

Honor and Honor Codes

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Some recent moral issues involving the military are the dangers of nuclear war and the role of the military profession. In this paper I shall discuss the moral training of our future officers, an aspect of the military profession that is not typically examined. More specifically, I shall discuss the Honor Code at the United States Air Force Academy to make some general points about character training and moral education. I shall argue that because of a lack of clarity concerning crucial moral notions, well-meaning people use a system that may actually subvert the very goals aimed at.

I begin with a description of the Honor System at the U.S.A.F. Academy. This description will be followed by a list of some problems of administering the code, including the latest cheating scandal. I shall next propose an analysis of the problems and present some solutions, solutions that are also applicable to non-military education. Finally, I shall raise the standard objections to the kind of proposal made, and then offer responses to them.

The Honor Code

Honor Code at the U. S. Military Academy and the U. S. A. F. Academy is very brief:

We will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does.¹

The code is not, of course, a prediction or merely a resolution. It consists of four separate negative obligations whose aim is to help train and educate future officers,

. . . to develop exceptional officers. The Code is an effort to influence cadets to live honorably so that they will graduate as exceptional officers with high standards of individual honor and integrity and maintain those standards throughout their lifetimes.²

An elected group of first-class (seniors) and second-class (juniors) cadets make up the 8-member Honor Boards that hear honor cases. The Boards decide whether

or not a violation has occurred and whether or not discretion will be granted. (At least six votes are required to find a cadet in violation). Discretion can be granted when a cadet is found in violation and there are “. . . exceptional circumstances wherein aspects of the case warrant [it].”³ In these cases the cadet is still guilty of an honor violation but is given a second chance. “Exceptional circumstances” would include unusual pressure on the cadet, or when a usually honorable cadet acts out of character in unusual circumstances. Should a cadet not be granted discretion, there is still the possibility that the Commandant of Cadets may grant suspension, but

only in rare cases where the performance of the cadet has been otherwise exceptional or where unusual circumstances exist.⁴

Failure of these safety net channels does not necessarily guarantee disenrollment since by failing to resign a “convicted” cadet triggers an investigation by a Hearing Officer. Depending on this officer’s findings, the Academy Board may yet decide to retain the cadet.

Problems

My claim is not that the system does not work perfectly, for no system works perfectly. Indeed, I think that the Honor System works pretty well. The vast majority of the graduates are honorable people, as one would expect from those who have chosen to serve their country. Perhaps the graduates are honorable in spite of the system. However, almost everyone I have talked with, officers and cadets, agrees there are serious problems in the system. The issue is then whether there are modifications that can reduce the problems.

Let us begin the recounting of the problems here by attending to the prestigious Borman report, examining the cheating scandal in the mid-1970s. It notes that cadets have been found guilty of violating the Honor Code and consequently disenrolled for actions that do not show someone to be dishonorable.

Recently, for example, a cadet who *reported himself* for stating that he had done 20 sit-ups, when in fact he had done only 18, was found guilty of violating the Honor Code. A similar incident had occurred in 1970. In July of 1974, a new cadet who *reported himself* for telling his squad leader, who “did not remember the particular incident,” that he had shaved, when in fact he had not, was separated. In 1975, a third classman was found guilty by the Cadet Honor Committee of “intentionally deceiving” in that “he wore a second class dress coat to a motion picture” during the week (a regulation prohibited third classmen from attending weeknight movies).⁵

The West Point study group, in the year following the Borman report, concurred.⁶ The Superintendent’s Review Committee at the U. S. A. F. Academy, The Rokke Report, came to very much the same conclusion.⁷

Changes made at the U.S.A.F. Academy as a result of the reports, reduced but did not eliminate violations for “trivial” offenses. During the year 1982-83 a cadet was found in violation for not correcting a mistaken count of push-ups

by another cadet administering a physical fitness test. Another cadet who, while engaged in the room grading of a fourth classman, took a damaged model F-16 to his room to repair, and so announced to the accompanying cadet, was found in violation of the Honor Code (stealing). In these two cases the cadets were given discretion, though not in the case where an upperclassman, following a picnic, decided to transport some fourthclassmen back to quarters after returning beer kegs to a party store. The fourthclassmen left the car during the drop off—not permitted—and finished a nonempty keg. The upperclassman lied about the fourthclassmen's leaving the car to protect them. He was found in violation for lying and expelled (disenrolled). There are many other, some even clearer cases reported to me, but I hesitate to repeat them because they are hearsay.

