EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

The twenty-two essays that make up this volume were selected from nearly one hundred papers delivered at the forty-second annual meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP). Those delivered at the meeting were, in turn, only a fraction of the more than three hundred papers submitted for consideration. The present volume thus provides a glimpse into the rich and diverse field of continental philosophy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The editors have made no attempt to impose thematic consistency on their selections, and a second fine volume could have been constructed from those not chosen. But a reader who dips into this one at any point is certain to find something to think about. Each essay makes an interesting point, and makes it well.

It is instructive to reflect upon what it means that a number of essays which exhibit neither stylistic nor thematic continuity can nevertheless genuinely belong together—to reflect, that is, on what an association like SPEP represents. It is often said that SPEP is an "umbrella" organization, in which the various intellectual directions that go under the rubric of "continental philosophy" find a home: in addition to phenomenology and existentialism, there is hermeneutics, critical theory, feminist thought, post-structuralism, race theory, and much besides. But the metaphor of the umbrella is not really appropriate, for it conjures up a picture of isolated individuals (or isolated intellectual currents) that just happen to be standing in the same place to get out of the rain, and this does not do justice to the complex relationships that unite these "individuals," however different they may be, and testify, however obliquely, to something like a common project. As a figure for these connections, the idea of a "network" offers itself.

In one sense, though, a network is precisely the wrong idea. The television conglomerates that go under this name exist in order to deliver a uniform content to as wide an audience as possible, and this is hardly characteristic of SPEP or of continental philosophy. Nor is the internet quite the right way to think of it. Connections between websites can, but need not, be anything more than a matter of whim; one site may "link on" to another (as Lyotard might say) for any reason, or for no reason. Such linkage neither stems from, nor need it create, any form of commonality—it could, but it need not. In contrast, for all its diversity something holds SPEP together and informs the sense that this work belongs somehow to a common project. There is, of course, the opportunity for "networking," but this isn't the sort of thing that can account for the commonality in diversity, since it already presupposes it. Perhaps the idea of a network can yield a way to think about this if we focus on its humble root, the net.

One familiar kind of net is made up of a series of knots in which distinct strands intersect, and we might think of these as individuals who find themselves at the intersection of distinct traditions. There is a certain integrity to these "positions," but there is also flexibililty and movement. This movement, however, is holistic: to pull on one strand of the net is to make ripples in the rest, since the net itself, while one can always add to it, has, at any given time, a kind of definition. That is because a net is usually used for something.

One use for a net is to carry things. Like the European shopper who brings home the bread and butter in a netted tote, the SPEP network serves to hold what sustains us, what we have found in our search through the intellectual bazaar. Only together can such things be held; the individual knots, and the strands, cannot keep and preserve them. On this view, there is something that would be lost if phenomenologists were not netted up with feminists, post-structuralists were not linked with critical theorists. We could "carry" less, or nothing at all.

Before we can carry something, however, we have to catch it, and in this task, too, nets come in handy. As each of us pursues an in-

dividual path of research, extending a strand or tradition, we contribute to a more general fishing expedition, reducible to no single effort, so long as our strands make up a net. A net can get tangled, certainly, and thus become relatively useless; but there is no ultimate difference between knots that were "intended" and knots that emerged from what started out as hopeless tangles—so long as the net can trap its quarry. Further, from the standpoint of an individual knot or strand what gets drawn up in the net might well appear less the sea's treasure than the shore's detritus, but the logic of the net entails that no one will be in a position to make that judgment with certainty. And some fish are sure to be caught this way.

We should note, finally, that it is thanks to the net's grid structure that something can be caught and retained in it. If we are after very large things, then the grid need not be too refined; but the more subtle the prey the tighter the grid needs to be. An organization such as SPEP, then, will want to ensure that it can add strands and knots wherever refinement is needed. There are many areas of philosophy that are not now part of this net that could, if linked on in imaginative ways, yield an interesting haul. Nevertheless, perhaps the most important lesson of the net is this: however refined the grid, something will always escape. For this reason, we cast it out again and again, each year, hoping to catch something new.

Language, History, Hermeneutics

This section is comprised of four essays, each of which mines the work of a different philosopher (Ricoeur, Levinas, Gadamer, and Heidegger) in an effort both to elucidate the ways in which questions of language, history, hermeneutics, and their intersection upon one another have been addressed by each philosopher with respect to a particular issue, and to raise critical questions in response to each philosopher's treatment of these issues. The topics explored in this section include Ricoeur on the philosophy of history, Levinas on the ethical relation in *Otherwise Than Being*, Gadamer on the self-excessive character of speech, and finally,

Heidegger and the emergence of the German community as an authentic "we."

