

Annotated Glossary

The annotations are meant to provide a genealogical sense of the incubation, development, and at times abandonment of some of the key terms in Heidegger's unique and idiosyncratic vocabulary.

Abbauen, deconstructing.

This common German term for the process of dismantling or tearing down or taking apart, which etymologically means “de-constructing” or “unbuilding,” the reversal of building (*Bauen*), appears roughly simultaneously in the works of Husserl and the young Heidegger in their formulations of the method of phenomenology, suggesting that it might have been the fruit of their common discussions at the time. The first instance in Heidegger is to be found in WS 1919–1920 (*GA* 58, 147) in relation to the reversal of the deformation of life-experience inflicted at once by both objectification and subjectification. Deconstruction is there closely connected with “critical destruction” (*GA* 58, 139, 160–62, 248), which in SS 1919 was called, in quasi-Kantian fashion, “phenomenological critique” (*GA* 56/57, 125–27). The 1920 critical review of Jaspers (chapter 13) in particular is careful to distinguish this intertwined triad of terms.

Anzeige, formale, formal indication.

A core feature of Heidegger's “method” of phenomenological hermeneutics which first surfaces in the Jaspers review (1920; chapter 13) in the repeated “formal indication” of “existence” as the be-ing of the “I am.” But it is not until *Being and Time* itself that “ex-sistence” is formally indicated as the projective stretch toward the ek-static temporal horizons of the holistic situation of existence in which each of us find ourselves. Earlier in 1920, the formal indication of intentionality develops its triple-sensed (formal) “prestruction” of relation, containment of content, and actualization or fulfillment, soon to be complemented by the comprehensive sense of temporalization and the conservative sense of safekeeping (October 1922; chapter 14).

In his letter to Löwith in 1927 (chapter 20), Heidegger roots the genesis of his formally indicative hermeneutics of facticity in his 1915–1916 habilitation on categories and meaning in Duns Scotus, especially in his formalization of factic individuality. KNS 1919 diagrammatically schematizes the power of formality in reflexive categories to gain access to the pretheoretical, preworldly “primal something” of our individual facticity. In WS 1919–1920, this access route is given the name “formal indication” (*GA* 58, 198, 248; on the formality of the I, see 106–7, 157, 216–17, 251).

Already here, formal indication is keyed to the existentially situated “I am,” to which the indicative or “indexical” personal pronouns, “you are” and “we are,” would

be added. Formal indication therefore becomes the call to each of us to own up to the holistic limit-situation of existence in which we happen to find ourselves and to properly make it our very own, to appropriate it.

Auseinandersetzung, confrontation, disputation, (articulated) contestation that lays open and sets apart.

The Jaspers review (chapter 13 and the “Aristotle Introduction” [chapter 14]) already telegraph this term, which first becomes central in the 1930s, and which places its “polemic” action on the level of being, perhaps in contrast to the “agonistic” action of the “supermen.”

Ausgelegtheit, interpretedness, in and of a domain that has always already been interpreted, typically everydayness.

This term first emerges in October 1922, and in SS 1923 it is made to dominate in the habits and customs of the Anyone, and thus plays an increasingly significant role in the talks of 1924 (chapter 16) and 1925 (chapter 18), where it is gradually tied to the historical situation in which we happen to find ourselves. In § 74 of *Being and Time* on proper historicity, it becomes clear that *we have already been interpreted* by the particular historical community of language and tradition into which we happen to have been thrown, and the choice is posed of either allowing that initial interpretedness to perpetuate itself in habitual rote repetition or to make that tradition our own by creatively retrieving and reinterpreting it for our own time and generation, a theme that was already sounded in October 1922 (chapter 14) in its *formal* “indication of the hermeneutic situation” of human existence.

Bekümmern, anxious or troubled concern; also distress, trouble, anxiousness, worry.

