MADNESS AND *POLITEIA*

AESTHETIC DISRUPTION IN FOUCAULT AND PLATO

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> To men I am still the mean between a fool and a corpse.
>
> *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 121

> No longer a ship but a hospital.
>
> *Madness and Civilization*, 35

In the *Preface* to *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault emphasizes that the Greek Logos—crystallized in the Socratic dialectic—has no contrary.[1] Likewise, the rational discourses of Western society refuse to recognize madness as a contrary to reason, regarding it instead as an error meant to be silenced. This refusal reveals an important connection between Foucault's archaeology of madness and Platonic philosophy in general—a link that becomes evident by reading the *Republic* through the lens of Foucault's analysis.

Establishing a significant relationship between *Madness and Civilization* and Plato's *Republic* is hindered by the fact that Foucault begins his investigation at the end of the Middle Ages and not in Ancient Greece. Nevertheless, the approach taken by these two texts toward the theme of rational discourse reveals a strong connection between them. The utopian ideals that permeate the *Republic* emphasize the necessity of philosophical rationality ruling unchecked in society. Foucault's analysis of madness questions the value and legitimacy of investing such a myopic governing principle with absolute authority. Perhaps more than any other issue, the interpretation of art provided by each author both underscores the intense antagonism between these texts while simultaneously revealing a noteworthy dialogue between them.

In the *Republic*, Socrates banishes art—especially tragic poetry—as the great danger to the virtuous order of rational rule. Contrarily, *Madness and Civilization* champions art as the lone medium capable of challenging the tyranny of reason. Beneath this conflict, these texts share an interpretation of art that aligns it so closely with insanity as to suggest the potential identification of the two. For Socrates, this proximity reveals one of art's greatest threats, whereas for Foucault it evinces art's capacity to resist the power structures and prevailing discourses of reason. Still, Foucault and Socrates conceive of the relationship between art and insanity differently. Whereas the former believes art capable of expressing a dark truth of nothingness by making present death and void, the latter admonishes artistic expression for appealing to the baser appetites, thereby causing them to usurp an individual's soul. These disparate views regarding the power of art reveal distinct conceptions of madness as (1) hubristic excess in Plato and (2) the overwhelming terror of nothingness in Foucault.

Reading *Madness and Civilization* against the *Republic* reveals the presence of Foucauldian themes submerged just below the surface of the Platonic text. Namely, Foucault argues that a culture's relationship to madness is most evident in the distinction between confinement and embarkation. A society that confines the insane understands madness as an error that must be either cured or silenced. A society that practices embarkation—best illustrated through the ships of fools in the Middle Ages—recognizes a possible truth to madness that presents a fundamental challenge to the rational foundation of Western science, religion, and morality. In this sense, embarkation admits a potential contrary to reason, whereas confinement utterly denies it.

The character of Cephalus allows us to develop the relationship between Foucault's analysis and the *Republic*. Socrates also desires to eliminate all the consequences of unreason, including madness, the fear of death, and art. Cephalus unites these three themes in a single character, so that his early exit from the scene portends the exclusion of them all. Fur-

ther, his identification with precisely these three concepts suggests that Plato, too, may recognize them as essentially related.

This essay begins by developing Foucault's understanding of madness, the relationship between madness and art, and the distinction between embarkation and confinement as explained in *Madness and Civilization*. Next, it turns to Plato's conception of madness as presented in the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic*, considering the relevance of Cephalus to both of these dialogues. Both sections examine the close relationship between madness, art, and the fear of death in the two principle texts. The paper concludes by postulating the relevance of a Foucauldian sense of madness to Platonic thought.

Madness, Civilization, Death, and Art

Foucault's history of madness begins in the twelfth century with the proliferation of leprosariums across Europe, although his interest lies primarily in their near total disappearance a few hundred years later. These structures of confinement remain after the disease is eradicated, eventually coming to house a different threat to the health of society.[2] Nevertheless, the shadow of Greek philosophy permeates the book based upon its relevance to the central problem as described in the *Preface*. There, Foucault traces the origins of the opposition between reason and madness back to the relationship between σωφροσυνή and ὕβρις in Ancient times.[3] Σωφροσυνή means not only moderation, temperance, and self-control, but more originarily soundness of mind, prudence, and discretion. Foucault opposes ὕβρις, which means wanton violence or insolence as well as an outrage or injury upon a person,[4] to this soundness of mind. Thus self-controlled and prudent reasoning is opposed to violent, excessive, and impudent speech.