The first essay by David Pellauer entitled, "Hermeneutics and Philosophy of History: Ricoeur at Ninety," examines the way in which concern over the philosophy of history has permeated Ricoeur's work from *History and Truth* up through his most recent work, *Memory, History, Forgetting*. Pellauer begins by elucidating Ricoeur's more explicit considerations of the philosophy of history in texts including *History and Truth* and *Time and Narrative*, and argues that Ricoeur still explores many of the issues surrounding "doing" a philosophy of history even after his hermeneutical turn that begins with the text, *The Symbolism of Evil*. Pellauer identifies the more subtle, or what he calls "latent," considerations of the philosophy of history in Ricoeur's work on language. Ultimately, Pellauer develops what he takes to be a new perspective on philosophy of history in Ricoeur's work initiated by Ricoeur's assertion that the speculative approach to the philosophy of history in the form of Hegel, Marx, or Spengler is no longer feasible; what is called for instead by Ricoeur is a (re)construction of a philosophy of history that opens up onto the ontological question of the historical condition. For an elucidation of this new approach to, and reconstruction of, the philosophy of history in Ricoeur's thought, Pellauer points us to Ricoeur's work on the idea of the exemplary in the essay "Aesthetic Judgment and Political Judgment According to Hannah Arendt." Pellauer then develops the role of the exemplary and suggests that it can point us toward a new philosophy of history that is capable of attending to the larger ontological question of the historical condition.

In the second essay, "The Other Speaking in my Voice: On the Suppression of Dialogue in *Otherwise than Being*," Matthew Edgar challenges Levinas' conceptualization of the ethical relation in *Otherwise than Being*. Edgar notes that in *Totality and Infinity*, the Other speaks to and commands me, whereas in *Otherwise than Being*, it is *my* spoken response to the Other that voices her call. This transition, Edgar explains, is necessitated by a conflict between: (a) the ap-

parent reciprocity and co-presence of the face-to-face relation, and (b) the absolute asymmetry and alterity of the command. To avoid construing the ethical relation as one of reciprocal co-presence, Levinas had to situate the trauma of ethical assignation absolutely prior to the phenomenal presence of the other person in the face-to-face. Thus, in *Otherwise than Being* I am assigned *to* the Other, not *by* the Other, from I know not where, in a manner that Levinas identifies with Illeity. Edgar argues that the cost of salvaging asymmetry is the loss of any meaningful connection between 'The Other' of the command and *this* concrete other with whom I converse.

The third essay of this section by Jamey Findling entitled, "Gadamer and the Living Virtuality of Speech," deals with a central notion in Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory of language: the living virtuality of speech. Findling begins by explaining that Gadamer's appraisal of language seeks to counter what he calls the "forgetfulness of language," i.e., the reductive attitude towards language that originated in Plato's *Cratylus* and that can be defined in terms of its preoccupation with the question of language's correctness. Findling goes on to detail Gadamer's oppositional approach to the reductive attitude toward language that hinges on Gadamer's insistence that language is the irreducible middle term that joins being and understanding and, in so doing, inscribes a measure of novelty into every hermeneutic event. Findling traces out Gadamer's approach to language, elucidating the way in which Gadamer is able to conclude that it is the self-excessive character of speech (i.e., what Gadamer calls the "living virtuality of speech") that accounts for the novelty and historicity—and hence the irreplaceability—of each spoken word.

The last essay in this section, "'Poetry and People' in Heidegger's *Germanien* Lectures" by James Gilbert-Walsh, begins with the observation that in his 1933 *Rektoratsrede*, Heidegger exhorts the German community to engage in a collective self-assertive act whereby it might emerge forth for the first time as an authentic "we." Only one year later, however, in his lectures on Hölderlin's *Germanien*, he insists that such a possibility is not currently available to the German people. Heidegger reads Hölderlin's poem as a call to the Germans to await and prepare the way for an authentic community yet to come. One might interpret Heidegger to be calling upon the people to be "patiently nationalistic, " i.e., to make way for the eventual emergence of a new German community. Gilbert-Walsh, however, argues that he is exhorting the Germans to acknowledge and prepare for a community to come that is in no way "German." For the Heidegger of 1934, "we Germans" can only be those for whom the question "who are we?," addressed to us through poetry, discloses precisely our inability to be "who we are" in any authentic way.

