

suicide, euthanasia, the definition of death, rights of the dying patient, and the significance of life and death. In addition to papers already referred to, there are selections from Veatch, Margolis, Paul Ramsey, and many other contributors to current debates. The editors adopt a policy of deleting material too difficult for classroom use; several papers (e.g., those by Nagel and Hare) suffer badly from the deletions, and the portions omitted are less difficult than much else in the book. Despite this reservation, the book can be highly recommended for courses on the topics considered. It should also prove useful as a supplementary text for courses in bioethics. The topics in Carse and Dallery largely overlap with those treated in Beauchamp and Perlin. Philosophers will prefer the latter, however, since Carse and Dallery provide few strictly philosophical selections. (The book does contain a section on abortion; users of Beauchamp and Perlin who desire coverage of the topic will wish to obtain supplementary readings.)

Finally there is Weir's collection: its title matches Beauchamp and Perlin's, and the section headings are similar. But the contents diverge. The contributors include psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, theologians, doctors, and lawyers. But despite the editor's assurance that the "issues are ethical in nature...in that they call for critical, systematic reflection upon moral conduct..." (xii), there is nary a philosopher represented. The book cannot be recommended. □

Growing up with Philosophy,

Ed. Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, 412 pages.

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Professional philosophers in this country often say that their subject is at a disadvantage

because freshmen have not been exposed to philosophy at school. In many countries in Europe, philosophy subjects, such as logic, philosophical psychology, and metaphysics are taught in some secondary schools. It is not uncommon for professional philosophers to begin their careers teaching in a school and to move up to a university later on. Hegel, for instance, taught philosophy at the Gymnasium of Nuremberg for eight years, and then took a professorship at Heidelberg. Recently, there has been some interest in this country in the possibility of introducing philosophy into the school curriculum. In consequence, a number of philosophers have addressed themselves to the problems in the way of this enterprise. The editors of this anthology even think that "a new branch of philosophy has emerged: philosophy and children." There appear to be three main problem areas which make up this new branch: the philosophical problems arising out of the peculiarities of childhood itself and its relation to adulthood, the peculiarities of the philosophical thinking *of* children, and finally, the special requirements of philosophy *for* children. This large anthology touches on all three problems, though the two questions most frequently discussed are whether children spontaneously become involved with philosophical problems and whether it is desirable that they should be confronted with such problems and acquainted with the often worrisome controversies over them of which the history of philosophy is full.

The 29 papers in the book are grouped into four parts and twelve sections. The first part contains seven essays by classical authors, mostly philosophers and educationists but also a short lively piece by Tolstoy who describes his first encounters with philosophical ideas in boyhood, e.g., his encounter with philosophical skepticism, which brought him to such a stage of derangement that "I sometimes glanced quickly in the opposite direction, hoping suddenly to find nothingness (*néant*) where I was not" (26).

Part II consists of eleven pieces which

are subdivided into six sections. The first section, raises the question of whether children are philosophical. The two entertaining and partly autobiographical articles by Gareth Matthews and Stephen Toulmin, claim that at least some children are natural philosophers. By this the authors mean that children have the ability and tendency to fall into conceptual puzzlement, such as, whether there is only one sky or more than one, what happened before the beginning of time, and would I still be me if I had been born of other parents. This thesis, that (some) children are natural philosophers appears to be common ground among the contributors—at least no one explicitly disagrees with it, and it is one of the few things on which all the contributors can agree.

The two essays by Peter French and Christopher Olsen, grouped together in the next section of Part II and headed “The adequacy of childhood understanding,” do not fit well into this anthology. French attempts to defend, with arguments taken from Kripke, a Cartesian position on the mind/body problem against recent attacks by Michael Levin, and Olsen offers a Wittgensteinian sketch of a whole theory of knowledge. The relevance of these papers to the new branch of philosophy is very thin, and to be valuable, the papers would have to give much more detailed treatment to their topics than was possible or would be desirable in such an anthology.

The next four sections, deal with the ability of children to understand, and the desirability of their having to try to grapple with, the problems of a particular philosophical discipline: metaphysics (two papers by David L. Norton and Michael Gillespie); moral philosophy (Joseph Flay and Clyde Evans); social philosophy (Jane Roland Martin and Louis I. Katzner); and philosophy of science (only one paper: Martin Tamny). Except for the last one, in which the attitude is favorable, the pattern is much the same: one author thinks children are unable or that it is undesirable to expose them to philosophy, while the other author takes the opposite

line.