The relationship between σωφροσυνή and ὕβρις crystallizes the most common Platonic conception of madness. However, this opposition is not identical to reason and madness in Foucault's analysis, where the language of psychiatry provides "a monologue of reason *about* madness" (MC xi) devoid of any communication. While ὕβρις threatens σωφροσυνή just as insanity threatens contemporary rationality, Foucault finds a closer approximation to the modern silencing of madness by reason in the fact that the Greek *logos* has no contrary. For Foucault, this utter annihilation of opposition represents the most fundamental dream of nineteenth century psychiatry towards madness as well as of Socratic reasoning towards any contrary to *logos*.[5]

The meaning of confinement and its relationship to the desire to silence any truth of madness provides a central question for Foucault's analysis. He finds that before the seventeenth century not only were the insane not universally confined, but neither was the attempt made to thoroughly silence any meaning intimated by their condition. "In the Middle Ages and until the Renaissance, man's dispute with madness was a dramatic debate in which he confronted the secret powers of the world" (ibid. xii). As Foucault explains in "*Stultifera Navis*," the Middle Ages finds Western civilization both confronting and admitting a possible truth underlying the condition of madness. Because this confrontation engages the question of madness as containing a potentially positive truth, the situation resembles the Ancient relationship between σωφροσυνή and ὕβρις more closely than that between *logos* and its contrary.

Embarkation designates the cultural practice most symptomatic of such recognition of insanity. Ultimately for Foucault, the monologue of reason that lacks real communication—that is, the silencing of madness—is directly connected to confinement. Any communication between reason and madness results in embarkation. "*Stultifera Navis*" argues that while the insane were not invariably expelled from society, a great many were driven away, often through accompanying rituals of exclusion. Fifteenth century art and literature exhibit a striking proliferation of madness as their central theme, replacing the reign of death as the focus of Western art.[6] Much of this art portrays expelled madmen symbolically seeking their lost reason, as in a ship of fools. Foucault finds this shift in artistic representation not to signify a fundamental difference in object, but rather to substantiate an emerging cultural interpretation of the meaning of madness as the living presence of death itself.

Embarkation is inexorably linked to just this meaning of madness. For Foucault, the

practice of embarkation, together with representations of madness and expelled madmen in late fifteenth century art, show that at this point in its development Western culture confronts madness as a threat with a positive truth. "The mockery of madness replaces death and its solemnity. From the discovery of that necessity which inevitably reduces man to nothing, we have shifted to the scornful contemplation of that nothing which is existence itself. Fear in the face of the absolute limit of death turns inward in a continuous irony" (ibid. 16). This movement from fear of death to fear of madness coincides with the disappearance of leprosy. In a footnote, Foucault explains that "the experience of madness exhibits a rigorous continuity with the experience of leprosy. The ritual of the leper's exclusion showed that he was, as a living man, the very presence of death" (MC 291). The exclusion of the mad replaces that of the leper because madness replaces leprosy as the visible presence of death itself. This explains the sense in which the fear in the face of death as absolute limit turns ironically inward. "The head that will become a skull is already empty. Madness is the *déjà-là* of death" (ibid.). According to its fifteenth century meaning, madness represents the presence of death within existence itself, rather than what lies beyond an absolute limit.[7]

As a living representation of death, the truth of madness is precisely the truth of nothingness and the non-being of truth. Foucault develops a distinction between the meaning of madness in the literary and the plastic arts based upon the representation of word and language on the one hand and image on the other.[8] Both forms proclaim madness to belong to all of humanity, whether or not an individual recognizes this to be the case. Painting proclaims the complete annihilation of the individual, literature the foolishness of all knowledge.[9] Foucault finds that the classical experience of madness develops as a response to its fifteenth century literary expression. In a striking reversal, madness ceases to represent the error of morality and knowledge, coming instead to be represented itself *as* an error.[10]

By the seventeenth century, the threat of madness has subsided. Foucault identifies the core difference between the Classical and pre-Classical response to madness as the distinction between confinement and embarkation.[11] By reversing the fifteenth century literary meaning of madness, the discourses of reason interpret madness as error and moral fault. The cultural practice of confinement intends to eradicate this error and cure this vice. It is in this sense that Foucault intends his remark, "no longer a ship but a hospital" (ibid. 35). Confinement seeks to silence madness as a danger to be sure, but a danger that can be cured because it is based upon an error or a moral fault. Where the practice of confinement denies any contrary to reason, embarkation displays awareness of an excess for which rational discourse cannot account.