Foucault

This section, which is comprised of three contributions focusing on the work of Michel Foucault, offers provocative interpretations of Foucault's work. The topics of Foucault's work that are courageously taken on by the authors in this section include, Foucault's practice of political spirituality, the role of human emotions in Foucault and the question of whether Foucault lends them any moral significance, and finally, the question of whether Foucault's archaeological interpretive strategy is opposed to a phenomenological one.

Ladelle McWhorter's essay, "Foucault's Political Spirituality," attempts to understand Foucault's use of the phrase "political spirituality," which appears twice in writings from 1978. McWhorter begins by cautioning against a superficial reading of the phrase—such as assuming that it designates a political strategy justified by or grounded in religious doctrine. Instead she insists that a more careful reading reveals that the phrase names a practice in which both the regime of truth within which one thinks and the regimes by which one governs oneself are simultaneously placed in question and conjunctively reworked. In other words, the phrase names a practice of self-transformation, but one undertaken not in an effort to conform oneself to given norms or to achieve

given goals; rather this practice of self-transformation occurs along with ongoing transformation of norms, values, standards, and goals. McWhorter argues that the kind of work Foucault describes is both political and spiritual—political, because it involves realigning networks of power, and spiritual, because it involves *ascesis* in the transformation of an *ethos* Hence, McWhorter asserts, the phrase he uses for it, while perhaps startling at first, is appropriate. McWhorter suggests that one could go so far as to characterize all of Foucault's work as the product of his practice of political spirituality.

In her essay, "My Body, This Paper, This Fire," Laura Hengehold challenges those critics of Foucault who are both concerned about his powerful use of rhetoric and imagery, and fearful that his theories of power and criticisms of the philosophical subject leave no room for the moral significance of human emotion. Beginning with the observation that both Kant and Foucault regard the sentiment of "resistance" as fundamental, Hengehold develops an account of emotion as an effect of the same individualizing and subordinating power relations that make the philosophical subject seem like a necessary ground for resistance to felt domination. Hengehold then turns to Foucault's exchange with Derrida regarding the pathos of philosophy because she finds that the exchange invites further examination of his personal preference for "sublime" emotions that are provoked by abstractions such as the "being of language," and allows us to contemplate the production of differentiated affects that would reflect the individuality of agents with other preferences.

In the last essay of this section, "The Completeness of Foucault's Table of the Classical Episteme," Andrew Cutrofello examines the way in which Foucault and Husserl both invoke the category of the historical apriori, yet conceive of it in different ways. Cutrofello reminds us that for Husserl, the historical apriori consists of sedimented traces of meanings which the phenomenologist attempts to reanimate. For Foucault, he claims, it refers to conditions of discursive production that the archaeologist gleans by treating texts as indicative symptoms rather than as the bearers of expressive meanings. Cutrofello notes that these are diametrically opposed interpretive strategies, but suggests that they are in fact inextricably connected with each other. To demonstrate this connection, Cutrofello draws upon Derrida's discussion of the relationship between the ideals of univocity and equivocity. Cutrofello argues that although Foucault attempts to account for this difficulty in the way in which he presents the history of literature from Cervantes to Mallarmé, his proleptic reference to the disappearance of "man" is not enough to establish the purity of archaeology as a non-phenomenological way of reading. To illustrate this, he calls attention to a structural homology between Foucault's diagrammatic representation of the classical and modern epistemes and Kant's table of judgments, suggesting that it would be impossible to choose between phenomenological and archaeological interpretations of this affinity. Cutrofello concludes with a reference to Christopher Nolan's film *Memento*, which, he claims, illustrates what it means to be, irreducibly, an empirico-transcendental doublet.

Issues In Phenomenology

This section encompasses a wide variety of issues in phenomenology stemming from the work of various philosophers including Husserl, Kant, Heidegger, Bachelard, and Merleau-Ponty to name a few. The topics that the essays investigate and the claims put forth by the contributors in this section are as diverse as the philosophers upon whose works they build. Some authors have placed "new spins" on traditional issues in the field of phenomenology while others have brought to the surface entirely new phenomenological concerns. The common thread that unites the selection of essays in this section is not only the pertinence of the topics broached and issues raised to the field of phenomenology, but the intriguing phenomenological insights offered to us by their authors.

