Notes

Notes to Atterton and Hansel, "Morality in the Laboratory"

1. Levinas, "Le mot je, le mot tu, le mot Dieu," *Le Monde* 35 March 18–20 (1978), 10, 306. Translated by Michael B. Smith as "The Word I, the Word You, and the Word God," in *Alterity and Transcendence* (London: Athlone, 1999), 91–96.

2. See Levinas, "The Understanding of Spirituality in French and German Culture," trans. Andrius Valevičius, *Continental Philosophy Review* 31, no. 1 (1998): 1–10.

3. Conducted by Josy Eisenberg, this previously untitled interview appeared in a program entitled "La Source de vie," and was originally broadcast on French television on March 26, 1978.

Notes to Simon, "Tracing the Sacred, Tracing the Face"

1. "We were impressed by the opposition to the idea of totality in Franz Rosenzweig's *Stern der Erlösung,* a work too often present in this book to be cited."

2. Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza,* trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 80.

3. Ibid., 82.

4. For Rosenzweig, psychism is analogous to what he calls *ensouling,* that is, the process that occurs when the pride and defiance of the *daimon* of a human turns to soul when he or she becomes the object of loving attention in a revelatory love relationship.

5. For a critical examination of the twisted roots of Frege's separation of sign and signified and how that is woven into the background of Husserl's phenomenology, see Claire Ortiz Hill and Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock, *Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2003), esp. chap. 2, "Remarks on Sense and Reference in Frege and Husserl," 23–40.

6. Here I am paraphrasing an insight that I received from John Lewellyn.

7. See *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen,* ed. Wolfgang Pfeifer (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999), 439–40.

8. Ibid., 48.

9. Franz Rosenzweig, *Stern der Erlösung* (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988), 466. Translated into English as *The Star of Redemption,* trans. Barbara Ellen Galli (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005).

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 467.
12. Robert Gibbs, *Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 186.
13. For an interesting application of this sense of "accounting for time as one's own," which Rosenzweig provides in Part 2, Book 3 of *Stern der Erlösung,* see Hans Liebeschütz, *Von Georg Simmel zur Franz Rosenzweig: Studien zum Jüdischen Denken im deutschen Kulturbereich* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1970), 4ff.
14. Rosenzweig, *Stern der Erlösung,* 467.
15. Ibid.
16. For a well thought out presentation of the rejection of historicism by Rosenzweig, as well as other Jewish intellectuals such as Walter Benjamin, see David N. Myers, *Resisting History: Historicism and its Discontents in German-Jewish Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
17. See Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), esp. sec. 5, "Action," 175–247.
18. Rosenzweig, *Stern der Erlösung,* 467.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 470.
21. See Richard A. Cohen, *Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 241–51.
22. Rosenzweig, *Stern der Erlösung,* 467. For this, note the possible connection of Rosenzweig's sense of pure perception to the passivity or unintentional consciousness of Levinas's ethical relation.
23. See Norbert Samuelson, *A User's Guide to Franz Rosenzweig's "Star of Redemption"* (Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 1999), 101.

Notes to Allen, "Reflections on the Metaphysical God"

In addition to the abbreviations at the front of this volume, the following are also used: Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference* (*ID*), trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism* (*LH*), trans. F. A. Cappuzi and J. G. Gray, in *Basic Writings,* ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 217–65; Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'" (WN), in *The Question Concerning Technology,* trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 53–112. The use of the abbreviation of Levinas's work, *GCM,* specifically refers to his essay "God and Philosophy," 55–78.

1. In addressing these issues, I am not only seeking to follow a path of questioning internal to Levinas's thought itself, but to contribute to a line of thinking on Heidegger's critique of Western metaphysics as onto-theology addressed, among others, by Ignace Verhack in his article "Immanent Transcendence as Way to 'God.' Between Heidegger and Marion," in *Religious Experience and the End of Metaphysics,* ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

2003), 106–18. Verhack questions whether it is "still possible, in the wake of the Heideggerian deconstruction of metaphysics as onto-theology, to make 'God' a theme for *philosophical thought*" (107, italics added). He goes on to claim that Heidegger's critique of onto-theology is often (mis)understood as a removal of God from Being, and a restriction of philosophy to this Being purified of God, such that questions about God can no longer be philosophically posed, and talk of God only has its place in faith and theology. This interpretation forgets that Heidegger's critique is actually directed in some senses at a search for a God beyond onto-theology who can come into Being and thus into philosophy as the thinking of Being. Or, as I will argue is the case in both Levinas and Heidegger, there is an openness in Being to the coming of gods, though no certainty as to their arrival or continued presence, and this openness and uncertainty are reflected in the ways we continue to speak of God in philosophy after the Nietzschean and Heideggerian critiques of metaphysics.

2. See, for instance, *Being and Time,* ¶ 1, on the forgotten question of Being; or *LH* 226–27: "Metaphysics does not ask about the truth of Being itself."

