

Editors' Introduction

We're delighted to bring you the 36th volume of *Social Philosophy Today*, the annual publication of the North American Society for Social Philosophy (NASSP). *Social Philosophy Today* is a peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary journal launched in 1988 by founding editors Yeager Hudson and Creighton Peden as a forum for in-depth discussion of contemporary social issues.

Each issue of *Social Philosophy Today* takes the theme of the previous year's International Social Philosophy Conference, the annual meeting of the NASSP. These themes are determined well in advance, and sometimes current events transpire so that the theme takes on an even greater relevance upon publication than when it was chosen. Such is the case with our theme this year, "Home: Sanctuary, Shelter, and Justice." During the Covid-19 pandemic, the notions of home, sanctuary, and shelter have taken on new importance for all of us, as many of us have spent much of the spring and summer sheltering at home to protect the health and safety of ourselves, our loved ones, and our communities. At the same time, the May 2020 killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police has sparked protests across the United States and internationally. The killing of Floyd, as well as the fatal shooting of Breonna Taylor and others, by police officers and the mass protests these events have inspired highlight important questions about the idea of a political community as a home, and about what sanctuary, shelter, and, indeed, justice mean for Black people and members of other marginalized groups. Although the essays in this issue were written prior to the pandemic and the protests of spring and summer 2020, they grapple with underlying questions and themes that are more relevant than ever.

We begin this issue with Sally Scholz's 2019 Presidential Address. It has been a tradition that presidents of NASSP, on completing their terms, deliver an address at the group's annual meeting. Scholz, who in 2019 completed a four-year term of tireless, exemplary service, delivered the address "Solidarity as Sanctuary" at the 2019 annual meeting. In her address, Scholz explores whether community members' acts of solidarity with refugees traveling to the United States or to European countries to escape violence and persecution—acts such as providing food, medical care, legal assistance, or shelter—can themselves be understood as

forms of sanctuary, and what implications such an understanding of solidarity as sanctuary might have for our moral thinking about the refugee crisis. She highlights three related potential benefits of understanding solidarity as sanctuary: first, it highlights human rights over security and protection; second, it emphasizes the participation and presence of migrants themselves; and third, it can help shift the immigration debate from questions of whether to extend civic, political, or social rights to noncitizens, and instead to questions of “counterfactual reciprocity”: essentially, the notion that we help those who are in trouble because we know that they would help us were the situation reversed.

Part II of this issue comprises the two keynote addresses from the 2019 NASSP annual meeting. First, Gillian Brock adds to the philosophical literature on refugees by asking: given that wealthy nations have an obligation to large-scale displaced peoples, what form should the help implied by that obligation take? Given, also, that the current refugee assistance system is broken—Brock discusses various reasons why—and that the average period for refugee status is *twenty years!*, what could be changed in order to benefit “all key stakeholders”? Focusing on the largest population of refugees—currently Syrians—and attending to different host country approaches (Uganda and Jordan), Brock argues for a variety of development-oriented tactics that promote stability in the regions affected and aim to honor the autonomy of displaced persons by promoting the right to secure employment.

In the second keynote address, José Jorge Mendoza considers David Miller’s 2016 argument that states have a right to an immigration policy that excludes the (non-refugee) immigrants of their choosing. In doing so, Mendoza takes on the two main arguments in Miller’s position: that such policies prevent but don’t coerce; and that although justice demands that states “protec[t] human rights,” it is within the bounds of justice to allow states to “dete[r] people from exercising their human rights.” The fallout of such a position, according to Mendoza, feeds the injustices that have come to be known collectively as “crimmigration”: where criminal law and immigration become problematic bedfellows. The policing that would follow from Miller’s position, Mendoza points out, would undermine the human rights that states are obligated to protect.

Next, Part III consists of four original essays addressing issues related to the theme of “Home; Sanctuary, Shelter, and Justice.” First, Abigail Gosselin examines the relevance of home for patients in psychiatric hospitals. Gosselin writes that practices of home-making, such as “surrounding oneself with objects that hold personal meaning and value, arranging and organizing objects in meaningful ways, and manipulating the environment to foster a sense of privacy,” can aid recovery from mental illness by improving epistemic and moral agency. She describes how many patients in psychiatric care try to replicate the functions of home as best they can, but she suggests that hospitals should do more to foster these functions and thus facilitate patients’ recovery.