The greater part of *Madness and Civilization* traces the development of the insane asylum as an institution paradigmatic of this desire to confine. Rather than maintaining a truth *of nothingness* in which an abysmal darkness replaces the hopes of religion and morality, confinement asserts that same nothingness to be the truth *of madness* itself. Madness becomes the very nothing that it asserts of the world. It therefore must be confined and silenced so as to be reduced to the nothing that it is.[12] The desire to confine madness as a disease is an extension of the desire to silence madness as an illegitimate error.

Foucault understands this conception of madness as nothingness as unreason—whether unreason itself proclaims nothingness as the truth of the world or unreason interpreted as the non-being of error by the discourses of reason.[13] Based upon this conception of unreason, Foucault offers a striking interpretation of art since the nineteenth century in the *Conclusion* of his text. "After Sade and Goya, and since them, unreason has belonged to whatever is decisive, for the modern world, in any work of art" (ibid. 285). Rather than comforting humanity with the certainty of purpose, unreason proclaims the tragic wisdom of Silenus from the void of the abyss: the secret darkness at the heart of every truth that asserts all meaning and value as error.[14] According to Foucault, this nothingness of unreason marks the decisive moment in any contemporary work of art. Without some such trace of madness, he challenges the status of the work *as* art.

Foucault argues that madness escapes confinement through art—both plastic and literary—presenting an omnipresent challenge to

the rational order that forms the basis of Western civilization. The excess of these works confronts reason with that which is beyond reason, thereby questioning its legitimacy as absolute authority on meaning and purpose (just as the excess of ὕβρις challenges the value and necessity of σωφροσυνή).

> Ruse and new triumph of madness: the world that thought to measure and justify madness through psychology must justify itself before madness, since in its struggles and agonies it measures itself by the excess of works like those of Nietzsche, of Van Gogh, of Artaud. And nothing in itself, especially not what it can know of madness, assures the world that it is justified by such works of madness. (Ibid. 289)

Through art, madness as unreason breaks free from its prison and confronts the world with its terrifying truth, thereby forcing rational society to question the very legitimacy of its drive for absolute knowledge and the ethical normativity it supports. The world must face the possibility of unreason, of meaningless suffering, of Nietzsche. Art does not annihilate rational discourse and the mechanisms of power anchored in it; rather, it defeats the world in its drive to eliminate the visibility of unreason's truth. "Madness is the absolute break with the work of art; it forms the constitutive moment of abolition, which dissolves in time the truth of the work of art; it draws the exterior edge, the line of dissolution, the contour against the void" (ibid. 287). Through madness, art ceases to convey meaning, instead revealing the lack of meaning that humanity either cannot see or cannot bear to see. In this sense, by representing madness directly and non-being indirectly, the work of art displays the limit and contour of the void.[15]

Cephalus and the *Republic*

In the character of Cephalus, Plato subtly links poetry, madness, and the fear of death together in a single figure. He effectively excludes all of these disruptive forces from Socrates' theoretical city in the symbolical act of Cephalus "embarking" from the conversation in order to look after his sacrifice. This shows surprising traces of a more contemporary meaning of madness in Plato, raising the spectre of a contrary to the Greek *logos* belonging to the *Republic* itself. Additionally, the union of these three themes in Cephalus informs Socrates' encounter with the poets in Book X. By expelling Cephalus (and through him art, madness, and the fear of death) Plato suggests an embarkation that could possibly culminate in the return of all three in Book X. This supports a different interpretation of the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry from the view that poetical pleasure could be of some value to the *kallipolis*.[16] It discloses an admission, however slight, that reason may indeed have a contrary and that philosophy itself could be based upon the fundamental error of denying this possibility.[17]

Cephalus' relationship to madness extends beyond Socrates' refutation of his definition of justice. Plato casts his shadow over the entirety of the *Phaedrus*, a dialogue that offers a thorough discussion of different kinds of madness. Phaedrus responds to Socrates' initial question by relating, "I was with Lysias, the son of Cephalus" (*Phaedrus* 227a).[18] Lysias, also Polemarchus' brother, is in turn the father of the first speech on love given by Phaedrus, as Socrates emphasizes later in the dialogue.[19] The reference to Polemarchus at 275b cannot help but cause the reader to recollect the *Republic*, thereby tying these two dialogues together. Moreover, just as Lysias is the father of both Phaedrus' speech and Socrates' first speech on the value of love, Cephalus is in turn the father of Lysias. He is, then, the grandfather of the accounts of madness belonging to these speeches.

