EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

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These papers from the SPEP Seattle '94 and Chicago '95 meetings explore the ways in which the Western continental traditions are open to and create openings for the other. Arranged under the headings of Matters of Love and Justice, The Existential and Phenomenological Fields, Postmodern Surfaces, For and Against Heidegger, these essays show us the many face of the other: the other as sexed and gendered, the other as a race apart, the non-human other of technology, the animal other, the Buddhist other. They ask about the meanings of these others. They probe the ways in which otherness rebounds on our sense of identity, on our understanding of the boundaries of love, on our political commitments. Derrida, Foucault, and Heidegger have been and continue to be crucial figures in this confrontation with otherness. We pursue the openings of Heidegger's works and struggle, sometimes with and sometimes against, their influence on our thinking. We are provoked by the works of Derrida and Foucault to cut new genealogical and deconstructive paths. Guided by these ways of thinking we push this thinking to do new work and in this push we (re)discover the depth and possibilities of the continental legacy.

Matters of Love and Justice

We open this volume with *Matters of Love and Justice*, a group of papers that grapple with what many see as the dominant concerns of our times: the questions of the Other, the meaning of community, the possibilities of/for democracy. Written by and about the central thinkers of our times—Cixous, Deleuze, Habermas, Derrida, and reaching back to Hobbes—these essays reflect current debates concerning the relationships between subjectivity, identity, sex, gender, and race. They explore the possibilities, limits, and dangers of modern, postmodern, hermeneutic, phenomenological, and critical theory approaches to matters of justice and call on us to examine the intersections between the erotic body and the body politic.

We open this section with Hélène Cixous' "Stigmata: Job the Dog." Speaking of love born, betrayed, reborn, and justice, it is a story of boundaries assigned, crossed, overturned, and transgressed. Boundaries as barriers. Boxes that enclose and bar. The opening between the dog and the human, the walls between the Arab, the Jew, the French. The innocent as holocaust. The sister as assassin. Fips, the dog, as Job, the man. Cixous the child who could not forgive the mad dog then. Cixous the woman who loved Fips, not then but now.

Cixous' essay shows what C. Colwell's "Deleuze and the Prepersonal" discusses: the dissolution of the subject requires a revaluation of the reality of the Other and the meaning of community. As long as the subject was secure, it was assumed that a gap existed between the subject and its human other, and that barriers separated the human and the non-human domains. It was also assumed that communities, like subjects, were identity-realities. Given that these assumptions no longer hold, Colwell proposes that we examine Deleuze's notion of the prepersonal for its explanatory, heuristic, and political implications. He asks us to explore the ways in which the prepersonal transforms our idea of the individual, resituates our relationship to the human and non-human other, and alters our sense of community. These transformations, he warns us, are not without their dangers.

As Colwell provocatively delineates the possibilities and dangers of Deleuzian politics, Chantal Mouffe alerts us to the limits of critical theory's politics. Her closely argued essay, "Decision, Deliberation, and Democratic Ethos," relies on Derrida's concept of the constitutive outside to critique Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy. Identifying postmodernism as an ally of democratic pluralism, Mouffe argues that in understanding the ways in which the outside is always already inside we can distinguish the political, the necessary antagonisms constitutive of all human societies, from politics, the practices aimed at controlling/ordering these antagonisms. This distinction allows pluralist democracies to

formulate their social and political conflicts in adversarial and agonistic terms rather than in enemy and antagonistic formulas. It also moves us to accept the fact that agreeing on principles does not mean that we will agree on their interpretation, and that a public sphere of deliberative rational consensus is conceptually impossible.

Marie Fleming's essays, "Critical Theory Between Modernity and Postmodernity," brings a feminist eye to the critical theory-postmodernism dispute. Taking up Richard Bernstein's and Thomas McCarthy's argument that only critical theory can provide an answer to the question: "critique in the name of what?" Fleming finds that critical theorists cannot answer Nancy Fraser's question: can critical theory acknowledge gender differ666ences? Fleming argues that critical theory's inability to adequately address gender issues seriously undermines its stated aim of having practical intent and that to address gender issues adequately critical theory would have to reexamine its assumptions regarding modernity, universality, emancipation, and rationality.

