

## NOTES

### NOTES TO BLOECHL, "INTRODUCTION"

1. If curiosity has lingered, this may be due in part to the fact that Levinas sometimes gives the impression of being interested in politics only secondarily, by way of ethical metaphysics, and in part to the fact that his explicit forays into contemporary political matters are at best piecemeal. A "first wave" of concerted interest among his readers was recorded in France and Belgium during the early 1980s. See, e.g., Alan Finkielkraut, *La sagesse de l'amour* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), and Roger Burggraeve, *From Self-Development to Solidarity: An Ethical Reading of Human Desire in Its Socio-Political Relevance according to Emmanuel Levinas* (Leuven: Peeters, 1985).

2. Emmanuel Levinas, "Useless Suffering," in *EN 97 / En 115*.

3. Emmanuel Levinas, "Ideology and Idealism," in *Modern Jewish Ethics: Theory and Practice*, ed. Marvin Fox (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975), 130–31.

### NOTES TO GOUD, "WHAT ONE DEMANDS OF ONESELF"

1. Johan F. Goud, "Über Definition und Infinition: Probleme bei der Interpretation des Denkens des Emmanuel Levinas," *Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift* 36 (1982): 126–44.

2. *DF 23 / DL 39*. "Plus je suis juste, et plus je suis severement juge, dit un texte talmudique."

3. Jacques Derrida, *L'écriture et la différence* (Paris: Minuit, 1966), 145.

4. *OB 162 / AE 207*. "[L]a philosophie: sagesse de l'amour au service de l'amour."

5. See C. A. van Peursen, *Ludwig Wittgenstein* (Baarn: Het Wereldvenster, 1965), 51ff.

6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge, 1961).

7. Spinoza's philosophy is one of the classical philosophies of being and totality. According to Spinoza, every being is ruled by the *conatus essendi*, i.e. the endeavor to persevere in existence. H. G. Hubbeling calls it "endeavor in self-preservation." *Spinoza* (Baarn: Het Wereldvenster, 1966), 83. "Levinas is aware

that his philosophy of the Other and of otherwise-than-being “is at the antipodes of Spinozism” (*TI* 105 / *TeI* 78).

8. “Manner of Speaking,” *GCM* 178–80 / *DVI* 266–70.

9. Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), 1–25.

10. Appears in *EDE*, 203–16.

11. See Stephan Strasser, *Jenseits von Sein und Zeit. Eine Einführung in Emmanuel Levinas' Philosophie* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 373: “Man kann sich darüber wundern, dass Levinas das Ideal der ‘sapientia’ völlig ignoriert, während doch das jüdische Volk seit Jahrtausenden stolz darauf ist, dass die Weisheit bei ihm ihre Wohnstätte gefunden hat.”

12. Levinas is probably referring to Kierkegaard’s expositions of postponement of the ethical (in *Fear and Trembling; Repetition*, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983], 54ff.). Through his willingness to sacrifice Isaac, Abraham rose above the general level of morality, Kierkegaard feels. Without any mediation, Abraham stood before the absolute. He acted “for God’s sake and — the two are wholly identical — for his own sake” (*ibid.*, 59). Levinas criticizes this explanation in *PN* 74, 76–77 / *Noms Propres* (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1976), 108–09, 113.

13. Levinas, “Notes sur la pensee philosophique du Cardinal Wojtyla,” in the French edition of *Communio* 5 (1980): 87: “Tres remarquable est aussi — et j’y ai été particulièrement sensible — la solidarité indefectible entre les structures ethiques, auxquelles aboutit sa phénoménologie de l’humain, et la Transcendance.”

14. J. J. Petuchowski, “Gibt es Dogmen im Judentum?” *Theologische Quartalschrift Tübingen* 160 (1980): 96–106.

15. In his *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807) G. W. F. Hegel endeavored to find the scientific system of truth in which “absolute knowing” — i.e., actually God’s knowing concerning himself — could be conceptually expressed. See on this G. W. F. Hegel, “On Scientific Cognition,” *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). Levinas contrasts this “truth triumphant” with the idea of persecuted and crucified truth in Kierkegaard (*PN* 69 / *Noms Propres*, 99ff.)

16. According to Fr. Waismann in his contribution to the collection *Logical Positivism*, ed. A. J. Ayer (New York: Free Press, 1959), 360. Waismann was one of the first members of the famous “Vienna Circle.”

17. See for example *TI* 101 / *TeI* 74; *OB* 91 / *AE* 116. For the concepts “meaning” and “sense” see “Meaning and Sense” in *CPP* 75–107 / *HaH* 17–63; also found in, *Basic Philosophical Writings*, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 33–64.

18. See Edmund Husserl, “Die Krisis des europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie,” in *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die*

transzendente Phänomenologie, 2nd ed., ed. Walter Biemel, *Husserliana* VI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 314–48.

19. Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 1, ed. Elmar Holenstein, *Husserliana* XVIII (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), especially chapter 6.

20. In all these cases, thought remains abstract. This applies not only to inference of implications from basic concepts (analysis), but also to logical connection of concepts (synthesis), and to the endeavor for certain knowledge through opposites (dialectics). In contrast with this, phenomenology seeks concrete things, “horizons” from which our concepts derive their original meaning. Thereby it achieves connections “until now permitted only to poets and prophets”: heaven and earth, hand and instrument, the body and the other appear to be a priori conditions for our knowledge (*EDE* 134).

21. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 201–28. Levinas already indicated this criticism in the “conclusion” of his dissertation, published in 1930 (*Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl*, 4th ed. [Paris: J. Vrin, 1978]).

22. See for Husserl's theory of perception and of the silhouettes (*Abschattungen*) in which the object of perception always appears, Reinhout Bakker, *De geschiedenis van het fenomenologisch denken*, 5th ed. (Utrecht: De Bezige Bij, 1977), 88ff., 110ff. “We say: I see a tree, whereas we see only the front. But we see the front as front side and this implies that the back side is being assumed as well. Yes, we see the back as the yet unseen back. One perspective refers to the other. One perception anticipates the other” (*ibid.*, 90).

23. Read H. J. Heering, *Franz Rosenzweig. Joods denker in de 20e eeuw* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), especially chapter 6. “Rosenzweig wants to know nothing about time in itself and about time as abstraction. For him, time is the action of God and man. He speaks of abstract time as ‘ideal’ time in ‘former’ thinking, time that is not real” (*ibid.*, 47).

24. This question and Prof. Levinas's answer came about by correspondence (in May, 1982). I add them to the text with Prof. Levinas's permission.

25. *GCM* 112 / *DVI* 175–76. According to Levinas, the correlation between “being present” and “representative consciousness” is typical of Western “ontology.” See for example his text “Signature” in *DF* 291–95 / *DL* 373–79.

26. *GCM* 89 / *DVI* 142. The *via eminentiae* is one of the ways to speak of God in medieval thought: God, the first cause, possesses all human perfections (goodness, freedom, etc.) in an eminent way, that is to say, in unlimited measure.