This term is used in the 1920 and 1922 essays as well as in the courses held in this period to convey the original motivation to philosophize in the face of the very facticity of life. It is replaced by the distinction that “angst reveals care” as the development approaches *Being and Time*. In 1922 Heidegger observes that the care of existence is double genitive, and thus verbally a middle voice. The German *sich kümmern* perhaps best brings out the middle-voiced character of anxious concern; it means both the active “to trouble oneself” and the passive “to be troubled.”

bergen, to shelter, harbor, cover (as in a cove), thus to conceal (*verbergen*); to recover, save, salvage (from a forgotten tradition, in the later Heidegger’s typical sense).

This word first begins to assert itself in the “truth” essay of 1926 (chapter 19), and in the 1930s it tends to displace the *Seinsverwahrung*, the truthful safekeeping of being, so prominent in the early 1920s. In the series of Heidegger’s words for the happening of truth (*Wahrheit*), *Bergung* as shelter and safekeeping occupies a broad middle (-voiced) ground between outright concealment (*Verborgenheit*) and unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*, *Entbergung*).

Besinnung, deliberation-on-the-sense, meditation-on-the-meaning; non-objectifying “reflection.”

Selbstbesinnung, akin to an “examination of conscience,” but with an outer-directed “existential” emphasis on examining oneself in the context of one’s historical situation.

sich besinnen, to pursue, follow, track, or trace the sense already taking place in one’s situation. Note the middle-voiced character of this intrinsically “reflexive” verb.

The dictionary definition of “reflection” for *Besinnung* immediately runs afoul of Natorp’s objection against Husserl’s reflexive method of phenomenology, namely, that reflection stills the vital stream of experience (*GA* 56/57, 99–101, 110). Significantly, the young Heidegger in 1915 (in a local newspaper article! [chapter 5]) interjects the word into his lifelong vocabulary by way of Nietzsche rather than Husserl (where *Reflexion* rules) to initiate a meditation on the situational sense (*Sinn*) of the World War, thus stressing the pursuit (tracing, following) of concrete sense to be drawn out of the historical context, rather than by “taking thought” in the form of a subject reflecting on an object.

Blickstand, initial stand for viewing (unique to October 1922 [chapter 14]).

Blickrichtung, direction of view.

Sichtweite, range of vision.

This triad emerges in 1922 as an alternative way to articulate the hermeneutic situation in conjunction with interpreting Aristotle’s highly visually oriented philosophy. See also *Vorhabe*, *Vorsicht*, *Vorgriff*.

Bodenständigkeit, autochthony, rootedness (in native ground), being indigenous.

This term was first used in SS 1924 in the context of a passage in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (I.5.1360b20) on a landed aristocracy. In the context of the talk on truth in late 1924 (chapter 17), it alludes to the existential rootedness in a native language as in a “locus of truth” and nexus of “ground” concepts. In SS 1925, it refers to the phenomenological sense of demonstration as a return “back to native ground, roots, origins” (*GA* 20, 104/76, 119/87, 423/307). See also *GA* 34, 210; *GA* 39, 181; *GA* 40, (30); *GA* 54, 223. Made politically incorrect by National Socialist propaganda, the term will nevertheless be made central in Heidegger’s 1955 “memorial address” to a hometown crowd, which originally bore the subtitle “*Bodenständigkeit im Atomzeitalter*” (Autochthony in the Atomic Age).

Dasein, being-t/here, Da-sein, existence.

This is a fairly frequent word in its dictionary meaning of “existence” in the works and letters of the young Heidegger since 1910, and in common phrases like the “existence of God” (Kant) and the “struggle for existence” (Darwin). The term is gradually introduced in its etymological sense of “da sein” as “being there” in its various vectorial ins and outs in the Jaspers review (1920): factic life as at once out-of-itself in “objectifying” accomplishments, which are in turn gathered-into-itself in self-experiencing, in these concurrent movements “being there” (chapter 13). In the course of SS 1923, “Dasein,” which now replaces earlier terms like the historical I, the situated I, and factic life experience, is inaugurated as a technical term, i.e., is “formally indicated,” in two distinct directions: 1) in the temporal particularity (*Jeweiligkeit*) of its facticity or its “be-ing”; and 2) as “being-in-the-world.” The two vectorial directions are very nicely brought together already in SS 1920 in the recurrent phrase “self-worldly Dasein” (*GA* 59, 75–82 *passim*) to identify our potentially most originary experience. The lecture of July 1924 on time (chapter 16) clearly intones “Da-sein” in the multiplicity as well as unity of its temporal characters. “Being-there,” in sum, suggests 1) the uniquely situated existence of the human being “thrown” into the facticity of its world and 2) actively being-open, disclosive, revealing, discovering its historically unique world and itself (chapter 17).