3. For Levinas's account of subjective being as worldly and illuminated, see *EE* 37–51 and *TI* 109–83.

4. On the subject as creature in Levinas see: *TI* 102–05; and *OB* 104–05, where the metaphor of maternity is used to refer to the subject as created.

5. See Levinas, "De la signification du sens," in *Heidegger et la question de Dieu,* ed. R. Kearney and J. S. O'Leary (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1980), 240–41. See also *TI* 42–48, where the Heideggerian approach to Being is placed second to ethics and justification.

6. While this does not necessarily reassure the reader against Dominique Janicaud's claim that Levinas's notion of transcendence as ethical desire presupposes a kind of "metaphysico-theological" structure that would underwrite his philosophical language, we can see that Levinas argues strongly, here and elsewhere, against a theological source for transcendence in his philosophy. See Dominique Janicaud, *Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française* (Combas: Éditions de l'éclat, 1991), 15.

7. For an excellent account of Heidegger's critique of metaphysics as onto-theology, see Iain Thompson's article, "Ontotheology? Understanding Heidegger's *Destruktion* of Metaphysics," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 8, no. 3 (2000): 297–327.

8. See *LH* 226: "Metaphysics does indeed represent beings in their Being, and so thinks the Being of beings. But it does not think the difference of both."

9. See *ID* 70: "When metaphysics thinks of beings with respect to the ground that is common to all beings as such, then it is logic as onto-logic."

10. See *ID* 59: "Ontology . . . and theology are 'Logies' inasmuch as they provide the ground of beings as such and account for them within the whole"; and *ID* 68–69 on logos as ground in metaphysics.

11. See *ID* 60: "The Being of beings is represented fundamentally, in the sense of the ground, only as *causa sui*. This is the metaphysical concept of God";

and *ID* 70–71: "When metaphysics thinks of beings as such as a whole, that is, with respect to the highest being which accounts for everything, then it is logic as theo-logic."

12. See Heidegger, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," in *Basic Writings,* 441–42.

13. For a further account of some of Levinas's "misreadings" of Heidegger, see: François Raffoul, "Being and the Other: Ethics and Ontology in Levinas and Heidegger," in *Addressing Levinas,* ed. Eric Sean Nelson, Antje Kapust, and Kent Still (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 138–51. Contra Levinas's separation of ethics and ontology, his identification of ontology and the Same, and his privileging of the death of the other over the mineness of death in Heidegger, Raffoul argues for a sense of Heideggerian Being that is traversed by otherness, for a reading of Dasein that is both fundamentally mine and a being with others, and for a being toward my own death that is singularizing and thus the condition of encountering others as other. He further suggests that Heideggerian ontology should not be separated and subordinated to ethics, but rather understood as an "originary ethics." I develop my own reading of this originary ethics further on.

14. In *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond,* ed. John Van Burn (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 121. We can also find reference to the atheism of philosophy in Heidegger's 1925 lecture, *History of the Concept of Time,* trans. T. Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 80, where he claims: "As long as phenomenology understands itself, it will adhere to this course of investigation [i.e., the phenomenological one] against any sort of prophetism within philosophy and against any inclination to provide guidelines for life. Philosophical research is and remains atheism.... Precisely in this atheism, philosophy becomes what a great man once called the 'joyful science.'"

15. See *LH* 242; 252–54: "Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of divinity to be thought. Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what the word 'God' is to signify" (253).

16. See, for instance, "What are Poets for?" and "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," in Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought,* trans. A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 91–161.

17. See chapter 8, "Subjectivism and Humanism," of Ben Vedder's *Heidegger's Philosophy of Religions: From God to the Gods* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007), 189–214.

18. "The thinking that is to come is no longer philosophy, because it thinks more originally than metaphysics—a name identical to philosophy" (*LH* 265).

19. See "What are Poets for?," 93–94: "Poets are the mortals who singing earnestly of the wine-god, sense the trace of the fugitive gods, stay on the gods' tracks, and so trace for their kindred mortals the way toward the turning.... We others must learn to listen to what *these* poets say."

20. *LH* 251: "When one proclaims 'God' as the altogether 'highest value,' this is a degradation of God's essence. Here as elsewhere thinking in values is the greatest blasphemy imaginable against Being."

21. This descent happens in the interest of human justice and equality, so that goodness may be available to all and reducible to some kind of thought and calculation despite the fact that the Good itself, produced in ethics, always breaks through thought and calculation and does not concern itself equally with goodness for the self and for the other. See *OB* 153–62.

22. One can find traces of this narrative of creation at work in *TI* 77–79, 102–05. It becomes even more pronounced in *OB*.

23. Adriaan Peperzak, for instance, argues that we have yet to come to a clear understanding of what the difference between the God of philosophers (the onto-theological/metaphysical God) and the more personal God of faith consists in—if there is a clear difference at all, that is. For a discussion of this topic, see Adriaan Peperzak, "Religion after onto-theology," in *Religion After Metaphysics,* ed. Mark Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 104–20.