One interpretation of this kind of case by many cadets, officers, and former officers is that disillusionment and lack of faith in the code are brought about by a too-rigid interpretation and enforcement of it. This is not just my civilian view; it is the view of many people on the inside.

Many wonder whether the code itself, or the way it is interpreted and administered contributes to the recurring scandals at the service academies.⁸ There is evidence in the cited reports that the administration of the Honor Code is subverting its aim of producing honorable officers. Many cadets have substituted purely externally motivated compliance for internally motivated action. This substitution perhaps is partially due to the perceived inadequacies of the system.⁹

One problem is the lack of “fit” between offense and punishment. This is described in a variety of ways, especially where and when there is only one punishment available.

Any change to the Honor Code which does not include alternative sanctions will be entirely cosmetic. It will not attack the fundamental problems caused by an unreasonable penalty. Consequently, it will do very little to make the Honor Code more effective in developing honorable officers.¹⁰

This citation is from an undergraduate paper written by a current air force officer who was then a firstclassman at the U.S.A.F. Academy. A *range* of penalties is now available but only to first and second year cadets. (A range of sanctions was also proposed in *The Rokke Report*.)¹¹

The code has become, for many, the *only* moral requirement. It may be that sanctions and fear of sanctions lends needed support to those who are tempted to violate a moral code, but that must be an aid to a moral code, not its substance. The American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., distinguished the perspectives of the good man and that of the bad man. The latter is one whose social behavior is the result of the threat of societal punishment. Such persons act as they do because they are coerced. The good person acts because of the belief that such behavior is morally correct. Many cadets have, apparently, taken on the perspective of the bad person. What can be done to change this?

Philosophical Interlude

In response to the following proposed dilemma I shall indicate ways to revise

moral education at the service academies.

Either rules allow exceptions or not. If they allow exceptions they are useless because there are too many exceptions. On the other hand, if the rules don't allow exceptions, they are useless because they aren't sufficiently flexible to be used by fallible human beings.

A response to the dilemma requires a view about moral rules and an account of character development. By 'character' is meant the set of reasonably stable character traits of a person. Persons are honest or dishonest, calm or excitable, kind or vicious. Few people have been totally and purely vicious, character traits refer to the overall tendency of someone. Those who are typically or usually kind are said to be kind. When someone's typical behavior in a variety of circumstances is honest, the person is honest.

Small children are neither naturally honest, nor naturally dishonest. We help form our children's character by punishing when they act dishonestly and rewarding them when they are honest. One aim of moral education at the military academies is to replace the external standard enforced by society and parents with an internal character trait that will lead to exemplary action. This is, I think, a commonly shared view of moral education.

Unless in an important sense [cadets] come to view the Academy's morality as self-imposed, they will come to see a conflict between the demands an autonomous morality makes on them and the demands the Academy makes on them—with the result that the only motivation available for adherence to the Academy's morality will be a prudential (and cynical) legalism.¹²

First year cadets are not four year olds unable to act without external sanction and guidelines. Though close to a full adult status, they do not yet have the fully formed character that will allow them to act honorably in difficult situations. When expulsion is the penalty for a trivial offense the assumption seems to be that such behavior does show a fully formed bad character.

Our character development program should not assume cadets are either saints or sinners; instead, we should support and encourage cadets to try to be honorable; if a cadet falls short, we should consider it possible, or perhaps even likely, that the miscreant can both be made to see the error of his or her ways and can be returned to the Wing with a determination to live up to the standards expected of persons leading the defense of their country.¹³

A sinner has a fully formed bad character, but the rest of us have virtues and vices in degrees. People are, e.g., courageous in degrees. Someone may be courageous in defending his or her views in public, but afraid of heights or of dogs. Someone might be quite honest about business, but lie about his war exploits. Only when there is frequent lying on topics of some importance do we say a person is a liar.

If we agree that virtues come in degrees and are acquired gradually through practice, we are less inclined to think that only one penalty, the maximum, is appropriate for an infraction. However, the horn of the dilemma stating that moral rules can have no exceptions supports this kind of position.

