

Modern Library for purposes of introduction for many years owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Weiss for providing an alternative. Loewenberg continues to have the advantage of an unusually elegant Introduction. But Weiss' book provides selections that are, on the whole, richer and closer to the heart of Hegel's system. Weiss also makes full use of the translations that have appeared in the more than forty years which have elapsed since the original publication of the Scribner's volume.

Weiss limits his selections to portions of the *Phenomenology*, *Science of Logic*, *Encyclopaedia* and *Philosophy of Right*. Evidently, there is no end to possible disagreement over what specific sections of which books should be included in a volume whose title claims to provide the reader with "the essential" writings of Hegel. Perhaps there are several possible introductory books, each presenting a somewhat different set of "essential" works. But this does not much matter, nor does it detract any from the value of Weiss' selections. He has included many of the indispensable classical passages and much else besides, and the book as a whole has enough breadth and depth for any ordinary introductory purposes.

Professor Weiss' own Introduction is workmanlike and helpful. He is close to the center of the current revival of interest in Hegel and shows himself invariably well informed about scholarly developments. Inclusion of a Foreword by J. N. Findlay is a little more difficult to justify. It makes no scholarly contribution but I presume that Findlay's *imprimatur* is supposed to help the publisher sell more copies. Even this purpose, however, might not have required the non-functional presence of a distinguished name. I suspect that the book will be widely used for what it is: a useful introduction to a philosophical mind that demands attention and respect.

— John Lachs

JUSTUS HARTNACK. *Immanuel Kant: An Explanation of his Theory of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1974. Pp. 110. \$4.00, hardbound.

Professor Hartnack attempts to cover quite a lot of ground in this short (20,000 words) book. The first ten pages of the book are spent in a discussion of Kant's life. The next fifty-six pages are devoted to the discussion of Kant's theory of knowledge. Hartnack takes a different approach from most modern English-speaking commentators on Kant, for he emphasizes the importance of the antinomies in motivating the Kantian project and in understanding Kant's aims. Kant's relation to his predecessors, both rationalist and empiricist, is deliberately downplayed, and his attempt to show that Reason was not in conflict with itself is given center stage. Hartnack concentrates upon the first and second antinomies in his exposition of the Kantian problematic, and then introduces the rest of the Kantian apparatus as needed in order to exhibit Kant's explanation of the occurrence of the antinomies and their resolution. The section on the theory of knowledge is closed with a brief comparison of Kant and Wittgenstein.

The next thirty-four pages are devoted to Kant's ethics and philosophy of religion. Hartnack's exposition, as is usual, follows the lines of the *Grundlegung*, and though quite short, is a fairly direct and effective introduction to some of the problems. There is a short section on Kant's attitude towards the existence of God that counts as a discussion of his philosophy of religion. Hartnack then appends a few pages of "concluding remarks" to the book, in which extremely brief mention is made of some of Kant's successors, both immediate and remote.

I am not at all sure what audience this book is aimed at. It does not contain

enough for use in an advanced undergraduate course on Kant, and I doubt whether its hardback price would even make it worth buying for a typical survey of early modern philosophy course as a secondary work while Korner's book is available in paperback. Furthermore, the playing down of the historical continuity of the Kantian problematic might limit its value in that situation.

But there are also some serious problems with what the book says. In trying to be brief, Hartnack has glossed over many possible misinterpretations of his exposition; on the whole, the book does not seem nearly as carefully worded as such a short work on Kant needs to be. For instance, in his discussion of the pure concepts of the understanding, Hartnack nowhere distinguishes the various meanings of "concept" or the different ways in which one can be said to have a concept. Consequently, it would be possible for a reader to come away from the book believing Kant to be an unsophisticated innatist. The possibilities for misinterpretation are also evident in the first sentences of Hartnack's explanation of the transcendental deduction: "Nothing can qualify as an experience unless it is an experience of an object. The different sense impressions must therefore be conceptualized as an object." (p. 53) These sentences can easily and naturally construed in an entirely misleading way, and the necessary clarification is never made. In his discussion of Kant's life, Hartnack tells us that Kant gave his last lecture in 1796, and five lines later tells us that at the end of his life his lectures got so boring that young Fichte called them soporific "after he had attended one of Kant's lectures in 1798." (p. 9) This may be a misprint; if so, it is not the only one in the book. Since I cannot imagine that this book will be of great use to the student already well versed in philosophy, I can help but think that

Hartnack's brief comparison of Kant to Wittgenstein would be of little help to the neophyte who couldn't be expected to have heard of Wittgenstein. Hartnack's insistence upon the inevitable compulsion of reason to use the Ideas constitutively is so strong that one wonders if Kant didn't undertake a hopeless task in trying to straighten out the antinomies. One might also ask why, given Hartnack's approach to Kant's theory of knowledge, he didn't use the third antinomy as a natural lead-in to Kant's ethics.

In sum, although Hartnack's focusing upon the antinomies is a good counterbalance to the usual approach to Kant, the book makes no significant new contributions to Kant scholarship and in my opinion is just not carefully enough written to be a great use to the beginner.

— Willem de Vries

B.J. DIGGS, ed. *The State, Justice, and the Common Good: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy*. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1974.

Professor Diggs' book is a paperback which is convenient to hold and carry and has easy to read typography. It contains selections from the following philosophical works: Hobbes' *Leviathan*; Locke's *Second Treatise of Civil Government*; Hume's *Treatise* (Book 3 part 2, on justice, property, and the origin of government and political obligation); Rousseau's *Social Contract*; Marx and Engels' *Communist Manifesto*; J. S. Mill's *On Liberty*; T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* (Book 3, chapter 3), *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (sections on political obligation and human rights). "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract"; and Rawls' *Theory of Justice*.

In addition to the selections, there