Rodney C. Roberts's contribution explores the history of unjust treatment of the Kānaka Maoli, the indigenous people of Hawai'i, by the United States: its overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian nation, the annexation of Hawai'i, and its incorporation by the United States as its fiftieth state. Roberts contends that rectificatory justice requires more than the apology offered in 1993 by the United States. The apology is inadequate without appropriate restoration or compensation for the wrongful losses inflicted. Thus, Roberts concludes that justice demands that the Kānaka Maoli be given back their home and a sovereign Hawaiian nation be restored.

Next, Elizabeth Lanphier applies the idea of "home" to the notion of "moral community" in order to emphasize the kinds of obligations we have to each other in dwelling together in communities that evolve and shift in the "values and practices" to which they hold themselves accountable. "Ethical home-making" suggests the requirement that its members be accountable for harms that occur within that community from which some of its members may benefit, and which they have played a role in shaping and upholding. Ethical home-making brings an emphasis to relation and to pluralist expectations and to the plasticity of home-making that Lanphier finds illuminating when grappling with the notion of moral community, especially when structural injustices are embedded in that community.

Finally, Thomas Carnes intervenes in the controversy over the forced separation, by the United States, of unauthorized immigrant parents from their member children and argues that liberal states are wrong to engage in forced separation and that they should seek to regularize such immigrants instead. Although many arguments for regularization focus on how deportation wrongs the unauthorized immigrants themselves, Carnes grounds his argument in how deportation wrongs the state's members, the unauthorized immigrants' member children. Forced separation through deportation, he contends, wrongs affected children by violating a basic right to sustain the intimate relationships with their parents on which they rely for their development into fully autonomous agents.

Part IV contains three original articles focusing on issues of racism and colorism. First, Gisela Reyes examines the social phenomenon of colorism, by which social privilege is allocated according to skin color. Reyes takes issue with the tendency to treat colorism as essentially an extension of racism. Although she acknowledges that it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish the two, in this paper she considers examples in which colorism and racism can manifest independently of each other. Acknowledging the distinction is important, she argues, in ensuring that societal efforts to mitigate the effects of either phenomenon are effective.

William H. Harwood takes on the troubling racist implications of "direct-to-consumer genetic testing (DTCGT) companies" such as *23andMe*. Tracing the history of the concept of race through the 1600s and the philosophers of the Enlightenment who propelled it forward, and pointing out the ways in which

DTCGT companies tie themselves in knots to sell themselves as anti-racist, Harwood makes an excellent case for their actual propping up of an implicit white supremacist agenda, and the potential for (and already actual) wide-ranging unethical breaches such as genetic discrimination and compromises to privacy.

Finally, Margaret Betz examines whether political violence can ever be justified. Betz contends that in answering this question, we must never lose sight of the fact that vulnerable social groups are often excluded from legal protections. She argues that resistance violence by members of vulnerable groups can be a legitimate option irrespective of its likelihood for practical success due to its role in manifesting the dignity and humanity of resistance actors.

This issue concludes, in Part V, with a symposium based on the winner of the 2018 NASSP Book Award Prize (awarded at the 2019 meeting). The winner was Rahel Jaeggi's *Critique of Forms of Life* (Harvard University Press, 2018). This section contains commentaries on Jaeggi's book by members of the NASSP Book Award Committee, as well as a brief response by Jaeggi.

Seth Mayer, the chair of the Book Award Committee, leads off with an introduction and summary of Jaeggi's main arguments. As Mayer explains, Jaeggi defends including forms of life as a topic of social and political critique against objections that doing so might lead to support for oppressive political stances. Mayer writes that Jaeggi "refuses to retreat from applying philosophical critique to forms of life. Our everyday social life matters too much to be ignored, and discussion and debate about forms of life is inescapable, in any case." On Jaeggi's preferred stance, which she calls "experimental pluralism," different forms of life "confront problems they face and can be critiqued when they stagnate in the face of those problems."