24. *GCM* 57: "To ask ourselves . . . whether God cannot be uttered in a reasonable discourse that would be neither ontology nor faith, is implicitly to doubt the formal opposition . . . between, on the one hand, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, invoked without philosophy in faith, and on the other the god of the philosophers. It is to doubt that this opposition constitutes an alternative."

25. On the shift in philosophy from the notion of God as highest idea of an onto-theological metaphysics to a hermeneutic approach to God as constantly withdrawing from thought and calling for renewed approaches and reinterpretations, see Ben Vedder's tracing of the development of the hermeneutical tradition in philosophy from Schleiermacher, through Dilthey to Gadamer and Heidegger in his "The Disappearance of Philosophical Thought in Hermeneutic Philosophy: Historicizing and Hermeneuticizing the Philosophical Idea of God," in *Religious Experience and the End of Metaphysics,* 14–30. In his own way, Levinas as well falls into this hermeneutical tradition.

26. For some excellent further reflections on the "original ethics" at work in Heidegger's thinking of Being, see F. Raffoul and D. Pettigrew, eds., *Heidegger and Practical Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002). Of particular interest is Jean-Luc Nancy's article, "Heidegger's Originary Ethics" (65–85), where Nancy offers an interpretation of the thinking against values at the end of the *Letter on Humanism* as going beyond a determinate morality of preestablished rules and values toward a more originary ethics of action or comportment (*l'agir*) where we have no preestablished norms to guide us, but are intimately involved in, and deeply responsible for the making of values through our very action, that is, through our comportment toward ourselves, others, and Being itself. Nancy claims that to understand Being as ethos, as abode, is to understand it not so much as a dwelling place, but as the very act of dwelling, as a kind of conduct (79). In fact, the two senses of dwelling need not be separated,

for if language is the house (the dwelling place) of Being, it is also the way we comport ourselves toward Being.

27. See *LH* 256–58 and section 4, "The Ones to Come" of Heidegger's *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning),* trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999).

28. This suggests that the ethics of hospitality Jacques Derrida discovers in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas—see Derrida's *Adieu à Emmanuel Levinas* (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1997)—may also find inspiration in Heidegger. It also reminds us that the welcoming (*accueil*) of the stranger so central to Levinasian ethics (which is paradoxically a kind of expropriation, a giving of all I have to the stranger) can only occur if I have a place, a home, an economic horizon within which to receive the stranger.

29. On this concluding remark, a particularly insightful reading of the possibly broader ethical tenor of Heidegger's thought is to be found in Silvia Benso's *The Face of Things: A Different Side of Ethics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), where she takes Heidegger's thought as inspiration for elaborating an "ethics of things," an "ethics of the other of the Other," that would come to supplement Levinas's ethics of the human other (xxix). As well as responsibility to human others, responsibility to things is also necessary in our present age according to Benso: "To avoid the environmental catastrophe to which technological rationality seems to have consigned the age of postmodernity, it seems therefore necessary to explore, and espouse, ways of relating to things that do not reduce them to objects, but rather recognize in them the possibility of their own signification, of their own difference, of their own alterity" (xxxiv–xxxv).

Notes to Casper, "Recognizing the Gift in Giving Thanks"

1. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy,* trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 166.

2. Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* 980a21.

3. The text is derived from a lecture Husserl gave in 1904/05 and was edited by Martin Heidegger in cooperation with Edith Stein in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* in 1928. A second edition appeared with Niemeyer in Tübingen in 1980; the full volume and its handwritten appendices can be found in vol. X of Husserliana and its English translation: Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*, trans. John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).

4. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 10.

5. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research,* trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 114–15. See also p. 130: "What this questioning intends to understand is precisely that which Ego-metaphysics and egoic idealim

of the most varied gradations cannot let appear, on account of their preconception: the question of the sense of the 'am.'" Also see the appendix entitled "The Ontological Sense of the 'Am'" (132–35).

6. See ibid., 25, 40–41; also Heidegger, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens,* Gesamtausgabe, vol. 60, ed. Claudius Strube (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1995), 248.

7. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology,* trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), 89.

8. In *Being and Time,* Heidegger readily understands Dasein as *Mitdasein,* as Dasein with others. It is precisely because of this that he is concerned with the authentic being itself of Dasein. See for example Martin Heidegger, *Einleitung in die Philosophie,* Gesamtausgabe, vol. 27, ed. Otto Saame and Ina Saame-Speidel (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1996), 325: "Dasein must be able to be essential itself . . . if its is to know itself as being carried and led by *an other,* if it is to be able to open itself up for the being-there with others, if it is to be able to invest itself for others." (Dasein muss wesenhaft es selbst sein können . . . wenn es sich getragen und geführt wissen will durch ein anderes, wenn es sich soll öffnen können für Mitdasein der Anderen, wenn es sich soll einsetzen für Andere.)