To respond directly to the dilemma requires another set of distinctions

involving the term ‘absolute.’ The sense of ‘absolute’ people have in mind when they deny there are any, is that moral factors are fixed in weight. A factor, e.g., truth-telling, is a characteristic of an actual or proposed action (e.g., lying to your mother) used to determine if it is morally right or not. If someone lies to ruin another’s reputation the factor shows the action is morally wrong. A factor has a fixed weight when the addition of other information cannot change the moral judgment, as in “Lying is always wrong no exceptions.” In contrast, a factor has variable weight when additional factors, e.g., hurting someone’s feelings, can change the moral judgment. When the factor of lying is taken as fixed in weight, then when your mother asks how you liked the pie she baked specially for you, your moral duty is to tell her it wasn’t very good. But if it is taken as variable in weight then the factor of not hurting her feelings will carry the day.

The view that the moral factors are of variable weight—e.g., sometimes lying is weightier than the good to country, but not always—is close to common sense morality.¹⁴ Where absolutes are conceived of as fixed weight factors I agree there are no absolutes. Beginners in moral reasoning sometimes then argue that since there are no absolutes (as described), everything is “relative to one’s culture.” This is the view of ethical relativism, that whatever is accepted as morally right (or wrong) by the majority in a society is right (or wrong) in that society. Slavery, being accepted as morally right by the majority of Americans in 1820 was thereby proven to be “right.” Relativism, though, does not follow from the denial of absolutes because there are other options. Utilitarianism, the *prima facie* theory of W. D. Ross, the contractarian view of John Rawls and almost every other ethical theory also deny that there are absolutes. Each of these views has a different account of how the factors are to be weighed, which is what primarily makes them different theories.

A response to the apparent dilemma posed at the beginning of this section is now possible. Are rules useful only when they don’t allow exceptions? They are, if there are only fixed-weight rules available. Fortunately, we know how to use variable-weight rules. We may not *know* how we are able to use them, but able to use them we are. Instead of saying there is an exception to a rule that is exceptionless, we can say the rules are variable in weight. Our moral rules contain moral factors that on occasion may be overridden by other factors. No factor is the weightiest on every occasion—for then it would be of fixed weight. There is no set number of exceptions to the moral rules, so there is not too great a number, or too small a number for that matter. Thus, the first horn of the dilemma, “If they (the rules) allow exceptions, they are useless because there are too many exceptions,” is incorrect.

A Few Suggested Changes

Many of the changes I shall suggest below are in the U. S. Military Academy reports already cited.

Hearings. There should be a two-step process. In step one the decision by the Cadet Honor Committee will be as now, with a finding of violation or no

violation. In step two a different panel will decide how to treat a violation. The panel should be composed of either a mixed cadet/officer group or entirely of officers.

Penalties. The Penalty Assessment Board (or Sanction Section Committee, or whatever it might be called) will select from a range of penalties depending on their assessment of the seriousness of the violation. At one end of the spectrum will be disenrollment, and at the other, perhaps remedial honor activities. There should be a single Penalty Assessment Board, it should serve the whole year, with significant overlap of the faculty each year. For example, if there are six faculty, they might serve three-year terms with two being replaced each year.

There are some spectacularly wrong actions that indeed show a morally unacceptable character. The rapist should be disenrolled from any school, military or civilian, as should the drug dealer, the seller of stolen exams, and so on.

The following suggestions are based on *The Rokke Report*, with a few modifications. The range of sanctions suggested is:

1. Violation. No discretion.
2. Discretion. (Discretion as presently understood, but with the above understanding of character, etc.)
 - a. No further (moral/honor) education is needed. Cadet returns to the Wing without further action.

. . . considering all the circumstances of the case and other relevant evidence concerning the cadet's integrity, the cadet has truly learned the personal value of honor, has resolved to live honorably in the future, and is fit to remain in the Cadet Wing, but would benefit from a period of reflection, counseling, or study.¹⁵
 - b. Specific deficiencies. The cadet is of a generally good character, but has some specific deficiency; for example, needs to strengthen the virtue of honesty. Upon successful completion of a program designed by the committee the cadet will be returned to good standing in the Wing.
 - c. General deficiency. The cadet is of a generally good character but unclear or confused about honor or ethics. There is positive reason to believe such behavior will cease once the unclarity or confusion is cleared up. Though I have ideas about specifics, I don't think I am the one to make such recommendations.
3. Suspension. (See Sec. 6 of U.S.A.F. Academy *Honor Code Reference Handbook*).
 - a. Offered by Penalty Assessment Board. (This may be offered in conjunction with 2b. or 2c. above).
 - b. Offered by the Commandant of Cadets.

