enough for use in an advanced undergraduate course on Kant, and I doubt whether its hardback price would even make it worth buying for a typical survey of early modern philosophy course as a secondary work while Korner's book is available in paperback. Furthermore, the playing down of the historical continuity of the Kantian problematic might limit its value in that situation.

But there are also some serious problems with what the book says. In trying to be brief, Hartnack has glossed over many possible misinterpretations of his exposition; on the whole, the book does not seem nearly as carefully worded as such a short work on Kant needs to be. For instance, in his discussion of the pure concepts of the understanding, Hartnack nowhere distinguishes the various meanings of "concept" or the different ways in which one can be said to have a concept. Consequently, it would be possible for a reader to come away from the book believing Kant to be an unsophisticated innatist. The possibilities for misinterpretation are also evident in the first sentences of Hartnack's explanation of the transcendental deduction: "Nothing can qualify as an experience unless it is an experience of an object. The different sense impressions must therefore be conceptualized as an object." (p. 53) These sentences can easily and naturally construed in an entirely misleading way, and the necessary clarification is never made. In his discussion of Kant's life, Hartnack tells us that Kant gave his last lecture in 1796, and five lines later tells us that at the end of his life his lectures got so boring that young Fichte called them soporific "after he had attended one of Kant's lectures in 1798." (p. 9) This may be a misprint; if so, it is not the only one in the book. Since I cannot imagine that this book will be of great use to the student already well versed in philosophy, I can help but think that Hartnack's brief comparison of Kant to Wittgenstein would be of little help to the neophyte who couldn't be expected to have heard of Wittgenstein. Hartnack's insistence upon the inevitable compulsion of reason to use the Ideas constitutively is so strong that one wonders if Kant didn't undertake a hopeless task in trying to straighten out the antinomies. One might also ask why, given Hartnack's approach to Kant's theory of knowledge, he didn't use the third antinomy as a natural lead-in to Kant's ethics.

In sum, although Hartnack's focusing upon the antinomies is a good counterbalance to the usual approach to Kant, the book makes no significant new contributions to Kant scholarship and in my opinion is just not carefully enough written to be a great use to the beginner.

— *Willem de Vries*

B.J. DIGGS, ed. *The State, Justice, and the Common Good: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy.* Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1974.

Professor Diggs' book is a paperback which is convenient to hold and carry and has easy to read typography. It contains selections from the following philosophical works: Hobbes' *Leviathan*; Locke's *Second Treatise of Civil Government*; Hume's *Treatise* (Book 3 part 2, on justice, property, and the origin of government and political obligation); Rousseau's *Social Contract*; Marx and Engels' *Communist Manifesto*; J. S. Mill's *On Liberty*; T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* (Book 3, chapter 3), Lectures on the *Principles of Political Obligation* (sections on political obligation and human rights). "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract"; and Rawls' *Theory of Justice.*

In addition to the selections, there

are three fairly long sections by Professor Diggs. The first is a general introduction in which he traces from Plato to Hobbes the conceptions of the community, the individual in relation to the community, and the moral law. The second section summarizes the views of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Rousseau, and serves as a preface to the readings from those writers. In the third section, Professor Diggs introduces the remaining selections by discussing justice; distribution of goods; the common good; and the thought of Hegel, Marx, Bentham, Mill, Green, and Rawls.

The book can be evaluated pedagogically in three ways.

(a) Since every instructor has his own views on just which philosophers should be covered in a beginning course on political theory, no one is likely to be wholly satisfied with Professor Diggs' choices. However, the selections which he provides from each individual writer are exactly right—with the exception of that from J. S. Mill. The Mill selection contains almost nothing from Chapter 2 of *On Liberty,* which is traditionally regarded as the heart of Mill's essay. Thus, any teacher who wants readings from a substantial number of the philosophers whom Diggs includes will probably not find a better text.

(b) The introductory sections by Professor Diggs are unusually well-written, clear, and informative. Most instructors will find that they contribute to their own knowledge and understanding. Their value in a textbook is questionable though. The first, general introduction is useful; but it will have no more meaning to a person who has not studied some political philosophy than to a newcomer. Most contemporary undergraduates have no notion of or feeling for either community or legitimacy. Though they may repeat the words, they are unlikely to understand what discussions of polis versus cosmopolis, or sociology versus morality, are all about.

