students of Freud will be indebted to him for some time to come.

1. ". . . to relate [the explanation of a single symptom] in detail would occupy the whole period of this lecture. Its chain of associations always has more than two links; and the traumatic scenes do not form a simple row, like a string of pearls, but ramify and are interconnected like genealogical trees, so that in any new experience two or more earlier ones come into operation as memories. In short, giving an account of the resolution of a single symptom would in fact amount to the task of relating an entire case history." ("The Aetiology of Hysteria," 1896, Standard Edition, *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 3, 196-197.)

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ALBERT WM. LEVI. *Philosophy as Social Expression*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1974, pp. vii, 318, bibliography and index. $12.50 hardbound.

This is an important and troubling work. It is humanistic and philosophic but in a way that is not currently the fashion. For this reason it is sometimes deeply disappointing in that it ignores questions and treatments which are expected, yet sometimes it is very helpful.

There are two major aspects of Levi's enterprise: (I) An introductory,polemical discussion concerning methods of doing history of ideas and assessing cultural factors which enter the genesis of a philosopher's work. Cultural information is held to be necessary for the proper appreciation of a philosopher's effort in later ages. (II) Application of these convictions by way of four (or five) philosophers, i.e., Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, and Moore (by way of a mini-essay on Kant). (The concluding chapter should likely be read first for it is an excellent summary of most of these ideas.)

In the Preface, Levi avows that the book is not a text but is intended to be more scholarly; yet not surprisingly he thinks that it could be a text and hopes that it will be used in courses in conjunction with appropriate primary sources. But his hope about course employment is I believe vain. The book (in hardback as it is) is too expensive. It is also too chatty or in-groupy-professional in tone. There is unnecessary name-dropping—name-dropping because Levi is (perhaps not improperly) cultivating a new genre. He hardly ever gives citations but he reflects at length and with great technicality about what "scholars" have debated (cf. p. 49). He system-drops, too, e.g., discussing Marx and Hegel and Sartre (cf. p. 63). He occasionally seems to lapse into abstruse and unconvincing editorializing; e.g., commenting on Cairns' introduction to *The Collected Dialogues* (Pantheon Books, 1961), he writes, "This argument is itself both disingenuous and biased—and it is false. For to say that Plato's system is 'an implication of the system of nature' so that Plato 'is aristocratic only as nature is herself aristocratic' is to succumb to the worst excess of an untenable doctrine of natural law" (p. 64). Lots of intuitive risk-taking in terms of psycho- or socio-analyzing the dead (in Plato's case a man who has been dead for well over two thousand years) occurs. For all these reasons, I do not encourage Levi in his hope for employment of this book in courses. But since I appreciate many of the risks and learn from them I do encourage instructors to read the appropriate chapters for courses which include the philosophers or contemporaries of the philosophers whom Levi discusses.

The discussion of Moore, the professional, the philosopher's philosopher, is poignant and useful (especially concerning ethics), but not well enough developed. A study of the spread of professionalism in every pursuit is obviously missing. The principal point seems to be that professionalism, spearheaded by Kant, is a reaction to dilettantism which was the decayed version of Descartes' philosophy of the gentleman. Moore is a caricature of the professional in philosophy in that he just wanted clarity for its own sake. His is the triumph of method because he has no product, no content (p. 295). There is a whiff of decadence about this. After a lifetime of scrutiny Moore could decide almost nothing. He could publish very little. In his case, the society expressing itself through philosophy is just a narrow range of inbred specialists.

Moore, therefore, was not a professional in the way the Sophists were. Indeed much of what he did he did without pay. Levi in fact develops a striking analogy between Moore and Socrates, pointing out how much Moore's character was the force which shaped philosophy and still does. The trouble is that philosophers are too isolated and insulated from the rest of the isolated and insulated academic world and that world too isolated and insulated from the real world.

Although Levi does little prognosticating and little prescribing, he leaves as a legacy of this book the problem of treatment of the soul of philosophy. Despite its many weaknesses, then, there are many strengths here and reflections of many shadows.

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DICKINSON S. MILLER. *Philosophical Analysis and Human Welfare: Selected Essays and Chapters from Six Decades.* Loyd D. Easton, ed. Dordrecht, Holland; Boston, U.S.A.: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975, pp. x, 333. $39.00, hardbound.

The name of Dickinson Miller will be familiar to readers of William James as he was an acknowledged influence in the latter's theory of cognition and a respected critic of pragmatism. Readers of analytical philosophy will know the name of R.E. Hobart, in fact a pseudonym of Miller's, in particular for the 1934 *Mind* article "Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable without It" (reprinted here in a revised version). Dickinson Miller was born in Philadelphia in 1868 and died in 1963. He taught philosophy at Bryn Mawr, Harvard, and at Columbia University (1904-1919); he also taught Christian apologetics at the General Theological Seminary in New York from 1909 to 1924, when he resigned in protest against a pastoral letter from the Bishops of the Episcopalian Church, which condemned symbolical interpretations of the virgin birth as heretical. Miller finally retired from academic work in 1926 and lived in Europe until 1934, returning to America to become ordained in 1935, combining occasional church duties with philosophical writing. While in Europe he was in contact with members of the Vienna Circle, and also with Wittgenstein, C.A. Strong, and Santayana.

Although Miller published a fair number of articles and reviews, this collection, partly of published articles, partly of chapters for a never completed book, is his first complete book in print. It will be of considerable interest not only to those interested in the history of American philosophy, but also to all those concerned with conceptual analysis or analytical philosophy, particularly for Miller's unusual stress upon its potentialities as a philosophy of radical social and religious engagement. The essays collected here, covering a period of almost sixty years, are on issues such as: the relation of *ought* and *is;* free will and determinism; the nature of cognition; the defects of pragmatism; consciousness; religious belief; the relation between intelligence and moral goodness; together with essays on such philosophers as James and Santayana.

Dickinson Miller is, doubtless, not a major philosopher, but he is certainly an intelligent and balanced one, with an intriguing breadth of interest. He had formulated many of the typical principles of Oxford ordinary language philosophy of the 1950's many years before; indeed in his 1925 essay on his mentor, G.S. Fullerton, he describes the latter as dealing with induction, in the 1890's, by that sort of appeal to the ordinary use of the expression "good argument" which appeared an exciting innovation to Oxford philosophers sixty years later. These principles (e.g., the "paradigm case" argument) may look a little faded now, but they are far more refreshing to the human spirit in Miller's formulation than the later ones.

Miller was deeply influenced by James in his theory of consciousness, deployed to good effect in criticisms contained in this volume both of Husserl and Ryle, but he deplored the "will to believe" and pragmatism. He argues, persuasively,