiencer and the affectively-drenched content is not like the frontal relation of a perceiving consciousness to a visible object over against it.<sup>50</sup> Instead, I find myself suffused with the felt texture of my own kinaesthetically-accomplished undergoing; I do not have to “turn toward” this because I am already pervaded (or perhaps invaded) with it in the shifting play of the living-streaming present, and what is at stake is appreciating the “how” of the undergoing itself rather than pinpointing exactly “what” is felt in it.<sup>51</sup> The situation is therefore not one of trying to “fix” the feeling as an immanent temporal object with certain enduring qualities, not only because what one “stays with” and “follows”<sup>52</sup> is the streaming process itself, “in living constitution,”<sup>53</sup> rather than something constituted in it,

but also because lingering with the living texture of the undergoing and immersing myself more fully in the lived activity of “feeling” can allow the stream to shift and flow on with a different flavor: The lived feeling might crumble if I were to try to pin it down, transfixing it with a ray of attention, but when I participate in living it more fully, in the manner proper to “feeling” as an ongoing undergoing, it transmutes, and I change with it.

Yet an even further step is possible if we release our prior suspension of the “adumbrating” tendency that apperceives affection as a moment in the how of the givenness of a more complex configuration. What is important here is that suspending a particular apperceptive style can allow alternative apperceptions to emerge once the adumbrating function is reinstated. More specifically, it is possible to apprehend the affective tone of my felt undergoing not only in terms of my own individual body, but in terms of the texture of the intercorporeal field as well. What comes to experience in the sensuous feeling of my own lived body is more than just me, for my own flesh functions as a living medium through which the affective texture and tone of the interkinaesthetic field as a whole comes to appearance.<sup>54</sup> We are, in short, suffused with affective invitations that do not stand over-against us, but permeate us in such a way that we are always constantly in kinaesthetic complicity with them, welcoming them or refusing them entry—and thereby co-constituting a broader communal field of forces within which these invitations play.<sup>55</sup> Thus being-there and taking part in the manner proper to feeling accomplishes the constitution not of an “object” in the sense of a “thing” as a transtemporal unity/identity, but of a shifting web of intercorporeal relationality, an affective milieu forming and informing everything we do.

I began this investigation in the methodological spirit of truth to evidence: Instead of defining the concept of “affection” in terms of received categories, my aim—following Husserl—was to allow the phenomenological findings about affection to create new categories and transform old ones. This in turn took me to a kinaesthetic practice of “*fühlendes Dabei-Sein*” that can lead to a deep openness in which we are simultaneously more awake to

ourselves and more connected with more than ourselves, as well as more concretely aware of the intimate implication of the experiencer in the experiencing. Husserl's protean theory of affectivity allows us both to understand affectivity in terms of transcendence, and to understand transcendence as an achievement

of a kinaesthetic consciousness that is always already in the act of responding to the affective pull of an interkinaesthetic field of which it is a functioning moment—and for which it is a transcendental-phenomenological condition of possible givenness.

## ENDNOTES

1. The following volumes from Edmund Husserl, *Husserliana* (Den Haag/Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff/Kluwer Academic Publishers/Springer, 1950ff.) were consulted in this survey: 4, 6, 11, 14, 15, 17, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38; all references to *Husserliana* take the form: volume number/page number(s). I also consulted Edmund Husserl, *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934)*. *Die C-Manuskripte*, ed. Dieter Lohmar, *Husserliana Materialien* 8 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), cited as HM8/page number(s), as well as Edmund Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, ed. Ludwig Landgrebe (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1999), cited as EU/page number(s). A fuller treatment of Husserl's notion of affectivity would require situating it in a broader context by pursuing more detailed investigations of such related concepts as passivity, receptivity, and activity, or of the relation between the predicative and the pre-predicative, etc., which cannot be carried out here; it is also not possible for the present paper to consider the secondary literature on Husserl's concept of affection or to pursue the treatment of this theme in the works of subsequent phenomenologists. Finally, it should be mentioned that references to primary sources in this essay are illustrative rather than exhaustive.
2. See 19-1/272ff.
3. See especially 11/148ff., 417ff.
4. 38/159 n.1; the text in question is a critical response to the treatment of "attention" in the second volume of Carl Stumpf, *Tonpsychologie* (Leipzig, 1890).
5. 38/163ff.
6. 38/165f. Husserl first contrasts the "emotional" posture or habitus with the "theoretical," then identifies the theoretical posture as a special case of the organized unity of interests he terms the "*objektive Haltung*" (38/166).
7. 38/167, 171ff., 476f. Husserl continues to investigate the theme of interest in later work as well—cf., e.g., EU/91ff.; 8/98ff.; 9/412ff.; 34/190ff., 213ff.; HM8/73ff., 189ff., 251ff., 314ff., 323ff.
8. See especially 38/477, where Husserl emphasizes that "incitement" (*Reiz*) is always to be understood as "tension" (*Spannung*). Husserl's term *Reiz* is usually translated as "stimulus" in physiological or psychophysical contexts; the English translation of *Husserliana* 11 and 31 uses "allure," but since *Reiz* connotes the irritating as well as the charming and enticing (cf. 33/276), I have chosen the more neutral term "incitement."
9. 37/355 (*Gemütsfärbungen, Gefühlsfärbung*); cf. 38/166.
10. For Husserl, these are of course not atomistic "sense data" existing in their own right, but must be understood as core moments reached by "dis-mantling" (*Abbau*). See, e.g., 4/336; HM8/109ff., 134, 244, 352 (and cf. 223ff.).
11. 31/9.
12. 31/8.
13. 37/326f.
14. EU/passim. Note that for Husserl (34/436), the goal of natural/mundane experience is being as a persisting possession that I can always come back to and confirm again, in knowledge that is then in its turn an abiding possession beyond flowing, transitory experience (8/475, 34/188, 340; cf. EU/232). Hence objectivation requires not only the integrative passive syntheses whose achievement is an object that transcends the temporally individuated moments through which it comes to givenness (cf., e.g., EU/308f.), but also a type of open reiterability, an "I can and will always be able to" (34/358, 436), whose correlate is the "selfsame" object.
15. See, e.g., 14/51, 379; HM8/86. Here I am setting aside issues pertaining to the notion of self-affectation; ambiguities in the locution "*ichfremd*" may be resolved by contrasting the current thematic engagement of the active, awake I with what is other to the I's current activity, even if this "other" stems from, e.g., the I's own past. Thus the distinction between what pertains to the I and what is alien to it would be relative and functional, rather than a matter of fixed regions or categories.