When Professor Diggs summarizes in his two other sections the views of the philosophers from whom selections are provided, he makes the mistake so attractive to compliers of books of readings and so often fatal. He deprives the instructor of anything new to say in class. He thus forces the instructor in self-defense to turn to some other source-book which gives the selections he wants without commentary.

(c) Anyone wanting to structure a unified course around Professor Diggs' book will find the task difficult. As the title indicates, the book really has at least three topics: the state, or, more precisely, the origin and limits of political sovereignty and obligation; the nature of justice; and the (common) good. The selections from Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and half of Hume concern sovereignty and obligation. Together they form a coherent unit. The other half of Hume, the selection from Rawls, and part of that from Green have justice as their subjects. The rest of Green and the Mill reading deal with the good; though only Green is interested in the common good while Mills' theme is the good for the individual. The Communist Manifesto seems not to fit in with any of the three topics. It could, however, be put into a grouping concerned with the distribution of goods, along with Rawls and Green's essay on Liberal Legislation.

Professor Diggs asserts that Rawls' essay brings together all of the other selections into a whole. But that is not really the case. Rawls does use a contract theory to deal with the subject of justice, which he equates with liberty and distribution of goods. And all of the philosophers included talk about either social contracts, justice, liberty, or distribution. Nevertheless, the moral analysis of sovereignty and political obligation in terms of contracts is quite different from a contractual analysis of

the morally correct distribution of goods. Only a book with contract theories as its central theme can include both in some sort of unified whole. Similar remarks could be made about liberty and the good.

In summary, for anyone needing for assigned reading at least 3 or 4 of the selections included and who has something to say about them which is different from Professor Diggs' comments, his book would be an excellent choice. Instructors with other aims might not find it so attractive.

— *Rollin W. Workman*

EUGENE FREEMAN and MAURICE MANDELBAUM, eds. *Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation*. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1975. Pp. 323. $4.95, paperbound.

This collection, which appeared only this year though it was expected earlier, contains fourteen papers on various aspects of Spinoza's philosophy. Ten of the papers are already familiar, having appeared some years ago in an issue of the *Monist* devoted to Spinoza; the others are new. The average quality of the papers is high; all of them repay careful attention. There is considerable range in the topics represented; most of the central topics in Spinoza's philosophy are discussed in at least one paper. The most conspicuous gap, perhaps, is the philosophy of religion, but it is not neglected altogether: Frederick C. Copleston's paper includes some interesting remarks on Spinoza's equation of God and Nature.

The essays are not, for the most part, attempts simply to expound Spinoza's theories, although William Sacksteder's essay on Spinoza's concept of democracy is an exception. But here just the exposition of Spinoza's theory requires a considerable exercise of philosophical insight, since the portion of the *Political Treatise* in which Spinoza planned to discuss democracy was never completed. Reconstruction of his views on this topic therefore requires extrapolation from his discussion of other forms of government as well as understanding of the philosophical context of his political theories.

The papers are written with the concerns of twentieth century philosophy very much in mind. Thus G.H.R. Parkinson considers the bearing on Spinoza's position of certain recent arguments concerning the notion of power, William Frankena tries to determine the precise status of Spinoza's definitions of ethical terms and their relation to the non-ethical parts of his philosophy, and Douglas Odegard undertakes his examination of Spinoza's identification of mind and body "from the viewpoint of someone familiar with issues of current interest in philosophy of mind." Sometimes, as in E.M. Curley's paper on the ethics of belief, independent discussion of a philosophical problem, not the philosophy of Spinoza, provides the primary focus of the investigation. But all this is simply to say that the contributors' interest in Spinoza is philosophical, not historical, and thus the subtitle of the collection, "Essays in Interpretation," is appropriate. Some of the interpretations offered are novel and extremely interesting.

For example, there is a paper by Errol E. Harris on "Spinoza's Theory of Human Immortality." The usual readings of Spinoza's theory of immortality link immortality with the nature of adequate ideas, and with the possession of adequate ideas by finite intellects. Since adequate ideas are the same whether considered in God's intellect or in man's, a man's intellect, to the extent that he possesses adequate ideas, is identical with God's. Therefore, since God's intellect is infinite and eternal, man's intellect is infinite and