Destruktion, de[con]struction; to be distinguished from *Zerstörung*, pure and simple destruction.

“Critical-phenomenological destruction” is first introduced in WS 1919 as a methodological term to replace what in SS 1919 was called “phenomenological critique” and is used in close association with *Abbauen*, “deconstructing,” e.g., in the Jaspers review and the “Aristotle Introduction.” The positive goal of the seemingly negative critique or “dismantling” of our traditional presuppositions about be-ing is to incur a return to our pretheoretical primal and originary experience of be-ing, to the primal dynamics and structure of “life in and for itself in the *eidōs*, in its understanding evidence and evident understanding” (so in SS 1919: *GA* 56/57, 126), which Heidegger calls the “phenomenological criterion” of the critique. Compare *Abbauen*.

Dijudikation, adjudication.

“Phenomenological adjudication” of our presuppositions regarding original experience is discussed in some detail only in SS 1920 and is applied to the preconceptions of Natorp, Dilthey, and Jaspers in order to “adjudge” (decide, determine) how closely (or remotely) their philosophical starting points approach the originary experience of be-ing, “life in and for itself in the *eidōs*, in its understanding evidence and evident understanding” (*GA* 56/57, 126; compare *Destruktion*), which constitutes the “phenomenological criterion” for the adjudication, for the “de-cision regarding the genealogical position of the meaningful context [being judged] when viewed from the origin” (*GA* 59, 74; see also 75, 79, 84, 190). Phenomenological adjudication is thus situated at the juncture between the interlinked “methods” of critical deconstruction down to the originary experience of be-ing and the reconstruction of its “prestruction” by way of a formally indicative hermeneutics.

Durchschnittlichkeit, averageness.

The averageness of the public in publicity as lived by the Anyone first emerges in October 1922 (chapter 14). The everyday circulation of generic and common talk in the form of idle gossip and repetitive chatter (*Gerede*; first in SS 1923) serves to accentuate the averageness in the form of a widespread and persistent common “interpretedness” according to which the everyday public world is understood. Compare *Ausgelegtheit* and *Man, das*.

Ereignis, (properizing, appropriative) event.

To mark the qualitative time of history into its proper periods in 1915 (chapter 7), Heidegger refers to the uniquely defining e-vents of the Christian Incarnation and the Islamic Hegira. In KNS 1919, *Er-eygnis* in the etymological sense, playing on the notes of *eigen* (own, proper) and *eigentlich* (proper, authentic), first makes an appearance to characterize the most intense lived experience of the historical I in close conjunction with the meaning-bestowing dynamics of “It’s worlding!” The I is fully *there in* the “It’s worlding!” such that “I myself ap-propriate [*er-eygne*] It to myself and It appropriates itself according to its [unique and proper] essence” (*GA* 57/58, 75). But already in 1920, *Ereignis* is used to designate the events of objective history rather than of the “history of actualization and self-fulfillment” (*Völlzugsgeschichte*). In *Being and Time*, the happening of (my, our) history proper, demanding its proper enactment in “authentic historicity,” performs this function rather than *Ereignis*, which only begins to reassert its unique function of granting us our proper identity (*Eigentlichkeit*)

and so our “proper name” (*Eigenname*) in SS 1928, in a repetition of KNS 1919, and then takes center stage in the later Heidegger as his favored word for be-ing.

Existenz, existence; etymologically understood by *Being and Time* as “ex-sistence.”