27. According to Heidegger, being is no reality beyond time, but a reality that is happening. It is the history of the lighting up, of the manifestation, of truth.

28. Argumentations of the type *qalvachomer* (literally: light and heavy) can be found, among others, in Gen. 44:8; Deut. 31:27; Prov. 11:31; Jer. 12:5; Ezek. 15:5; and in Paul: Rom. 5:9–10, 15, 17; Rom. 11:12, 24; 2 Cor. 3:9, 11.

29. Paul Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations. Essais d'herméneutique* (Paris: Seuil, 1969), 368, 401.

30. NT10 / QT24. Levinas expresses similar ideas in BV60–61, 196f. / AV 78–79, 233–34.

31. The expression *philosophia perennis* stands for the idea that philosophical tradition, in spite of all its differences in insight, represents eternal truths. According to an aphorism of H. D. Thoreau: “What the first philosopher taught, the last one shall have to repeat”; from H. D. Thoreau, *The Journal of Thoreau, Volume 1 (1837–1855)* (Mineola, N. Y.: Dover, 1962).

32. Emmanuel Levinas, “De l’évasion,” in *Recherches philosophiques* 5 (1935–1936): 391. Translation of this passage is from Steven G. Smith, “Reason as One for Another: Moral and Theoretical Argument,” in *Face to Face with Levinas*, ed. Richard A. Cohen (Albany: State University of New York Press), 58.

33. See the “Avant-Propos” in *EE / EaE*.

34. According to the foreword in the second edition of *EaE*.

35. A theme that has generally been very much neglected by Western philosophy. Levinas gives it considerable attention. For clarification, see Strasser, *Jenseits von Sein und Zeit*, 147–93.

36. See Levinas’s own essay on the matter, “Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel et la philosophie,” and another by Strasser, “Buber und Levinas. Philosophische Besinnung auf einen Gegensatz,” in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 32, no. 126 (1978).

37. TO 29–37 / *Le temps et l’autre* (Paris: PUF, 1979), 7–15

38. Cf. Levinas, “The Ego and the Totality,” in CPP 27: “Rational animal cannot mean an animal saddled with reason; the interpenetration of the terms indicates an original structure.”

39. See TI 154ff., 254ff. / *TeI* 127ff., 232ff.; and Strasser, *Jenseits von Sein und Zeit*, 147–93.

40. OB 121 / AE 156 (“Le persécute ne peut se défendre par le langage, car la persécution est disqualification de l’apologie.”); PN 88 / *Noms Propres*, 129 (“Ces notions impliquent certes l’hétéronomie de l’obligation débordant les engagements librement consentis. Elles portent atteinte scandaleusement à la notion sacrée de l’autonomie.”).

41. *HaH* 94–95 / “No Identity,” *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 147. Cf., OB 8 / AE 10.

42. See OB 165–71 / AE 210–18, and GCM 178–80 / *De Dieu*, 266–70.

43. Levinas has shown this especially in analyses of the poetry of Paul Celan and Maurice Blanchot. See PN 40ff. / *Noms Propres*, 59ff.; and “On Maurice Blanchot,” in PN 127–56 / *Sur Maurice Blanchot* (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1975), 12–13, 38ff., 55ff.

44. Jean-Paul Sartre, *L’existentialisme est un humanisme* (Paris: Editions Nagel, 1946), 37.

45. Blaise Pascal, *Pensees* (Paris: Flammarion, 1993), section V, 295: “C’est la ma place au soleil.” Voila le commencement et l’image de l’usurpation de toute la terre.” (“That is my place in the sun.” Here is the beginning of the exploitation of the whole earth and its image.)

46. EE 95 / EaE 162–63. Cf., *Le temps et l'autre*, 89.
47. According to, among others, Father Zossima in Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*. Levinas quotes this statement for example in OB 146 / AE 186, and in GCM 72 / DVI 119.
48. See C. Lefevre, "Autrui et Dieu: La pensée d'Emmanuel Levinas, question aux chrétiens," *Mélanges de Science Religieuse* 37 (1980), 255–73.
49. See OB 144 / AE 182; GCM 75 / DVI 123.
50. See concerning this my dissertation *Levinas en Barth* (Amsterdam, 1984; German trans., Bonn-Berlin, 1992), chapter 3.1.
51. This has been brought in as a criticism of his thought several times. An extensive dispute is provided in Roger Burggraeve, *The Ethical Basis for a Humane Society according to Emmanuel Levinas* (Liege: The Center for Metaphysics and Philosophy of God, 1981), 5–57.
52. TI 245 / TeI 223. "[D]errière la ligne droite de la loi, la terre de la bonte s'étend infinie et inexplorée."
53. DF 19 / DL 36. "L'accord de tant de bonte et de tant de legalisme constitue la note originale du judaïsme."
54. See Bernard-Henri Levy, *Le testament de Dieu* (Paris: Grosset, 1979).
55. Kant's first proposition was: "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), 73, 80. Both propositions can be found in Immanuel Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, 421, 429.
56. OB 158 / AE 201. "Dans la proximité de l'autre, tous les autres, m'obsèdent et déjà l'obsession crie justice, réclame mesure et savoir, est conscience."
57. GCM 82 / DVI 132–33. "Mais en réalité la relation avec autrui n'est jamais uniquement la relation avec autrui: d'ores et déjà dans autrui le tiers est représenté; dans l'apparition même d'autrui me regarde déjà le tiers."
58. GCM 74 / DVI 121–22. "Dire sans paroles, mais non pas les mains vides."
59. "Le moi et la totalité," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 59 (1954), 353–73.
60. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), ch. 1, 13.
61. Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive*, The English Version, A Critical Edition by Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 24.
62. See Lam. 3:30; Matt. 5:39; Luke 6:29. Cf. OB 111 / AE 141; "No Identity," part 3, n. 50 / HaH 93.
63. According to Enrique D. Dussel, *Metodo para una filosofía de la liberación. Superación analectica de la dialectica hegeliana* (Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme, 1974), 181ff.
64. DF 164 / DL 215. "Preface," in M. Buber, *Utopie et socialisme* (Paris, 1977), 7–11.
65. See Levinas, "Transcendence and Height (1962)," in *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 14. / "Transcendence et hauteur," *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie* 56 (1962): 93.

66. In a talmudic lecture on “Judaism and Revolution,” given in March 1969, Levinas made these same observations and followed them up with: “Last May, we welcomed the disadvantaged mostly in the universities” (*NT97 / SAS 16*).

