Immanent Spirituality

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A worthy touchstone to arbitrate between worldviews immanent and transcendent is the *désir d'éternité*, the "desire to gather together the scattered moments of meaning into some kind of whole."[1] According to Charles Taylor, who adduces this touchstone, only transcendence has a satisfactory response to its longing: personal immortality. What response, if any, remains for immanence? Must it invent comic masks to hide the frown of an indifferent world? Must it surrender everything to the river of a senseless time? Must it be mute before the anguish of the bereaved? Taylor is right that Epicureanism and its modern materialist progeny cannot help.[2] Epicurus taught that death was nothing, because its victims cannot perceive the loss. But whatever consolation this may offer for *la mort de moi*, my own death, it is useless against *la mort de toi*, the death of a beloved. The dead may be insensible, but Epicurean sophisms do nothing to assuage the grief of those who live on in their absence.

Nietzsche rejected scientific materialism not because it failed to console the bereaved but because he saw it as the last stage of the ascetic ideal, a desperate effort to will something, even an inaccessible world of truth, rather than not will at all.[3] He also rejected transcendent spiritualities, the worldviews of "the hinterworldly," whose weariness with this life and its suffering prompts them to turn from it toward a fantasy world without suffering.[4] Scientific materialism and transcendent spirituality were thus, in Nietzsche's estimation, two sides of the same ascetic coin; both the scientist and the priest, despite their apparent rivalry, were weary of life. Without assessing Nietzsche's diagnoses of either, which so many partisans have contested over the last century, we should instead consider what positive response he has to the *désir d'éternité*. For if his philosophy is to be anything more than a critique, if it is to appear as a spirituality while in contact with Taylor's worthy touchstone, it must respond to this longing. As it turns out, Nietzsche does have a response, but it is nothing new. The Eternal Recurrence is an ancient doctrine whose first proponent was Heraclitus.[5]

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the book that treats this obscure doctrine and its spiritual alternative to transcendence in most detail, Nietzsche's hero summarizes it with a song whose final line is *Alle Lust will Ewigkeit*: all joy wants eternity.[6] Taylor interprets this line as "not: we're having such a good time, let's not stop; but rather: this love by its nature calls for eternity."[7] Whether or not this is an accurate interpretation of Nietzsche's text, it is an accurate phenomenology of passionate love. When you love passionately, even when your love turns out to be ephemeral, it does not feel ephemeral so long as it lasts. On the contrary, it feels like a summons to eternity. But is this summons coherent? The love we know in this life, like everything else known here, is woven with finite threads. When they come to an end, when the beloved dies, and the weaving must stop, we hurt, want to weave on, and so dream of infinite—which is to say eternal—threads. *La mort de toi* more than any other experience makes this longing clear. The bereaved more than anyone else dreams of a hinterworld where reunion with the beloved is guaranteed. But is this dream coherent?

Remove finitude, and the fabric of everything we know comes apart. Try to imagine a baseball game, for example, with an infinite number of innings. Even if the glorious bodies of the eschaton could play without fatigue forever, the deepest problem with this alluring fantasy—at least for baseball enthusiasts—is that there could never be a winner. No matter how wide a gap in score opened up during such a game, the losing team would always have the consolation of other innings in which to close it. With so specious a consolation, however, would disappear all the drama and meaning of the game. Still more would this meaning dis-

appear if eternity were not infinite time, as some imagine it, but instead all time gathered into one moment, as others prefer. What drama, what sense, would there be in a baseball game whose ninth and first innings were co-present?

Now, if the excitement of sport has never gripped you, try to imagine Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire dancing to a song of infinite length. Their technique would remain as dazzling as the talent of the resurrected Lou Gehrig, and it is just as tempting to fantasize about them dancing forever as it is to imagine him playing his last game one more inning, and then another. . . . But what was most valuable in their art, as in his play, would then be lost. Without a sense of the end, and thus of the choreography of their movements, the beauty and drama they achieved in finite time would become the infinite and thus meaningless repetition of technique; or, if eternity be imagined as all moments gathered together, this finite beauty and drama would become the absurdity of every move executed at once. And so on for every activity we know. Life itself, as the activity of activities, requires the finitude imposed on it ultimately by death to preserve its meaning.