In other areas of a student's life performance is rated by degree. Cadets earn a "C" or an "A" in a course, or a high or low military rating. Given that character development occurs, and that there are degrees of severity of wrongness, it is reasonable that penalties for honor infractions should come in degrees. The granting of discretion and the option of suspension already show an acceptance of this in principle, but it would be better to recognize this straightforwardly so as to be able rationally to design penalties of different degrees.

As matters now stand, the Academy (and most schools) puts forward a face

of a set of moral rules without exception ('absolutes'), but then has exceptions in tact, discretion, and suspension. Instead of having a system that says, "Except for the exceptions, this code has no exceptions," it would be better to recognize the variable-weight nature of moral rules from the beginning (and avoid an inconsistent position). This recognition, though, also requires a range of penalties.

Combatting "Cool" and Toleration.

A range of penalties and the corresponding recognition of degrees of severity of violation would, I predict, decrease significantly the number of cadets who are "cool" on honor. Cadets who now tolerate infractions because they think the likely punishment doesn't fit the crime they see will be less likely to do so. The tendency to view the code as a merely externally imposed set of rules will be weakened, and the internalization of virtuous behavior strengthened. Cadets will be more likely to see that certain prohibitions are in the code because such actions are wrong, not that the actions are wrong because they are in the code.

In the next section I shall offer a brief argument for the proposed two-step process as helpful in that education. This completes my *prima facie* case for my proposals about the moral education of cadets (and any other students for that matter).

Two-Step Process

After observing a hearing at the U.S.A.F. Academy I strongly support a cadet-run hearing process. At the end of this process a finding of violation or no violation would be reached.

A second panel, tentatively called the Penalty Assessment Board, should be composed of senior officers—say majors or those with at least two years at the Academy—and cadets. (I'll argue for the inclusion of cadets after I try to establish the reason for the separate board). The problems of inconsistency and the resulting cadet cynicism would be lessened by three-year terms with overlapping tenure of committee members.

Faculty represent the moral standards of the U.S. military. (They are in a better position than cadets to determine whether certain behavior is indicative of character that is morally unacceptable in the military. It is not the purpose of this paper to give details on the mechanisms; that will be supplied by people at the academies should they find this kind of proposal worthy.)

A cadet perspective would be useful on a penalty board. Most officers understand the life of cadets fairly well, but there are usually factors that are not fully appreciated except by those who experience them. Even if an officer had been a cadet at that very institution, there is a tendency to forget certain things, especially if they were somewhat unpleasant. Finally, unless cadets are involved in the penalty phase they will tend to think the process is out of their hands and will thus distance themselves from it.

This completes the *prima facie* case for my proposal. However, there are always objections to proposals, objections to which one must respond if the

proposal is to be accepted. It is not, though, possible to respond to all objections because people are always able to think of more objections.

Possible Objections to the Proposal and Responses

Alienates Cadets: The two-step procedure takes the administration of the code away from the cadets, thus the problem of an external code would arise again.

The code as presently administered involves both the Superintendent offering suspension and the Commandant overturning recommendations of discretion of an Honor Board. This “interference” with cadet decisions does not seem to cause alienation, so there is some evidence that the penalty board will not. In addition, if there are cadets on this board, cadets will have an input into the process.

Some say once there is even one officer on a panel, cadets—no matter how many of them there are—will automatically defer to that officer. However, decisions are made after discussion, and it is the discussion that is crucially important. In the discussion reasons and evidence are presented, the basis of any decision arrived at. In other contexts, cadets show no timidity in presenting their views (e.g., the present U. S. A. F. Academy Military Review Committee has both officers and cadets). Officers now show no timidity in asking for the views of cadets when they do not volunteer them.

One Bad Case: In combat, it has been said to me, it has happened that a lie caused many unnecessary deaths. Thus, we must teach our future officers never to lie. The notion of variable-weight moral factors may make sense in civilian life, but it doesn’t in the military.

As pointed out earlier, lying, for example, is already viewed as a variable weight factor. The notion of tact (it is sometimes morally permissible to lie in social circumstances—“the food was terrific”) shows this. Furthermore, lying to the enemy is okay; lying to an assassin who bursts into your room before you, Jones, have put on your name tag and says, “I have come to kill Jones. Are you Jones?” is morally permissible.¹⁶

Judgment, No Morality, No Penalty: Some argue that once we allow judgment to be used then no one will ever be found in violation because cadets will always find some way to conclude that a violation, e.g., lying, was not serious, or was overridden by another factor. So, once judgment is permitted there will be few, if any, decisions of violation reached. Furthermore, in society we see people “justify” every conceivable action. They use drugs, engage in indiscriminate sex, steal office supplies, and so on.