By SS 1920, Heidegger is carefully distinguishing between the closely related terms *Dasein* and *Existenz*, where “existence” constitutes the possibility of actualizing “self-worldly *Dasein*” to the fullness of its potential-to-be its proper self, thus of “really being and existing,” being “authentic.” In his review of Jaspers’s book, which is destined to inaugurate *Existenzphilosophie*, he points out to Jaspers that existence is in fact the formal indication of the “sense of be-ing of the ‘I am’” capable of being actualized by way of passage through the “limit situations” of life. In October 1922, existence reappears as the authentic be-ing of life accessible by way of the distressed questioning of its facticity in a countermovement to life’s tendency to lapse. In WS 1925–1926, this restricted sense of existence narrowed down to *Dasein*’s ownmost possibility expands, by way of the formal clue of “being-out-toward,” into a more universalized sense of temporal possibility and thus becomes the formal indication of “ex-sistence” developing into the ek-static structure of temporality in the final draft of *Being and Time*.

existenziell-existenzial, existentiell-existential.

The terminological specification of existence in SS 1920 naturally brings the adjective or adverb “existentiell” (*GA* 59, 29, 37, 82, 181, 183, 185–86) into ever-increasing play in Heidegger’s courses, works, and letters, but the adjective “existential” is far rarer. This is in keeping with the fact that the pair is matched to correspond with the distinction ontic-ontological only in the final draft of *Being and Time*.

Faktizität, facticity.

The abstraction “facticity” as an ontological development of ontic “factic life” was first coined by Fichte and was taken by neo-Kantians like Lask to be the “brute, irrational” side of transcendental structures. Heidegger first salvages the term from its neo-Kantian usage in the courses of WS 1919–1920 (*GA* 58, 172–73, in a supplemental note postdating the course) and SS 1920 (*GA* 59, 173–74) to identify the transcendental “primal reality” (*Urwirklichkeit*; *GA* 59, 173) of factic life experience already charged with a hermeneutic rationality. The phrase “hermeneutics of facticity” (first used in October 1922 [chapter 14]) thus hinges on a double genitive, where the hermeneutics first comes from facticity itself. As Gadamer, paraphrasing Dilthey, succinctly put it, “Das Leben selbst legt sich aus”: Life itself lays itself out, articulates itself, interprets itself. “Factic life in its facticity, *its rich realm of relations*, is what is nearest to us, is our neighborhood: we ourselves *are it*” (*GA* 58, 173). Accordingly, the distinction between (existential) facticity and (categorical) factuality (*Tatsächlichkeit*) is also first made in October 1922. In the 1915 habilitation, *Tatsächlichkeit* had served in part as a surrogate for facticity, following Dilthey, who conflated the two terms.

Gegenständlichkeit, comprehensive object(ivity).

In keeping with his phenomenological complaint against science’s excessive objectifying (and ipso facto subjectivizing) tendency in inappropriate contexts, Heidegger in 1920–1922 terminologically distinguishes the German synonyms *Objekt* and *Gegenstand*, and reserves *Gegenständlichkeit* for phenomena like fear-of and care-for that are clearly relational and situationally intentional in character and that cannot be understood without regarding both “poles” (already dichotomizing!) of the relation in un-

divided unison; hence a “comprehensive object” like “life itself.” *Gegenständlichkeit* thus moves into close proximity with phenomenological *Sachlichkeit*, its drive to get to the matter *itself* (the mark of phenomenological ontology for Heidegger), to get at “what matters,” adhering to what is relevant to the particular “object”/matter under discussion. Any and all forms of objectifying are simply irrelevant to *be-ing itself*.

Gerede, common speech (idle talk, gossip, repetitive chatter).

This term was first introduced in SS 1923 to describe in more detail the nature of the *interpretedness* of the everyday world that is being promoted and furthered within the *averageness* and *publicity* of the *Anyone*, which are the *elements* of the domain of everydayness that were already put in place in October 1922. “Common speech,” as in *koine* Greek and Latin *vulgata*, i.e., the popular Latin in common usage among the Roman people, is perhaps the best translation of *Gerede* in a Heideggerian context, as opposed to the more graphic idiomatic translations suggested above, inasmuch as it alludes to the general, generic, and impersonal concepts that prevail in common speech. Heidegger in SS 1924 remarks that the language of everydayness paves the way for the language of objective science, shaped as it is by the criterion of general or universal validity (*Allgemeingültigkeit*).