Borges captured this painful but inescapable truth in "The Immortal," his fable of a soldier whose quest for the city where none dies costs him dearly, but never so dearly as his success. For after reaching this city, then drinking from its magical stream, he learns that among its immortal citizens "every act (every thought) is the echo of others that preceded it in the past, with no visible beginning, and the faithful presage of others that will repeat it in the future, *ad vertiginem*."[8] In the midst of this eternal repetition, where "there is nothing that is not lost between the indefatigable mirrors,"[9] all exertion appears vain.[10] Why exert yourself now, after all, when there is always tomorrow? To digest this enervating insight, and others like it, meditate for a moment upon some of the peculiar consequences of eternal life.

Were you to live infinitely, for instance, you would have enough time to live not only your own life any number of times, but also the lives of others, all others, and likewise infinitely. Perhaps the boredom provoked by eternity would even require you to seek the relief of novelty. If so, Borges concludes, in the city of the immortals individuality disappears: "no one is someone; a single immortal man is all men."[11] But the preservation of individuality—especially after death has robbed us of a unique beloved—is the chief appeal of eternity. Thought through a little further than its initial appeal, in short, eternity appears more frustrating than satisfying. Reversing course, Borges' hero seeks instead the waters of a stream that will restore his mortality. Only upon finding it after another arduous quest, then feeling pain once again, does he find peace: "Incredulous, speechless, and in joy, I contemplated the precious formation of a slow drop of blood."[12]

Arguably the insight was first Homer's. His Odysseus forfeits an eternity of repetitive pleasure with Calypso in order to return to his mortal wife.[13] Homer's gods likewise need nothing so desperately as the human drama they have created—especially the tragedy of Troy, where their offspring risk their mortal lives—to lend their otherwise repetitious and senseless lives both drama and meaning. Zeus fights with Hera from time to time, but there is no quarrel so serious that it cannot be remedied with another round of ambrosia.[14] Without Sarpedon to mourn, what drama would remain to him?[15] Without Paris to punish, what drama would remain to her?[16] For the gods, there is always and necessarily tomorrow; by contrast, writes Borges, "everything in the world of mortals has the value of the irrevocable and the contingent."[17] He captures this tragic wisdom with his eerie fable, but Nietzsche recovered it for modern Europe when he began his career by celebrating the birth of tragedy and philosophy in the tragic age of the Greeks; in other words, the wisdom of the Homeric age. According to the argument shared by the two books with these titles, this age ended with the Socratic promise—that is, the promise made by Plato's Socrates in dialogues such as *Phaedo*—of rational salvation from the body, from time, and finally from death.[18]

Howsoever we understand Nietzsche's tragic alternative to the salvific promise of this transcendent spirituality, which had so deep an influence on Christianity, his alternative cannot be the doctrine that the world will forever repeat itself. After all, such eternal repetition would be as enervating as immortal life in Borges' miserable city.[19] Although the Stoics misunderstood Heraclitus this way,[20] and some

passages of *Zarathustra* make Nietzsche seem a victim of their misunderstanding, neither he nor Heraclitus could have subverted so carelessly their hard-won recognition of time.[21] There is not space enough here to exonerate Heraclitus, although we shall conclude with a hint of his subtle view. For Nietzsche's part, we must recall that the passages of his writing suggesting an eternal recurrence are either from his unpublished notes or two successive published works. Following Robert Solomon, we should ignore the unpublished notes, focusing instead on the published references.[22] There is a famous passage from *The Gay Science* (4.341) that introduces the eternal recurrence, but Nietzsche later called this "the basic idea of *Zarathustra*."[23] Indeed, the next paragraph (4.342), which concluded the original edition of *The Gay Science*, was duplicated almost exactly as the prologue to *Zarathustra*, which he wrote next. In sum, then, if we wish to understand Nietzsche's thinking about the eternal recurrence, we should focus our investigation on his heroic spiritual journey.[24]

Significantly, the passages relevant to this thinking never contain assertions by Zarathustra. Instead, they contain questions he asks of another (a dwarf), or assertions made to him by others (his animals).[25] These passages seem thus not to be statements of doctrine, as if doctrine were ever to be found in Nietzsche's writing, but instead spiritual exercises whereby Zarathustra learns to love everything, imagining it as one, taking together all past and all future, all pain as well as all joy:

> Have you ever said Yes to one joy? Oh my friends, then you also said Yes to *all* pain as well. All things are enchained, entwined, enamored—if ever you wanted one time two times, if ever you said: 'I like you happiness! Whoosh! Moment!' then you wanted everything back.[26]

This is not the metaphysics of an eternally repetitious universe; it is the paean of someone in love with the world. What distinguishes this lover from most is that he acknowledges everything demanded by his love. If you have ever loved one moment, he claims, your love commits you to love also every moment that necessarily preceded it and every moment that will necessarily follow it. This is not the denial of time, in eternity, but instead the recognition of time, even its affirmation. This, Nietzsche believes, is the demand of true love.

