

HABERMAS'S DEVELOPMENTAL LOGIC THESIS UNIVERSAL OR EUROCENTRIC?

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I

One of the more controversial elements of Jürgen Habermas's critical theory of society is the theory of social evolution. It is controversial largely because it is formulated on a developmental model, and as such it distinguishes between the logic and the dynamics of social evolutionary change.¹ By virtue of this distinction the developmental model reconstructs the universal sequence of hierarchically ordered stages that determine the range of possible forms societies can assume in the course of historical change. A common objection to the developmental model is that it is justified on the basis of an analogy between the structures of ontogenesis and phylogenesis, that is, between the development of the individual and of society, and that this analogy is far too weak to support the claim that the evolution of societies follows a universal developmental logic.² This objection is significant because it argues that Habermas's developmental model of social evolution is conceptually problematic from the start. In this essay, I will argue that while this objection is relevant and carries some force against Habermas's early arguments for the developmental model, it is not relevant to the arguments Habermas later formulated in *TCA* and which appeal to different grounds. Nevertheless, there is a different though related problem with this later justification. As before, the problem lies with the difficulty in justifying the universal claims of the developmental model. If the developmental logic of social evolution cannot be shown to be universally valid, then it is open to the charge of being ethnocentric. I will argue that Habermas cannot sustain the claim that the developmental logic of lifeworld structures is universally valid on the basis of only the conceptual and theoretical resources of the theory of communicative action.

At the most general level, the overarching scheme of Habermas's theory of social evolution is inspired in a significant way by Piaget's application of the concepts of genetic structuralism to epistemology.³ For genetic epistemology, knowledge is predetermined neither by the subject, nor by the object; rather, it involves a moment of 'novel elaboration' by the subject in response to the object. This moment of novel elaboration manifests itself in the form of structures of consciousness that mediate between the subject's explicit knowledge and the object itself. Habermas wants to adapt this general model of individual, or ontogenetic, learning to the macro-level of collective, or sociocultural, learning. The developmental theory of social evolution is the result of applying the model of genetic epistemology to the problem of understanding sociocultural learning. By appealing to the formal pragmatic analysis of the theory of communicative action, the resulting theory of social evolution explains sociocultural learning as a rationalization process.⁴

The essential premises of Habermas's theory of social evolution can be summarized as follows.⁵ (1) Development occurs in two dimensions, the dimensions of cognitive-technical knowledge and of moral-practical insight. These two dimensions of development are mutually irreducible, and each of these logical sequences is universal. (2) The logic, or pattern, of development should be distinguished from the dynamics of development, which depends upon contingent empirical factors. (3) The logic of development can be understood in terms of an increase in rationality. And (4), developments in moral-practical insight serve as the "pace-maker" of evolution since such developments are necessary to stabilize the systemic crises generated in society by endogenous developments in the cognitive-technical dimension.

It is important to note that since Habermas distinguishes between the logic and the dynamics of development, it does not follow that development must occur. Whether or not a society in a given sociohistorical context does develop is strictly a contingent matter; but if a society develops, it will do so according to the universal developmental logic. When a society evolves, then, it does so for contingent reasons, and it is said to have proceeded to a higher developmental stage, which, since it involves an increase in rationality, can be interpreted as a transition to a higher "learning level." What is significant about this move to a higher stage is that it involves not merely an accumulation of content, but it also involves a morphological transformation of the society's shared structures of consciousness. It is important to note that these structures of consciousness are not properties of the mind; they are intersubjective structures that are features of the sociocultural lifeworld. As is well known from the theory of communicative action, Habermas maintains that there is a complementary relationship between individual communicative actions and the sociocultural lifeworld. For our purposes here it is only important to recall that one of the functions of the sociocultural lifeworld is as a reservoir of shared meanings that are drawn on in everyday linguistic interaction. The sociocultural lifeworld thus structures and delimits the semantic horizon of linguistically-mediated communicative interaction. In the transition to higher learning levels, then, the transformation of these shared structures of consciousness can be understood as a change in the general types of reasons that are considered acceptable in rational argumentation, that is, in the sorts of reasons that count as good grounds in rational justifications.⁶