67. Cf. Martin Buber, *Paths in Utopia* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958).

#### NOTES TO BARBER, “EPISTEMIC AND ETHICAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN BRANDOM AND LEVINAS”

1. The author would like to thank James McCullom for helpful comments on this paper.

2. See Robert Brandom, “Freedom and Constraint by Norms,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 16 (1979): 167–96; “Some Pragmatist Themes on Hegel’s Idealism,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 7 (1999): 164–89; “Facts, Norms, and Normative Facts: A Reply to Habermas,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 8 (2000): 371; *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 17, 18–30, 38–39, 43–44, 52–55; Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alfonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 199.

3. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 79–80, 87–94, 116–21, 132–34, 140–43, 158; “Facts, Norms, and Normative Facts: A Reply to Habermas,” 363, 364.

4. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 142, 147, 150, 152–53, 155, 276, 592.

5. Brandom, “Reason, Expression, and the Philosophic Enterprise,” in *What is Philosophy?*, ed. C. P. Ragland and Sarah Heidt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001), 93.

6. *Making It Explicit*, 116, see also 650; and “Reason, Expression, and the Philosophic Enterprise,” 93–95.

7. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 88–89, 194–95, 226, 276, 601; “Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism,” in *Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 118–20.

8. Brandom, *Articulating Reasons*, 97–106.

9. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 601.

10. John McDowell, “Knowledge and Internal Revisited,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 64 (2002): 104.

11. *Ibid.*, 101. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: J. & J. Harper Editions, 1969), no. 308, p. 39c; Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 177, 222.

12. John McDowell, “Brandom on Representation and Inference,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57 (1997): 161; Brandom, “Replies,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57 (1997): 192; McDowell, “Reply to Brandom,” in *Perception*, ed. Enrique Villanueva (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1996), 294.

13. McDowell, “Reply to Brandom,” in *Perception*, 294.

14. McDowell, “Reply to Brandom,” in *Perception*, ed. Enrique Villanueva (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1996), 294–95.

15. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 289, 553.
16. McDowell, “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited,” 98–99, 100–101, 103.
17. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 499, 640, 643–44. In making explicit something that must have been implicit all along, Brandom would not be all that different from Edmund Husserl who in his *Cartesian Meditations* addresses the question of intersubjectivity only in the Fifth Meditation because one cannot address everything at once, though intersubjective dimensions had been at least implicit in earlier discussions.
18. Brandom, “Perception and Rational Constraint: McDowell’s *Mind and World*,” in *Perception*, 255–58; McDowell, “Reply to Brandom,” *Perception*, 295–96, *Mind and World*, 78–86; “Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 55 (1995): 895, 902–08; McDowell, “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited,” 104–05.
19. *OB*, 64, 86, 121, 152, 156, 162; *TI* 36, 39, 80–81, 195. *TI* here refers to the following edition: Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay in Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979).
20. Of course, McDowell does not hold that beliefs cannot be challenged by the facts to which they are in relation, see *Mind and World*, 40.
21. Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Levinas’s Logic,” in *Face to Face with Levinas*, ed. Richard A. Cohen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 123–26, 144; *OB* 113, 128, 147, 150, 158–62; Enrique D. Dussel, *Método para una filosofía de la liberación: Superación analéctica de la dialéctica hegeliana* (Guadalajara: Editorial Universidad de Guadalajara, 1974), 190–95.
22. *OB* 75, 87–88, 90, 119; Brandom, “Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism,” 168–73.
23. *OB* 75; Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 193–98, 598; Brandom, “Some Pragmatic Themes in Hegel’s Idealism,” 174.
24. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 162, 164–66, 194, 196, 601.
25. *Ibid.*, 53, 61, 166, 584–601; “Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism,” 178–81.
26. For Levinas, heeding the ethical summons of the other produces a powerful, fearless self, courageous because unpreoccupied with its own death. This self though is not a goal adopted beforehand, but more an unintended by-product, see *TI* 244–47.
27. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 185; “Facts, Norms, and Normative Facts,” 371.

#### NOTES TO BERNASCONI, “EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY”

1. See also Francois Poirié, *Emmanuel Levinas. Qui êtes-vous?* (Lyon: La Manufacture, 1987), 98; trans. Jill Robbins, *Is it Righteous to Be?* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 52.

2. See, for example, Thaddée Ncayizigiye, *Réexamen éthique des droits de l'homme sous l'éclairage de la pensée d'Emmanuel Levinas* (Boston: Peter Lang, 1997), 485.

3. Emmanuel Levinas, "Existentialism and Anti-Semitism," *October* 87 (Winter 1999): 28. Levinas is referring to the "Memorandum and Questionnaire Circulated by UNESCO on the Theoretical Basis of the Rights of Man," reprinted in *Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations*, ed. UNESCO (London: Allan Wingate, 1949), 251–57.

4. I have chartered this itinerary in "No Exit: Levinas's Aporetic Account of Transcendence," *Research in Phenomenology* 35 (2005): 101–17.

5. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1973), 293.

Arendt's ideas on this issue were given a renewed currency when they were recalled in the late 1980s and 1990s both by Julia Kristeva in *Étrangers à nous-mêmes* (Paris: Fayard, 1988), 220–29; trans. Leon S. Roudiez, *Strangers to Ourselves* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 148–54; and by Giorgio Agamben in *Homo Sacer*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 126–35.

6. It is surprising that more attention has not been paid to this essay. For an exception, see Ephraim Meir, *In Proximity: Emmanuel Levinas and the Eighteenth Century*, eds. Melvyn New, Robert Bernasconi, and Richard Cohen (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2001), 243–59. There are, of course, a few references to Thomas Hobbes, but no real engagement at any level of detail. See Cheryl L. Hughes, "The Primary of Ethics: Hobbes and Levinas," *Continental Philosophy Review* 31 (1998): 79–94.

7. See further Robert Bernasconi, "Different Styles of Eschatology," *Research in Phenomenology* 28 (1998): 3–19.

8. I have recently elaborated this idea, with its clear biblical resonances, in "Strangers and Slaves in the Land of Egypt: Levinas and the Politics of Otherness," in *Difficult Justice*, ed. Asher Horowitz and Gadd Horowitz (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 246–61. To be sure, the question immediately arises as to the whether all share equally in this "memory of the totalitarianisms that still haunt today's humanity" (*ITN* 138 / *HN* 161) The privilege Levinas accords to Judaism in his philosophical works arises from its memory of suffering. He thereby comes to rely on a memory philosophy that seems to be available only to those who share in the cultivation of this memory. This raises serious questions about his attempt to translate Hebraic wisdom into a Jewish philosophy to one that is truly universal. I have explored these questions elsewhere, but by no means exhausted them.

9. Levinas cites the essay in the Hebrew version which appeared in *Daat* 5 (1980), with an English summary (23–24). The full English text appeared in a supplement to the *Lessing Yearbook: Humanität und Dialog*, ed. E. Bahr, E. P. Harris, and L. G. Lyon (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1982), 37–65. Henceforth cited as *HD*. On this topic, see also "Moses Mendelssohn über



Naturrecht und Naturzustand,” in *Ich handle mit Vernunft...*, ed. N. Hinske (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1981), 45–82. Altmann is the author of a 900 page biography of Mendelssohn: *Moses Mendelssohn* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1973).