Tom Nenon's essay, "Husserl's Conception of Reason as Authenticity," examines Husserl's diagnosis of the presence of a cri-

sis of science and reason in Europe, announced in Husserl's last two major articles, viz., "Die Krisis des europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie" and "Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie." Aware of the ambiguity surrounding Husserl's use of the term "reason," Nenon delves into a textual analysis of Husserl's employment of the term and ultimately finds that Husserl's conception of reason differs significantly from many modern uses of the term which tend to treat reason as a primarily intellectual capacity and reduce it to some sort of calculation. Finding Husserl's use of the term reason in these last two major publications to be consistent with some of his earlier writings that borrow and develop Brentano's conception of reason, Nenon ultimately concludes that Husserl's conception diverges from Descartes' much more than is commonly recognized. Moreover, Nenon argues that Husserl's conception of reason is in closer alignment with those philosophers of hermeneutics who characterize reason as a process that is not restricted to the individual any more than it is restricted to the intellect.

Mirja Hartimo's essay, "Spielbedeutungen," begins by tracing the origin of the notion of games-meaning, *Spielbedeutung*, (first introduced by Husserl in the *First Logical Investigation* [§20]), to Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and the symbolic as opposed to the authentic approach to arithmetic. She then situates signs endowed with a *Spielbedeutung* in the context of the *Logical Investigations*. Hartimo compares and contrasts those signs endowed with a *Spielbedeutung* with indication-signs and with expressions. Ultimately, Hartimo concludes that they are not properly either indication-signs or expressions and suggests that a reason for this is Husserl's primary interest, in the *Logical Investigations* and elsewhere, in describing genuine meaning instead of rule following. This, Hartimo argues, shows the normative character of Husserl's descriptions: he investigates how people ought to think rather than how they often do think.

Christopher Arroyo begins his essay, "Specters of the Humean Self: A Husserlian Critique of Kant's Theory of Virtue," by noting that the most pressing problem for Kantian ethicists is the role of the emotions in Kant's moral philosophy. Though the standard reading of Kant's ethics (which depicts his ethics as completely rejecting any positive role for the emotions) has been shown to be inaccurate, contemporary Kantians still acknowledge his precluding the emotions from functioning as moral motivators. Arroyo insists that they must attempt to resolve this problem while retaining the greatest strength of Kant's ethics, namely his grounding of virtue in the dignity of human beings. This essay examines how the problem of the emotions affects Kant's account of virtue. Arroyo argues that Kant cannot account for virtue as an abiding state of character and that this failure is due to his inadequate understanding of the moral subject as bifurcated into rational and sensible natures. Hence, in order to overcome this problem, Arroyo says that a new account of subjectivity must be given, one that can remedy Kant's inadequate account of virtue while providing a sufficiently strong sense of moral obligation. Arroyo argues that Husserl can provide such an account of virtue because of his description of embodied transcendental subjectivity and he indicates the ways in which Husserl can ground a sufficiently strong sense of obligation through his concepts of insightful valuing, the "truly ethical human being," and the material a priori.

Beata Stawarska's "Merleau-Ponty in Dialogue with the Cognitive Sciences in Light of Recent Imitation Research," points us to the recent revival of interest in pursuing a constructive dialogue between phenomenologists and cognitive scientists which she says testifies that the methodologies based on first and third person approaches can be correlated. The question of how exactly this correlation is to be achieved has received a number of responses. One view, neurophenomenology, proposes that these methodologies enter a relation of mutual constraint and enlightenment. Another view, heteropheonomenology, claims that first-

person reports should be transformed into raw data for science, i.e., for third person analysis. Finally, there have recently been developments towards having a front-loaded phenomenology where phenomenological contributions are used directly in conducting empirical research. Stawarska examines recent studies on neonate imitation in light of this complex dialogue between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. The contention that she defends is that imitation studies provide a concrete example of how to conduct the dialogue of mutual constraint and enlightenment between phenomenology, notably the work of Merleau-Ponty but also Sartre, and the cognitive sciences. Stawarska examines how her claim bears critically on Dennett's heterophenomenological proposal, and hypothesizes about front loading phenomenology into experimental research on imitation.