II

The key to understanding Habermas's theory of social evolution is in understanding what I will refer to as the "developmental logic thesis." This thesis is implied by premises (1)–(3) from above and states that in each of the dimensions of cognitive-technical knowledge and moral-practical insight development follows its own universal logic, and this logic of development can be understood in terms of a

formal increase in rationality. In order to make sense of sociocultural rationalization Habermas once again turns to genetic epistemology. The key concept here is that of *decentration*, which in genetic epistemology means an increasing reflexivity with respect to one's own egocentric perspective.⁷ So Habermas conceives of sociocultural rationalization in terms of a structural decentration of the lifeworld. A central claim, then, of the developmental logic thesis is that developments in each of these dimensions (cognitive-technical and moral-practical) universally and necessarily follow a path of increasing decentration.

In his early formulation and defense of the developmental logic thesis Habermas appealed explicitly to the homologous structures of ontogenetic and phylogenetic development. In "Historical Materialism and the Development of Normative Structures," he stated that "the reproduction of society and the socialization of its members are two aspects of the same process; they are dependent on the same structures."⁸ In the same essay he went on to defend this claim by appeal to the "homological arguments." These arguments, however, are problematic and are narrow grounds upon which to base the developmental logic thesis. Not only is an argument from analogy not the strongest form of argument, but the attempt to defend an analogy between the individual and society has a long and highly problematic history in social theory. There are, it is argued, simply too many dis-analogies between the individual and society, making the appeal to such an argument highly problematic at best.

Despite these considerations, the objection that Habermas commits the ontogenetic fallacy is not entirely decisive with respect to this early formulation. It is important to recognize that Habermas does not assert an analogy between the two, but only a homology. That is, he argues from analogy only in a limited sense in that he wants to identify only the structural properties that both ontogenetic and sociocultural development share. Moreover, Habermas does not ignore the pitfalls of such an argumentative strategy. Even before articulating the details of the homological arguments he cautions that "we must take care not to draw hasty parallels."⁹ Accordingly, he carefully

enumerates certain provisos regarding these arguments. First, the confusion of structure and content must be carefully avoided, for transformations of structure do not necessarily affect contents.¹⁰ Second, the developmental logic thesis does not entail that each member of a society will be representative of the evolutionary stage of that society. There is no reason to think that there will be a direct connection between the level of development of a society and the level of development of each of its members. Third, we should not expect a perfect and complete correspondence between the patterns of ontogenetic and sociocultural development. For whereas ontogenesis involves the development of intersubjective competencies, social evolution begins from the achievement of complete social interaction. Fourth, although there may be homologous structures in ontogenetic and sociocultural development, we should not expect these structures to be functionally identical in each case. With these provisos Habermas successfully distinguishes his own argument from the many problematic prior attempts to explain society as “the individual writ large.”

I would suggest, then, that this early formulation and defense of the developmental logic thesis was not fatally flawed simply because it relied on an argument from analogy. Despite a careful enumeration of provisos specifying strict limitations of the asserted homologies, this direct appeal to a homology between ontogenesis and phylogenesis has not been very convincing. The elaboration of the formal pragmatic analysis of language that culminated in *TCA* provided Habermas with the conceptual and theoretical resources to justify the developmental logic thesis on other grounds. The result is that in *TCA* Habermas gives an argument justifying the developmental logic thesis that avoids the problems that arise when one appeals, no matter how carefully, to an analogy between ontogenesis and phylogenesis. In order, then, to further assess the cogency of the developmental logic thesis it is necessary to examine this new argumentative strategy.

III

The formulation of the argument for the developmental logic thesis found in *TCA* is

grounded explicitly in formal pragmatics. In the course of an explication of the communications-theoretic conception of the lifeworld, Habermas makes the following argument:

The fact that sociocultural developments are subject to the structural constraints of communicative action can have a systematic effect. We can speak of a developmental logic—in the sense of the tradition stemming from Piaget, a sense that calls for further clarification—if the structures of historical lifeworlds vary within the scope defined by the structural constraints of communicative action not accidentally but directionally, that is, in dependence on learning processes. For instance, there would be a *directional variation of lifeworld structures* if we could bring evolutionary changes under the description of a structural differentiation between culture, society, and personality. One would have to postulate learning processes for such a structural differentiation of the lifeworld if one could show that this meant an increase in rationality.¹¹