As Mouffe and Fleming test the limits of critical theory politics, Anne Caldwell questions Derrida's political credentials. Her nuanced essay, "Fairytales for Politics," focuses on Derrida's most overtly political work, *Specters of Marx*, to sound out its political implications. Finding these implications wanting, she marks their limits with the names of Heidegger and Irigaray. Named Heidegger, these limits concern Derrida's inability to transform the logic of Heidegger's inscription of justice from a reversal of the logic of metaphysics into a logic that escapes the tradition. Named Irigaray, the limits concern Derrida's inability to establish the basis for reciprocal relations with materially concrete others. Exploring these limits Caldwell determines that though Derrida eloquently formulates the ethical demand as the demand to respect infinite and human alterity, it is Irigaray who shows us how to live in this respect.

That the question of respect is also a matter of the body is a crucial point of Susan Bordo's pointed paper "Can a Woman Harass a Man? Toward a Cultural Understanding of Bodies and Power." Insisting that current conversations about sexual harassment miss the mark, Bordo, shows us how to get them on track. She analyzes contemporary movies, advertising, the Hill-Thomas hearings, and the Packwood affair to focus on the way the ideology of masculinity frames the question of sexual harassment. She calls upon her own experiences of being harassed to argue that harassers are gender bullies and that harassment ought to be understood as the willful reduction/dismissal of one subjectivity by another. Her telling analyses of signs, images, and messages reveals the ways in which the issue of sexual harassment is trivialized, sensationalized, or perverted, and shows us how to read the meanings of these erasures.

While Susan Bordo asks us to rethink our understanding of sexual harassment, Linda martin Alcoff alerts us to the contemporary paradox in our thinking about race. On the one hand, the concept of race has lost its scientific and philosophical credibility. On the other hand, we cannot understand our social or political realities without reference to the category of race. Insisting that we move beyond this paradox, Alcoff's powerful essay, "Philosophy and Racial Identity," makes the case for taking up the philosophical project of understanding racial identity. Assuaging our fears that this project will return us to the terrors of essentialism, she argues that we can retain the category of racial identity without essentializing race if we understand race as an historically real but not metaphysically necessary factor of identity formation and if we take a phenomenological approach to the question of racial identity.

Robert Bernasconi's "Opening the Future: The Paradox of Promising in the Hobbesian Social Contract" convincingly argues that a hermeneutical analysis of the paradoxical logic of Hobbes' social contract theory is pertinent to contemporary questions of race and politics. In making this argument, Bernasconi reminds us that the history of philosophy can be a living force in contemporary political thought. Unwilling to dismiss Hobbes' paradoxes as flaws to be avoided or to consider them as marginal textual slips to be forgotten/forgiven, Bernasconi makes the case that these paradoxes ought to be mined for what they disclose about our relationship to the future, each other, and the state. He shows that Hobbes' paradoxes reveal the interdependence of the individual and the state, and that the promise of the social contract opens us to the promise of the future. He tells us that interrogating the Hobbesian promise and its paradoxes saves us from the dangers of ignoring the political implications of the lack of hope that infects the inner cities and

protects us from the error of seeing the individual and the state as poles of competing interests.

The Phenomenological and Existential Fields

This section of our volume brings us to our roots, phenomenology and existentialism. With two papers examining the writings of the founders of the phenomenological and existential traditions, Husserl and Kierkegaard, and three essays exploring the ways in which the spirit of these traditions speaks to Buddhist, feminist, and technological concerns, we discover the importance of revisiting our roots and the riches of our heritage. We see that the issues raised by phenomenology, especially the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, are not specifically Western, that the existential-phenomenological attention to the lived body cannot ignore the sexed and gendered body, and that the phenomenological concerts of science and lived experience transcend modern science's concept of itself and of the real. In short, we discover that the tradition is alive with possibilities.