Paul Crowe's essay, "Between Termini: Heidegger, Cassirer, and the Two Terms of Transcendental Method," explores the famous 1927 Davos debate between Heidegger and Cassirer. It takes as its guiding thread a distinction, introduced by Cassirer and taken up by Heidegger, between the *terminus a quo* of transcendental research and its *terminus ad quem*. Heidegger claims that while Cassirer is clear as to the *terminus ad quem* of his philosophy, he has not adequately determined its *terminus a quo*, the subjective origin of the process of constitution. Crowe first explains the sense and force of this criticism of Cassirer. From there he turns to Heidegger's apparent concession that his own philosophy has a converse deficiency. While penetrating to the *terminus a quo* with his analytic of Dasein, Heidegger intimates that his *terminus ad quem*, which he identifies as the question of Being, remains unclear. The further course of the debate, Crowe claims, illuminates what is at stake here. Crowe suggests that Heidegger's fundamental ontology has done little to explain how the *Seinsfrage* cashes out in terms of a multiplicity of factical correlated regional ontologies and the correlated "anthropological" determinations of the subject: precisely, Crowe insists, where Cassirer's philosophy of culture is strongest.

Crowe offers Heidegger's brief 1928 flirtation with a project he terms metontology as confirmation of his ongoing concern with this problem and suggests that the *Kehre* and themes from Heidegger's later work can also be cast as a further response to it.

Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, in "The Aesthetic and the Poetic Image," gives a comparative phenomenological analysis of images presented by paintings and those evoked by poetic language, focusing on the unique intimacy with which Rilke's poetry was affected by his viewing of Cézanne's paintings. Rilke's fascination stemmed from his perception of "instinctive beginnings toward a similar objectivity." Gosetti-Ferencei claims that both visual and verbal images create a unique and common level of phenomenal reality, one overlooked by the stubborn difference assigned to poetry and painting in traditional aesthetics (from Lessing's in "Laöcoon" to the ekphrastic debate between Murray Krieger and Paul de Man). Beyond the arbitrariness of the poetical sign, its temporality and non-spatiality were thought to be opposed to the spatiality and atemporality of the more natural signs of painterly images. Gosetti-Ferencei argues, to the contrary, that poetical images take part in the composition of phenomenal-virtual spatiality at the level of consciousness, and aesthetic images, even those of relative simplicity, for instance in Color Field paintings, unfold temporally according to the structures of internal time consciousness. The experience of time can even be the 'subject matter' of such works. In returning to Rilke and Cézanne, at the site of the phenomenological image, Gosetti-Ferencei discovers an experiential collaboration of the poetic image with the aesthetic image.

In "The Difference an Instant Makes: Bachelard's Brilliant Breakthrough," Edward Casey challenges the idea that the instant is something which only divides, dissolves, and deconstructs. Rather, using Bachelard's conception of the instant, Casey argues that the instant is at once creative and destructive. The creative potential of the instant is what Casey terms Bachelard's "brilliant breakthrough." Contrasting the way in which the instant has been treated in the

works of Plato, Heidegger, Benjamin, Kierkegaard, and Bergson, among others, Casey goes on to emphasize Bachelard's insight into the creative role of the instant while exploring the implications of this new sense of the instant. He fleshes out the instant's parameters of creativity and develops an account of the creative dimensions of the sudden and the surprising and their relationship to forms of newness. From a phenomenological standpoint, Casey supplies us with an altogether "new" way of articulating and conceptualizing the instant that capture its dimension of creativity.

The last essay in this section, Mary McAllester Jones' "The Redemptive Instant: Bachelard on the Epistemological and Existential Value of Surprise," investigates an aspect of Bachelard's criticism of contemporary phenomenologists and philosophers of existence by examining his use of the ideas of redemption and surprise in his epistemological work. McAllester Jones argues that these ideas, which are shown to be interconnected, point up the existential dimension of his epistemology. Bachelard's conception of the redemptive instant is seen not only to derive from his view of the discontinuity of modern scientific knowledge with its processes of rectification and approximation but to give these processes existential value by associating the correction of scientific error with the notion of redemption from sin. She shows that the idea of redemption is to be bound up with Bachelard's conception of surprise and indeed to provide the key to its apparent contradictions. In discussing Bachelard's view that to have epistemological value, surprise must be rectified and thus "redeemed," this essay looks closely at the conception of the cogito and of the human being that he develops early in his work. McAllester Jones then demonstrates the persistence of these ideas and values in his last books on science and concludes by discussing Bachelard's argument here that philosophers who refuse the existential lessons of modern science will consequently impair human existence.