This argument can be reconstructed as follows: *if* sociocultural developments are in fact structurally constrained by the formal-pragmatic properties of communicative action, and *if* the variation of lifeworld structures are dependent upon learning processes, *then* we can claim that the variation of sociocultural lifeworld structures follows a developmental logic, in terms of which rationalization can be analyzed. The first step in analyzing this argument will be to clarify the sense in which communicative action constrains the development of the sociocultural lifeworld, and the second will be to explain in what sense the variation of lifeworld structures is dependent upon learning processes.¹²

How, then, are sociocultural developments subject to the constraints of communicative action? Habermas analyzes communicative action in terms of speech acts. In communicative action a speaker generates an utterance that unavoidably raises validity claims. The hearer to whom the speech act is directed is then compelled to respond to the validity claims implicit in the utterance with either a yes or a no. In other words, in communicative action a speaker raises certain validity claims in her ut-

terances and the hearer is obligated either to accept or reject those validity claims. Speech acts, however, do not occur in a decontextualized space; they occur within and against a background lifeworld. The lifeworld is a background in two senses. First, it serves as a reservoir of shared semantic resources or meanings which constitute individual utterances. And second, it serves as a storehouse of common knowledge, which provides a stabilizing force against the risk of dissension in determinate communicative exchanges. But the relation between communicative action and the lifeworld is not one-sided. The lifeworld is renewed and maintained in communicative actions, and it is altered by means of discourse. Communicative action is the process through which the sociocultural lifeworld is reproduced, and conversely, the sociocultural lifeworld generates the context and provides the resources for determinate communicative actions.

In addition to serving as a complementary concept to communicative action, the lifeworld's internal differentiation reflects the formal-pragmatic structure of communicative action. This structural reflection is a consequence of the sociocultural functions of communicative action—these functions are the reproduction of cultural knowledge, the establishment and maintenance of intersubjective relationships, and the socialization of individuals. By means of these functions, communicative actions renew the lifeworld in the dimensions of culture, society, and personality. This formal-pragmatic structure is reflected in the sociocultural lifeworld, because, in a sense, both communicative action and the lifeworld occupy the same intersubjective “space.” The formal pragmatic structure of communicative interaction exists *in between* individual interlocutors, and it functions to reproduce the sociocultural conditions of communicative action itself, i.e., the coordination of social actions, the reaching of intersubjective understanding, and the socialization of individuals.

Thus, if we assume for the sake of argument that Habermas's formal-pragmatic analysis of communicative action is correct, and if we assume the complementarity of communicative action and the lifeworld, then we can establish

the claim that the communicative infrastructure of the sociocultural lifeworld is internally related to, and hence logically constrained by, the formal-pragmatic properties of communicative action. Although the argument appears to be valid, the soundness of the argument is primarily grounded in the cogency of Habermas's formal-pragmatic analysis of communicative action, where the confirmation or disconfirmation of this formal-pragmatic analysis is achieved by the intuitive plausibility it has for competent acting and speaking subjects. The question of the cogency of the theory of communicative action lies well beyond our immediate interests, and so its cogency will simply be assumed in the remainder of this essay.

The second premise of the argument for the developmental logic thesis is that the variation of lifeworld structures is dependent upon learning processes. We have seen how the complementarity of communicative action and the lifeworld function to reproduce lifeworld structures, but how are these structures altered and transformed by communicative action? In mundane communicative actions the lifeworld is maintained and reproduced as it is, without (significant) change, because on the basis of the shared lifeworld communication generally proceeds uninterrupted by disagreement. But when disagreement erupts, and a speech act offer is challenged by the hearer, a validity claim becomes problematized. By challenging a validity claim the hearer invites the speaker to provide reasons in support of the problematized validity claim. This involves, however, a transition from uninterrupted communicative action to the level of argumentation, or “discourse” in Habermas's sense. On Habermas's understanding of discourse, participants bracket practical imperatives and attempt to reach a rational agreement concerning the problematic validity claim. In doing so, they unavoidably presuppose that ideally an agreement could be reached based only on the “unforced force” of good reasons. By raising validity claims in communicative actions we unavoidably rely on certain idealizing presuppositions, presuppositions concerning the possibility of their uncoerced redemption in discourse. Thus, the unavoidable raising of criticizable validity claims in communicative