Karen Adkins focuses her commentary on the distinction Jaeggi draws between two types of criticism of forms of life: internal criticism and immanent criticism. Internal criticism is essentially focused on a disconnect between a form of life's stated norms and its practices, whereas immanent criticism goes further, addressing deeper contradictions such as when forms of life contain "different practice-constitutive norms that *cannot be realized together*" (Jaeggi 2018, 262, emphasis in original). Adkins suggests that the boundary between internal and immanent criticism may be less clear than Jaeggi contends. What initially appears to be internal criticism—e.g., a form of life fails to live up to its own pure, consistent norms—may in fact be immanent criticism, because the norms themselves may not be pure or consistent. For Adkins, this highlights the importance of attending to the history of how our norms developed; if we fail to get the history right, we may mistakenly perceive as internal criticism what is in fact more transformative immanent criticism.

Erik Anderson raises questions about Jaeggi's understanding of forms of life. Jaeggi characterizes forms of life as *ensembles* of interconnected social practices, understood as "habitual, rule-governed, socially significant complexes of inter-

linked actions that have an enabling character and through which purposes are pursued” (Jaeggi 2018, 61). Anderson contends, though, that it can be unclear how to differentiate forms of life. This difficulty is relevant to the normative exercise of critiquing forms of life, as in practice it may often be unclear, when presented with some objectionable behavior, which form of life is to be the object of our criticism. Anderson also discusses the implications of Jaeggi’s account for liberalism, and he considers what a Jaeggian liberalism might look like. He contends that we could appeal to Jaeggi’s “notions of rational forms of life, immanent social criticism, and experimental pluralism as justificatory bases for many traditional liberal freedoms,” such as religious liberty and freedoms of speech, conscience, and association.

Paul Thompson’s commentary focuses on Jaeggi’s notion of reflexivity. Thompson believes scholarly use of ‘reflexivity’ often obscures an important distinction between reflex action—a non-intentional, mechanistic process—and reflectiveness—which involves thoughtful, conscious evaluation. He sees Jaeggi’s work as leaning toward the latter understanding of reflexivity, though at times he finds “some tension in [her] use of the terms *reflection* and *reflexivity*.” He suggests that attending more closely to the distinction between reflectiveness and reflex action may be useful to Jaeggi’s project of critiquing forms of life in that “when reflective institutions provoke an anti-reflective response, they may indicate a limitation in our form of life.”

In her response, Jaeggi graciously acknowledges the honor of the prize and expresses gratitude for the dialogue that emerges with her commentators. Embracing Adkins’ point about the dangers of not getting our history right, Jaeggi agrees that another layer of her project requires us to examine “why and by what means we have been prevented from this knowledge.” Accepting the indeterminacy of her position, she defends this indeterminacy as a strength against the criticism that leads Anderson to see it as a weakness, and she argues that the perspective-taking is required. It depends whether you’re looking at the Catholic Church, e.g., through the lens of religion vs. atheism, or with the lens of how celibacy and “a certain interpretation of gender roles” leads to the current crisis within the institution. Finally, she expresses her appreciation of Thompson’s concern with her claim of the fundamental reflexivity characteristic of forms of life in this current era of fake news and contempt for science. Critically challenging science has often moved humanity forward. But that tendency is strikingly different from a “profound and dangerous state of denial” that actually blocks people’s ability to reflect on their experiences. The danger of shutting down our fundamental reflexivity, Jaeggi acknowledges, is real and there will be a price to pay for it.

In conclusion, the editors would like to offer thanks to a number of people: First, we thank NASSP President Beth Sperry and the Executive Board for encouraging us in our role as stewards of this journal. Thanks also to the authors featured in this issue for submitting thoughtful and engaging articles, and to the anonymous

referees for valuable feedback about the submitted papers. And thanks as always to Diana Malsky and George Leaman of the Philosophy Documentation Center, for helping to shepherd this and every issue through the production process.

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