Opening this section with Shannon Sullivan's "Fractured Passion in Kierkegaard's *Either/Or*," a close reading of Kierkegaard's seminal work, we see that matters of passion and justice were present at the birth of existentialism. Sullivan's careful analysis demonstrates the fruitfulness of an interesting dilemma in Kierkegaard's *Either/Or*. The superiority of the ethical over the aesthetic, Jude Wilhelm argues, lies in passion, for it is passion that gives the self continuity over time, the unity of resolve and the energy to repeat its choice from day to day. The Judge contrasts this passion invidiously with the aesthete who flits from pleasure to pleasure, from curiosity to curiosity in a discontinuous, fragmentary, irresolute time. But it is also in passion that the self discovers the wrong-headedness of its choices and the need for conversion. That "fractured passion" is not a disaster for the self, Sullivan argues, but a creative possibility; for instead of confining the self to a too narrow unity, it opens up the possibility of a self conceived as what Sullivan calls a "mosaic multiplicity of voices."

David Michael Levin's "Liberating Experience from the Vice of Structuralisms: The Methods of Merleau-Ponty and Nagarjuna" takes this idea of a multiplicity of voices from the question of the individual to the question of cultures by initiating a conversation between the Madhyamika philosophers Nagarjuna and Candrakirti and Merleau-Ponty. His point in creating this conversation is to show that though their ultimate aims differ, the deconstructive activities of Merleau-Ponty and the Madhyamika philosophers address a similar problem, the effect of conceptual structures on our relationship to lived experience, and has a similar effect, we are returned to the truth of lived experience. For the Madhyamika philosophers, this truth is an experience of openness. For Merleau-Ponty, this truth directs us to the logos of experience. Levin's point in opening these different ways of thinking to each other and in opening us to these different ways of thinking is not to argue that the Buddhists were phenomenologists but to show that in addressing the problem of the relationship between lived experience and its conceptual structures, Nagarjuna and Candrakirti anticipate questions raised by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and direct us to ways of fleshing out his positions. In this way, he shows us how to listen to voices from other times and cultures with contemporary Western ears that are attentive without being reductive.

As Levin ponders the relationship between Buddhism and phenomenology, Anna Alexander explores the way in which the relationship between phenomenology/existentialism and feminism has played with the figure of Simone de Beauvoir. Her paper, "The Eclipse of Gender: Simone de Beauvoir and the Différance of Translation," uses différance/différence as a heuristic and hermeneutical tool to interpret the erasure of Beauvoir's sexed and gendered philosophy of the Other and to examine the gap between *The Second Sex* and *Le Deuxième Sexe*. By bridging the gap and refusing to allow the erasure to prevail, Alexander details the ways in which de Beauvoir's philosophy in situation grounds her concept of the singular body that is lived both as a thing and as a point of view. In showing that this philosophy in situation and this view of the singular body expresses the spirit of phenomenology and existentialism, and by arguing that this concept and view are the most profound insights of twentieth century philosophy, Alexander places de Beauvoir's feminist thought at the heart of the continental tradition.

The themes of situation and reading are taken up by Marianne Sawicki's "Empathy Before and After Husserl," as she introduces us to the practice of situated reading. Sawicki is interested in

Husserl's evolving treatment of empathy. Her carefully researched paper argues that to understand Husserl's new science of phenomenology and its treatment of intersubjectivity adequately, we must take account of Munich phenomenology (especially the work of Theodor Lipps) and explore the textual production of Husserl's works (especially the role of Edith Stein). Her analysis reveals Husserl's debt to and difference from Lipps and explores the implications of his differences with Edith Stein. It shows us how these debts and differences are at work in Husserl's theory of intersubjective exchangeability.

