space is inefficient, yet the second and third selections are not annotated. One of the strengths of this new edition is its inclusion of "On Political Economy." Comments on this piece would have provided an opportunity to point out its importance in relation to *The Social Contract*. And it would have been beneficial to include additional comparisons with some of Rousseau's other works and further comment on secondary sources. Overall, the benefits of the annotation seem to be mainly secondary; they do not provide substantial aid in understanding the basics of Rousseau's political philosophy.

Sherover's Introduction (vii-xxv) is in some ways misleading and offers little that will aid the student. It does an adequate job of defending Rousseau against the charge of supporting totalitarian governments, it suggests his adversion to inequalities, and it indicates, but without sufficient explanation, that Rousseau views the proper state as an organic whole. While these points are useful, several other remarks are suspect: After claiming that his annotations are helpful in coming to grips with difficult features of the work (ix) he misleadingly takes a simplified view of the notions of the original contract and of the common good. (The social contract is partly explained by an analogy with a corner stop light, (xiii), and the common good is explained as a kind of consensus (xviii) ). Perhaps the most seriously misleading aspect of the Introduction is the attempt to link Rousseau's state with large-scale industrial society in opposition to a small agriculture society. Sherover here is unclear: he probably is engaging in an application of Rousseau's theory (as he more clearly states on p. 24 and p. 128). But I believe the impression left with many students from the Introduction will be that Rousseau wrote with the intention of ordering a state much like a contemporary advanced industrial nation, or that his position can easily be applied to such a state. This makes an understanding, for example, of the common good more difficult. On the whole, then, I do not believe the Introduction will be especially valuable to students.

Sherover's text is most suitable for use in advanced undergraduate or graduate courses on social contract theory in general or on Rousseau. Lower level survey courses covering the social contract tradition would, I think omit much of the material Sherover provides and would get more use out of Ernest Barker's *Social Contract* (an edited version of Locke, Hume and Rousseau). The virtues of the annotations are not, in my view, significant enough to override the convenience, for a survey course, of Barker's work. A course dealing entirely with Rousseau would seem to be the most likely to benefit from Sherover. However, since the gains from the edition's comments are not of primary importance, a collection of Rousseau's main political writings might be more suitable, depending, of course, on the instructor's intentions. For example, G. D. H. Cole's *The Social Contract & Discourses* contains, in one volume, more of Rousseau's work, including, besides the selections in Sherover, the first two discourses. And Cole's Introduction seems to me to be somewhat more helpful than Sherover's.

Finally, Sherover provides a good annotated list of suggested readings. Unfortunately no index is provided.

— *Joseph P. DeMarco*

SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF. *Socrates to Sartre: A History of Philosophy*, Second Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975. Pp. 527. $9.95, hardbound.

Anyone teaching any introductory course is faced with a difficult choice

which revolves around the question of depth versus breadth: whether it is better to do a few things well or many things if not badly, at least superficially. In teaching an introductory philosophy course, the problem is even more complex, since there are several mutually exclusive approaches possible even within the depth-versus-breadth option. The "Problems Approach" is popular, and its advocates say that it is the only way for a beginning student to be encouraged to form a rational, reasonable philosophy of his own. Then there is the "Original Writings Approach," which ranges all the way from bulky anthologies containing large swatches of the great philosophers to single, small volumes which contain only one seminal work, such as the *Republic* or Descartes' *Meditations*. Those who choose this method maintain that there is absolutely no substitute for the author's own words, read in the original or as close to the original as one can get.

For Professor Samuel Stumpf, on the other hand, there is simply no doubt as to what method is best. In the preface to the 1966 edition of *Socrates to Sartre* he begins by saying, "An introduction to philosophy is best achieved through a study of its history." If you accept this point of view, I do not see how you could do better than use Professor Stumpf's text.

It begins with Thales and continues through the main luminaries of philosophy all the way up to the present time. Although it contains most of the usual apocrypha which are meant to liven up the dusty trails of philosophical history, the central, underlying continuities are never lost sight of. Stumpf's writing is clear and lively, and his presentation never degenerates to a Baedeker of great thinkers—a danger which is always present and which could leave the student in a "If it's Tuesday, this must be Leibniz" state of confusion.