9. Heidegger, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens,* 80: "Die christliche Religiosität lebt die Zeitlichkeit als solche"; see also ibid., 82, 104, 116.

10. Already in 1917, Hermann Cohen, as the last article of his "Einheit oder Einzigkeit Gottes" was about to go to print, searched for a German expression for the Jewish term for revelation, "Mathan Thora" (Gift of the Thora) in order to twist it free from its undue objectivization so as to interpret it as an event: "But *Mathan* is not *Mathana*. It should thus be allowed to translate, if this would be a usual way to use this word: *die Gebe, die Gebung* . . . a self-giving of God, as he gives himself in everything, that comes from him." (Mathan aber ist nicht Mathana. Es müsste also übersetzt werden dürfen, wenn dieser Wortgebrauch üblich wäre: die Gebe, die Gebung . . . ein Sich-Geben Gottes, wie er sich in allem gibt, was von ihm ausgeht.) Hermann Cohen, *Jüdische Schriften* (Berlin: Schwetschke, 1924), 96–97.

11. See Bernhard Casper, *Angesichts des Anderen. Emmanuel Levinas. Elemente seines Denkens* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009), 161–74.

12. On this fundamental trait of the human condition in Rosenzweig and Ebner see Bernhard Casper, *Das dialogische Denken: Franz Rosenzweig, Ferdinand Ebner und Martin Buber,* 2nd edition (Freiburg: Alber, 2002). On Ferdinand Ebner see also: Ferdinand Ebner, *Schriften,* ed. Franz Seyr II (München: Kösel, 1963), 293: "all being is conceived as gift, that is in its last ground to say: as grace" (wird alles Sein als Gabe. d.h. im letzten Grunde als Gnade begriffen); ibid., 301: "That all being is grace" (*Dass alles Sein Gnade ist*).

13. Levinas commented on his relation to Heidegger in these terms during a 1981 interview with me. See Bernhard Casper, "El rostro, la primogenitura y la fecondidad. Dialogo con Emmanuel Levinas el 11 de junio 1981 en Paris," *Revista de Filosofia* 107 (2003): 19–28.

14. Meister Eckhart, *Werke,* ed. Niklaus Largier (Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1993), 2:234/35: "Die Gutheit ist weder geschaffen noch gemacht noch geboren; jedoch ist sie gebärend und gebiert den Guten, und der Gute, insoweit er gut ist, ist ungemacht und ungeschaffen und doch geborenes Kind und Sohn der Gutheit." (diu güete enist noch geschaffen noch gemachet noch geborn; mêr si ist gebernde und gebirt den guoten, und der guote, als verre sô er guot ist, ist ungeamachet und ungeschaffen und doch geborn kint und sun der güete.)

15. Plato, *Republic* 509b: "ouk ousias ontos tou agathou all'eti epekeinas tes ousias."

16. Levinas, *Carnets de captivité et autres inédits,* Oeuvres, vol. 1, ed. Rodolphe Calin and Catherine Chalier (Paris: Grasset, 2009), 129: "Dans la philosophie classique la paternité est épuisé par la notion [de] cause. Voir Aristote. C'est contre cela que je m'élève en posant la paternité comme une relation originelle." On the relation of fatherhood as a category originally given, also see ibid., 141, 382, 450.

17. The *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Basel: Schwabe, 1971–2007) lacks the terms fatherhood, sonhood, bearing (*Gebären*), and being born (*Geborenwerden*). Yet the *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Metaphern,* ed. Ralf Konersmann (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007) includes an article "Gebären" (bearing) by Christian Begemann, 121–34. However, this article neglects the Middle Ages completely and engages in no way with the correlative thinking of Meister Eckhart.

18. Eckhart, *Werke,* 2:26/27: "*wiedergebärende Dankbarkeit*" (*widerbernden dankbærkeit*).

19. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* 1094a3: "*agathon hou pant'ephietai.*" Translation by W. D. Ross. See Bernhard Welte, "Meister Eckhart als Aristoteliker," in *Gesammelte Schriften,* ed. by Bernhard Casper (Freiburg: Herder, 2006–09), 2:219–31.

20. Eckhart, *Werke,* 1:25: "Unser Herr Jesus Christus ging hinauf in ein Burgstädtchen und ward empfangen von einer Jungfrau, die ein Weib war."

21. Levinas, *En decouvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger* (Paris: PUF, 1974), 156. On this see Casper, *Angesichts des Anderen,* 27–32.

22. See Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,* trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 25–27.

23. Eckhart, *Werke,* 1:24.

24. The convertibility of *bonum* and *verum* in medieval thought is rooted here.

25. Such reciprocal obligation in the service of specific intentions—today, one might think of commercial giveaways—can always be part of the praxis of giving. These are described by sociology. Marcel Mauss has brilliantly done so in his sociological and ethnological "Essai sur le don" (1924).