The conception of madness developed in the *Phaedrus* differs significantly from the *Republic* insofar as the former distinguishes between good and bad sorts of madness, while the latter acknowledges only the negative kind. The *Phaedrus'* first two speeches identify madness as the cause of love, which is viewed as a sickness and is opposed to σωφροσυνή as ὕβρις: "A lover will admit that he's more sick [νοσεῖν] than sound in the head [σωφρονεῖν]" (ibid. 231d).[20] In his first speech, Socrates develops this point, explicitly identifying the opposition as that between σωφροσυνή and ὕβρις at 238a.[21] Ὕβρις describes the desire for pleasure overpowering both rational consideration

of the good and the moderate soundness of mind this entails. This passage clearly illustrates the opposition between σωφροσυνή and ὕβρις emphasized by Foucault, an opposition which the *Phaedrus* understands as that between reason and madness.

Socrates faults this conception of love for being too limited at *Phaedrus* 244a, and his second speech begins by developing a distinction between different kinds of madness (μανία) that produce different kinds of love.[22] This passage both conclusively identifies love as a kind of madness and distinguishes between good and bad madness. Like the harmful madness, beneficial madness involves being out of one's mind (μανίνεται) and so is hubristic in this sense. However, it is a divinely inspired loss of control that brings human beings some of their greatest goods, including (1) prophesy, (2) relief from suffering, (3) poetry, and (4) recollection of the beauty of the forms.[23] At 266a, Socrates confirms the division of madness (παράνοια) between a bad and hubristic sickness and a good, divinely inspired mania. Both involve being out of one's mind and are thus hubristically opposed to σωφροσυνή. However, divine madness can produce nearly identical results to σωφροσυνή,while destructive madness produces the opposite effect. Cephalus' grandchildren—the *Phaedrus'* first and second speeches on love—provide no account of this divinely inspired madness.

The *Republic* too fails to recognize the benefits of divine madness. As the dialogue opens, Cephalus is at the cusp of death and singularly concerned with the fate of his soul. His character is introduced as strikingly old and prior to Socrates' arrival he has been offering a sacrifice. Cephalus argues that the greatest good wealth can provide is to allow for just actions and numerous sacrifices in order to prepare one's soul for death.[24] This response highlights the terror that Cephalus experiences in the face of death. "When someone thinks his end is near, he becomes *frightened* and *concerned* about things he didn't *fear* before. It's then that the stories we're told about Hades, about how people who've been unjust here must pay the penalty there—stories he used to make fun of—*twist his soul* this way and that for *fear* they're true" (*Republic* 330d-e, emphasis mine). There can be little doubt that Cephalus is dominated by fear of death,[25] and while the reasons that he fears death are not explicitly Foucauldian, the fear itself is.

Cephalus' fondness for poetry links the fear of death to this artistic genre. He references Homer at 329a,[26] Sophocles at 329b-d, and Pindar at 331a. Significantly, he agrees with the views expressed by each of them. Finally, he blames the stories about Hades—which are certainly found in Homer as well as the tragic poets—for his fear of death, explicitly connecting the fear of death to poetry.

When Cephalus agrees that justice is "speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred" (ibid. 331c) Socrates quickly refutes this through an instance of *insanity*, of an individual who is "out of his mind [μανείς]" (ibid.). Cephalus' conception of justice can not account for the mad because it demands the same treatment and the same rights for all individuals regardless of their psychological condition. Plato uses μανείς to describe the insane. This verb means to be enraged with anger in Homer and to be mad (insane) or beside oneself in later usage.[27] Clearly, it recalls a hubristic loss of control, and Socrates' unwillingness to return weapons to an individual in such a condition illustrates that this does not denote an instance of divine madness as described in the *Phaedrus*.