Is true love thus masochistic? Why, if I love this one moment of joy, must I love all the other moments of pain that come before and after it? A moment is joyful because it is meaningful, extraordinarily so: being the first member of your family to graduate from college, seeing your newborn child for the first time, finishing the work of art that says everything you wished it would say. But these moments of joy are so meaningful because they are moments in a narrative: a story of financial and familial struggle survived, or of illness and dark nights of the soul overcome. As we saw above, in the examples of the baseball game and the dance, meaningful moments must be embedded in finite narratives, narratives of risk and therefore tragedy, circumscribed by death. To love such a moment fully is to love the narrative that constitutes it; and to love such a narrative fully is to love the world in which that narrative unfolds. If Zarathustra be believed, if he be followed as a prophet of immanent spirituality, we must love the whole world, with its pain, illness, betrayal, death. Perhaps this is a world without end, in which case it would seem that infinity has returned in an immanent form, but this cosmic infinity nonetheless maintains the human finitude necessary for our meaning, joy, and creativity.

Zarathustra thus declares that "the best parables should speak about time and becoming: they should be praise and justification of all that is not everlasting,"[27] and presumably Nietzsche sought in *Zarathustra* to craft just such a parable. If he praises suffering and death, it is not to fetishize them,[28] nor to see death in particular as "a privileged site from which the meaning of life can be grasped," as Taylor worries.[29] Rather, Nietzsche respects death because it makes possible the prospect of "creating—that is the great redemption from suffering, and life's becoming light."[30] Herein, therefore, lies the positive contribution of Nietzsche's immanent spirituality: creativity. Against the ascetic dreams of the scientist and the priest—which either deny facets of life or promise a joyous reunion with the beloved that could only be a mirthless because senseless repetition—Nietzsche offers the joyous spirituality of becoming and creation. Tinged as it is with the bittersweet recognition that cre-

ation requires time, death, and thus suffering, it is a tragic spirituality. But without these painful prerequisites, it recognizes, innovation and creation would be impossible.

This recognition is difficult to maintain alongside the *désir d'éternité*, to be sure, but it is no less true for that: death, it turns out, is the prerequisite of meaning. The contrast with the "ethical insight" Taylor mistakenly infers from Nietzsche's refrain could not be starker; according to him, "death undermines meaning."[31] Nor could this contrast be more important to our everyday existence. Transcendence, on the one hand, promises to redeem both lover and beloved alike from the finitude imposed on time by death. The practitioner of transcendent spirituality thus tries to cultivate a perspective—by prayer, liturgy, and works of mercy—from which love appears bathed in the light of eternity. Immanence, on the other hand, sees promises of redemption from time as seductive tricks, not so much because there is no such redeemer, but because there *cannot* be one. Or, to put the point more bluntly: if there were such a redeemer, it could only be Satan. To redeem us from death, were it even possible, would rob us of the meaning and drama that make us the envy of the gods. Borges saw this wisdom even in the transcendent religions themselves. "Jews, Christians, and Muslims all profess belief in immortality," he wrote, "but the veneration paid to the first century of life is proof that they truly believe only in those hundred years, for they destine all the rest, throughout eternity, to rewarding or punishing what one did *when alive*."[32]

The practitioner of immanent spirituality, by contrast, venerates that first century purely, without surrendering to the illusion of redemption. She tries to cultivate a contrary perspective from that of transcendence, one from which its seductive tricks appear as such, and from which love appears always in the shadow of death. The goal is not pessimism, any more than the goal of transcendent spirituality is optimism. Rather, the goal is meaning. The problem typically laid before those who forego transcendence—the problem of meaninglessness—belongs properly at the feet of those who advocate it. The special problem for immanent spirituality is rather how to respond to the *désir d'éternité* to which transcendent spirituality has such a ready answer. How, in short, to cultivate the perspective from which life has most meaning? What are the immanent correlatives of prayer, liturgy, and works of mercy?