actions possesses a *rational potential*—the potential of communicative rationality. This means that “argumentation makes possible behavior that counts as rational in a specific sense, namely learning from explicit mistakes.”¹³ And since “learning processes . . . themselves *rely* on argumentation,” the tapping of this rational potential in argumentation constitutes a learning process that results in an intersubjective understanding or agreement.¹⁴

In discourse, interlocutors learn in the process of rational argumentation on the basis of the mutual consideration and evaluation of reasons. If by means of discourse the parties reach a rational agreement, they have, based only on the power of good reasons, corrected their mistakes and adopted new understandings, which then become part of their shared lifeworld. Through innumerable iterations by ever more members of the society, the structures and content of the sociocultural lifeworld gradually become transformed. But this is not simply a process of random variation, for the lifeworld has not been changed arbitrarily. Rather, to the extent that the variation of the lifeworld is a product of rational argumentation—and only to that extent—the rationality of discourse is transferred by means of new understandings into the lifeworld, resulting in a rationalization of the lifeworld itself.

IV

If this analysis of the complementarity of communicative action and the lifeworld is correct, it is reasonable to ask whether these considerations can ground the claim that the developmental logic of structures of the lifeworld is universally valid. This claim to universality is especially problematic in light of the radical underdetermination of the theory by the sociohistorical evidence. The theory is underdetermined in part because of the fact that we are dealing with historical data that requires interpretation, and in part because of the fact that the theory explains development only in terms of the infrastructure of the lifeworld. To be sure, Habermas recognizes this challenge, for he notes that once one replaces the phenomenological concept of the lifeworld with the communications-theoretical one, “the idea of approaching *any society whatsoever* by

means of it is not at all trivial.”¹⁵ But he goes on to claim that in adopting the communications-theoretical concept, the “burden of truth for the universal validity of the lifeworld concept—a validity reaching across cultures and epochs—shifts then to the complementary concept of communicative action.”¹⁶ Presumably, the argument for this can be reconstructed as follows. The formal pragmatic analysis of communicative action has elucidated the invariant structures of the use of language in communication, and this analysis will be universally valid for all users of propositionally-differentiated languages. Communicative action and the lifeworld are complementary; as such they mutually presuppose one another. Given this complementarity, and since the formal pragmatic structures of communicative action are universal, we can conclude that the formal pragmatic structures of the sociocultural lifeworld are also universal.

It is far from evident, however, that this conclusion is warranted. First of all, suppose that the developmental structures of the lifeworld are not universal and invariant. If communicative action and lifeworld are in fact complementary, as Habermas maintains, then we might just as reasonably infer that it is the results of our formal pragmatic analysis of communicative action that are not universal and invariant. If the two concepts of communicative action and lifeworld are indeed complementary in the way that Habermas claims, then it is not entirely clear on what grounds he asserts the asymmetrical relationship between them. In order to make good on this claim, Habermas owes us an argument for asserting this asymmetrical relation between communicative action and lifeworld, since given the explication of these two concepts in *TCA* we would expect a symmetrical rather than an asymmetrical relation between them.

Second, Habermas maintains that the structural differentiation of the three formal world concepts—the objective, the social, and the subjective worlds—is itself the interpretive achievement of acting and speaking subjects: “In their interpretive accomplishments the members of a communication community demarcate the one objective world and their intersubjectively shared social world from the subjective worlds of individuals and (other)

collectives.”¹⁷ This suggests that the formal pragmatic analysis of communicative action, which rests heavily upon the relations actors can take to each of these three formal worlds, may be uncovering structures that are not necessarily invariant and universal, but are the result of interpretive practices that occur in the medium of language and against a lifeworld background.¹⁸ In other words, if the elements of the formal pragmatic analysis are themselves the results of interpretive accomplishments, then the claim that the formal pragmatic analysis of communicative action uncovers invariant structures becomes problematic.