The welcome reception of the first edition convinced Professor Stumpf that only minor revisions were required for the second. There are, therefore, very few additions. They range from a lucid exposition of Hume's ethics, through simplified sections on Carnap, Ryle, Quine and Austin, to a longer, opaque treatment of Husserl. The fact that Stumpf knows so much about current ethical theory and values—clearly his first love—may explain some of the unevenness of these sections. Nevertheless, one wishes that there might have been a little more care exercised in the preparation of this second edition.

The bibliography, which is intended "to encourage the reader to become acquainted with some original writings and important critical commentaries," suffers from a severe lack of updating. With very few exceptions, the works cited would seem to indicate that nothing of value has been written on Western philosophy since 1964.

Another criticism is that no notice seems to have been taken of certain questionable claims in the first edition, even though these had been pointed out in reviews that appeared at that time. For example, the statement, "Potentiality means the absence of something and is therefore *nothing*," (189) surely deserved re-phrasing or at least a word of explanation. The difference between the potentiality for growth of an acorn and that of a beach pebble cannot be passed off as the difference between two "nothings."

But the book is good. The originality and intelligence with which the author solves the depth-versus-breadth problem make the work an admirable achievement. It can stand alone as the text, if one opts for the historical approach. If a teacher favors one of the other approaches to beginning philosophy, *Socrates to Sartre* would provide a valuable supplement for locating the philosophers studied in their intellectual and historical contexts. In addi-

tion, Stumpf's clear, compact descriptions should appeal to the general reader who wants merely to have an intelligible overview of the main currents of Western thought.

— *William E. McMahon*

PAUL W. TAYLOR. *Principles of Ethics; An Introduction*. Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975. Pp. xii, 234. Paperbound.

The nine chapter headings are "What is Ethics?," "Ethical Relativism," "Phychological Egoism and Ethical Egoism," "Ulititarianism," "Ethical Formalism," "Intrinsic Value," "Moral Responsibility and Free Will," "Values and Facts," and "The Ultimate Question" (which is the question "Why be moral?"). Taylor's main concern is to discuss the theoretical issues rather than to present or criticize the exact doctrines of particular historical figures, although he does usually mention important names. His presentation of utilitarianism, for example, is a synthesis of the doctrines of many utilitarians, and his discussion of theories of happiness merges the views of Plato and Aristotle. Two exceptions to this general approach are the treatment of Kant, which includes extended commentary on particular sections of the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,* and the discussion of the doctrines of Hare and Foot. In discussing questions on which there is considerable philosophical dispute, Taylor's usual practice is to present the conflicting views and then announce that the reader must decide the issue for himself. He departs from this practice in his discussion of the question "Why be moral?," where he argues for an existentialist-type view that ultimate choice cannot be based on reasons, and that we must simply *decide* whether or not to be moral.

As is apparent from the foreword by series editor Joel Feinberg, this book is directed to students who are already sophisticated enough to be agitated by such problems as whether rational grounds can be given in support of any moral standards. For those who are not this sophisticated, Taylor usually does not put enough effort into providing motivation to study theoretical issues by tying them to the immediate moral concerns of the students. For example, in the section on different conceptions of happiness, Taylor does not seem to try to make each conception vivid and plausible to the student, but rather seems concerned mainly to classify the different conceptions of happiness. And he begins his chapter on the free will controversy with a section on excusing conditions rather than with a vivid statement of the positions. This lack of concern to capture student interest is perhaps not a grave defect in these cases, since the different positions are so obviously of more than academic interest. But student motivation to understand will definitely suffer from Taylor's approach in other cases, such as his discussion of naturalism and noncognitivism. He merely seeks to set out and criticize various theories, without making the student feel that the theories are worth studying. Another motivation problem may arise in the case of students who take fundamentalist religion seriously, for Taylor nowhere considers the view that the true moral law is revealed to us in the bible.

Problems of motivation aside, this book is not geared to the needs of students of average intelligence. Sometimes this is simply a matter of failure to provide an illustration which would make the text more concrete and easier to grasp; for example, a simple illustration of a meta-ethical theory would have been helpful where meta-ethics is first contrasted to normative ethics. Sometimes, as in the section