Justice, Subjectivity, Recognition

The compelling essays presented in this last section explore issues of exigency germane to the field of contemporary continental ethics. The title for this section ("Justice, Subjectivity, Recognition") is not meant to be an exhaustive list of the issues raised by our contributors. On the contrary, it only indicates one set of issues that could be said to be common to all of the essays in this section. Other ethical concerns taken up in this section include, sexual difference, the relationship between universality and singularity with particular reference to ethical responsibility, the bonds of collectivity under a colonial regime, the import of lived experiences of a consciousness that lives as a stranger to itself for any theory of ethics, philosophical anthropologies and their variant approaches to the issue of cloning, and conceptualizing misrecognition within a normative framework of justice.

Alison Stone's essay, entitled "Hegel's Dialectic and the Recognition of Feminine Difference," responds to recent feminist criticisms of Hegel by offering a new interpretation of his dialectic that draws on the work of Gillian Rose. According to feminist criticisms, Hegel's dialectic is implicitly masculinist insofar as it involves a primary, symbolically masculine, term incorporating and nullifying its feminine other. Stone introduces these feminist criticisms with particular reference to Hegel's account of the conflict between family and state in ancient Greece, then considers a possible defense of Hegel's dialectic, according to which it overcomes oppositions between masculine and feminine terms by incorporating both within third, more encompassing, structures. However, Stone admits that feminist critics can plausibly reply that Hegel's supposedly encompassing third terms are really merely amplified versions of his first—symbolically masculine—terms. Here, Stone introduces Gillian Rose's reading of Hegel's third terms as "broken middles" which consist only in the ongoing splittings and diremptions occurring between the first two terms of any dialectical process. Because, on Rose's reading, Hegel's third terms just con-

sist in a movement of differentiation, these "broken middles" occupy the symbolic space of sexual duality rather than masculinity. According to Stone, this reading enables some fruitful convergences between Hegel's dialectical thought and a feminism of sexual difference, and she sketches out these convergences in conclusion.

In "Hegel's *Antigone* and the Dialectics of Sexual Difference," Karin de Boer argues that although Hegel has often been criticized for his allegedly conservative conception of the fixed social positions assigned to men and women, turning to Hegel's remarks on the *Antigone* in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* allows one to see that the cultural determination of sexual difference in ancient Greece may be considered to open up a history in which the 'natural' distribution over the two sexes of cultural oppositions such as family and state, emotion and reason, body and mind, receptivity and activity, nature and spirit, is increasingly dissolved. Deploying the principle of Hegelian dialectics, de Boer sketches out a history of sexual self-consciousness—a history that Hegel himself could never have written—and interprets this history as the dialectical movement in which men and women gradually acknowledge that values traditionally identified as masculine or feminine are not just posited over against themselves, but constitute implicit moments of their proper being. De Boer is not claiming that each human being should aspire to a perfect synthesis of moments traditionally distributed over the different sexes. She rather argues that one's natural sexual determination will continue to delimit the finite space within which we are increasingly free to explore the cultural significance of sexual differences.

It is commonly maintained that Levinas's philosophy is critical of universal principles and concepts on the grounds that they compromise the singularity of the Other. But this view is not without its ambiguities, especially in that the ethical responsibility that Levinas describes bears characteristics that we typically associate with universality. Through an analysis of Levinas's critique of Kant, Leslie MacAvoy in her essay, "Thinking Through Singularity and Universality in Levinas," argues that universality and singularity are more deeply implicated in one another than the received view suggests. To demonstrate this, she investigates the role of the concepts of necessity and generality in Levinas's notion of ethical responsibility. MacAvoy argues first, that ethical responsibility in Levinas is necessary and, to be consistent with a critique of universality, he would have to explain how a responsibility can be necessary without universality. Second, she argues that although Levinas's critique of universality seems aimed at the generality typically associated with universality, he may in fact need to appeal to generality to identify the most vulnerable ones for whom responsibility is borne.