16. See, e.g., 11/142f., 152; 33/281f. I am setting aside the question of whether or not the irruption of a core hyletic moment originally triggers time-constitution, rather than providing an ever-changing “filling” for a streaming whose formal structure is always already governed in advance by unchanging essential laws.
17. More precisely, what is presupposed is the passive constitution, from out of the primal standing-streaming source (34/167ff.), of the stream—in the proper sense (34/182)—of lived experiences (i.e., an immanent time in which all acts and affections are individuated); the passive constitution of each sensory field via associative syntheses of like with like (on the basis of which further syntheses linking sensory fields—e.g., seeing a texture before touching it—are then also established); and the passive constitution of saliences within a field, not only by contrast with a background (11/148ff.), but also as at least momentarily enduring (33/282): Once again, when we consult the phenomena themselves, we are not left stranded in the face of an arbitrary array of atomistic “sense data,” but discover an experientially confirmable play of formations that are not full-fledged “objects,” but are not nothing, either (11/164; cf. 162).
18. Husserl takes this “turning to” (*Hinwenden*) to include not only (cognitively accented) “attention” (*Aufmerksamkeit*), but all forms of advertence (*Zuwendung*) as well—see, e.g., 37/332; cf. 31/8.
19. See, e.g., 4/217; 35/391; HM8/114 n. 2, 182, and see also 351.
20. 4/213, 335; 11/105, 409; EU/83. Note that for Husserl, “activity” in the strict sense is judged from the standpoint of actional I-engagement and is not equivalent to the sense of activity as dynamic process or efficacy. Note also that although “passive” does indeed mean “without the doing of the I,” the I in question may well be an awake I that is in fact engaged in a “doing” of some sort (34/179): Passive performances (and unthematized receptivities) are in continual effective operation throughout such explicit doing, and function as its silent support.
21. See, e.g., 33/285, HM8/319f.; the moment of advertence in the broad sense also includes the possibility of not turning to the affective incitement.
22. The affective incitement need not always motivate a cognitive response, but can immediately spur one to practical action—cf., e.g., EU/53. Note that the notion of affection as motivation arises in the context of genetic phenomenology, and the resulting descriptions do not necessarily conform to the paradigm of founding/founded relations that govern static phenomenology.
23. See, e.g., 37/355, 17/294, HM8/183; for examples of rather extended senses, see 34/160, HM8/338. It is especially important to realize that affection is not merely a moment “prior to” advertence, but exerts an ongoing, dynamic efficacy—see, e.g., 11/419, EU/388, HM8/320, and cf. Elizabeth A. Behnke, “Phenomenologist at work,” *Husserl Circle*, Prague, 2007. On the sense of a “dynamic” phenomenology irreducible either to a static-phenomenological concern with one-sided founding relations or to a genetic-phenomenological search for origins, see Elizabeth A. Behnke, “On the Dynamization of Phenomenological Concepts,” *Focus Pragensis* 4 (2004): 9–39.
24. See, e.g., 14/passim.
25. See, e.g., 14/447, 450, 452 n. 1; HM8/238, 336.
26. See, e.g., 37/332; 17/216ff., 296f.; EU/passim.
27. For an attempt at a further alternative that sees these matters in generative terms, see 37/294ff.
28. See, e.g., 31/5; cf. 4/7. Here it is not possible to review the issue of founding relations between “objectivating” and “non-objectivating” acts, a theme that Husserl inherits from Brentano—see, e.g., 19-1/383, 401ff., 514f., 519; 28/261f., 322ff., 334ff.; 38/407.
29. See, e.g., 4/337, 37/326, HM8/318ff.; for an earlier anticipation of the later view, see 38/164.
30. See, e.g., HM8/318ff.
31. Understood transcendently, our kinaesthetic complicity in the event of affection is a key moment on the “constituting” side of the correlational a priori: The “pregiven” sensuous/physiognomic world is always already a constitutive correlate of a “pregiving” kinaesthetic consciousness. (On the sense of “pregiving” meant here, see, e.g., 34/319, 451f.)
32. See, e.g., HM8/189, 193.
33. HM8/199; cf. 118.
34. 11/168, HM8/323.
35. 4/219f.; cf. 11/166.
36. 11/272.
37. 11/149f., 415; cf. 6/174.
38. See, e.g., HM8/183ff. Note that our being affected by a certain “silence” testifies yet again that it is not a matter of “sense data,” but of what Husserl terms the “affective relief” (11/168) of saliences and backgrounds.
39. Husserl emphasizes that we always inevitably belong to an affective sphere (6/111), a horizon of ac-