Preliminarily, the refutation of Cephalus anticipates the noble lie: the perfectly just rulers must be able to lie in order to create the best society.[28] If justice required telling the truth unconditionally, *The Republic* would be unjust. Indirectly, this refutation prefigures the expulsion of the insane as well, a point that becomes more evident later in the dialogue. Telling the truth is banished because one must not always be honest with the insane. However, the insane themselves must also be banished; for one cannot tell the truth or repay debts to them *because they would act unjustly*. Thus Socrates upholds the right to lie because of the insane, while simultaneously prohibiting madness because the mad are likely to act unjustly.

Cephalus quickly gives up, being much more interested in sacrificing to the gods in order to overcome his fear of death than engaging Socrates in philosophical conversation. Through the image of Cephalus departing to tend to his sacrifice, Plato foreshadows the expulsion of the comic and tragic poets, the fear

of death, as well as the insane from his *polis*,[29] while uniting these three themes in a single figure. As Cephalus departs, he takes with him a conception of justice that prohibits lying in addition to a political vision that would recognize death as something fearful and allow madness the right to exist.

Much like the character of Cephalus, Book III also links poetry to madness and the fear of death. From 386a to 388e, Socrates criticizes epic and tragic poetry primarily because they represent heroes fearing death and lamenting suffering, ultimately excluding all such art from *The Republic*. Poets must not represent Hades as being "full of terrors" (ibid., 386b), which is exactly how Cephalus fears it to be. Over the course of Book III, Socrates excludes tragic and comic poets from citizenship in his city because their artistic representations of fear and violent laughter would cause citizens to lose restraint (καρτερῶν at 388d), moderation (σωοφροσύης at 389d) and self-mastery (ἐγκράτειαν ἑαυτοῦ at 390b).[30] This loss of self-restraint can only lead to destructive hubristic madness.

As if emphasizing just this point, Socrates also forbids children from imitating bad individuals, including the mad. "They mustn't become accustomed to making themselves like madmen [μαινομένοις] in either word or deed, for, though they must know about mad [μαινομένοις] and vicious men and women, they must neither do nor imitate anything they do" (ibid. 396a). This passage prohibits madness from occurring among the citizens of Socrates' *polis*. Further, because Socrates insists that his citizens must know about both mad and vicious people, he exhibits a very different desire from that which leads to confinement. Socrates' resistance to confining and silencing the mad provides a reason to interpret Cephalus' early exit as the embarkation of madness.

Conclusion

If accepted, this interpretation informs the encounter with the poets in Book X. The exclusion of poetry is based primarily on its relationship to pleasure and pain. "If you admit the pleasure-giving Muse, whether in lyric or epic poetry, pleasure and pain will be kings in your city instead of law or the thing that everyone has always believed to be best, namely, reason [λόγου]" (*Republic* 607a). Socrates cautions that the presence of poetry will cause citizens to be ruled by pleasure rather than by reason, likely leading to the hubristic excess that the *Phaedrus* identifies as harmful madness. However, Book X allows that poetry can return if it is able to defend itself by demonstrating it to be, "beneficial both to constitutions and to human life" (ibid. 607d). The most straightforward reading of this offer is that divinely inspired *beneficial* madness includes poetry as one of its kinds. According to the *Phaedrus*, such madness can produce the same effects upon the human soul as σοφροσύνη. If "the charm of the pleasure-giving muse" (ibid. 607c) is shown to be beneficial, this would be because as beneficial madness it produces effects similar to the divinely inspired recollection of the forms.

While this reading is well grounded, the close connection between Cephalus, insanity, death, and art suggests an alternative interpretation. The fact that Cephalus is the patriarch of the speeches that only recognize bad madness insinuates that his relationship to madness in the *Republic* may be similarly construed. Yet Plato's depiction of his character suggests that a different kind of madness—one far more Foucauldian—may be operative in this text. This other madness, entirely absent from the divisions of the *Phaedrus*, would represent the truth of non-being.[31] In *Madness and Civilization* this truth presents itself to humanity through art as the visible presence of death itself, a role fulfilled by Cephalus in the *Republic*. Each time madness appears in this dialogue, it is a problem that must be banished from Socrates' theoretical society as the *Republic* offers no direct account of the benefits of divinely inspired madness.