Moving from the situation of reading to the situation of the environment, Don Ihde's innovative "Whole Earth Measurements" argues that phenomenology can take up environmental issues if it abandons its modern understanding of science and pursues its intuitions regarding perception, world constitution, and praxis. He introduces the concept Technoscience and the perspective Earth-as-Planet to get us beyond Husserl's classical understanding of science and beyond romantic reductionism. The effect of Ihde's concept and perspective is to disrupt the association of technology with bad artificiality and to understand it in terms of mediated perceivability. In providing an account of science's instrumental realism, Ihde shows us how to develop a hermeneutic of things and how to place phenomenologists in a position to detect the Greenhouse Effect. Finding a place of phenomenology in the field of environmental politics, Ihde refigures and revitalizes the phenomenological theme: to the things themselves.

Postmodern Surfaces

The Society continues to wrestle with the complexities of postmodernism, with Derrida and Foucault and their provocative antecedent, Nietzsche, whose desire to be "superficial—out of profundity" is one of the hallmarks of the postmodern.

We open this section with David Wood's insightful analysis of responsibility and God in Derrida's *The Gift of Death*, his encounter with Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*. Derrida finds the very paradigm of responsibility in the paradox that Kierkegaard describes, viz., the unavoidable necessity to sacrifice the general, ethics (=Isaac) in response to the call of singularity, the Other (= god). When I feed my children, Derrida says, I let all the other children in the world starve. But Wood has several worries: that Derrida here denies the situatedness of obligation and implies that we occupy a universal space in which we may with equal ease be anywhere, anytime; that the supposition that the gaze of all the suffering in the world is upon me is to exaggerate my own importance, that there is a voice of insatiable guilt here. Wood also wonders about the link between God and subjectivity when Derrida ways that the name of "God" is the name of an invisible interiority, of an interior secret, between me and god, between me and myself, a link that is no less closely made in *The Sickness Unto Death*. Is this a psychological reduction of God? Was Kierkegaard himself implicated in it? Does it turn around into a genuine, radical saying about God, or about the structure of the self and its relation to the Other? Does all this testify to the truth of what Sartre—perhaps Levinas, Derrida's most important source, Wood surprisingly suggests—said, in an essay on Kierkegaard, about the difficulty of becoming an atheist?

The transition from Derrida to Foucault is effected by Michael Naas, a frequent translator of Derrida's works, who here joins the name of Derrida with that of Foucault with the aim of tracing the path—of following the pendulum swings back and forth—of their famous exchange. Naas begins with one of the more historical exchanges in recent French thought, thirty years ago, when Derrida criticized the very possibility of writing something called *The History of Madness* and Foucault made a stinging rejoinder some years later. This debate continues even today, after the death of Foucault, with Derrida's "To Do Justice to Freud" (1991), in which Derrida addresses Foucault's ambivalent attitude to Freud, an ambivalence, as Derrida contends, rooted in Freud himself. What Naas sees in the debate between Derrida and Foucault over Descartes and Freud is a debate over mastery and discipleship: whether Descartes is the master of madness, whether Foucault is the master of Descartes and Freud, and finally the question of who between them, Derrida and Foucault, is finally judge the master—recalling that in 1963 Derrida called himself "an admiring and grateful disciple." Who does justice, to who is justice due, after these thirty years? Naas suggests that in the end Derrida is questioning the very idea of mastery as a way to approach a text. To do justice to Foucault is to stay with the questioning of mastery itself astir in his texts,

which exceeds the economy of master and disciple and opens to the future.

In the first of three papers on Foucault in this section, Alan Schrift picks up this point concerning the questioning of mastery, of the sovereign subject, in Foucault's work. Schrift issues a warning about overreacting to this tendency and missing what is distinctive about Foucault's last writings, in which Foucault attempts variously to reconfigure the individual human subject. No doubt, there is a powerful Nietzschean trajectory in the early writings that delimits the role of the subject as the origin and author of discourse, as sovereign subject. But Schrift pursues Foucault's later interest in the practices of subjection and liberation that constitute the subject as either subjected or liberated, such forms of subjectivation belonging to what Foucault calls ethics, the care of the self. Foucault's view of the relations of power leads neither to resigned surrender to uninterrupted oppression nor to Habermas's transparent communication, but rather to "allowing these games of power to be played with a minimum of dominaation." To illustrate this possibility Schrift turns to the work of Judith Butler and Chantal Mouffe.