26. See Jean Duvignand, *Le don du rien. Essai d'anthropologie de la fête* (Paris: Stock, 1977).

27. Act 2, scene 5: "*Was hast Du für mich getan?—Nichts, nichts, mein Florestan.*" I follow the text of the famous interpretation of *Fidelio* in the Bavarian State Opera House in 1957 directed by Ferenc Friscay.

28. In relation to the phenomenology of language in general, see Casper, *Angesichts des Anderen,* 119–31.

29. Eckhart, *Werke,* 1:24.

30. French: *revaloir qc à qn;* Italian: *mostrarsi riconoscente.*

31. Eckhart, Werke, 1:26/27: "'Weib' ist der edelste Name, den man der Seele zulegen kann, und ist viel edler als 'Jungfrau'" (Wip ist daz edelste wort, daz man der sêle zuo gesprochen mac, und ist vil edeler dan juncvrouwe).

32. Eckhart, *Werke,* 1:26/27: "denn Fruchtbarwerden der Gabe, das allein ist Dankbarkeit für die Gabe, und da ist der Geist Weib in der wiedergebärenden Dankbarkeit" (wan vruhtbærkeit der gâbe daz ist aleine dankbærkeit der gâbe, und dâ ist der geist ein wip in der widerbernden dankbærkeit).

33. Eckhart, *Werke,* 1:26/27: "wo er Jesum wiedergebiert in Gottes väterliches Herz" (dâ er gote widergebirt Jêsum in daz veterliche herze). The French Eckhart scholars Gwendoline Jarczyk and Pierre-Jean Labarrière thus translate "*widerbernde dankbaerkeit*" as "the gratitude that begets in return" (*la gratitude, qui engendre en retour*). Jarczyk and Labarrière, *Maitre Eckhart. L'étincelle de l'âme* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), 43. Rendering the expression in German as "*wiedergebärende Dankbarkeit,*" though in accordance with today's orthography, brings with it the danger that "*wieder*" is understood solely in the sense of "again." On this, see the long list of word formations using the prefix *wider-* in Mathias Lexer, *Mittelhochdeutsches Taschenwörterbuch* (Stuttgart: Hirzel, 1992), 317ff., such as "*wider-minne: gegenliebe*" (responsive love).

34. For a fundamental reflection on the importance of freedom as purely formal is found in a central passage of Levinas's thought, see Levinas, *Carnets de captivité,* 343. Recently, Gerold Prauss has shown that an understanding of freedom as purely formal autonomy does not do justice to the whole and just understanding of freedom in Kant. See his *Moral und Recht im Staat nach Kant und Hegel* (Freiburg: Alber, 2008).

35. See Bernhard Casper, "Die Determination der Freiheit," *Rivista di Filosofia* 68–69 (2008): 141–52; also in *Forum* 49 (2008): 7–17.

36. On the determination of the absolute and infinite concretion see Welte, *Gesammelte Schriften,* 1:269–72, 4:182–89.

37. See the editor's introduction to the *Carnets de captivité,* 23–24; also in the text p. 70, as well as the equation of the phenomenological reduction to the Sabbath: "To break with history is to place oneself in history" (*Interrompre l'histoire, c'est se situer dans l'histoire*) (59, 73).

38. See Heidegger, *Being and Time,* 258–66.

39. Levinas, *Carnets de captivité,* 53: "*solitude, responsable de l'univers tout entier.*" See also the expression made by Father Zossima's ailing brother, Markel, in Dostoyevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov,* to which Levinas later makes frequent reference: "Each of us is guilty before everyone for everyone, and I more than the others." On this, see Bernhard Casper, *Angesichts des Anderen,* 72.

40. See Levinas, *Carnets de captivité,* 72, 81–82.

41. In the sermons of Eckhart one finds the wonderful word "*ebenmensch*" (*sameman*) for this idea. See Eckhart, *Werke,* 1:76. My translation follows the

insight of Rosenzweig and Buber in their German translation of the scripture, namely that the Hebraic "*kamoka* [can] only refer to a noun, not to a verb, . . . and thus 'love-*kamoka*' (he is like you) means: he also is created in the image of God" (kamoka [kann sich] nur auf ein Substantiv beziehen nicht auf ein Verb, . . . und so bedeutet "liebe-kamoka" (er ist wie du), denn auch er ist im Bilde Gottes geschaffen). Franz Rosenzweig, *Sprachdenken. Arbeitspapiere zur Verdeutschung der Schrift,* Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4, 2 (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1984), 140. *Kamoka* can thus not be used adverbially as in the current German translations "Love your neighbor as (you love) thyself." Consequently, Rosenzweig and Buber translate "*Liebe deinen Genossen / dir gleich*" as "Love your neighbor / who is like you." Cohen repeatedly uses this translation, for example in the preface to *Der Nächste* (Berlin: Schocken, 1935).

