

ogy of the important role played by such propositions throughout his corpus will shudder at the effect on the innocent of Apostle's carelessness. On p. x of his preface we are put on notice that a future translation of the *Posterior Analytics* is in the offing. Now that Oxford has brought out Jonathan Barnes' excellent version in its Clarendon series of texts, which feature philosophically worthy commentaries, let us hope he is dissuaded. After all, with inflation as it is, who knows how much unsuspecting libraries and the idle rich will have to cough up to purchase it?

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PETER T. MANICAS. *The Death of the State*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons (Capricorn Books), 1974, pp. xv, 268. Paperbound.

If being free is contingent upon the fullest possible development of our potential humanity, and if the material basis for that development depends upon a highly complex network of cooperative productive interaction, then what room is left for the liberal ideal of "minimal interference" with persons "living as they wish"? In his book, *The Death of the State*, Peter T. Manicas tries to come to grips with this problem, a problem inevitable to those who, like Manicas, wish to adopt the Marxist conceptions of freedom and of social production but who nevertheless have some sympathy with the bourgeois conception of freedom so well articulated by John Stuart Mill (and so easily adapted to right-wing anarchisms). Manicas does as well as can be done trying to speak from what are really irreconcilable worldviews, and in the process he has produced a very useful book, quite well suited to teaching social and political philosophy courses at virtually any level. In the first five chapters, Manicas does a remarkable job of setting forth a coherent argument, sketching in at least rudimentary form (and sometimes in more detail and depth than that) the important philosophical

precedents for (or against) his position, placing those in the historical-philosophical context from which they derive their full meaning, relating present political realities to all of this, and responding where appropriate to contemporary political theorists. At every point his presentation is clear and coherent, easily understood by beginning students, and easily debated by more advanced students.

In the first chapter Manicas argues that the (actual) function of the state is to define the boundary between public and private and to regulate what is thereby defined as public. "*The state, then, is the public organized under an authority which, within a given territory, has the monopoly of legal coercive power.*" (p. 31, emphasis in the original) Although he points out that the distinctions between public and private have always been ideological in that they have served to maintain the existing power relationships in any given society, he raises, in Chapter 2, the problem of constructing such boundaries so as to morally justify the use of coercive power entailed by the distinction. He considers the three traditional answers: natural law, which while it has the value of asserting, correctly, that people do stand "naturally" in moral relation to one another and that obligations derive from their being human, does not give us adequate criteria for distinguishing what ought to be the case from what is the case; conventionalism (contract theory) which begins with a premise of natural rights and is forced therefore to postulate society as a voluntary association when there is overwhelming reason to suppose that no society is in fact voluntary; and utilitarianism, from which it follows only that while sometimes (perhaps) we ought to obey the law, we do not ever have a *duty* to do so. Thus Manicas, like Robert Paul Wolff before him, ends by denying the existence of any legitimate states. Manicas nevertheless rejects Wolff's defense of anarchism since he does not feel that the individual loses autonomy simply by taking on an obligation (Wolff's main argument). He points out merely

that there is no good reason ever to undergo such an obligation to a state.

Chapters three and four are largely historical-philosophical. In Chapter 3 Manicas illustrates the way the "liberal state" arose as a means of defending the emerging capitalist social and productive relationships, especially those of private property, commodity exchange, and the alienation of labor. The relevance of Hobbes and Locke in the philosophical justification of this state, and the critiques of it by Rousseau and Marx are extremely well done. In Chapter 4 Manicas examines the theory and practice of democracy, arguing that in practice there never has been democracy in any meaningful sense (at least in the modern era), and that as theory it has been praised only when the praise masked the non-practice of it. Contemporary practice is not democratic and the contemporary political-scientific attempts to justify that practice *as* democratic are abysmal failures.

In Chapter 5, Manicas locates the *ideal* of liberalism, if not the practice, in Mill's principle "All restraint *qua* restraint is an evil . . . leaving people to themselves is always better, *ceteris paribus*, than controlling them," and considers the conservative attack on that principle: that freedom leads to human misery because men are foolish and/or sinful. He also considers and defends the liberal response to that criticism: that theories of human nature used by the conservative are false; that the consequences of freedom are good; and that the liberal has a unique concept of goodness which undermines the conservative claim. Finally, the moral limits of freedom are considered, and Manicas comes out against paternalism but, surprisingly, in favor of taxation. It is in this chapter and the next that Manicas's difficulties arise. For if, as Manicas does, one defends taxation on the grounds that production is a social activity and taxation is merely a way to distribute the fruits of that production more equitably to the producers, and if further the ability to fully develop our potential human powers is contingent upon this social produc-