Geschichte, (lived) *history*; versus *Historie*, (recorded) *history* of historians and historical science.

Heidegger first distinguishes these two *prima facie* German synonyms, after an early period of indiscriminate usage, in late 1924, in the context of reviewing the Dilthey-Yorck correspondence in a just published journal article (now in *GA* 64), which then carries over into his semipopular lectures on Dilthey in April 1925 (chapter 18). The distinction is based on Count Yorck’s remark, often cited by the early Heidegger (e.g., in chapters 13, 17, 18) that “We ourselves *are* history [*Geschichte*].” This distinction is already mirrored in a distinction that Heidegger first made in 1920 (chapter 13) between the actualization-historical (*vollzugsgeschichtlich*) and the objective-historical (*objektsgeschichtlich*), where the latter is now terminologically linked with *Historie* and *historisch*, as in *historische* worldviews and written *Historie*, especially when written from the objective vantage point of science. *Historie* is thus associated with historiography and the historiographical inquiry into the past, whereas *Geschichte*, and *Geschichtlich-sein*, “being-historical,” is fundamentally future-oriented, the way we carry (project, enact, actualize) our unique past into the future, a historical action that involves both understanding interpretation and resolute decision. This way of being-historical is the protoaction of proper historicity or historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*, already in the talks of 1924 and 1925), the very being of being-there.

Bestelltsein (*das Wie des*), (how of) being-placed or -pos[ition]ed, thus being-disposed.

This was Martin Luther’s way of speaking about *affectus*, affect or affective habit, first of all in regard to *how* the human being is placed before God, then (dis-)positioned in the world in the flight from God (chapter 15). Heidegger’s use of the term in early 1924 paves the way for his literal translation in SS 1924, in the context of Aristotle’s discussion of the passions, especially the e-motion of flight called fear, of Aristotle’s generic category for the e-motions, δια-θέσις, as *Befindlichkeit*, dis-position, disposedness, how one finds oneself being “put upon” by the world.

gleichursprünglich, equiprimordial, co-original.

This high-frequency coinage in *Being and Time*, typically used to express the relationship among the existentials, receives occasional usage in Heidegger's early essays. The phrase *gleich ursprünglich*, "equally original," recurs in the 1915 habilitation (*FS*, 158, 166, 172, 323) in regard to the question of the "convertible" relationships of the transcendentials of be-ing (*esse*) as well as its "ontological difference" from any entity (*ens*; *FS*, 323). The phraseology probably derives from Heidegger's reading of Emil Lask.

Hingabe, dedicative submission, devotional surrender.

This term plays a central role in Heidegger's 1917 gloss of Schleiermacher's Second Speech on Religion (chapter 9) to express the receptive moment of immediate experience at the level of the unity of intuition and feeling, where we humans "*give ourselves over* to the universe and allow ourselves to be moved by it." Heidegger became acquainted with the term from reading Lask, who used it to describe our immediate experience of forms of life, like values, in which we are already "given over to" them, immersed and absorbed in them as in a non-reflective categorial dimension. *Hingabe* as pre-reflective absorption in the categories thus becomes a non-ocular replacement for *Hinsehen*, directly looking-at, inspecting, intuiting. *Hingabe* thus expresses a less "theoretical" and more "practical" manner of receptivity to our immediate experience, our "openness." Heidegger began using the term in a significant way as early as 1915 (*FS*, 140). Another term adapted from religious experience at this time, Eckhart's *Gelassenheit* (letting-be), will eventually win out in the expression of "receptivity" and "openness" to be-ing and existence.

Jeweiligkeit, temporal particularity, each particular while.

jeweils, jeweilig, at the time, (temporally) particular.

je-weils, "to each its while."

je, each, in each instance (instantiation).