42. Levinas, *Carnets de captivité,* 98, 119: "*accomplissement.*" It is peculiar which important role this determination, which reminds of the sense of actualization and maturation in early Heidegger, plays in the *Carnets*: "divine choice that might be redemption" (*élection divine qui est peut-être le salut*) (68).

43. See Levinas, *Carnets de captivité,* 114. Levinas later repeatedly referred to the Servant Songs (Isaiah 53) as the biblical epitome of his thinking.

44. On the essence of Christianity "whereby in love one suffers the suffering of the other," see Levinas, *Carnets de la captivité,* 109. Using the abbreviations J and C, Levinas repeatedly brings together Judaism and Christianity in the *Carnets.*

Notes to Welz, "A Wandering Dog"

In addition to the abbreviations at the front of this volume, the following are also used:

Immanuel Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* (*R*), ed. Karl Vorländer (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1990), page numbers of this volume are given first and are followed by the page numbers of the 2nd edition.

1. See Bob Plant, *Wittgenstein and Levinas: Ethical and Religious Thought* (London: Routledge, 2005), 166–79.

2. This is the imperatives' first formulation taken from *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785).

3. See David Papineau, "Naturalism," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/.

4. Barry Stroud, "The Charm of Naturalism," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 70, no. 2 (1996): 43–55, here 50.

5. Ibid., 53.

6. See Plant, *Wittgenstein and Levinas,* 174.

7. Ibid., 175.

8. Ibid., 149.

9. Ibid., 171; John Llewelyn, *The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience: A Chiasmic Reading of Responsibility in the Neighborhood of Levinas, Heidegger and Others* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 56.

10. See *R* 20 / 7–8; 29 / 21. I focus on this relatively late work, which appeared after the three Critiques, because it largely summarizes Kant's position on human nature.

11. See *R* 28 / 19; 46 / 46.

12. See *R* 29 / 21.

13. See *R* 19 / 6.

14. See *R* 55n / 59.

15. See *R* 44 / 43.

16. See *R* 48 / 48.

17. As to a phenomenology of the invisible Good, see the section on Levinas in my book *Love's Transcendence and the Problem of Theodicy,* Religion in Philosophy and Theology 30 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 277–326.

18. See Catherine Chalier, *What Ought I to Do? Morality in Kant and Levinas,* trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), chap. 4.

19. See ibid., 72, 75–80.

20. Levinas, "Ethics of the Infinite," in Richard Kearney, *Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 61.

21. See *R* 3, preface to the first edition.

22. See *R* 6–7, preface to the first edition.

23. As to the problem of theodicy see my article, "Reasons for Having No Reason to Defend God—Kant, Kierkegaard, Levinas and their Alternatives to Theodicy," in Hendrik M. Vroom, ed., *Wrestling with God and with Evil: Philosophical Reflections,* Currents of Encounter 31 (Amsterdam: Rodopi Press, 2007), 167–86.

24. *OB* 129, see also *GDT* 184.

25. For a critique of Levinas's opposition of selfish erotic and unselfish nonerotic love see my articles, "Keeping the Secret of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard and Levinas on Conscience, Love, and the Limits of Self-Understanding," in Claudia Welz and Karl Verstrynge, eds., *Despite Oneself: Subjectivity and its Secret in Kierkegaard and Levinas* (London: Turnshare, 2008), 153–225; and "Love as Gift and Self-Sacrifice," *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 50 (2008): 238–66.

26. See Plant, *Wittgenstein and Levinas,* 178.

27. Levinas, *The Levinas Reader,* ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996), 82.

28. Levinas, "Ethics of the Infinite," 60.

29. Rudi Visker, "Is ethics fundamental? Questioning Levinas on irresponsibility," *Continental Philosophy Review* 36 (2003): 268.

30. Visker, "Is ethics fundamental?," 275.

31. See Simon Critchley, *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 7–8. Critchley here discusses the innovation in *Otherwise than Being* (*OB* 18), which was present only in the preface to *Totality and Infinity* (*TI* 30), namely the model of the performative saying and the constative said as a way of explaining how the ethical signifies within ontological language. Levinas's method of reduction reduces the said to the saying, thereby letting the saying reside as an interruption within the said (see *OB* 7).

32. See Visker, "Is ethics fundamental?," 275.

33. Robert Bernasconi, "What is the question to which 'substitution' is the answer?," in Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 240.

34. For an elaboration on this thought, see Welz, "Keeping the Secret of Subjectivity," 153ff.

35. By contrast, in *On Escape* (first published in 1935), Levinas emphasizes the ontological significance of shame. Shame is here described as "enchainment" (*OE* 55), as inability to escape one's own existence. In one's having-to-be, one is stuck to oneself. Levinas's explicit account of shame is unfolded also in *Totality and Infinity* (1961) and in remarks scattered throughout his works (e.g., *EN* 169; *OB* 90, 11, 195). See my article, "Shame and the Hiding Self," in *Passions in Context* (forthcoming).