Part III consists of two attacks, both very interesting, on psychological stage theories of human development. The first, by Gareth Matthews, drawing again on his own experience with children rejects Piaget’s three-stage theory of intellectual development on the basis of a detailed examination of the latter’s methodology; the second, by Joseph Margolis, subjects Kohlberg’s similar developmental theory of moral development, to a detailed analysis from which he concludes that the theory is so conceptually muddled and vague that it is unconfirmable, and so itself commits the unforgivable sin of supporting a “hidden curriculum.” These two papers are philosophically interesting in their own right, but they are also of importance for discussions in many other papers since those writers who incline to the view that children are incapable of profiting from a formal philosophical education find their main support in developmental theories in psychology.

Part IV deals with the role various philosophical disciplines might play in the education of children. The first section contains a single paper, by Frederick S. Oscanyan, on the teaching of logic; the second section two papers, by David W. Ecker and John Wilson, on aesthetic education; the third section five papers on moral education, by Martin Benjamin, Ann Diller, Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp, Clyde Evans, and Richard M. Hare; and the fourth section a perceptive paper by Samuel Scolnicov on whether the teacher of philosophy should remain a neutral discussion leader or should enter the discussion as a participant.

The editors conceive of the book as primarily a college text for departments of philosophy and education, but also for lay persons who want “to know what happens when the thought of a child intersects with the ideas of a civilization.” It seems to me that the book does not serve either of these purposes very well. Teachers of philosophy may well complain that many of the articles are neither

philosophically original and exciting nor sufficiently detailed and scholarly surveys or summaries of the relevant literature. Educationists will certainly complain that the book deals mainly with recondite second or third order problems and contains very little of practical value for those who need guidance on how to introduce philosophy to children. And lay persons may well complain that very few articles deal with what happens when the thought of a child intersects with the ideas of a civilization and those that do are anecdotal or speculative and leave one in doubt about what really does happen. Perhaps the best that can be said for the book is that it presents the reader with some representative views of what is possible and desirable in teaching philosophy to children, with many of the obstacles to doing it, and with a number of searching, sensitive, and challenging treatments of a great many topics from the new field of philosophy and children. The book also has a short bibliography. □

A Companion to Plato's Republic,
Nicholas P. White. Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett Publishing, 1979, 272 pages.

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This is an intelligent and sympathetic attempt to isolate and appraise the "philosophic argument" of Plato's *Republic*. The notes include, not only White's analyses, but a good set of cross-references to relevant recent analytic work, and to a few older standard interpretations.

It is clear, as one finds that the author intends to disregard the "literary elements," to minimize the metaphysics, to do away with metaphor so far as possible, and to offer no clarification of the mathematical models, that a conception of philosophy quite different from Plato's own is operative in this enterprise. It

comes as only a slight surprise, therefore, that the painstakingly reconstructed "argument" that the author extracts strikes him (and us) as unsatisfactory (58-60).

If Whitehead was right in his view that learning must take place through successive phases of romance, precision, then generalization, this book is wholly unsuited for any beginning audience of young philosophers or political scientists. It operates at so selective a level of the precision phase that the beginning Platonist, however gifted, can only find it irrelevant and dull. The more advanced reader may find it interesting to see this transformation into a widely-accepted current idiom.

The *Republic* has been the subject of a lively and controversial literature bearing on its importance and contemporary relevance as a good or bad example of political philosophy. But this aspect of the work — which gives it both relevance and a sense of reality—is not treated in the discussion. (I miss references to Popper, Levinson, Havelock, Wild, Crossman, Strauss, Bloom, to name the first half-dozen that come to mind.) The coverage of the history of interpretation is marked by a radical limitation to the near present: it reminds me of Rudolph Carnap's opening remarks to a symbolic logic seminar in Chicago. "We will begin," he said, "with the *classical* period of logic. That is, with the work of Whitehead and Russell in 1913."

Some notion of the contrast of the two philosophic styles, the *Republic's* and White's *Companion's*, may be indicated by comparing the conclusions of the two.

PLATO: "And so, Glaucon, the tale was saved...And it will save us if we believe it...and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever...And thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you, we shall fare well." (*Republic* 621B-D, Shorey's trans.)

WHITE: 621b-d. Conclusion. In a brief and eloquent summation, Plato insists on the importance of keeping these things in mind in one's deliberations. (*Companion*, p. 266)