Against the background of his Aristotelian reflections on phronetic insight into the particular ultimate, what is to be done here and now in this temporally unique and concrete situation (*καίρως*), and the place of the particular, *ἕκαστον*, in ousiology as well as kairology, Heidegger formally introduces Da-sein, "being here and now," as his technical term precisely because it indicates the "particular while" that each of us is and has to be. The family of terms surrounding particular whileness governs the talk on time in July 1924 (chapter 16) but by and large recedes into the filigree of *Being and Time* where *Jemeinigkeit*—"Dasein is in each instance mine"—replaces *Jeweiligkeit*. As a result, the tiny but crucial particle *je* (and its variants) is often omitted or translated generically as "every" and "always" instead of distributively as "each" and "at any given time." One thus loses the crucial distinction that Heidegger is making in *Being and Time*, by way of the exemplary distinction between "All men are mortal" and "Each of us must die," between the generic (common, objective) universal of the "All" and "Every" and the distributive (temporally unique, hermeneutic, contextual, formally indicative, existential) universal of the "Each" (*Jedes* in the German). The legal principle in case law, "To each his/her own," is now temporally modified through Da-sein to "To each its allotted while," which points to the unique, one-time-only, originary time of a particular lifetime that each of us is called upon to own up to and make our own, or, as Heidegger puts it, "actualize" (*vollziehen*: enact, fulfill). The stark polar contrast that structures *Being and Time* is that of the proper originary time of my unique lifetime versus the common public time of average everydayness.

The life option is that of being-myself versus being-like-everyone and the language is that of the hermeneutically distributive universal properized according to the particular context *je nach dem* versus the common generic leveled universal of the averaged and impersonal Anyone.

Man, das, the Anyone, the Everyone.

First introduced in October 1922 (chapter 14) to specify the pronominal “subject” of the averageness of the public, this term is first substantified into a German noun in SS 1923 (*GA* 63, 31). Translating the term as “the they” and “they-self” suppresses the key note of generality and generic universality that governs the everyday discourse of the general public, and so dulls the contrast between the common and the proper that sustains this constellation of terms.

Öffentlichkeit, the (general) public, (domain of) publicity.

This term likewise first appears in October 1922 in conjunction with interpretedness, averageness, and the “one.” Adding “general” to “the public” once again contributes to bringing out the contrast between the generic universal of the “all” and the distributive universal of the “each.” Compare *Jeweiligkeit*.

Rede, (discursive) speech, discourse.

In the 1924 context of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and his definition of the human being as the living being possessing (and possessed by) speech, λόγος as speech (and *not* judgment) emerges as a comprehensive locus of truth as unconcealment, and will thus find its way into *Being and Time* as an equiprimordial mode of being-in, being-there, disclosedness. In view of its repetitious and habitual character, speech will also be closely correlated with the concealment of being (see *Gerede*). The articulative note of discursiveness will later be highlighted as an equiprimordial character of be-ing itself as a “differentiating gathering,” the ordering whole of λόγος.

Seiendes, being; beings, entities.

Sein, be-ing, being, Being.

Heidegger’s repeated insistence that Being and beings are ontologically different prompts us to interject a new orthographical differentiation into the English by translating the German infinitive, *Sein*, as the hyphenated word “be-ing” to underscore at once the dynamic, muscularly verbal character of being—it is in fact time itself—as well as its relational character, actively spinning out a web of relations by contextualizing or “worlding” us and other beings and dispatching us in various temporal directions. In short, as at once context and direction, be-ing itself is meaning, *Sinn*.

Sinn, sense, meaning.

Bezugssinn, (sense of) relation, relational sense.

Gehaltssinn, (sense of) containment, containing sense.

Vollzugssinn, (sense of) actualization, fulfillment, enactment, performance.

Zeitigungssinn, (sense of) temporalization, temporal development, maturation, fruition.

Already in the overview of logic in 1912 (chapter 4), sense emerges as the very “object” of logic and so of the logic of philosophy (in the form of categories). In WS 1919–1920, a triple-sensed intentionality of relation, containment, and actualization is formally indicated as the prestruction of all human experience, where the three “ele-

ments” are identified as “guiding directions of sense” (*Sinnführungen*; GA 58, 261). The course of WS 1921–1922 adds the comprehensive temporalizing sense of mature development that comprehends all three elements into a temporal unity, and the “Aristotle Introduction” of October 1922 adds the note of custodial preservation of sense through the habit of tradition. The directional character and triadic context of sense are still evident in the filigree of the famous definition of sense in *Being and Time* (BT, 151) as “the toward-which [*Woraufhin*] of [factic life’s] projection, already structured by pre- possession, pre-view, and pre-conception, according-to-which [*Woraufhin*] something as something becomes comprehensible.” See also *Besinnung*; *Verwahrung*.