10. One should not be misled by the fact that Mendelssohn insists that the social contract is not for the sake of peace, to establish a difference on that issue between him and Levinas who is constantly invoking peace. Both are arguing against a broadly Hobbesian approach. Levinas’s way of saying this is to set out not from a state of war, but “on the basis of a prior peace” (OS 123 / HS 185). Levinas was always clear that what he meant by peace was not security and the cessation of war. Peace for Levinas is eschatological in his sense of an interruption of history.

11. See also OS 121–22 / HS 183. See also Lionel Ponton, *Philosophie et droits de l’homme de Kant à Levinas* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1990), 194–95.

12. Altmann explores this further in another essay: “The Philosophical Roots of Moses Mendelssohn’s Plea for Emancipation,” *Essays in Intellectual Jewish History* (Hanover, N. H.: University Press of New England, 1981), 154–69.

13. Moses Mendelssohn, *Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum* (Berlin: Friedrich Maurer, 1783), 62; trans. Allan Arkush, *Jerusalem or on Religious Power and Judaism* (Hanover, N. H.: University Press of New England, 1983), 59. Henceforth *J* and *JJ*, respectively.

14. For the essential background, see Robert Bernasconi, “The Third Party,” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 30 (1999): 76–87.

15. Emmanuel Levinas, “Transcendence et Hauteur,” in *Liberté et commandement* (Cognac: Fata Morgana, 1994), 80–81; trans. Tina Chanter and Simon Critchley, “Transcendence and Height,” in *Basic Philosophical Writings*, ed. Adrian Pepercak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 23.

16. *CPP 22 / Liberté et commandement* (Cognac: Fata Morgana, 1994), 46. On the trace, see Robert Bernasconi, “The Trace of Levinas in Derrida,” *Derrida and Différance* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 13–29. Already in *Totality and Infinity* there is some suggestion of a connection between Levinas’s first conception of extra-territoriality and his idea of the anterior posteriori, which is a forerunner of the trace (see *TI 170 / TeI 144*).

17. On the background, see Scott G. Swanson, “The Medieval Foundations of John Locke’s Theory of Natural Rights,” *History of Political Thought* 18 (1997): 399–459. However, it should be clear that I am on the opposite side of the debate when it comes to the interpretation of Locke.

18. See Robert Bernasconi, “Locke and the Politics of Desire,” *Acta Institutionis Philosophiae et Aestheticae* 7 (1989): 97–110; and, “On Giving What is Not Mine to Give: A Critique of John Locke’s Displacement of the Rights of the Poor to Charity” in *Le don et la dette*, ed. Marco Olivetti (Milan: Cedam, 2004), 419–29.

19. See Domenico Losurdo, “Right Violence, and Notrecht,” in *Hegel and the Freedom of Moderns* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 153–79.

20. An earlier version of this essay was delivered as a lecture at the Hangzhou International Conference on Levinas at Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China on September 11, 2006. I am grateful to the participants for their comments and to the organizers for their invitation.

#### NOTES TO FAULCONER, “THE PAST AND FUTURE COMMUNITY”

1. Emmanuel Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in *CPP* 165. *CPP* here refers to the following edition: *Collected Philosophical Papers*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 165.

2. Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 91, n. 21.

3. Francois-David Sebbah, *Lévinas: Ambiguïtés de l’altérité* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2000), 177.

4. Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 82.

5. Jacques Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas* trans. Pascal-Anne Brault and Michael Nass (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999), 4–5.

6. Derrida, *Adieu*, 5; see also 61.

7. For Kant’s discussion of Abraham, see “Abschluß und Beilegung des Streits der Facultäten,” *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 7 (Bonn: Institut für angewandte Kommunikations und Sprachforschung, 1988), CD-ROM, 61–67. Kierkegaard, of course, wrote *Fear and Trembling* (trans. Howard and Edna Hong [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983]), a book via which many today get their understanding of Abraham. Derrida’s *Gift of Death* (trans. by D. Wills. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995]) also takes up the story.

8. The Hebrew verb means “to say,” “to say to oneself,” and “to command.” It is in the imperfect tense, suggesting not only that the act took place in the past, but also that it happened as an event or process.

9. Nehama Leibowitz, *Studies in the Book of Genesis in the Context of Ancient and Modern Jewish Bible Commentary*, trans. Aryeh Newman (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1972), 114. The first use of the verb *barekh* is an imperfect use, suggesting continuation and repetition. The final verb, “shall be blessed,” is perfect: the blessing, the event of blessing, will continue until all have been blessed.

10. Marriage is not the only such promise. Religious vows often have a similar character. See an example in Exodus 19: God asks the children of Israel to agree to keep his commandments (19:5) and, after they agree (19:8), he gives them the commandments.

11. Michael Baken, *The Duality of Human Existence: Isolation and Communion in Western Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 217.

12. See Genesis 2:20. That verse speaks of Woman as a “help meet” — an appropriate helper, one who gives assistance. The Hebrew word usually refers to God. Literally it means a “helper over against” or “another who helps.”

13. Perhaps that is why Isaac disappears from the story at this point: he has been cut off, separated, from Abraham.

14. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the word relate comes from the pluperfect stem of *referre*, “to refer.”

15. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), §17.

16. I am grateful to Joseph Spencer for this suggestion.

17. Cf. James E. Faulconer, “Philosophy and Transcendence: Religion and the Possibility of Justice,” in *Transcendence in Religion and Philosophy* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 79.

#### NOTES TO DRABINSKI, “ON SUBJECTIVITY AND POLITICAL DEBT”

1. This is a perplexing, if occasional, phrase, for surely Levinas wants nothing of the organic character of Aristotle’s politics — much less a theory of virtue(s). But what it does underscore is how political subjectivity is constitutive of the very sense of any subject.

2. Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, “Dialogue on Thinking-of-the-Other,” in *EN* 202ff.

3. Emmanuel Levinas, “The State of Israel and the Religion of Israel,” in *The Levinas Reader*, ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 259–60.

4. On this point, see John Drabinski, “The Possibility of an Ethical Politics: From Peace to Liturgy,” *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 26, no. 4 (2000): 60ff.

5. Chantal Mouffé, *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000), 101.

6. See Etienne Balibar, “Racism and Nationalism,” in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1991), 37–67. “In fact the discourses of race and nation are never very far apart” (37).

7. Antonio Negri, *Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State*, trans. Maurizio Boscagli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 2.

8. Negri, *Insurgencies*, 3.

9. *Ibid.*, 333.

10. Emmanuel Levinas, “The Other, Utopia, and Justice,” in *EN* 229–30.

11. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, *Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State Form* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 309.

