welcoming because in accord with our ethical intuitions. A Merleau-Pontyan ethics would be an ethics of hard work, an ethics of collectively accomplishing a good rather than an ethics of an ideal settled in advance. To develop such an ethics we would do well to see how the flesh invites itself to go wrong. This aspect of Merleau-Ponty's ethics, it seems to me, is unfortunately obscured by the particular approach to flesh that predominates in the second and third parts.

Interrogating Ethics concludes with a codicil. This contains an intriguing essay on the mouth, by David Wood, which traces how the very function and formation of the mouth, as regulating what is food or not, already marks our bodies and our ontology with a tension between facts and values, between is and ought. In other words, this primal opening of the body bodes a bodily ethics. The final essay, by Hugh Silverman, speaks about what it means to speak about a philosopher such as Merleau-Ponty, and shows how our discussion of him brings in various specters of other philosophers. Here, death shows itself in the discussion of ethics, embodiment, and responsiveness.

Overall, *Interrogating Ethics* is a rich and intriguing volume which opens an ethical dimension within Merleau-Ponty's thought. It contributes to Continental philosophy's exploration of an ethics beyond the usual since it emerges from and spreads into diverse areas of life, rather than being pursued as a topic and practice separate from the general run of life.

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The Sense of Space
DAVID MORRIS
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004; 220 pages.

The Sense of Space picks up Merleau-Ponty's investigation of spatiality from the *Phenomenology of Perception* and works out a rigorous philosophy where depth figures as the original ground of human existence. It is in depth that we primarily live, argues Morris. Not, however, the depth of scientific measures or the geometer's ruler, but a depth that is a dynamic crossing of body and world, a depth in which we are always already emotionally, expressively, and intersubjectively involved. Morris compellingly assumes the style of the *Phenomenology*, employing vivid experiential descriptions and scientific case studies while, like the later Merleau-Ponty, driving these phenomenological investigations to fruition

in a primordial ontology of chiasmic reversibility that precedes and grounds subjective experience.

Morris's introduction, a philosophical work in its own right, lays out "The Problem of Depth." Following the work of Merleau-Ponty and Ed Casey, Morris explains that depth is the primary dimension that affords us perceptual existence, placing us in contact with a world of voluminous things. Traditional accounts of space argue that we come to a sense of spatial depth by reconstructing a representation of the world latent in the intrinsic resemblances of sensory givens, or by inference to an intelligible order beyond sensation. Morris criticizes these views for presupposing an already determinate world, a world into which we are thrown as into a container, where the significance of our place has long been established. Dynamic systems theory is presented as an alternative. Here spatiality only ever emerges from the body's own motion. However, this is still a body conceived in terms of physics, and the space it unfolds is not its own but the result of already established principles. Morris explains that body and world are complicit in an ordering that is at once a priori and a posteriori. This ordering is reversible: it functions by a self-organizing principle which, in shaping, is shaped by what it shapes. Body and world form an ambiguity irreducible to exacted forms. Morris writes that this original crossing is "a spark of desire," concomitantly blending and differentiating its terms. The body-world crossing is the "original here," the dwelling in which we are implaced, the wellspring from which body and world come to have an intelligible sense. Our spatial experience is of an exchange of body and world, not at some fixed point but as a dynamic threshold. Morris decisively points out the way in which we experience ourselves as a join between the extra-ordinary, unified sense of our own bodies and the ordinary space of things. Following Merleau-Ponty, our bodies are not in space but of space, constantly forming identities with objects by integrating them into our bodily space (say, perhaps, the driving implements in a car) or by being drawn out of one's bodily space (finding oneself thrown into a British car where all directions are reversed and nothing is where it should be when we reach for it). Our spatial relations take the form of this expanding and contracting spatial body-world threshold. Morris clearly presents the insight that in order for this threshold to exist there must already be crossed movement in it. The world is not some foreign manifold but a primal contact which "intimates its possibilities" to us, such that our nascent experience of space calls for its own exploration in the development of ever more stylized movements.

The first part of Morris' book elaborates this "Moving Sense of the Body." Morris criticizes scientific accounts that seek to explain the motion of solid, determinate bodies by virtue of general, pre-existent laws.

Quoting Bergson, Morris reveals that in such a world everything that will be already is. Time does not matter because its significance is fixed beforehand. In place of this, the author argues for an immanent causality, immanent not to already determinate bodies but to movements that give rise to determinacy. Causality is a "vital order" which establishes its own norms and logic; it is "a multiplicity of movements [which] form a moving structure that is the ongoing result of the very movements that are so structured" (56). Rather than being repeatable and reducible to component parts, self-organizing structures are their own index of intelligibility. In a captivating analogy to origami paper folding, Morris reflects about how causality operates by folds within movement itself. Movement comes to limit itself, folding itself into constraints. These folds are of a piece with the thing they fold, yet introduce differentiation within it. That is to say, in limiting and differentiating, these folds recast the possibilities of motion, allowing for ever more complex structures to articulate themselves. What is more, these structures call to be understood in their own time, within the meaning that arises from their reciprocal relation as a "becoming out of limit" (75).