Since the longing for eternity seems truly inexorable, it cannot be simply denied, the way so many anti-clerical and utopian fantasies of modernity have tried to do. These denials have produced no paradise but instead hell on earth, "a victory for darkness,"[33] where the longing for eternity found perverse expression in guillotines, concentration camps, and gulags. What is needed from an immanent spirituality, then, is a way not of denying this desire but of working through it. Others have proposed immanent spiritualities for modernity—Spinoza, Hegel, or Deleuze are popular candidates—but none of these alternatives makes clear what it requires not just as a theory of immanence but as a *practice*. Philosophers engage our intellects; the longing for eternity is an emotion, and a particularly tenacious one at that. What is needed from immanent spirituality, then, is a practice that changes us emotionally as much as intellectually. This would be an immanent ethics to complement immanent spirituality. Fortunately, such a practice already exists.

In order to appreciate it as an ethics—something not even most of its practitioners wish to do—we should consider how its response to transcendent ethics matches the response of immanent spirituality to its transcendent rivals. Proponents of transcendent ethics argue that moral prescriptions for our changeable world must be underwritten by unchanging moral standards. According to them, proponents of immanence must supply a guarantor of morality lest human life become rudderless and inhumane. Think only of the Ten Commandments, and the movement in this country to inscribe them in the public square as ramparts against the advance of "relativism." Philosophers are not immune to such movements. Among us, there are approximations in both Neo-Thomistic and Neo-Kantian ethics; indeed, the movement is discernible in any ethics that grounds morality in a metaphysics of eternity, whether it be populated by saints or rational principles. If immanent spirituality eschews eternity, by contrast, must it also surrender unchanging moral standards? In a word: yes. But so much the better for it. Eternity's claim to underwrite ethics turns out to be

as hollow as its claim to underwrite meaning. In both cases, moreover, it bankrupts what it promises to fund.

To see why, let us briefly consider two influential ethics that make this shared problem of transcendence clear: Platonism and Christianity. If Plato's Forms were to succeed as guides to judgment in this changeable world, despite the fact that they exist in unchanging eternity, they must bear a relation to time, and this relation must be discernible by us. Each Form there must bear a relation to its particular instances here, so that we may judge these mutable instances by reference to an immutable paradigm. Thus, for example, if I am unsure whether it is good to stand my ground on the battlefield (here and now), I need only look to the Form of the Good. Granted that I can do this—and it is by no means clear that I can, for it is by no means clear what it means to 'look to the Form of the Good'—if standing my ground on the battlefield (here and now) appears to be related to this Form, then I should judge it good; if not, not. Granted that I can do this, then, judgment in our changing world would remain anchored to unchanging standards in a world beyond ours.

But there are many serious problems with this strategy. As Plato himself observes, everything in this changing world is good in some way, bad in others.[34] This truth is as inherent in the Platonic view of the material world as it is in Jesus' parable of the wheat and the tares.[35] Recognizing this truth, however, the person who looks to the Form of the Good must concede that everything is related in some way to that Form. If the Good be any guide to judgment, then, the judge must ensure that the instance she judges good be related to the Form of the Good *in the right way.* Nowhere in Plato is that special relationship explained, nor does it appear that could it be, for howsoever it be explained, the judge will be off on an infinite regress. In order to judge that some instance to be judged is related to the Form of Goodness in the right way, after all, she must now make a higher-order judgment, one about the relationship of this relationship to the Form of Rightness. And so on *ad infinitum*. Even Plato recognized this problem in his *Parmenides*, and Aristotle adopted it as a criticism of his teacher in the beginning of his *Nicomachean Ethics*.[36]

The Christian version of transcendence must therefore remedy the flaw which these Greeks exposed. But perhaps there is more hope in the religious version than there was in the philosophical one: few people faced with a moral decision turn to the Form of the Good, whereas billions turn to God and his commandments. Christians from Augustine to Girard have claimed that our moral standards require His transcendent guarantee because here in time we are too corrupt to deduce them for ourselves.[37] To remedy our shortcomings, they typically argue, we must rely on a divine authority. But the epistemic regress provoked by Platonic transcendence still haunts this Christian alternative. How can you judge, for instance, that the right authority underwrites the Decalogue? Or some particular translation of it? Or some particular interpretation of this translation? Because this eternal standard must guide your judgment here in time, where tares have been planted among the wheat, you must judge how to apply it to time's infinitely diverse particular circumstances. But how? There are no eternal rules for applying eternal standards to temporal circumstances; even if there were, however, they too would require eternal guidebooks. And so on *ad infinitum*.