Foucault's history of insanity suggests that practicing embarkation with respect to madness admits the possibility of a contrary to reason and to *logos*.[32] While Foucault maintains that the Greek *logos* has no contrary, the *Republic* prefers embarkation to confinement as the primary form of exclusion: Cephalus and the poets embark in exile rather than being totally silenced. Could this reveal a Platonic hesitation, a concession that the contrary of the Greek *logos*—the abysmal wisdom behind insanity's folly—may in fact exist, against

Foucault's own assertion? *Madness and Civilization* not only provides an avenue of interpretation for the relationship between madness and art in Plato, but the *Republic* itself challenges Foucault's insight regarding the silencing of reason's contrary at the origins of Western philosophy.

Through his love of poetry, his concern with death, and his lack of interest in Socratic justice, Cephalus suggests a hidden meaning of Platonic madness: a recognition that the blindness of the mad might not be error, but could perhaps be dazzlement caused by gazing too long into a dark truth. Socrates reinforces this possibility by directly connecting the fear of death with poetic representation. If the Foucauldian interpretation of art can be shown to be operative in the *Republic*, Socrates' hesitation regarding its exclusion would have a far more significant impact than simply allowing his citizens to experience the pleasure of poetry. If the poets are able to defend themselves and have their ship of fools readmitted to Socrates' *Republic*, this would not justify the poets as much as disrupt the *kallipolis* to the point of dissolution. The defense of poetry would not prove that it belongs in a just society, but rather that a well-governed city born from the sovereign rule of reason is founded upon an error in addition to a lie.

ENDNOTES

1. Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), xi. Hereafter MC.
2. See Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 3–4 for a discussion of the relationship between leprosy and madness.
3. See *Madness and Civilization*, xi. For an analysis of the relationship between the Greek *Logos* and classical reason, see Jacques Derrida, "Cogito and the History of Madness," in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 31–63. Derrida criticizes Foucault's position that the Greek *Logos* has no contrary by suggesting that the Socratic victory over *hubris* perhaps already shows, "the marks of a deportation and an exile of logos from itself, the wounds left in it by a decision, a difference; and then the structure of exclusion which Foucault wishes to describe in his book could not have been born with classical reason" (40). This point grounds Derrida's overall critique of *Madness and Civilization* that Foucault artificially begins his analysis of the exclusion of madness with Descartes in the classical age. I follow Derrida's view that the exclusion of madness may begin long before Descartes. However, I argue that rather than being problematized by this position, Foucault's work in fact suggests and reinforces it.
4. See Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon With a Revised Supplement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1751 for σωφροσυνή, and 1841 for ὕβρις.
5. Compare with Plato's *Sophist* 258e–259a where Plato's Eleatic Stranger declines to discuss a contrary of being, limiting his discussion to its contradictory. See also "Cogito and the History of Madness," 34–42 for Derrida's critique of Foucault's analysis of this silencing.
6. See *Madness and Civilization* on the forcible expulsion of the mad (8); on the point that not all of the insane were driven away (9); and on the ritualization of exclusionary practices (10). On the relationship between madness and art: "Indeed, from the fifteenth century on, the face of madness has haunted the imagination of Western man" and "up to the second half of the fifteenth century, or even a little beyond, the theme of death reigns alone" (ibid., 15).
7. Consider the following passage in support of this point: "the substitution of the theme of madness for that of death does not mark a break, but rather a torsion within the same anxiety. What is in question is still the nothingness of existence, but this nothingness is no longer considered an external, final term, both threat and conclusion; it is experienced from within as the continuous and constant form of existence" (ibid., 16).
8. In the plastic arts, this meaning reveals itself as a cosmic truth belonging to the world. The secret of nature is the annihilation of the individual contrary to any religious or philosophical purpose. Foucault finds a different interpretation of madness in Renaissance literature and philosophy. Rather than representing a truth belonging to nature itself, lit-

erature portrays madness as the dark truth of human *knowledge*. See ibid., 17–18, 22, and 25–26 on this distinction. In "The Archaeology of Foucault," in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, ed. David Couzens Hoy (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), 27–40, Ian Hacking argues that *Madness and Civilization* mistakenly romanticizes madness as having a pure and prior, although non-conceptual, meaning (28–29). Contrarily, in *Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth* (New York: Routledge, 1994), Alan Sheridan denies a fixed meaning to madness by arguing, "madness is not initially a fact, but a judgement" (13). I follow Sheridan and find passages such as those cited above to advocate a changing meaning of madness in different times and different media. This in part explains Foucault's claim in "Truth and Power," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 109–33, that in *Madness and Civilization* he was talking about power (115).