Situation, situation.

Lage, (circumstantial) state.

The “situation I,” a forerunner to Da-sein, first emerges in SS 1919 shortly after the appearance of Jaspers’s book on limit situations. The clear distinction between accidental *state* and the inescapable essential *situation* of factic life itself, as “the stand taken by life itself,” is made in October 1922 (see *Blickstand*). It is called the “hermeneutic situation” to indicate that it is already charged through and through with relational vectors of sense and is accordingly “prestructured” as a meaningful context called the world, which guides and directs the interpretation of any and all things contained within that world-context.

Sorgen, caring.

fürsorgliches, solicitous.

besorgendes, concerned, concerned.

The term “caring” first emerges in WS 1921–1922 as the “relational sense” of life in the world. Its precursors are the biblical *Bekümmern* (1920) and Augustine’s *cura* (1921). Solicitude and concern emerge adjectivally in October 1922 in the context of Aristotle’s discussion of human praxis. In the same context, “care” (*Sorge*) is identified as a formal indication of factic life itself, and includes within itself the solicitude or care-for-others and concerns about everyday things.

Umgang, getting around (by, along); coping; dealing; (pre)occupation (never intercourse, but perhaps interaction).

This term was first thematized in WS 1921–1922 to describe the how of the daily rounds in the world around us. In SS 1922, it becomes Heidegger’s translation of Aristotle’s concept of experience in *Metaphysics* I and is related to *sich auskennen*, “knowing one’s way around,” or the know-how of human experience developed through habit and memory according to Aristotle, by familiarizing oneself with the habit (custom, usage, practice) of a historical habitat according to Heidegger, so that one knows how to get around one’s world, get along with others, get by with things, in short, to cope with life’s relations. All of this know-how constitutes the content of what Heidegger calls *Seinsverständnis*, the understanding of being.

Umsicht, circumspection, looking around (over).

Durchsichtigkeit, perspicuity, transparency.

Hinsicht, inspection, looking at.

Sicht, sight.

All of these “sights” discussed in October 1922, whether original or derivative, along

with regard (*Rücksicht*) for others, are in *Being and Time* (BT, 146–47) situated within the “lighting” or “clearing” (*Lichtung*) of be-ing provided by *Seinsverständnis*, the understanding of be-ing.

Verfallen, falling (away), lapsing; decadence.

A term used incidentally in conjunction with *Abfallen* since SS 1920, it is thematized in detail under the biblical term “ruinane” (Latin *ruina*, fall) in WS 1921–1922 before it becomes the “fateful tendency” (*Verhängnis*) of decadent falling in October 1922 and the falling away from our proper existence in *Being and Time*.

Verwahrung, (truthful) safekeeping, safeguarding, preservation, conservation.

This term appears often in the October 1922 “Aristotle Introduction” essay implicitly as a final intentional sense (compare *Sinn* and *Zeitigung*) to convey the persistent temporality of a habit of truth, in preserving what has already been unveiled in the tradition and practical usage of a historical habitat. Its overt sense and its apparent etymology suggest translating *Seinsverwahrung* as “holding being in trust (troth, truth)” and being persistently “true” to it by way of fidelity and loyalty (*Treue*), in the act of conserving and ‘saving’ it. In the 1926 “truth” talk, this idea begins to shift over into the later Heidegger’s preferred term, *bergen*, to shelter in a cove(r), to preserve and protect by concealment, to save, salvage, and rescue from total destruction.

vollzugsgeschichtlich, actualization-historical; versus *objektsgeschichtlich*, objective-historical.

This distinction between compound adverbials of the historical occurs only in the Jaspers review and in the courses of WS 1920–1921 and WS 1921–1922, and already reflects the later distinction between the history that we are and the history that we record and write about. Compare *Geschichte* versus *Historie*.

Vorbabe, pre-possession, fore-having.