Suppose, however, that my arguments here are mistaken and that the formal-pragmatic structures of communicative action are universal, and that these structures are functionally reflected in the infrastructure of the sociocultural lifeworld. In this case, it is still necessary to clarify the way that the communicative rationality inherent in discourse shapes the developmental logic of the sociocultural lifeworld. Habermas argues that for both communicative action and the sociocultural lifeworld an increase in rationality is constituted by a decentering of the egocentric perspective. This strategy presents itself naturally to a theory of society that begins from the intersubjective character of communicative action. For it is clear that the process of reaching an understanding with someone requires that I overcome my egocentric perspective and be capable of adopting the perspective of the Other, and in doing so my reflexivity increases. This increase in reflexivity indicates an increased capacity for learning, hence Habermas speaks of progressing to new “learning levels.” Once again, developmental psychology is useful in clarifying this idea. For just as the child moves from egocentric, to sociocentric, and finally to universalistic action orientations, worldviews develop from the mythological, to the metaphysical-religious, to the post-metaphysical (universal). This rationalization process of decentration results in an increase in the learning potential of both the child (in ontogenesis) and the lifeworld (in phylogenesis). Sociocultural decentration occurs such that the infrastructure of the lifeworld is transformed in such a way that the formal characteristics of the new learning level

more adequately realize the functional properties of communicative action. As the lifeworld becomes increasingly rationalized, the rational potential inherent in communicative action is released; that is, the reproduction processes of the lifeworld rely less on uninterrogated traditions that are dogmatically reproduced and they become increasingly subject to the imperatives of reaching an understanding by means of communicative action. Most importantly, Habermas argues that this rationalization process is universal; insofar as a society develops, it must develop within the developmental logical structure of an increasing decentration.

If such a concept of developmental logic could then be utilized to explain sociohistorical change, then we would have good conceptual grounds for describing those tendencies as processes of rationalization. Indeed, in the second volume of *TCA* Habermas draws upon the empirical research of George Herbert Mead and Emile Durkheim to indicate how we can understand various sociocultural changes as rationalization processes. He cites the increasing differentiation between the lifeworld components of culture, society, and personality; the increasing distinction between form and content; and the increasing formalization of the distinct reproductive functions of the lifeworld, resulting in an increase in the reflexivity of lifeworld reproduction.¹⁹

But the claim that this account is universally valid does not seem to be warranted. Supposing that the formal-pragmatic structures of communicative action are universal, and that these structures are functionally reflected in the lifeworld, it does not follow that the logic of the development of these structures in the lifeworld is universal. To be sure, Habermas is not making any such a priori arguments; his is a reconstructive project that seeks to uncover the development of the infrastructure of the lifeworld in a retrospective manner. Nonetheless, the method of rational reconstruction will also fail to warrant the claim to universality. This argument fails because the claim to universality is radically underdetermined by the available empirical sociohistorical evidence, and it is underdetermined *in principle*. For a developmental-logical reconstruction of the historical structures of the lifeworld must be highly abstract in order to be at all plausible.

But the level of abstraction necessary to satisfy the condition of plausibility will preclude the possibility of a single best interpretation of the evidence. That is, we could not accumulate sufficient historical evidence that would be needed to make a case that the reconstructive interpretation offered is the single best interpretation of the evidence: the theory will be chronically underdetermined by the evidence. The consequence is that any proposed rational reconstruction cannot be shown to be the best interpretation of the available evidence without at the same time relying on unexamined normative assumptions.

V

Thus, it appears that the resources of the theory of communicative action are insufficient in themselves to warrant the claim that the developmental logic of the lifeworld is universally valid. A consequence of this conclusion is that it can be argued that since Habermas has asserted the universal validity of this developmental logic without sufficient warrant, he has in effect permitted a Eurocentric bias to seep into his theory of social evolution. To be sure, the social theorist can never completely avoid ethnocentrism, and Habermas does acknowledge the force of this concern, but he believes that the problem of ethnocentrism can be mitigated, if not avoided, by emphasizing both the theory's reconstructive methodology and its fallibility. On this account, the Eurocentric bias of his theory of social evolution, to the extent that it in fact has one, will be continually reduced and corrected for in the course of an ongoing social-scientific research program. But merely pointing out that the theory is capable of being falsified is inadequate since, as we have seen, the theory is radically underdetermined by the evidence. There is no guarantee that the Eurocentric bias will be gradually eliminated through the processes of empirical corroboration and theoretical reformulation because there simply is not sufficient evidence to determine theory choice.