9. Foucault argues that the literary representation of madness as a challenge to knowledge determines the future of Western culture's relationship to the condition. Because the madness of literature challenges a human truth rather than a cosmic truth, Foucault finds it to give rise to a moral interpretation. Further, the literary madness of the fifteenth century, while still thoroughly challenging reason, does present itself in the language of reason: words and concepts. It uses language to challenge any truth of language; it presents itself as a contrary to *logos* through the *logos* itself. See Sheridan, *Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth*, 18–23 for a clear discussion of this distinction.
10. "In the literature of the seventeenth century [madness] occupies, by preference, a median place; it thus constitutes a knot more than the denouement, the peripity rather than the final release. Displaced in the economy of narrative and dramatic structures, it authorizes the manifestation of truth and the return of reason" (*Madness and Civilization*, 32).
11. See ibid., 36.
12. See ibid., 115–16. Foucault makes this point quite succinctly: "the strict expression of [confinement's] meaning: an operation to annihilate nothingness" (ibid., 116).
13. "There is only one word which summarizes this experience, *Unreason*: all that, for reason, is closest and most remote, emptiest and most complete; all that presents itself to reason in familiar structures—authorizing a knowledge, and then a science, which seeks to be positive—and all that is constantly in retreat from reason, in the inaccessible domain of nothingness" (ibid., 107, emphasis original). See also ibid., 14–17, 22–23, 25–27, and 106–09 on the question of unreason and the meaning of madness as nothingness.
14. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 42, on the wisdom of Silenus. See *Madness and Civilization*, 25 for a reference to Silenus.
15. Derrida maintains Foucault's turn to art, specifically regarding "the absence of the work," as one of the most profound moments in the text because it grapples with the difficulty that "madness is what by essence cannot be said" ("Cogito and the History of Madness," 43). See *Madness and Civilization*, 287–89 for Foucault's development of this interpretation of art. The following passages help clarify his view: (1) "Madness is no longer the space of indecision through which it was possible to glimpse the original truth of the work of art, but the decision beyond which this truth ceases irrevocably, and hangs forever over history" (287); (2) "Through madness, a work that seems to drown in the world, to reveal there its non-sense, and to transfigure itself with the features of pathology alone, actually engages within itself the world's time, masters it, and leads it; by the madness which interrupts it, a work of art opens a void, a moment of silence, a question without answer, provokes a breach without reconciliation where the world is forced to question itself" (288); (3) "There is no madness except as the final instant of the work of art—the work endlessly drives madness to its limits; *where there is a work of art, there is no madness*; and yet madness is contemporary with the work of art, since it inaugurates the time of its truth" (288–89).
16. See Plato, *Republic* 607b-e, trans. G. M. A. Grube and revised by C. D. C. Reeve, in *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 971–1223. For a thorough analysis of the relationship between philosophy, poetry, and education in the *Republic*, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Plato and the Poets," in *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 39–72. Gadamer argues that Plato never seriously intends to allow the poets to return (43) and that he revisits the question in Book X only to further deface the

value of poetry (46) with respect to rational education. While I follow much of Gadamer's analysis, I take Socrates' conditional offer for the poets' return more seriously than Gadamer allows. For an alternative reading, see Leo Strauss, "On Plato's Republic," in *The City and Man* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 50–138. Strauss argues that the poets are allowed to return because philosophers can become poets, as illustrated by the Platonic dialogue (136–37).