36. Plant, *Wittgenstein and Levinas,* 156–57.

37. Levinas, "Humanity is Biblical," in *Questioning Judaism: Interviews by Elisabeth Weber,* trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 78, see also 82.

38. See my article, "Welche Macht ist mächtiger als Ohnmacht? Mit Levinas auf den Spuren dessen, was sich den Zeichen entzieht," in Philipp Stoellger, ed., *Sprachen der Macht. Gesten der Er- und Entmächtigung in Text und Interpretation,* Interpretationen Interdisziplinär 5 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2008), 179–80n58.

Notes to Hatley, "Skeptical Poetics and Discursive Universality"

1. Diane Perpich, *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), esp. 81, 122–23, 131, 144–45.

2. Oona Eisenstadt, *Driven Back to the Text: The Premodern Sources of Levinas's Postmodernism* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2002), 134.

3. Henry David Thoreau, *The Annotated Walden (Walden; or, Life in the Woods),* ed. Philip van Doren Stern (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970), 447.

4. See particularly *OB* 111: "This responsibility is prior to dialogue . . . and in the saying proper to responsibility is produced as a digression."

5. That is, the Greek word for peace. Traditionally, it is transliterated as "irene," but I have chosen here to modify the spelling in order to emphasize the comparison and contrast with "irony."

6. Babylonian Talmud: Menahot 29b.

7. Marc-Alain Ouaknin, *The Burnt Book,* trans. Llewellyn Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 174.

8. While some thinkers might proceed along the trajectory of this insight to argue against autonomy itself, that is not the conclusion being supported here. Autonomy remains an important and irreplaceable element in any politics that would speak on behalf of one's own and another's responsibility. And a clear sense of autonomy is essential if one, in one's own political practices, is to move from a notion of responsibility for the other to guilt on behalf of one's own actions. As in other Levinasian renewals of a philosophical term, autonomy would signify in the first place the autonomy of another rather than one's own.

9. Eric Kligerman, *Sites of the Uncanny: Paul Celan, Specularity and the Visual Arts* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 66.

10. Paul Celan, "Lob der Ferne" [Praise of Distance], in *Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan,* trans. John Felstiner (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 24–25. The second translation given is mine. For the entire version of Celan's poem in German, as well as Felstiner's translations of it, see the appendix to this essay on p. 111.

11. This is my rather idiosyncratic translation of Celan's line, "*Quell deiner Augen*," which Felstiner renders as "the springs of your eyes." Felstiner partially identifies the source of this image in a line from Celan's "Edgar Jene and the Dream of a Dream," in which Celan proposes as a poet to "never leave the depths and keep holding dialogue with the dark wellsprings [*finstern Quellen*]" (John Felstiner, *Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew* [New York: Yale University Press, 2001], 52). In a very Levinasian move, Celan now emphasizes in "LOB DER FERNE" how these *Quelle*—wellsprings, sources—are not a locus of primordial origin, but the provocation to anarchical address in the approach creatively offered by and in the *other's* eyes. What comes then of the Levinasian philosophical impulse to seek and express the truth, when it is directed, as Levinas would himself have it, not to principles or to an anonymous, even if universal arche (αρχή) but precisely and singularly to the *Quelle* of the other's eyes? Eyes expressive through their tears, tears signifying vulnerability in the other. It is hard to imagine a more perfect poem for Levinas to have cited to open his chapter on substitution.

12. This term is first proposed by German critic Gotz Wiendold and then adopted by Alvin Rosenfeld. See my discussion in *Suffering Witness: The Quandary of Responsibility after the Irreparable* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 182–87.

13. A collection of such disturbing images can be found at www.withoutsanctuary.org. For a discussion of the powerful yet complex modes of witness provided by the images from the Without Sanctuary website, see Roger I. Simon, "The Public Rendition of *Images Medusee:* Exhibiting Souvenir Photographs Taken at Lynchings in America," in *Storia della Storiografia* 55 (2009): 108–27. Difficult ethical questions assail any exhibition or even reference to these images, including the one being made here. Simon's essay is an important contribution in exploring the irresolvable ambivalence the postcards

introduce into our social and historical judgments. It also provides an exemplary case study in the practice of discursive universality.

14. In the poem's line—"*Ein Garn fing ein Garn ein* / A net snares a net in"—the word *Garn* translated by Felstiner as "net" actually means "yarn" and in turn suggests German locutions similar in their sense to the English "to fall for a line," in the "to be ensnared by someone"—*jemandem ins Garn gehen.* As in English one can also "spin a yarn" in German, which is to say, tell a tall tale.

15. The puns and other homonymic structures upon which poetic (and midrashic) language thrives not only can speak truth but may be privileged in doing so. Precisely in the instability of expression, in the incessant shifting of meaning that runs to and fro throughout poetic discursus, thought is rendered yet more sensitive to its unspoken, to its as of yet unwitnessed betrayal and violence. In poetry, as Celan provides for it, language cannot hide from its own voices!