Responding to a question put to Foucault by Elizabeth Grosz, Ladelle McWhorter pursues Foucault's distinction between the surface of bodies and pleasure, on the one hand, and deep sexual desire, on the other. She defends the "strategic" superiority of the body and pleasures over desire, which is, she contends, given to a dangerous liaison with normalization and biopower, far too entangled with the forces that would regulate sexuality. The production of the desiring subject, made possible by Christianity, which constitutes the self and its desire as a matter for interpretation and confession, is the precursor of the emergence of the interior sexual subject in the nineteenth century, culminating in the birth of psychoanalysis. Pleasures and bodies, the pleasures *of* bodies, on the other hand, afford the more effective sites of resistance, because they have not been as rigorously normalized as sexual desire and afford us opportunities, not to discover who we are, but to refuse who we are.

Kristin Switala examines the question of whether Foucault remains trapped with modernity by pursuing two mutations or shifts in language described by the early Foucault: (1) from language as representation in the classical age to the subject-centered language of the modern age and (2) the shift from modern language to what Foucault at first calls an archeology and then, later on, a genealogy. About these mutations Switala wants to know three things: (1) does such a shift beyond modernity actually take place? (2) How do the archaeological and the genealogical differ and what are the limitations of the former that occasion the shift to the latter? And (3) is genealogy truly non-modern? She concludes that while archaeology remains confined by modernity, because it tried simply to eliminate the subject, genealogy does signify a radical shift because it traces the mutation from the modern subject into something else, the "transdiscursive author" in "post-modern language."

In the final paper in this section, James Mangiafico takes up Nietzsche's conception of the value of truth, a notion that in various ways constitutes the doorway through which both Foucault and Derrida have passed. Mangiafico challenges the contention of Maudemarie Clark (following Walter Kaufmann) that Nietzsche never gave up on the will to truth, on his "commitment to truth," which on Clark's view is separable from the "ascetic ideal" that he did critique. Mangiafico argues that for Nietzsche an unconditional will to truth, placing an unconditional value on truth—a value shared by philosophy, science, and atheism!—is self-defeating, that it undermines its own condition of possibility. Arising from the desire not to deceive, the will to truth stands on moral ground, not on considerations of utility; but this very Christian truthfulness makes the whole supersensible order of divine truth questionable, so that it is led to "infer its own demise." Against this ideal of truth, Mangiafico concludes, Nietzsche sets up the artist's love of surfaces, the artistic desire to be "superficial—out of profundity."

Reading With and Against Heidegger

Heidegger continues to be a topic of major interest to the Society. The first two studies presented here, by John Protevi and Joseph Margolis, make probing critiques of Heidegger, while Krzysztof Ziarek meditates along with Heidegger and Benjamin on the work of art. The section concludes with two pieces, by Steven Crowell and John Sallis, that belong to the ambiance of Heidegger's work and are offered *in memoriam* to two honored members of the Society, Werner Marx and André Schuwer.

In an incisive and provocative essay, John Protevi examines Heidegger's thematization of the "difficulty" of philosophy in the lecture course on the *Sophist*. Protevi scrutinizes Heidegger's effacing of the primacy of locomotion in Aristotle in favor of the "motility" (*Bewegtheit*) of the temporality of authentic Dasein. This implicates Heidegger in a reduction of the body in need—naked and hungry, pressed by the necessity of labor—and hence in a certain decorporealization and spirtualization of Dasein, which is a gesture ripe with political consequences. For the difficulty of philosophy for the Greeks lay in the necessity of being "given time," given the "leisure" necessary to acquire *sophia*, a difficulty laid squarely on the bodies of slaves, workers, and women. Heidegger passes over *that* difficulty, real and ontical and metonological as it is, in favor of another difficulty, that of resisting everydayness in order to struggle with Being, while going so far as to attribute to the *polloi*—the many who were driven into the ground by their labors—the "laziness" and inertia of the everyday drift into thoughtlessness. Surely one of the "most remarkable" "inversions," Protevi comments, in all of Heidegger's works! The Greek affection for the contemplation of presence, Protevi concludes, arises from an aristocratic anxiety over their incarceration of the bodies of slaves, women, and workers—which Aristotle reads as brought upon them by their stupidity and Heidegger by their laziness.