17. Compare this point with Socrates' admission that perhaps the soul is not immortal at *Phaedo* 91a-c and 107c-d.
18. All quotations are from Plato, *Phaedrus*, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, in *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 506–56. Alan Bloom emphasizes the significance of Cephalus being the father to the scene of the *Republic* in his "Interpretive Essay" published with his translation of *The Republic of Plato* (New York: BasicBooks, 1991), 312.18
19. "If Phaedrus and I said anything that shocked you in our earlier speech, blame it on Lysias, who was its father, and put a stop to his making speeches of this sort; convert him to philosophy, like his brother Polemarchus so that his lover here may no longer play both sides as he does now, but simply devote his life to Love through philosophical discussions" (*Phaedrus* 257B).
20. "Sick" translates νοσεῖν, the active infinitive of νοσέω, which means both to be sick as for example from the plague as well as to be mad as from the passions (Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 1181). This has important implications with respect to Foucault's views on the treatment of madness as an illness that cannot be developed in this essay.
21. "Now when judgment is in control and leads us by reasoning toward what is best, that sort of self-control is called 'being in your right mind' [σοφροσυνή]; but when desire takes command in us and drags us without reasoning toward pleasure, then its command is known as 'outrageousness' [ὑβρις]" (*Phaedrus* 237e–238a).21
22. Socrates states this point very clearly at 244a, in correcting the mistake of his first speech: "That would have been fine to say if madness were bad, pure and simple; but in fact the best things we have come from madness, when it is given as a gift of the god." He repeats this distinction at 265a: "We did say, didn't we, that love is a kind of madness? Yes. And that there are two kinds of madness, one produced by human illness, the other by a divinely inspired release from normally accepted behavior? Certainly."
23. See *Phaedrus* 244b–245b and 249d–250a on the divisions of beneficial madness. Socrates opposes μαίνεται to σωφρονεῖ at *Phaedrus* 244a, showing that madness is opposed to σωφροσυνή just as ὕβρις is. This is said of bad madness. But he also opposes good madness as μαινεῖσαι to σωφρονοῦσαι at 244b, as long as the mania comes from a god. Socrates relates that the greatest goods (happiness in this life and the afterlife) can come to human beings through either σωφροσυνή or μανία. "There is no greater good than this that either human self-control [σωφροσυνή] or divine madness [μανία] can offer a man" (*Phaedrus* 256b).
24. See *Republic* 330d–331b.
25. As the passage continues, Cephalus makes the following remarks: "he is filled with foreboding and fear;" "he awakes from sleep in terror;" and "wealth can do a lot to save us . . . from having to depart for that other place in fear" (330e–331b). For thorough interpretations of Cephalus' character in the *Republic*, see Bloom, "Interpretive Essay," 312–16, and Strauss, "On Plato's Republic," 65–70. Bloom emphasizes the age and authority of Cephalus, arguing that Cephalus must be banished from the scene because the presence of his authority makes his view irrefutable (312). Bloom does point to Cephalus' fear of death (313–14), but he interprets this as something that wealth can overcome. Strauss discusses Cephalus' relationship to the poets (66) and his fear of death (67), but does not find them to be connected. Like Bloom, Strauss finds Cephalus' fear of death to be something easily overcome with wealth.
26. See Grube, *Republic* Book I, footnote 5.
27. See Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 1078; μανείς an aorist passive participle of μαίνομαι.
28. See *Republic* 382b-e, 414b-415d, and 459c-460c. Strauss develops the relationship between Cephalus' definition of justice and the noble lie ("On Plato's Republic," 72).
29. See *Republic* 386a–387b, 486a–b, and 603e–604c for the prohibition against citizens fearing death; 387c–388e and 568b for the exclusion of the tragic poets, 388e–389b for the exclusion of the comic poets, and 396a for the exclusion of madness. See also 400b, 402e, 496c, 573a-b, and 586b-c for Socrates' negative opinion regarding madness. Additionally, Socrates' use of ἀφρόνων (senseless,

crazed, frantic: Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 294) at 607b and ἀφροσύης (meaning folly, thoughtlessness: Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 294) at 619b should be considered.

30. "I divine you're looking into the question of whether or not we'll allow tragedy and comedy into our city" (394d). See also 388e–389a against comedy and 386a–388d against tragedy. However, it must be noted that 392c maintains that no final conclusions can be drawn until the definition of justice is discovered, thereby introducing the need to revisit this question in Book X.
31. As construed, it must be absent from the *Phaedrus* because it cannot be captured by the method of division; for it fundamentally lacks the being that this method divides up according to kinds. Gadamer distinguishes the modern interpretation of art from the Platonic insofar as the former, "holds that in the symbolic presentation of art one finds the deepest revelation of a truth which no concept can grasp," while the latter "sees art as essentially nothing but imitation ("Plato and the Poets," 59). My interpretation advocates that Plato too recognizes the potential for art to represent non-conceptual truth.
32. Derrida argues that the Socratic dialectic has, "expulsed, excluded, objectified or (curiously amounting to the same thing) assimilated and mastered as one of its moments, 'enveloped' the contrary of reason" ("Cogito and the History of Madness," 40). My analysis finds that the Socratic dialectic does exclude the contrary of reason, but it does not assimilate and master it. Exclusion and assimilation do not amount to the same thing. Following Foucault's distinction between embarkation and confinement, exclusion reveals a lack of mastery.

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