Vorsicht, *Vorblick*, pre-view, fore-sight.

Vorgriff, pre-conception, fore-conceiving.

Vorgriff emerges first, already in KNS 1919, and continues to be the clinching term among the fluid presuppositions that structure the hermeneutic situation of life; it is first joined by *Vorbabe* in SS 1922, and by *Vorblick* in October 1922, which is replaced by *Vorsicht* in WS 1923–1924. The prefix of *Vorgriff* is to be understood dynamically, implying both the “before” of precedence and the forward advance of anticipation, like the “Fore!” warning in golf, thus both past and future joined in the present. *Vorgriff* thus can stand alone in structuring the temporality of the situation. When joined with the other two structures, it naturally stands at the juncture between the pre-possession arising from the past and the fore-sight into the future, in the fullness of the unique new present begging to be conceived, interpreted, and thus explicitly understood.

Wahrheit als . . ., truth as . . .

Entdecken, uncovering, discovering.

Erschlossenheit, disclosedness.

Unverborgenheit, unconcealment.

Unverhüllen, unveiling (later *Enthüllen*).

Truth as the unconcealment of be-ing and the unveiling of beings first clearly emerges

in Heidegger's extended gloss of *Nicomachean Ethics* VI in October 1922 (chapter 14). Even though this purportedly etymological way of translating "truth" can be found in some old Greek-German dictionaries, Georg Misch registered puzzled surprise (through question marks and exclamation points) over it in his copy of the "Aristotle Introduction." The ensuing "truth" talks (chapters 17 and 19) will use the above constellation of terms in various ways before *Being and Time* itself will rigorously reserve the term "disclosedness" for the self and its world, and "discoveredness" for in-traworldly beings. The talk of December 1924 (chapter 17) is distinctive in providing the very first listing of the three modes of concealment (*Verborgenheit*, *verbergen*), two of them through language. The talk on Pentecost 1926 (chapter 19) begins to explore the term *bergen* (to put under cover, to shelter) as a form of authentic concealment provided by tradition (see *bergen* and *Verwahrung*). Circa 1930 Heidegger coins the German word *Entbergung* as a favored way of speaking of truth as unconcealment in his later years.

Welt, Selbstwelt, world of the self, self-world.

Mitwelt, social world; world-with(-others).

Umwelt, environment; surrounding (environing) world, world around us.

The term *Selbstwelt* is the only new coinage here; the other two are relatively common German words. The entire constellation is first invoked in WS 1919–1920 and will persist into *Being and Time*, except that the self-world drops out after SS 1925 and is replaced simply by "the world" in *Being and Time*. Already in WS 1919–1920, it is noted that the other two worlds "come to a focus" (*Zugespitztheit*; GA 58, 59 ff.) and "peak" intensity in the self-world, which is their "domain of origin." Actualizing this pretheoretical domain thus constitutes the originary experience which a phenomenological philosophy takes as its starting point and its goal, the experience of "self-worldly Dasein" (so in SS 1920).

zeitigen, to temporalize, i.e., to ripen, mature, come to fruition.

Zeitigung, temporalizing (development), maturation.

It has been noted that intentionality in 1920–1922 is explicitly formalized in terms of at least four interrelated and thus integrated "guiding directions of sense": the relational, containing of content ("the toward-which of the relating"), actualizing, and temporalizing sense. Unique to the October 1922 "Aristotle Introduction" is the addition of perhaps a fifth conservative sense, that of taking custody of the truth attained in order to maintain and preserve it in the steadying act of "truthful safekeeping" (see *Verwahrung*). But note its close connection to the fourth sense of temporalization (*Zeitigungssinn*), a term closely associated with a vintner's careful and patient cultivation of plants from young seedlings through to their ripening into the full fruition of the mature grapes, and further. ("We shall have no wine before *its time*.")

Zusammenhang, context, nexus, (inter)connection, continuity.

Etymologically a "hanging together," this high-frequency word drawn largely from Dilthey's hermeneutics proliferates in Heidegger virtually from his first writings, and is an ongoing challenge for the English translator to find the most idiomatic translation to accord with the context.