12. Emmanuel Levinas, “Ideology and Idealism,” in *The Levinas Reader*, 243–44.

13. Indeed, Negri concludes *Labor of Dionysus* with what he calls a “genealogy of the constituent subject.” Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, *Labor of Dionysus*:

*A Critique of the State-Form* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 308–13. Whatever the differences between Negri and Levinas, I think it is noteworthy that the problem of the multitude and State legitimacy turns, for both of them, back to the question of the subject.

14. On the prehistory of the I, see *GDT* 150, 192 / *Dieu, la mort, et le temps* (Paris: Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle, 1993), 153, 202.

15. I have argued in *Sensibility and Singularity: The Problem of Phenomenology in Levinas* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001) that Levinas's critique of Husserl operates in the space of affectivity, turning the Husserlian notions of sensation and impression as intelligible cores into enigmas and singularities. This transformation of sensation and impression in turn provides Levinas with the language of passivity and vulnerability. See, *Sensibility and Singularity*, chapters 4 and 5.

16. See also my treatment of liturgy in "The Possibility of an Ethical Politics," *ibid.*, and of course Jeffrey Bloechl's exhaustive treatment of the term in his *Liturgy of the Neighbor: Levinas and the Religion of Responsibility* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2000).

#### NOTES TO BERGO, "A SITE FROM WHICH TO HOPE?"

1. Jacques Rolland, *Parcours de l'autrement: Essai sur Emmanuel Levinas* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000).

2. In "God and Philosophy" (1974), Levinas states, "Saying opens me to the other, before saying something said, before the said that is spoken in this sincerity forms a screen between me and the other. It is a saying without words, but not with empty hands. . . . This is a Saying bearing witness to the other of the Infinite, which tears me open as it awakens me in the Saying. . . . A pure witnessing that bears witness not to a previous experience but to the Infinite, it is inaccessible to the unity of apperception. . . . The Infinite concerns me and encircles me, speaking to me through my own mouth. And there is no pure witnessing except of the Infinite. This is *not a psychological wonder*, but the modality according to which the Infinite *comes to pass*. . . . The sentence in which God comes to be involved in words is not 'I believe in God.' . . . The religious discourse *prior to all religious discourse* is not dialogue. It is the 'here I am,' said to the neighbor to whom I am given over. . . . my responsibility for the other" (*GCM* 74–75).

3. By these adjectives, I mean two aspects of psychic life as described by Freud. By *economic*, I am referring to degrees of intensity, which Levinas does not discuss, but which must be assumed if in the repetition structure of the encounter with the other, my responsibility increases as I take it on. By *dynamic*, I simply mean that the encounter entails an affective movement which, in *Totality and Infinity*, will be called "trans-ascendence." In *Otherwise than Being*, the dynamic quality of the relation has become immanentized, although without positing instances or identifiable layers of consciousness. The dynamic will be dramatized, moreover,

as a “dramatization of the phenomena,” as Didier Franck puts it, or as “a theater stage,” as Derrida qualified phenomenology in his *Speech and Phenomena* (cf. 86). See, respectively, *TI*; *OB*; Didier Franck, *Dramatique des phénomènes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001), henceforth *DP*; finally, Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs*, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

4. Husserl will argue that the form and contents of my intentional life can be described for the “psychologically pure ego” as also for the transcendental ego, as the two disciplines are related and can be distinguished by a simple change in attitude. Phenomenological description of the entire range of transcendental experience can be approached either from the descriptive presentation of lived acts of intention or from the way in which these are unified dynamically as mine and in a flow that will be called temporal. The pure transcendental ego thus contains nothing that cannot be found “in the natural realm, using the approach of a pure internal psychology” (§34). In a word, psychological consciousness is doubled or folded into transcendental consciousness, and what they approach is different, the way an approach to psychic activity differs from the exploration of the flow of unifying immanent temporality. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction on Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).

5. A concept he uses interchangeably with *différance*, in *Of Grammatology*, and which he owes to Levinas’s essay “La trace de l’autre” (1963), see “The Trace of the Other,” trans. Alphonso Lingis, *Deconstruction in Context*, ed. Mark Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 345–59.

6. We should say in passing that Catherine Chalier’s observation in “*L’utopie messianique*,” to the effect that there exists a parallel between the call of the other human and the call that the verses address to me, has to do with the fact that inscription — whether we mean it metaphorically as inscription in the psyche or on the body or whether we are talking about textual meaning — is the common denominator by which we denote the birth of meaning in sensation and in textual expression. “Levinas pense le mode d’accueil du Livre et la disponibilité qui tient éveillée devant l’énigme d’autrui *dans le même souffle éthique*: il s’agit, dans les deux cas, de répondre d’une vulnérabilité qui met en question . . . le verset crie ‘interprète-moi.’” Catherine Chalier, “*L’utopie messianique*,” in *Répondre d’autrui: Emmanuel Levinas* (Neuchâtel: la Baconnière, 1989), 67.

7. Levinas writes in *Otherwise than Being*: “Language issued from the verbalness of a verb would then not only consist in making being understood, but also in making its essence vibrate. Language is thus not reducible to a system of signs doubling up beings and relations; that conception would be incumbent on us if words were nouns. Language seems rather to be an excrescence of the verb. In sensibility, the qualities of perceived things turn into time and into consciousness, independently of the soundless space in which they seem to unfold in a mute world. But has not then sensibility already been *said*?” The answer will be yes and no; in its dynamic immediacy, sensibility has not already been said; in its description

post facto, it has been said, many times. Levinas asks, rhetorically, “Do not the sensations in which the sensible qualities are lived resound *adverbially*, and, more precisely, as adverbs of the verb to be?” (OB 35).

8. For a discussion of Levinas’s reading of Heidegger’s being, see Marlène Zarader, *The Unthought Debt: Heidegger and the Hebraic Heritage*, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 138–49; and, DP75–103. For “God and Philosophy” see above, note 2.

9. When, at the end of *Otherwise than Being*, Levinas calls for a “relaxation of essence to the second degree,” he has stepped beyond witnessing to the Infinite. The exhortation requires that we think past the question of being and ontology, to the intersubjective connection we discover through our own flesh and stated by our own voices. However, that being could be relaxed requires that it be thought as strife, as competing *conati*. For Heidegger, being as strife is tied to the metaphysical destiny being has undergone since the pre-Socratics, an unfortunate destiny from which it is necessary to turn back. For Levinas, this destiny is the only one possible for being, which has never been other than strife. See Didier Franck, *Heidegger et le christianisme: L’explication silencieuse* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2004), 116 n. 1: “In affirming that ‘evil is the order of being *tout court* — and [that] on the contrary, to go toward the other is the break through of the human within being, an ‘otherwise than being’, Levinas extends to the truth of the essence of being, of which humans partake, that which Heidegger reserved to its *metaphysical* [or forgetful of the question of being] *destiny alone*. This ‘extension’ is strictly connected with a misinterpretation of the pages of [Heidegger’s] *Anaximander Fragment* describing the revolt against *presance* [*Anwesenheit*].”