- tual and potential affection (34/303); we might say that “world-experiencing life” (34/171) is continually exposed to an affective dimension.
40. Cf. HM8/99 n. 1, 3.
  41. 14/54. See also Elizabeth A. Behnke, “Bodily Relationality,” in *Phenomenology 2005*, vol. 5, *Selected Essays from North America*, ed. Lester Embree and Thomas Nenon (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2007), 67–97, on the way in which our styles of kinaesthetic openness and participation affect our very engagement with the here and now.
  42. See, e.g., 4/145ff., 152f.
  43. Cf. 20-1/319f., 326.
  44. See 17/242.
  45. Cf., e.g., 8/170f.; 34/160, 178, 292, 352, 462. The type of phenomenologizing at stake here is accordingly not aimed at describing the ready-made world as it is usually lived in the natural attitude (which would be the task of a mundane phenomenology focused on the tacit structures of the lifeworld), but adopts an “unnatural” attitude (cf. 34/323) that retrieves constitutive performances from their usual anonymity (see, e.g., 17/251ff. [= §§97f.]; 6/114ff., 161ff. [= §§29, 46ff.], and cf. EU/49; 34/582f.).
  46. As Husserl points out (4/317), “acts” are subjective in an entirely different way than “sensations” are: I “have” sensations (and appearances), but I “carry out” acts, functioning as the source from which they well up in the (voluntary or involuntary) “I do.” For Husserl, the kinaesthetic moment in the strict sense—the kinetic “I move”—must be distinguished from hyletic data (HM8/320, 341), although when kinaesthetic possibilities are actualized they are also accompanied by the corresponding somaesthetic sensations. The point here, however, is that we can lucidly live-through our kinaesthetic performances in the same way in which we can suffuse the very process of experiencing with an original awareness (cf. 10/291) or “reflexivity” that is qualitatively different from a “reflection” that makes something within the immanent temporal stream into an “object.” On the “pro-flective” possibilities of lucidly living-through the ongoing in its ongoingness, cf. Elizabeth A. Behnke, “Bodily Protentionality,” Husserl Circle, Dublin, 2005.
  47. See HM8/352; see also 134, and cf. 33/275f.
  48. The tendency toward objectivation is deeply rooted enough that Husserl even asks whether we can speak of it as an “original instinct” (HM8/258), and this is one reason why the radical reduction to the living present (see, e.g., 34/185ff., 384ff.) is so radical.
  49. HM8/351f. My remarks related to this passage are not merely meant as a commentary on, or explication of, this particular text, but offer a distillation of my own further investigations of the style of experience he is talking about in this passage, corroborating and continuing his analyses.
  50. Cf. HM8/114: “Der Zorn steht mir nicht so gegenüber, so wie mir das Ding gegenübersteht.”
  51. Note that “undergoing” is itself an activity in the broadest sense (34/182). There is thus a double ambiguity in the word “feeling”: on the one hand, it can refer both to the bodily-sensuous and to the emotional register; on the other hand, however, it refers not only to something felt (“feeling” as a noun), but also to the lived activity of feeling it (“feeling” as a verb), reached by a *Rückfrage* that traces what is felt back to the correlative constitutive performances (EU/49; cf. 34/582f.)—in this case, kinaesthetic performances.
  52. See, e.g., HM8/319f., 323; cf. 340ff.
  53. 34/180.
  54. See Elizabeth A. Behnke, “Interkinaesthetic affectivity: A phenomenological approach,” *Continental Philosophy Review*, forthcoming.
  55. The question of to what extent the prevailing affective texture of the intercorporeal field shapes individual affectivity, in the sense of one’s habitual degree of openness and general readiness to be moved, cannot be addressed here, but it is crucial in times of terrorism and torture, of civil war and routine incivility, of overt violence and more subtle modes of violation: Can local practices such as restorative embodiment work create healthy affective communities, and if so, can this help to heal the wounded world we live in?

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