Joseph Margolis, seeking both to praise Heidegger and, if not to bury him, at least to break the spell of Heideggarian "sorcery," sets forth a typically elegant and well-wrought argument that identifies two important problems with Heidegger. The first paradox is Heidegger's attempt in *Being and Time* to make "Dasein" do a dual—and impossible—service, both ontical and ontological, both as the name of the Being of an ontically determinate entity, and the name of an entity that, while working under ineluctable historical constraints, is asked to be the opening to Being itself, the simply transcendent (rather like the transcendental-empirical couplet in Kant and Husserl). Too subjectivistically conceived in *Being and Time*,this relationship is fantastically reconceived in "A Letter on Humanism," s that we are asked to believe that Being speaks and Dasein/man listens, and that the latter is able to discern true from false ways of listening. The latter (fantastical) difficulty, depending on keeping a cocked ear close to the mouth of Being, is "mad," linked to Heidegger's Nazism, and beyond repair, but the former (subjectivistic) one is corrigible and promising. This would turn on reinstating and reconsidering the thorough-going historicity and contingency of any possible understanding of Being of which Dasein may at any given time be possessed.

The third contribution to this section, by Krzysztof Ziarek, undertakes a probing study of the relationship between poetry and experience in Heidegger and Benjamin. Ziarek seeks out the "non-aesthetic" element in art, by which he means the capacity of the work of art to critique and subvert modernity, an element that cannot be accounted for by aesthetic categories like taste and judgment. In particular, Ziarek is interested in how the work of art in technological modernity, in the age of the *Gestell* (Heidegger) or of mechanical reproduction (Benjamin), retains a "poietic" role that challenges and resists the rule of technological rationality. The poietic role of art, Ziarek argues, lies in its disclosive power, its capacity to reveal the world in its radical heterogeneity and difference, and to critique the homogeneity of technological regimentation.

The final two pieces in this section were submitted *in memoriam* for sessions devoted to honor the passing of two distinguished members of the Society, Werner Marx and André Schuwer. Steven Crowell's contribution to the symposium, dedicated to the memory of the work of Werner Marx, draws a portrait of Marx as a philosopher who thinks "with, beyond (or even against) Heidegger" in order to bring his work to bear in a domain—in particular of ethics—into which Heidegger himself would not venture. In so doing, Werner Marx also remained loyal to the phenomenological method (the Lehrstuhl at Freiburg to which he succeeded had belonged to both Heidegger and Husserl). In a thoughtful essay, Crowell follows Marx's meditation on our mortality as the phenomenological basis of an ethics of neighborliness in which Marx located the human bond, for it is our common mortality that brings us near one another.

While his is not an essay on Heidegger, John Sallis leads us through a meditation on bread and wine that belongs to the space that is opened up by Heidegger. Sallis develops the theme of "bread and wine" in a "broad range of registers"—the phrase "bread and wine" is the

title of a famous elegy by Hölderlin on which Heidegger has commented. It evokes the Christian sacrament of the Eucharist; it names a common gift we share among friends. A fitting gift for André Schuwer, who was a Franciscan priest, a reader of Heidegger and Hölderlin, a deeply loved friend of many members of this Society. Sallis explores the question of how bread and wine, as "things of sense," for eating and drinking, could signify the divine, by following two readings that disturb their functioning as a sign. The first reading follows the evolution of Hegel's commentary on the Christian Eucharist in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*; the second is taken from Hölderlin. Sallis argues that Hegel's account fails just where Hölderlin's succeeds, for bread and wine are truly signs not when they aim to make something present again but when, as in Hölderlin, safeguarding the distance of the divine, they signify the absence of the gods and serve as traces of the gods who have flown.