10. For a glimpse of his complex refusal of mere interiority, see OB 147: “The exteriority of the Infinite becomes somehow an inwardness in the sincerity of a witness borne . . . Inwardness is not a secret place somewhere in me; it is the eminent exteriority, this impossibility of being contained . . . concerns me and circumscribes me and orders me by my own voice . . . The infinitely exterior becomes an ‘inward’ voice . . . One is tempted to call this plot religious, it is not stated in terms of certainty or uncertainty, and does not rest on any positive theology.”

11. “To expose an otherwise than being will still give an ontological said, in the measure that all monstration exposes an essence. The reduction of this said unfolds in stated propositions, using copulas, and virtually written . . . it will let the destructuring it will have operated *be*. The reduction then will once again let the otherwise than being be as an eon . . . as an endless critique . . . destroying the conjunction into which its saying and its said continually enter” (OB 44).

12. See, for example: Gillian Rose, *The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Past* (London: Blackwell, 1992).

13. From the time of *Gay Science* (1886), when Nietzsche had determined that his relationship to the science of his time would be perspectival and critical, he sought ways of expressing the relationship between force and meaning. In 1885, for instance, he will say: “the character of the absolute will to power is found across

the entire extent of the domain of life. If we have the right to deny the presence of consciousness, it is hard to deny *propulsive passions*, e.g., in a virgin forest.” Friedrich Nietzsche, *La volonté de puissance*, vol. 1, ed. F. Würzbach, trans. G. Bianquis (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 224, fragment 21; XIII, §591, 1885–86, my translation.

14. Emmanuel Levinas, “Messianic Texts” in *DF* 95. Hereafter abbreviated as *MT*.

15. Nietzsche, *La volonté de puissance*, 276, my translation; taken from the second, enlarged Würzbach collection (1937–38), XII, Part 1, §229. This collection exceeds that translated and published by Walter Kaufmann.

16. See Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Didier Franck, *Nietzsche et l'ombre de Dieu* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1998). Hereafter abbreviated in the text as, respectively, *NP* and *NOD*.

17. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), §§108–09.

18. There can be meaning for consciousness because judgments emerge as thoughts out of a body that experiences sensation and degrees of inner modifications; the contrast of changing sensations, affecting each other, make it possible to remark their differences and reckon. That this happens at deeper organic levels is evident from healing to immune processes. For Nietzsche, then, the good is physiological long before it is moral; better, the moral is *embodied* before it becomes rationalistic or pneumatic. For all that Nietzsche was long critical of mechanism, see for instance the following where he accuses materialism of limited linear causality: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Kritische Studienausgabe*, 15 vols., ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980), 13.375, 14[188]. Henceforth *KSA* and according to the standard method of citation: the volume and page number followed by the notebook and note number (e.g., *KSA* 13.375, 14[188]).

19. This was common physiology, inspired by Darwin-popularizers like Ernst Haeckel, see anatomist Wilhelm Roux's, *Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus* [*The Struggle of the Parts in the Organism*] (Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1881), which Nietzsche read in the mid-1880s.

20. Nietzsche, *Kritische Studienausgabe*, see note 22 above. Also cited by Didier Franck, *NOD* 91, though Franck cites the wrong sheet number.

21. Levinas writes, “The said, contesting the abdication of the saying that everywhere occurs in this said, thus maintains the diachrony in which, holding its breath, the spirit hears the echo of the *otherwise*” (*OB* 44). In regard to the enigma of the Infinite, compare Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Press, 1966), § 53: “Why atheism today? — ‘The father’ in God has been thoroughly refuted; ditto, ‘the judge’, ‘the rewarder’. Also his ‘free will’ . . . It seems to me that the religious instinct is indeed in the process of growing powerfully — but the theistic satisfaction it refuses with deep suspicion.”

22. In his “Au-delà de la phénoménologie,” Franck observes: “If Husserl found himself obliged to presuppose a pre-intentional and pre-temporal set of drives [*pulsionnalité*], he never proceeded to an analysis of the drive nor *a fortiori* did he explain the manner by which this could give rise to intentionality . . . how meaning and phenomenality come from force. . . . In order to do this, we must show that sensation and meaning also belong to the drive. Sensation [belongs to drives], because it is therein that Husserl sees the origin of time and intentionality; meaning [*le sens*], [belongs] because all intentionality carries it with it” (DP 120–21).

23. The parts of the work not devoted to an argument against Heidegger sketch an aesthetic counterpart to life as struggle *or* as revelation-concealment. Levinas is aware of his aesthetic and ventures that, upon reading the work, we can resolve “to be otherwise,” but we cannot “otherwise than be.” While the adverbial quality of intersubjective investiture is not a decision *to revise* one’s ethical life, the effect of an almost palpable, immanent other-in-the-self is *also* aesthetic, a sublime that is suffering and glory.

24. Much the way the dead Moses haunted the band of brothers in Freud’s account of the origins of Judaism, in *Moses and Monotheism*.

25. Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux: Essai* (Paris: Mercure de France, 1991), 99; my translation, emphasis added. Klossowski is commenting here on Nietzsche’s unpublished fragments from 1886 to 1888, which were translated into French in the early 1960s.

26. That is what poses the conundrum, in justice, of the respective places of equity and distribution *versus* a certain suffering (receiving less than one gives) and the supererogatory.

27. Gershom Scholem, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 17, emphasis added.

28. Nietzsche writes there, “Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of *one* basic form of the will — namely, of the will to power . . .; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power and one could also find in it the solution of the problem of procreation and nourishment — it is *one* problem — then one would have gained the right to determine *all* efficient force univocally as — *will to power*. The world viewed from inside” (*Beyond Good and Evil*, § 36). This too, of course, is a wager, about seeing the world outside a merely human perspective and without a god who redeems or justifies.

#### NOTES TO BINGEMER, “OTHERNESS AS PATH TOWARD OVERCOMING VIOLENCE”

1. On this, see Roger Burggraeve, *The Wisdom of Love in the Service of Love: Emmanuel Levinas on Justice, Peace, and Human Rights* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2002). Henceforth *WL*.

2. These are among the central themes of *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*.



3. CPP 20 / “Liberté et Commandement,” in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 58 (1953): 268; *TI* 233 / *TeI* 209–33.

4. Emmanuel Levinas, *Autrement que Savoir*, ed. Guy Petitdemange and Jacques Rolland (Paris: Osiris, 1988), 63. Henceforth *AS*.

5. Emmanuel Levinas, “Droits de l’Homme et Bonne Volonté,” *Le Supplément*, no. 168 (1989): 58.

6. On this difficulty, see Levinas’s essay in Philippe Nemo, *Job and the Excess of Evil* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998).

7. Emmanuel Levinas, “Les droits de l’homme,” in Commission nationale des droits de l’homme, *Les droits de l’homme en question* (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1988), 44.

8. Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, “Anlits und erste Gewalt. Ein Gespräch über Phänomenologie und Ethik (interview with M. J. Lenger),” *Spuren in Kunst und Gesellschaft*, no. 20 (1987): 30; quoted in *WL* 65.

9. It is hard not to immediately go from here to what Simone Weil says about strength and war, and on to her essay on the *Iliad*. Cf. *Oeuvres Complètes*, vol. 2, *Écrits historiques et politiques*, bk. 3, *Vers la Guerre, 1937–1940* (Paris: Gallimard, 1988–), 528–552. Henceforth cited as *OC*, followed by volume, book, and page numbers: e.g., *OC* 2:3:528–52.

10. Cf. CPP 18–19 / “Liberté et commandement,” 267–68.

11. On this, see Burggraeve’s beautiful analysis in *WL* 65.

12. In this sense there is something diabolical about violence — and, let us not forget, biblical evil, Satan, is the one who lays traps to make the human being deviate from God (hence his very name: Satan, the enemy of human nature). On this, see the insight of Rule 14 of Saint Ignatius of Loyola’s first week of the Spiritual Exercises: [327] 14<sup>a</sup> regla. *La quatuordécima: assimismo se ha como un caudillo, para vencer y robar lo que desea; porque así como un capitán y caudillo del campo, asentando su real y mirando las fuerzas o disposición de un castillo, le combate por la parte más flaca; de la misma manera el enemigo de natura humana, rodeando mira en torno todas nuestras virtudes theologales, cardinales y morales; y por donde nos halla más flacos y más necesitados para nuestra salud eterna, por allí nos bate y procura tomarnos.*

13. CPP 19–20 / “Liberté et commandement,” 268–69. See also *WP* 67.

14. Here we may recognize what Weil had in view with her project of “first line nurses”: the symbolic violence that acts on consciences (she refers to the soul, or the inner life) can be the most dangerous of all. Cf. Weil, *Écrits de Londres et dernières lettres* (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), 187–95.

15. In addition to being a fundamental principle of the Jewish Torah, this sentence is used several times by Jesus in the Gospels.

16. Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, “Paix et proximité,” in *Les cahiers de la nuit surveillée* (Paris: Lagrasse, 1984), 339; English translation, “Peace and Proximity,” in *Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings*, ed. Adriaan Peperzak et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 162.

17. *Ibid.* For commentary on Levinas’s positive relation to the importance that Plato accords to unity, see *WL* 74.

18. Levinas, “Paix et proximité,” 339 / *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 162; see also *TI* 118–20 / *TeI* 91–92.

19. This is a central theme of *CPP* / “Le moi et la totalité,” first published in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 59, no. 4 (1954): 353–73; English translation in *CPP* 25–45.

20. *CPP* 18 / “Liberté et commandement,” 267–70.

21. Emmanuel Levinas, “Ethique et philosophie première. La proximité de l’autre,” *Phrénétique*, 1986, 124, n. 39.

22. Emmanuel Levinas, “La laïcité et la pensée d’Israël,” in *La laïcité* (Paris: PUF, 1960), 50.

23. This point comprises a central theme of the interview included in the present volume: Emmanuel Levinas, “What One Asks of Oneself, One Asks of a Saint,” interview with Johan Goud.

24. Cf. “Entretiens Emmanuel Levinas — François Poirié,” in François Poirié, *Emmanuel Levinas. Qui êtes-vous?* (Lyon: La Manufacture, 1987), 97–98.

25. “Les noms de Dieu d’après quelques textes talmudiques,” in *Débats sur le langage théologique*, ed. Enrico Castelli (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1969), 59.

26. See “L’au-delà du verset. Un entretien avec Emmanuel Levinas (à propos de Mère Teresa),” in L. Balbont, *Mère Theresa em notre ame et conscience* (Paris: Seuil, 1983), 118.

27. Burggraeve calls the attention to the fact that this was foreseen by Jeremias and Jesus, *WL* 160.

28. Levinas, “Paix et proximité,” 346; *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 168–69.

29. Poirié, *Levinas. Qui êtes-vous?*, 97.

30. Emmanuel Levinas, “The Paradox of Morality (interview with T. Wright, P. Hughes, A. Ainley, A. Benjamin),” in *The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other*, ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (London: Routledge, 1988), 175.

31. Poirié, *Levinas. Qui êtes-vous?*, 119. See also *WL* 162.

32. Weil, *Ecrits de Londres et dernières lettres*, 209.

33. *Ibid.*, 209.

34. Cf. Charles Péguy, *L’argent suite*, in *Oeuvres en prose* (Paris, La Pléiade, 1961), 1250–51.

35. Cf. Levinas, “Droits de l’homme et bonne volonté,” 58.

36. See the first part of this essay.

37. Levinas, “Droits de l’homme et bonne volonté,” 168.

38. Near the end of her life, Weil understood that this does not always happen. When violent strength is on the loose, law becomes powerless and only arbitrariness rules.

39. Simone Weil, *L’Enracinement* (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), 9.

40. *Ibid.*, 540.

41. Simone Weil, “L’Iliade ou le poème de la force,” in *Oeuvres*, ed. F. de Lussy and D. Canciani (Paris: Gallimard, 1999), 539.

42. *Ibid.*, 541.

43. *Ibid.*, 541.
44. Weil, *L'Enracinement*, 204.
45. *Ibid.*, 204.
46. *Ibid.*, 204. One finds in this text a clear expression of Weilian non-violence.
47. Weil, *Ecrits de Londres et dernières lettres*, 186.
48. Weil, *Oeuvres*, 171.
49. Emmanuel Gabellieri, “Simone Weil: A Philosophy of Mediation and Gift,” in *Simone Weil: Action and Meditation*, ed. M. C. Bingemer and G. P. di NICOLA, (São Paulo: EDUSC, 2005), 314.
50. Cf. Simone Pétrement, *La vie de Simone Weil*, vol. 2 (Paris: Fayard, 1973), 35.
51. *Ibid.*, 30.
52. Simone Weil, *Pensées sans ordre concernant l'amour de Dieu* (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), 93.
53. Simone Weil, *Attente de Dieu* (Paris: Fayard, 1966), 7.
54. “Simone Weil contre la Bible,” in *DF* 133–41 / *DL* 178–88.
55. Also quoted in Gabellieri, “Simone Weil,” 213. See also Gabellieri’s subsequent comments.

#### NOTES TO VISKER, “IN PRAISE OF VISIBILITY”

1. Jean-Luc Marion, “The Final Appeal of the Subject,” in *Deconstructive Subjectivities*, ed. Simon Critchley and Peter Dews (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 99.
2. Later published as “The Phenomenon of the Gaze in Merleau-Ponty and Lacan,” *Chiasmi International, New Series* 1 (1999): 105–20; 105.
3. *TO* 65, translation corrected.
4. *TI* 192–93; *TI* here refers to the following edition: *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984); *OB* 100; *OB* here refers to the following edition: *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988).
5. Jean-Luc Marion, “Le phénomène saturé,” in *Phénoménologie et Théologie*, ed. Jean-Louis Chretien (Paris: Criterion, 1992), 120.
6. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968). Cf. chapters 4, 7, and 8 of my *Truth and Singularity: Taking Foucault into Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999) on the problems this endo-ontological attempt runs into when trying to define a de jure invisibility.
7. *DF* 9; *DF* here refers to *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, trans. Sean Hand (London: Athlone Press, 1990).
8. Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 203.