Morris explains Merleau-Ponty's *schema corporel* as our living the world through a unity of diversely stylized habits. Like the structures discussed above, walking occurs as a structuring of limits that cross body and world. When I get to the point of developing the ability to walk and a walking style, I might learn to walk from the hip or the knee, says Morris. Learning one of these styles, however, reconfigures the movements that made it possible in the first place, in effect folding the folds that allowed it, and thus making a return to that original state of possibility difficult or impossible. Morris remarks that the body is labile. Its living depths in the world are subject to change and development. Habits follow this logic of a temporal, open structure. Morris argues that our movement is doubly the synchronic movement of our body-world threshold and the diachronic movement of constraints which fold this threshold into new possibilities—a determinately structured relation with the world which nonetheless holds itself open. In movement the body grows, and in growth the body moves, Morris explains. Thus in habit we live our engagements to the world in a kind of ecstatic temporality. We do not relate to things in their mere presence, but we encounter them having already anticipated them as we have come to live them and move with them. These stylized habits in turn are never fully what they are until they cross into engagement with things and resonate with them. Habits are described, paradoxically, as engaged insensitivities to actual situations which form the basis of further sensitivities. An example is that it is only when my body is unconcernedly attuned to the sounds of the new French words, i.e., once it has formed an identity with those

sounds, that their meaning is possible for me. In forming this habit I "grow into" a whole new sphere of action, which recasts all of my other engagements with the world. Like the causal structures articulated above (what Merleau-Ponty calls "motivating relations"), our habits grow into a completion which crystallizes their meaningfulness at the same time as it crystallizes the meaningfulness of their objects. Alluding to motor experiments conducted by Lackner and others, which present subjects experiencing their limbs in impossible positions, Morris reveals that the body schema is not a fixed representation of the body, but is an open structure rising out of body-world movement itself. One intriguing avenue Morris takes up, which I do not have space to explicate fully, is the centrality of asymmetrical movement in development: the child must learn to disagree with itself via jointed movement and thus join with the world in new ways. His "The Topology of Expression" chapter explores the reversibility of the body and world, as they infiltrate each other in this movement.

In a world that we are always comported toward and whose nascent meanings call us out of ourselves, the cogito is tacit. Intelligibility is never given in advance or once and for all but emerges as *sens* out of *non-sens*, as expressive gesture which renders body-world movement intelligible. Like the folding cause, this structure is chiasmic: expression and expressed become differentiated from within. Essentially, they are not different, so their difference in expression can never be conclusively clear-cut or hypostatized. Morris expertly ties this discussion of expression to learning, taking up the debater's paradox in Plato's *Meno*. He invokes Merleau-Ponty's point that our spatial relation is always already meaningfully crossed and that we encounter a furtive, beckoning intelligibility in the world as it pulls on us to bring it to its completion. Such is the case in a child who, seeing a vaguely differentiated and odd color, improves upon her perception until the colors "snap into place" and become determinate. Much of the second half of Morris' book is devoted to showing not only how expression and learning are integral to our sense of space but that this space is from the start ethical. Morris demonstrates that we learn from others in a process of analysis-synthesis, by which we mimic their movements in stages until we can perform these movements as integrated wholes. The structure of intersubjectivity is one of intercorporality, wherein we are always in touch with the movements of others. Thrown into this world with others, we first experience the world as an indeterminate *non-sens* to be resolved in perception, habits, learning, and expression. Morris culminates phenomenology in a transcendence of the subject, in the pre-personal, intersubjective, "unreflective fund of experience" Merleau-Ponty cryptically writes of, and what for Bergson is the time before the subject. Morris

argues that this other-relatedness is the ground of all of our freedom for Merleau-Ponty, and he makes a compelling comparison to anxiety in Heidegger. For Heidegger, the self's determinate relation to its world and things—which it takes to be the ground of its existence—often withdraws, suddenly holding us out into this pre-objective origin.

The final sections of Morris' book outline an ethics where imperatives do not issue from already formed subjects but reside in the open character of experience. We experience others as extra-ordinary depths, like ourselves and in our own space. There is no specular encounter where another's space clashes with my own; we are already within each other's space, always in touch with others. Morris lays out some elementary steps for this ethics in depth, in which we turn a face toward others. For Morris, our space is never something established prior to emotions or to our dealings with others but is always in the first place a space that matters, which calls on us, which we have always been crossed with yet always meet up with in new ways.

Morris' book is written in expressive yet technical prose. In his pages we encounter the musings of Hamlet and Ahab, the vivid descriptions of Neruda and Rilke, compelling anecdotes about climbing the staircases of our memory, Lackner's experiments about weightlessness in airplanes, and numerous other case studies. Morris' book rigorously challenges traditional accounts of spatiality, defends and elaborates the positions of Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and others, while intimating several developments and comparisons coming out of this account. Every serious student of phenomenology should study this book. Its novel insights will also be of great interest to anyone studying perception, language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, American pragmatism, ecological psychology, child psychology, and related fields. While his work is focused on Merleau-Ponty, and to a lesser extent Bergson, its insights regarding Aristotle, Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, and Deleuze are indispensible. Morris's book is an invigorating alternative to scientific and traditional explanations of spatiality. His thesis binds together traditionally isolated questions, placing expression, emotion, and ethics in the very depths in which we dwell.

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