This is not an argument for relativism, or nihilism, or any of the other bogeys used to scare those who would make it frankly. Nor is it an argument against Christianity, at least since Kierkegaard exposed the tension between ethical regulation and true piety.[38] Rather, it is an argument that exposes a necessary condition of moral judgment: individual choice. At every point of their submission, even those who wish to surrender their freedom to an authority must make a choice, consciously or unconsciously. If they choose to surrender their choice, their inescapable freedom frustrates them; if they persist in the pretense of submission, they choose hypocrisy more precisely than submission. We are thus brought face-to-face with the deepest reason why transcendence cannot secure moral judgment: its strategy of submitting time to eternity cannot recognize the most basic requirement of moral judgment here in time, where our moral judgments are made. This basic requirement is our freedom. In Sartre's memorable dictum, we are "condemned to be free."[39]

In the complementary words of Dostoevsky, "there is no more ceaseless or tormenting care for man, as long as he remains free, than to find someone to bow down to as soon as possible."[40] This premise undergirds the argument of his notorious Grand Inquisitor, who concludes from it that a true love of humanity and a true compassion for our suffering would relieve us of this burden of our freedom. The Church alone provides this relief, according to the Inquisitor, enchanting us with promises of miracles and mysteries, if not compelling us by its authority. While Dostoevsky himself seems to reject that conclusion—the Inquisitor is arraigning Christ, after all, whom Dostoevsky worshipped—he nonetheless seems to accept the premise. Rather than relieving us of our freedom, Dostoevsky seems to believe, Christ turns customary habits of submissive worship on their head, inviting us to revere him freely, without enticement of worldly reward, the enchantment of mystery, or the coercion of authority. That is why He refused the three temptations of Satan.[41]

Yet the same Dostoyevskian character who crafts the story of the Grand Inquisitor, Ivan, admits at the end of it that "everything is permitted."[42] It is no easy admission, but it must be made candidly, just as surely as it will be misunderstood. It does not mean that we should connive at the Holocaust, nor, more likely, at the cowardice, pusillanimity, and thoughtless conformity that pass nowadays for tolerance, expertise, and superficial diversity—not least in our beloved academy. It does mean that we should come to love the world as it is, not as our immature fantasies would have it be. One persistent fantasy, exploited by degenerate faiths and philosophies alike, is that of a perfect paradigm, a comprehensive moral code, an authority who will relieve us ultimately of our freedom. This is the fantasy of a transcendent guarantor for immanent moral judgment, and Dostoevsky was as harsh critic of it as Sartre was. All transcendent ethics lack such a guarantor, despite their pretense to the contrary; after exposing this pretense, immanent ethics should not rest with a merely critical recognition. Criticism without creativity is a recipe for resentment. Rejecting resentment as thoroughly as transcendence, proponents of immanence must explain why they refuse to retreat into quietism, a passive contemplation of the world. They must warrant the passionate engagement with it celebrated in both Dostoevsky and Sartre.

The immanent spirituality found earlier in Nietzsche provided just such an explanation and warrant, with its injunction to love the world and join in its creation. Few have expressed this injunction more succinctly than an earlier Heraclitean, Marcus Aurelius: "the universe loves to create what is to happen," he wrote to himself, "therefore I say to the universe: 'I join in your love.'"[43] But to join fully in this loving creation, two achievements are most needful—one cognitive, the other affective.

Cognitively, while affirming individual freedom, on one hand, and the necessity of time's cosmic drama, on the other, we must learn to think of ourselves at the intersection of this contradiction.[44] Fortunately, Heraclitus already has: *Ēthos anthrōpōi daimōn*.[45] *Ēthos* means character, over which we exercise some control; *daimōn* means divinity, something beyond our control; caught between the two is the dative of *anthrōpos*, human. One popular translation of this aphorism is "character is destiny." According to its interpretation, there is no cosmic destiny, only our characters. Fate is thus an illusion; freedom, real. But the subject of the Greek is ambiguous: it could just as well be translated as "destiny is character." In this way, freedom would be the illusion and fate real. Heraclitus has artfully balanced these two meanings, placing humans in the middle. Thinking of ourselves this way is not easy, especially if we have been trained to expunge all contradiction as unintelligible, but Heraclitus nonetheless teaches us how to do so. The recovery of his lesson began with Hegel, who wrote that "there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic."[46] Nietzsche went farther: "The world forever needs the truth, hence the world forever needs Heraclitus."[47] Deepened by over a century of meticulous philological scholarship, this archaeological dig continues to the present day.[48]

Affectively, while recognizing the mortal suffering that is so often time's measure, we cannot succumb to the resentment that is so typical of its victims. In other words, we need a practice to help us work through existential re-

sentment. Exposing the freedom to which we are condemned, additionally, we need a practice to help us work through our repetitive efforts to surrender it. We thus need a practice to help us love the world as it is—as perpetually new, as a perpetual invitation to renewal—rather than as a projection of our immature and repetitive fantasies. To enhance the meaning of our lives, in sum, we need a practice that works through resentment, submission, and repetition, moving us toward free and creative love, setting our lives within the narratives that give them this meaning.