9. As I argued in the chapters on Levinas contained in *Truth and Singularity*, chapters 5, 9–11, conclusion, and in its sequel *The Inhuman Condition: Looking for Difference after Levinas and Heidegger* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), chapters 1, 4–6.

10. I take unthought here in the Heideggerian sense as what an author did not have to think, rather than as what he failed to think: “the reference to what is unthought . . . is not a criticism.” Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy,” in *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 69.

11. Cf. Robert Bernasconi, “The Invisibility of Racial Minorities in the Public Realm of Appearances,” in *Race* (Oxford, Mass.: Blackwell, 2001), 284–99.

12. Ralph Ellison’s novel was published in 1952. I quote the obituary of the *Independent* (1994) as mentioned in the Penguin Twentieth Century Classics edition’s first page presentation.

13. On recognition see Axel Honneth, *Unsichtbarkeit. Stationen einer Theorie der Intersubjektivität* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), esp. ch. 1 (pp. 10–27); on respect, see Richard Sennett, *Respect: The Formation of Character in an Age of Inequality* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).

14. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), ch. 5.

15. Charles Taylor, *The Malaise of Modernity* (Concord, Ontario: Anansi, 1991), 40; henceforth *MM*.

16. Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge, 1981), 60.

17. Ian Hacking makes this very clear in his “Language, Truth, and Reason,” in *Rationality and Relativism*, ed. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), 48–66.

18. Emmanuel Levinas, “Meaning and Sense,” in *Basic Philosophical Writings*, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 58; hereafter *BPW*.

19. This is entailed by what he criticizes anti-Platonists like Merleau-Ponty for: “No meaning can any longer be *detached* from these innumerable cultures, to allow one to bear a judgment on these cultures” (*ibid.*, 57).

20. *Ibid.*, 44.

21. Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,” in *CPP* 50; *CPP* refers to *Collected Philosophical Papers*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987).

22. Thought, seeing, knowledge, reason, perception are terms Levinas does not see the need to distinguish in this context, given what he considers to be their common core.

23. In contrast to things which “have no light of their own [but] receive a borrowed light” (*TI* 74), the relationships of discourse allows the Other to “gleam” in his “own light” (*TI* 71).

24. Thus, the Other seems to operate a phenomenological reduction on me, at least if one follows Bernet in stretching the original sense of reduction to accom-

modate for post-Husserlian developments. See his “Phenomenological Reduction and the Double Life of the Subject,” in *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his Earliest Thought*, ed. Theodore J. Kisiel and John Van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 245–68.

25. E.g., Jacques Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène. Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl* (Paris: PUF, 1967), 98.

26. Since I have been criticized for making this, to my mind, obvious claim, let me refer the reader to *TI* 201: “The face opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation, which no ‘interiority’ permits avoiding.” Cf. also *OB* 128 and many other passages.

27. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* (London: Routledge, 2001), 529–30. Cf. my “Was Existentialism truly a Humanism?” *Sartre Studies International* 13, no. 1 (2007): 3–15.

28. The prefix “mè” is used to point to the fact that this something is neither an ordinary thing nor a nothing (see below on the difference between the meaningful and what has meaning). I introduced the term in my *The Inhuman Condition*.

29. E.g., *EE* 53: “What we call the I is itself submerged . . . , invaded, depersonalized, stifled.”

30. Again, this implies a kind of phenomenological reduction (cf. note 24) and the discussion thus bears on what exactly comes to light in it and how that affects the subject under reduction.

31. On insomnia: *EE* 61–64; on a possible psychoanalytical interpretation of the *it enjoys* (though the author does not refer to Levinas): Christiane Balasc, *Désir de rien. De l’anorexie à la boulimie* (Paris: Aubier, 1990).

32. Emmanuel Levinas, *Ethique et Infini. Dialogues avec Philippe Nemo* (Paris: Fayard, 1982), 43 (end of section 3, on the *il y a*).

33. This could solve some of the problems Arendt runs into in not distinguishing the public and the private this way (e.g., “the distinction between things that should be shown [to others] and things that should be hidden [from others]”; Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 72). I pursue this remark in my “Pushing Arendt into Postmodernity” (forthcoming in *Philosophy and Social Criticism*).

#### NOTES TO VOGEL, “EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND THE JUDAISM OF THE GOOD SAMARITAN”

1. The two main works in which Levinas elaborates this argument are *TI* and *OB*.

2. For a clear account of Levinas’s version of the Athens/Jerusalem distinction, see “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas” in *Face to Face with Levinas*, ed. Richard Cohen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).

3. For Levinas’s first extended critique of Buber, see Levinas’s essay, “Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge” in *The Levinas Reader*, ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). Most instructive, too, is a dialogue between Buber and Levinas represented in Sydney and Beatrice Rome, eds., *Philosophical Interrogations*

(New York: Harper and Row, 1964). For later discussions of Buber, see “Martin Buber’s Thought and Contemporary Judaism,” “Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel and Philosophy,” and “A Propos of Buber: Some Notes,” in *OS*.

4. “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas,” 24.

5. *Ibid.*, 26.

6. For his interpretation of the relation between care and justice, see Levinas, “The Bible and the Greeks,” in *TN*.

7. Levinas, “Judaism and Christianity” in *TN* 164.

8. This passage is translated by Adriaan Peperzak in “Judaism According to Levinas,” chapter 3 of *Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 27.

9. For Levinas’s “official” account of the relation between “Saying” and “the Said,” analogous but not identical with his earlier distinction between “Infinity” and “Totality,” see *OB*.

10. For his account of why helping those in need is an “imperfect” duty, see Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). On the worry that “impartialist” accounts of morality, whether Kantian or Utilitarian, are too self-abnegating, see Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” *Journal of Philosophy* 79, no. 8 (August 1982).

11. Bernard Williams, “Is International Rescue a Moral Issue?,” *Social Research* 62, no. 1 (1995): 67.

12. Levinas, “The Bible and the Greeks,” *TN* 133.

13. See John Davenport, “Levinas’s Agapeistic Metaphysics of Morals: Absolute Passivity and the Other as Eschatological Hierophany,” *Journal of Religious Ethics*, 1998.

14. Levinas, “The Bible and the Greeks,” *TN* 135.

15. Martin Luther King Jr., “On Being a Good Neighbor,” in *Introduction to Ethics*, ed. Gary Perspece (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1995).

16. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 90.