I have argued that while Habermas's new argument in *TCA* for the developmental logic thesis avoids the problems that the earlier argument from analogy faced, it nevertheless has its own problems. On Habermas's own account

of communicative action and the complementary concept of the sociocultural lifeworld it is not clear what justifies the asymmetry that is necessary to warrant the claim that the structures of the lifeworld are universally valid on the basis of a universal formal pragmatics of communicative action. Since the formal pragmatic analysis of communicative action is always already situated within the lifeworld it is difficult to see how the fundamental interpretive nature of these analyses can be side stepped. But unless this interpretive nature is somehow transcended, the claim to universality will be very difficult to vindicate. This is not to suggest that Habermas's developmental model of social evolution is invalidated by this difficulty. Rather, only its claim to have reconstructed a universally valid developmental logic of the structures of the sociocultural lifeworld is put into question. In my view, Habermas's developmental model of social evolution remains particularly promising if it foregoes the claim to universality. Instead of attempting to reconstruct a universal developmental logic it would be more plausible simply to reduce the scope of validity of the developmental logic to the sociocultural formation or form of life under investigation. In that case, it would be necessary to reconstruct the developmental logics for different sociocultural complexes and forms of life, but these would no longer claim universal validity. This approach would have the result of generating a plurality of developmental logics that would be commensurable only on the methodological level. It would be a mistake, however, to think that this revision would result in an invidious cultural relativism that would be inconsistent with the interests of a critical social theory. Habermas's developmental model of social evolution is an element of a critical social theory that can still be understood as applying the method of immanent critique. And since the suggested revision retains the developmental model thus allowing identification of unrealized rationality potentials *within* any given sociocultural configuration, the methods of immanent critique remain applicable. Moreover, it would also seem to be empirically evident—though an unfortunate fact in many ways—that what were in previous ages separate and distinct sociocultural complexes are

interacting to increasingly greater degrees under the pressures of globalization processes. This will have the effect of creating a contingent convergence of these diverse developmental logics. The result is that given the conditions of modernity, such a convergence appears inevitable, and so the proposal of

thinking in terms of a plurality of developmental logics should not, in the long run, be especially problematic for proponents of universalism such as Habermas'. For insofar as cultures learn from each other, the infrastructure of their lifeworlds will increasingly overlap.

ENDNOTES

1. For Habermas's statements of the theory of social evolution, see Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), esp. chps. 1–4; *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), chps. 3 and 4; *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. I, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984); *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. II, *Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989). Hereafter, the two volumes of *The Theory of Communicative Action* will be cited in the text as *TCA*.
2. See, for example, Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, *Social Action and Human Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Piet Strydom, "The Ontogenetic Fallacy: The Immanent Critique of Habermas's Developmental Logical Theory of Evolution," *Theory, Culture & Society* 9 (1992): 65-93.
3. Jean Piaget, *The Principles of Genetic Epistemology*, trans. by Wolfe Mays (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1972), p. 14.
4. See Habermas's discussion of Piaget in *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. I, pp. 67–71.
5. This is necessarily an oversimplification of a highly complex theory.
6. I discuss in greater detail below the way in which the formal-pragmatic structures of communicative action can constrain the development of the sociocultural lifeworld.
7. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. I, pp. 67–71.
8. Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, p. 99.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. II, pp. 144–45.
12. To be sure, a full defense of this thesis requires more than the logical and conceptual analysis done here, it also requires empirical corroboration. But of course that is beyond the scope of this paper and beyond the limits of my own expertise.
13. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. I, p. 22.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. II, p. 143, emphasis added.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 143–44
17. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. I, p.70.
18. See Barbara Fultner, "Habermas on the Lifeworld, Intelligibility, and Conflict Resolution," manuscript, 1996.
19. See Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. II, pp.145–46.

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