This is the practice of psychoanalysis, the ethics most suited to immanent spirituality.[49] Yet it cannot take its proper place as an ethics, let alone a spirituality, until its "therapeutic action," its obscure method of "working-through" (Freud's *durcharbeiten*) has been better explained.[50] Even so sensitive a commentator as Taylor has misconstrued it, believing that this method ignores the chief prerequisite of spirituality, a growth in wisdom.[51] Partially to blame for this misconstrual have been the psychoanalysts themselves, especially in this country, where they ardently sought, and for decades achieved, the respect of the medical profession. One cost of this campaign, now lost, was to adopt medicine's pretense of scientific objectivity and moral neutrality. But medicine is a practice, and every practice must have at least an implicit conception of its goal, its *telos*.[52] As a practice seeking to make the ill well, medicine's goal is health, so that its practitioners must have a conception of health—health of the body when they treat bodies, health of the soul when they treat souls.[53] As a practice seeking to make ill souls well, then, psychoanalysis has always required—but rarely sought—a conception of psychic health.

Once psychoanalysts acknowledge this requirement, and then pursue this conception rigorously, they will openly share the *telos* of ancient Greek virtue ethics: health of the soul.[54] Like Epicureans and Stoics before them, like Plato and Aristotle before them, and like Heraclitus and Parmenides before them, psychoanalysts offer a training in virtue.[55] Since Freud, and sometimes despite him, they have implicitly understood this health of the soul as the health of its emotions. They have sometimes misunderstood the emotions (as purely somatic drives), but we philosophers have done so more reliably—seeing the emotions for millennia as opponents of pure reason. Analysts have recently broadened their inquiries to include neuroscience, infant psychology, and even philosophy of mind, coming rapidly closer than any previous virtue ethics to knowing the nature of the emotions their therapy aims to heal.[56] Not for nothing did Eric Kandel, recent Nobel laureate in physiology and medicine, claim that "psychoanalysis still represents the most coherent and intellectually satisfying model of the mind."[57] Simultaneously, our field has largely overcome its inveterate suspicion of the emotions, and we too are making our contributions to this noble project.[58]

But perhaps our most important contribution will not be our thinking about the emotions in general, but instead our thinking about one longing in particular, the *désir d'éternité* with which we began, that "desire to gather together the scattered moments of meaning into some kind of whole."[59] Since antiquity we philosophers have been preparing to die. Plato made this our goal in *Phaedo*,[60] and Christianity brought his transcendent understanding of it to the ends of the earth. Before Plato, however, Heraclitus understood our death immanently and taught us to prepare for it in another way.[61] Heracliteans from Marcus Aurelius to Nietzsche have preserved this immanent alternative, the Eternal Recurrence. While others dream of immortality, and even hope to realize this dream soon, we should recognize it as the doomed wish of Borges' immortal soldier. It is one thing to recognize this abstractly; another to integrate it fully into one's life. Without the help of psychoanalysis, it is difficult to do so.[62] Without the help of philosophy, though, it will be difficult for psychoanalysis to become not just a "cure by love," as Freud wrote, but a cure *to* love.[63] A cure to love, in the end, the world.[64]

ENDNOTES

1. Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 720.
2. Ibid., 721.

3. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), 5.344; *The Genealogy of Morality*, trans. M. Clark and A. J. Swensen (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 1.13, 3.25.
4. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. A. Del Caro (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1, "On the Hinterworldly."
5. My account of Heraclitus on the Eternal Recurrence is forthcoming as chapter 2 in my *Becoming God: Pure Reason in Early Greek Philosophy* (London: Continuum Publishing, 2010).
6. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* 3, "The Other Dance Song"; 4, "The Sleepwalker Song."
7. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 720.
8. J. L. Borges, *Collected Fictions*, trans. A. Hurley (New York: Penguin, 1999), 192.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid. 190.
11. Ibid. 191.
12. Ibid. 193.
13. Homer, *Odyssey*, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 1996), 5.
14. Homer, *Iliad*, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 1990), 1.595-611.
15. Ibid. 16.430-61.
16. Ibid., 14.
17. Borges, *Collected Fictions*, 192.
18. See, e.g., Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967), 12–15.
19. That is, eternal recurrence would be so enervating were it experienced *as a repetition*. In this case, however, it would not be a repetition strictly speaking, but instead a new experience: the former experience plus an awareness of it this time as a repetition. Even still, this new experience would have to be as enervating as the immortal life envisioned by Borges, for what could be more so than an awareness not just of repetition, but an infinite awareness of repetition iterated infinitely? According to another interpretation of eternal recurrence, each iteration would be experienced as something new, by an amnesiac oblivious of earlier iterations. Only so could it be a genuine repetition. As such, though, it would be neither more nor less enervating than the life of linear time, where every moment likewise appears new. Yet if this was how Nietzsche understood his doctrine—that it makes no difference—he could hardly have considered it "the greatest weight" (*Gay Science* 4.341) See also Robert Solomon, *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great Immoralist Has to Teach Us* (New York: Oxford University Press 2003), 201–02.
20. Nemesius reports the Stoic doctrine that "There will be another Socrates, a Plato, and every man with the same friends and the same fellow citizens . . . and this renewal will not happen once, but several times; rather, all things will be repeated eternally." *On the Nature of Man*, Ch. 38; *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* 2.625**;** quoted in Pierre Hadot, *The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius*, trans. M. Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1992), 76. Marcus Aurelius writes more tentatively of "the periodic rebirth of the Whole." *The Meditations*, trans. G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 11.1.3; see also 2.14, 5.13, 5.32, 9.35. But Hadot interprets this as a spiritual exercise rather than as a cosmological doctrine (*The Inner Citadel*, 41, 48–51, 75–76, 144–45, 177–78, 267). For the relation between Heraclitus and the Stoics, see A. A. Long, *Stoic Studies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 35–57.
21. For Nietzsche, see *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* 2, "On Redemption." For Heraclitus, see Miller, *Becoming God*, chp. 2.
22. Solomon, *Living with Nietzsche*, 119 and *passim*, but more directly B. Magnus, "The Use and Abuse of *The Will to Power*," in Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins, *Reading Nietzsche* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 218–36.
23. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. R. W. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 1992), "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," 1. There is another mention of eternal recurrence in *The Gay Science*, but it specifies "the eternal recurrence of war and peace" (4.285).
24. T. K. Seung, *Nietzsche's Epic of the Soul:* Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), interprets *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as a spiritual journey. This essay was written without knowledge of Seung's book, although upon reading it I have discovered a persuasive interpretation to complement and elaborate the one offered here.
25. For the conversation with the dwarf, see *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* 3, "The Vision and the Riddle"; for the conversation with his animals, see ibid., 3, "The Convalescent."
26. Ibid. 4, "The Sleepwalker Song" (10).
27. Ibid., 2, "On the Blessed Isles."
28. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 637–39.
29. Ibid., 723–26.

30. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 66.
31. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 722.
32. Borges, *Collected Fictions*, 191.
33. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 376.
34. *Republic* 5.479a–b.
35. Mathew 13:24–30.
36. For Plato's own critique of the Forms, see *Parmenides* 130a2 and 135c6. For Aristotle's critique of them in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, see 1.6 (1096a13–1097a14). If Plato answers his own critique anywhere, it should be in the second half of *Parmenides*. Whether or not a successful defense be found there, L. P. Gerson, *God and Greek Philosophy* (New York: Routledge 1990), 40–49, offers an answer as difficult as it is promising. If anyone could save Platonic transcendence nowadays, it would be Gerson. But this is not the place to examine and evaluate either his answer or Plato's.
37. For Augustine, see V. J. Bourke, ed. *The Essential Augustine* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1974), 31 (*The True Religion* 24.45); for René Girard, see *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, trans. J. G. Williams (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999), 183, 186, 189.
38. Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, trans. A. Hannay (New York: Penguin, 1985), 83–95.
39. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," in Robert Solomon, ed., *Existentialism*, 2nd. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 211.
40. Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, trans. R. Pevear and L.Volkhonsky (New York: Vintage Classics, 1991), 254.
41. Mark 1:12–13, Matthew 4:1–11, Luke 4:1–13; Dostoevsky, 252–57.
42. Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, 263.
43. Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 10.21.
44. Robert Solomon discusses this conflict and proposes an approach that is concordant, though not identical, with mine. *The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 181–83.
45. DK 22B119. For a detailed interpretation, see C. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An Edition of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1979), 260–61.
46. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Greek Philosophy to Plato* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 279.
47. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. M. Cowan (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1962), 68.
48. The monument of this scholarship remains Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*. For my account of Heraclitus, and the intelligible alternative he poses to purely consistent thought (epitomized by Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction, but apparent as early as Parmenides), see *Becoming God*.
49. E. S. Pearson et al., *Textbook of Psychoanalysis* (Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2005), now stands as the *Summa* of this discipline's first century, featuring original contributions by dozens of leading figures writing on the most important aspects of practice and theory.
50. Great strides have been made recently by a psychoanalyst who is, not coincidentally, also a philosopher: Jonathan Lear. See especially *Therapeutic Action: An Earnest Plea for Irony* (New York: Other Press, 2003), as well as *Freud* (New York: Routledge, 2005) and *Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
51. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 618–23. My critique of Taylor on these points can be found in "Psychoanalysis as Spirituality, A Review of *A Secular Age*," *The Immanent Frame* (August 13, 2008): http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/2008/08/13/psychoanalysis-as-spirituality/.
52. For an elaboration of this point, see Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press 1984), 187. For the more general connections at work in this essay between practice, *telos*, virtue, and narrative, see ibid., 181–225.
53. Nothing metaphysical is intended—or excluded—by this use of "soul." General practitioners are physicians of the body, whereas podiatrists are physicians of the feet, but no metaphysical distinction between bodies and feet need be presupposed by the distinction of their specialties.
54. See, e.g., Heraclitus DK 22B116 in P. Curd, ed., *The Presocratics; Selected Fragments and Testimonia* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 33; Parmenides DK 28B6 (ibid., 46); Plato, *Republic* 444d8-e1; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1102a13-28; Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus* (Diogenes Laertius, 10.122); Seneca, *On the Happy Life*, 3.
55. For an account of ancient philosophy as a practical training in virtue, see Pierre Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?* trans. M. Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
56. See, e.g., M. Solms and O. Turnbull, *The Brain and the Inner World* (New York: Other Press, 2002); E.

Kandel, *Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and the New Biology of the Mind* (New York: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2005); P. Fonagy et al., *Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self* (New York: Other Press, 2004).

57. Kandel, *Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and the New Biology of the Mind*, 64.
58. See, e.g., Solomon, *The Passions*; Martha Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); J. Prinz, *Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotions* (New York: Oxford University Press 2006); and Solomon, *True to Our Feelings*.
59. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 720.
60. *Phaedo* 62d2, 64a3–4, 667e4–5, 80e4–81a2.
61. For my account of this alternative, see my *Becoming God* (especially chp. 2). The aphorism most important for this aspect of my account is DK 22B62, "Immortals, mortals, mortals immortals, living the others' death, dead in the others' life." For an interpretation very close to mine, see Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, 216–20.
62. In "Psychoanalysis as Spirituality" (now under review) I have sought to integrate a philosophical account of the emotions with an account of psychoanalytic "working-through" (otherwise known as its "therapeutic action"). This integration aims to explain more fully why psychoanalysis is a spirituality, properly speaking, as well as an ethics. The limits of so short a paper as the present one have not permitted more than a hint of that integration. The limited aim of this short paper has instead been to depict the background of similarly immanent philosophies over which a portrait of psychoanalysis may be drawn.
63. Sigmund Freud, "Letter from Freud to C. G. Jung. December 6, 1906," in *The Freud / Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C G. Jung* (Abridged Edition) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 10; "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva," *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth, 1943–74), 9:90; "On Narcissism: An Introduction," 14:101.
64. This essay could not have been developed without the help of two friends: first, Jonathan VanAntwerpen (editor of *The Immanent Frame*), who encouraged me to expand my idea of immanent spirituality, and especially my interpretation of Nietzsche, beyond an initial sketch; second, Jeffrey McCurry (director of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center), who invited me to respond to the objection that immanent ethics could not supply moral standards. I would also like to thank three groups essential for its development: first, those who commented on an early version of this paper, which appeared online at *The Immanent Frame*; second, the members of the Duquesne Undergraduate Philosophy Society (2008), who heard its first version, and proved to be, as so often, my best midwives; and third, the students of my spring 2010 graduate seminar (Heraclitus, Marcus, Nietzsche), who helped me refine it. Finally, I would like to thank the SPEP committee who chose this paper for the Junior Scholar prize of the 2009 meeting, thereby giving me not only a

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