tive process, then certain "paternalistic" requirements would seem called for to (1) guarantee that crucial productive process and (2) assist people to achieve that level of human development which will allow them to choose wisely and sanely. Manicas is quite clear that "*only* through the exercise of their human faculties can persons actualize their human powers" (p. 214); what he is less clear about is the equally true observation that human faculties do not develop asocially: that material, psychological, and social conditions are prerequisites for this development. Paternalism is bad where authorities are alien and where the individual as individual is irrelevant; it is not bad where the social group is the authority and there is genuine concern for the fullest human development of the individual. (Bureaucratic organizations which impersonally practice "suicide prevention" are an abomination; a society which genuinely values human life and practices suicide prevention is to be hoped—or fought—for.)

Manicas recognizes the importance of direct social participation for full human development, but he also recognizes that currently, at least, the interdependence of the world's productive processes would require an impossibly large group to participate directly in every decision making process. Manicas is also too sophisticated to opt for the anarcho-syndicalist solution: local control of small parts of the total productive system. Instead he opts for what can only be called a science-fiction fantasy: "post-scarcity anarchism." The hope here is that a technology will emerge which will allow for self-sufficient communities small enough to permit direct participation, communities certainly no larger than Greek city-states. (Imagine a world consisting of over ten thousand such communities, each with its own iron mines, farms, blast furnaces, sophisticated research hospitals, etc.) That these would have to be self-sufficient is clear both from Manicas's rejection of anarcho-syndicalism and from the fact that anything else would produce a *real* state-of-nature in which the "individu-

als" would be these communities and the "world government" which would emerge would look and act a lot like the ones which Manicas condemns. Yet every development of human history pushes in the opposite direction: toward greater divisions of labor, toward more complexity, toward more interdependence, and every technological revolution on the horizon suggests further moves in this direction. Manicas's fear of bigness no doubt stems from an understandable lack of trust of anything which happens "elsewhere" and from the fact that our current democratic "representatives" are inevitably pushed and pulled by powerful class interests often antithetical to the interests of the persons supposedly represented. But these fears and these facts themselves arise out of a poisoned social environment. Genuine human interests are indivisible, and any political movement worthy of support must work toward making that fact manifest. Once people recognize that fact, trust becomes possible, and the need to create small, self-sufficient enclaves disappears. Finally, it is worth noting that the "simpler" life which Manicas recognizes must result from his anarchistic societies has never in fact been simpler for people. The leisure necessary to pursue creative human endeavors is made possible only through greater and greater interdependence. In a sense then, what is valuable in the liberal ideal, the freedom (which in a better world becomes the necessity) to pursue independent creative activity, arises only out of very large scale social interdependence.

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VIRGINIA HELD, SIDNEY MORGENBESER, and THOMAS NAGEL, eds. *Philosophy, Morality and International Affairs*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, 348 pp. Paperbound.

This is the second collection of essays published by the Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs. The first collection entitled *Philosophy and Political Action*

(Virginia Held, Kai Nielsen and Charles Parsons, eds., New York, Oxford University Press, 1972) mainly explores the role of philosophy and philosophers in the formulation of public policy, the authority and legitimacy of the state, the grounds for political obligation and the meaning and possibility of revolution. In this collection, the general topic for discussion is morality and international affairs. While the publication of the first volume brings to our attention the increasing awareness of philosophers towards problems of social concern, the publication of the present volume testifies to the fact that the social concern of philosophers is now well-established and that they can contribute something significant to the clarification (and perhaps resolution) of political and social problems that confront our societies. The present volume is also significant in another respect. It directs our attention to what we may call "the morality among nations," a subject much neglected in the past by moral philosophers. As the editors state in the introduction: "It is a sad commentary on our situation that some of the essays have to defend the thesis that morality and justice ought to play a role in international affairs and that prudence and national self-interest (no matter how defined) ought not to be the ultimate arbiters" (p. ix).

Most of the essays in the present volume deal directly or indirectly with moral problems concerning war. This is perfectly understandable and it also strikes me as proper, since the wounds of the Vietnam war were still fresh in the minds of philosophers at the time of publication of these essays. The editors have divided the essays into three parts and have provided a brief introduction to each part. In the first part, "War and Its Crimes," four essays are included. These are: Hugo Adam Bedau, "Genocide in Vietnam?," Richard Wasserstrom, "The Responsibility of the Individual for War Crimes," Marshall Cohen, "Morality and the Laws of War," and Alan Gewirth, "Reasons and Conscience: The Claims of the Selective