In response, we must note that it is too late. We already weigh factors in society, and this is as it ought to be. If this were not legitimate you would have an obligation to say, “Well, this is the worst pot roast I’ve ever tasted,” and “that is about the ugliest baby I’ve ever seen.” It is this fixed-weight view of morality that is the more likely cause of our problems. Persons of the same mentality are inclined to argue, “Either moral rules are of fixed weight (top of the scale, categorical) or morality is an illusion.” Most people, correctly in my view, reject fixed-weight moral rules. Some of them then mistakenly conclude that morality is an illusion, that nihilism is correct. This is a mistake since there

is at least the option of moral factors being objective though of variable weight.

Moral factors are of variable weight, but some of them are typically of great weight. It is an exceptional circumstance that morally permits one to lie, not the usual circumstance. The burden of showing that a lie is morally permissible rests on the person who says that it is okay. So, the adoption of variable weight rules doesn't allow everything. Generally, we all have a heavy obligation to be honest, not to cheat, not to steal, and not to tolerate those who violate these obligations.

Cadets need to understand the nature of morality, which is why the moral education of cadets is begun in Basic Cadet Training. Cadets, as typical 18 or 19-year olds, are inclined to be relativists and egoists—even though those positions are incompatible. However, they are also inclined, in fact, to use moral factors as variable. When they engage in moral reasoning, instead of repeating what their high school English or Social Studies teacher told them, they almost all treat the moral rules as having variable weight. I've noticed this ability of students serving on academic misconduct panels at Ohio State University.

This argument shows the need for early, philosophically adequate, ethics instruction in all our educational institutions. We don't want to reinforce the false dichotomy of absolutism or relativism; we want to expose it right from the start.

Once we strengthen the tendency to view moral factors as variable in weight and not of fixed weight, we can help students to improve the quality of their thinking. If we try to get them to accept moral rules as fixed in weight we are likely to lose many of the most morally sensitive cadets—either lose them from the service or from service on Honor Boards. There are, according to the reports I've read, many cadets who serve on Honor Boards who think of moral rules as fixed in weight. My suspicion is that some of these people, by their interpretation of the Honor Code, alienate and drive some cadets away from the Honor Code.

Some of you will see that my proposals require that many officers will need some supplementary moral education in order for them to teach honor lessons to cadets. I think this is so, but there is nothing wrong with that. In my experience at the U.S.A.F. Academy, almost all officers use moral rules as variable in weight. The philosophy department can help by providing the conceptual framework to state this view, but the view is already very widely held.

Starving Farmer: After World War II, American A. I. D. officials found that the farmers in India would often not use the seeds they were given. Even though the seeds would result in significantly larger yields, they were not planted. The Indians explained, "We are just barely surviving now, but still surviving. If we plant your seeds and you are correct we'll live better. But if you are incorrect we shall starve. There is much to gain, but more to lose." This is the attitude of many at the U.S.A.F. Academy; the present system may not be terrifically good, but at least we are surviving. Any change may be for the worse—much worse.

The proposed changes are modest. No institution is going to scrap its honor system and start from scratch. There is an element of risk in anything we do, all innovation and change runs some risk of a change for the worse. That is why the burden of going forward is put on those who propose changes. Finally, there is no real danger of fatal damage of the academies from the changes. (By the way, the A. I. D. officials solved the problem by giving one farmer in each village the amount of grain he would harvest, and that farmer then planted the new seed. When the rest saw the result they also switched).

Congress: Senior officers often tell me that many changes would be made in the honor systems at the military academies if it were not for Congress. changes in the Honor Code would make scandals more likely, so no changes will (or ought to be) made.

The pressure put on the academies from Congress is to avoid honor cheating scandals. The academies have responded, not surprisingly, by making it very difficult to cheat. If there is a course with multiple sections there will be as many as four different versions of that examination. Take-home exercises, quite common at civilian institutions, are strongly discouraged, thereby reducing the number of fruitful exercises students can do.