In "Violence and the Denigration of Community in Fanon," Ann Murphy suggests that Fanon's discussion of intra-group violence in *Wretched of the Earth* betrays the investment that the colonizer has in eradicating the community of the colonized, and not simply the colonized as individuals. Murphy explains in her essay that even as colonialism justifies itself by collectively categorizing and dehumanizing the colonized, the colonial mindset must paradoxically refuse that such a collective exists, and do its best to resist the concretization of these bonds, even as it justifies itself so often in reference to them. Murphy argues that as insidious political agendas seek refuge in essentialist mythologies of group identity, they simultaneously erode the very fabric of collectivity. Murphy concludes that even as the colonial regime justifies its inhumanity with reference to a collective stereotype of the colonized as other, savage, inhuman, it must simultaneously refuse and denigrate the concrete bonds existing between group members.

Donna-Dale Marcano's essay, "The Strangeness of the Racialized Subject: Confronting Kristeva's Foreigner," aims to reconcile the appeal, influence, and insights of Julia Kristeva's work with that of canonical writers on race, W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon. Marcano turns first to Kristeva's *Strangers To Ourselves* wherein Kristeva attempts to utilize her previous conception of abjection in order to articulate an explicit po-

litical problematic, that of xenophobia. The solution, Kristeva argues, is to understand that we are all strangers to ourselves, that there is a "foreigner within" that haunts and troubles us, and that recognition of our foreigner within and thus our own foreignness will enable us to live with foreign others. Turning to the texts of Du Bois and Fanon, Marcano finds articulated a consciousness that lives as a stranger to itself, one that both lives with a "foreigner within" and as a foreigner within its own national boundaries. Marcano suggests that Du Bois' and Fanon's analysis of the social origins of such subjectivity requires that we examine social causes as the foundation for living as a stranger to oneself. Ultimately, Marcano argues that by neglecting discourses on race that provide insight into the lived experience of those who live as strangers to themselves and as foreigners, the ethical promises of Kristeva's solution is challenged.

Eduardo Mendieta's essay, "We Have Never Been Human, or How We Lost Our Humanity: Derrida and Habermas on Cloning," traces out the development of two divergent traditions of philosophical anthropology that have their roots in two different readings of a central doctrine in the biblical book of *Genesis*, the doctrine of *imago dei,* which states that humans were created in the image or likeness of God. Where one tradition of philosophical anthropology sees humanity as created, the other sees humanity as creative. Whereas positive philosophical anthropology stems from the former interpretation, negative philosophical anthropology stems from the latter. These two traditions are epitomized in the recent work on human cloning by Derrida and Habermas. Mendieta's essay seeks to develop a contrast between positive and negative philosophical anthropology by reading Habermas through the eyes of Derrida. In the process, Mendieta raises questions about corporeality, freedom and self-identity, and most concretely, a "phenomenology of the clone," a phenomenology that discloses how militant humanism is based on a form of genetic determinism that is unacceptable and dangerous. Mendieta suggests, furthermore, that

Habermas's recent pronouncements against human cloning, while prima facie politically and morally sound, are made at the expense of his own moves toward a postmetaphysical philosophical stand. Habermas, Mendieta argues, rejects human cloning, but only after betraying his own rejection of positive philosophical anthropology, in the work from the 1970s and 1980s. Mendieta concludes that Derrida's work, exemplifying negative philosophical anthropology, can help Habermas recover the radical dimension of his postmetaphysical project.

The last essay in this section, "Arguing Over Participatory Parity: On Nancy Fraser's Conception of Social Justice" by Christopher Zurn, presents appreciative and critical reflections on the socio-political and normative frameworks distinctive of Nancy Fraser's critical social theory. The first part of the essay sketches a few features of her view with an eye to how they contribute to the tasks critical social theory needs to accomplish today: a bivalent social theory that can focus on both maldistribution and misrecognition without reducing either type of injustice to the other; an account of misrecognition as status subordination rather than harm to personal identity; and, a capacious normative standard of justice specified in terms of parity of participation. In the second part of the essay, Zurn takes a more critical look at Fraser's normative framework. First, he raises three worries about its claim to the power of deontological assessments of social movement claims, about the extent to which the radicalism of social movement critiques are flattened out by the norm of participational parity, and, about the priority relations between the various conditions for social justice. Finally, Zurn develops a set of objections to Fraser's socio-theoretic claim that misrecognition should be conceived in terms of status subordination rather than identity violation. Zurn claims that various potential ways of meeting these objections raise important, but as yet unresolved, problems in Fraser's theory concerning the relationship between social practice and normative theory.