I agree that if there is the opportunity to cheat, some people will cheat. However, it is better to expose people early in their career as lacking honor than not to know because they are never tempted. It is one thing to be honorable in the midst of temptation and quite another to be said to be honorable because temptation is removed. Character training should not allow just one kind of behavior, for then one does not know what persons will do when the external pressure is not there. At a certain point we must allow the student or officer responsibility. We think everything else requires practice—why should this not be true of moral education? One has to believe in miracles to think that people who never exercise their virtues will develop them. While by allowing some opportunity for cheating, we make it more likely that cheating will occur, more cheaters will be caught (especially if some of the changes proposed here are adopted). As a result there will be a strengthening of the characters of the overwhelming number of students.

It is a strange view that Congress will not understand this position. If there was ever a body in which the actions of a few besmirch the character of the whole, it is Congress. The overwhelming majority of members of Congress are decent honorable people. Some, alas, are not. When those who are not are discovered, they are expelled. We do not, however, think it appropriate to punish all the members of Congress by preventing their meeting with potential bribers, or fishing with business people whose industries they may have to regulate. Surely Congress will understand there are some risks in allowing the freedom necessary to develop character. Surely they will not say that it is better not to develop character properly than to risk the scandals that such freedom might very well permit. I have more confidence in the intelligence and wisdom of those we elect to Congress than that.

Conclusion

There is no end to the raising of objections. As a believer in Jeffersonian democracy, I find this desirable, for we must then constantly renew our views by defending them. On the other side, simply because one has thought of a criticism one cannot conclude the view criticized is mistaken—not unless one has allowed full opportunity for rebuttal. These proposals are generally applicable to programs of character training, even ones without an honor code. Concerning the service academies I hope this will begin a public discussion on an issue of importance to all U. S. citizens. It is offered as a partial fulfillment of my obligation as a citizen, and as a philosopher who has been involved in the important activity of educating future Air Force officers at the U.S.A.F. Academy.

Notes

A draft of this paper was written while I was teaching at the United States Air Force Academy—I finished it after returning to my home institution.

1. This is the code of both the U. S. Military Academy and the U. S. Air Force Academy. Since the next two quotes are from the *Honor Code Reference Handbook of the Air Force Cadet Wing*, June 1982, (hereafter, *Handbook*), I'll give it as the source. This quote, p.1.

2. *Handbook*, p.2.

3. *Handbook*, p.24.

4. *Handbook*, p.27.

5. "Report to the Secretary of the Army by the Special Commission on the United States Military Academy, 15 December, 1976," Frank Borman, p.5. (Hereafter this will be referred to as *The Borman Report*.)

6. "Final Report of the West Point Study Group, July 1977," p.130. (Hereafter, this will be referred to as *Final Report*.)

7. *Report of the (United States Air Force Academy) Honor Review Committee*. Colonel Ervin J. Rokke, Chairman, p. IV-4. (Hereafter this will be referred to as *The Rokke Report*.)

8. The most recent of these scandals at the U.S.A.F. Academy once again puts the spotlight on the education of future officers. In April 1984 nineteen or more cadets used answers to a physics test obtained from others who had taken that test earlier in the day. (*Air Force Times*, Feb. 4, 1985, p.7.)

9. *Final Report*, p.10.

10. "AFA Honor Code: The Need for Alternative Sanctions." An unpublished paper written by the CIC, now Captain Paul Gilbert, p.1. Captain Gilbert teaches computer science at the U. S. Air Force Academy. He gave me permission to read his paper, from which I profited greatly, and to cite from it.

11. *The Rokke Report*, p. IV-11.

12. *The Rokke Report*, p. IV-9.

13. *The Rokke Report*, p. IV-11.

14. The view known as situationism is a form of utilitarianism. See, e.g., Joseph Fletcher, *Situation Ethics: The New Morality*, Westminster Press, 1966. I am *not* endorsing or expressing this view. For a survey of the views mentioned and a discussion of ways to evaluate them, see B. Rosen, *Strategies of Ethics*, Houghton-Mifflin, 1978.

15. *The Rokke Report*, p. III-2.

16. There is a logical defect to the One Bad Case argument that is best seen by constructing an equally good/bad argument the other way. It is almost certain that one (and all we need is one) lie told in combat saved many lives. Thus, if we accept the form of the argument in the One Bad Case to be used, we must teach our future officers always to lie. No doubt many soldiers in combat were spared death because they stopped to pick up a shiny object. We should conclude, given the above model of reasoning, that every soldier should stoop whenever there is a shiny object.

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