16. Paul Celan, "Gegenlicht," in *Gesammelte Werke,* ed. Beda Alleman and Klaus Reichert, vol. 3 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983), trans. Rose Marie Waldrop as "Backlight," in *Paul Celan: Collected Prose* (New York: Routledge, 2003). The first quote is my translation from the original German, p. 163; the following two quotes are from Waldrop's translation, pp. 11–12.

17. The connection between "Lob der Ferne" and "Gegenlicht" is even more direct. For in the latter is found the parable of a gallows that imagines itself a tree, even as the witnesses to the hanging look down in shame before the unbroken man who has been hanged and whose eyes, which have remained open, the hangman must now close (Celan, "Backlight," 13). But it is a tree that cannot be proven to exist. No one looked, the parable argues, so the gallows might have become a tree. The resistance of poetic language functions here, as in "Lob der Ferne," to arrest the reader by arresting how the very gesture of arresting her or him might be offered. The discourse here is not evidentiary. It resist otherwise than by providing an explicit or even implicit nay to oppose a yea.

18. This anticipates yet another poem by Celan: "Psalm" (*Tehilah* or "Praise" would be the Hebrew word used in regard to this literary/religious form of discourse which the Greek "Psalm" renames as "harp song"). In Celan's poem, the Psalm renders its praise by transmuting the "You" to which the words are directed into a "no one," the second person personal pronoun succumbing to a neuter placeholder. Registered in this transmutation and hinted at as well in Levinas's discursivity of pronouns is the illeity of G-d, the "itness" of the *En Sof,* of the Without Limit, of the Infinite (see especially Levinas's discussion of illeity in regard to the human and G-d in *OB* 149). Perhaps these names could also name G-d, but Levinas argues G-d is to be named in the first instance by my signifying my responsiveness, my obedience, to the other who approaches me in her or his vulnerability: *hineni.* Arguably, Celan, in his countering of the biblical Psalm, of its trajectory of praise for that which is too easily named, takes this approach as well.

19. See appendix, p. 111.

20. The translation of Celan's "*Irrsee*" by Felstiner as "Madsea" plays on how Celan's invented idiom mirrors *Irrsinn* the German locution for insanity. What this particular translation fails to sufficiently emphasize is the root meaning of *Irren* which is to err, to wander aimlessly. In an earlier translation, Felstiner attempted to articulate this latter meaning through another invented locution: "Wildsea" (Felstiner, *Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew,* 52).

21. Although, in the German, the difficulty turns around one's line that trolls for another's line only to be entangled in the other's trolling for one's own line. The same dynamics of imaginative stumbling is involved but perhaps not as pronounced as in Felstiner's translation of the German *Garn* by the English "net" in place of "yarn" or "line."

22. Torsion, a word peculiarly apt for Levinasian discourse that would be restless for the other, in cellular irritability: "Torsion, c.1425, 'wringing pain in the bowels,' from O.Fr. torsion (1314), from L.L. torsionem (nom. torsio) 'a wringing or gripping,' from L. tortionem (nom. tortio) 'torture, torment,' from tortus, pp. of torquere 'to twist' (see thwart)" *Online Etymology Dictionary,* s.v. "Torsion," by Douglas Harper, accessed October 1, 2010 via http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/torsion. The ambivalence of poetic discourse is not confused but twists, intensifies or magnifies itself in torsion precisely as its mode of truing itself to the other's proximity. This compaction of contraries by twisting their meanings about or against one another is to be distinguished from paradox, in which the contraries welcome one another with effortless grace, without suffering even being hinted at. The question needs to be asked: has one's reading of Levinas been too freighted with paradox and lacking in torsion?

23. Or would it be better at this moment to have employed, in place of the centripetal metaphoric of the tongue's fluid voice being slung outward, that of the tongue's fleshly engorgement, of a tongue swollen with the phonemic gesticulations of other voices, of other idiolects, a tongue stuttering in the excitation and discharge of its burden of saying? In this latter metaphoric my saying would come perilously close to the engorgement of the hanged man's tongue, the strangled one. This likely is closer to Celan's own implicit "*enlanguement*" of tongues in his poem. At another level, this observation indicates how philosophy is not only a seeking of the truth but also its expression. The words one chooses in order to pursue an argument are themselves as much an act of the philosophical mind as the argument itself, *as if* an argument might ever have been disembodied from its *langue,* its language, its tongue.

24. The one who renders justice, Levinas argues, "is not limited to 'the function of judgment,' the subsuming of particular cases under a general rule. The judge is not outside the conflict, but the law is in the midst of proximity" (*OB* 159). In the heightened ambivalence of poetic and prophetic discourse are given modes of public reasoning that provide ways of bringing into language *how* the one who judges is always already embroiled in the conflict demanding her or his judgment. The judge is always already witnessing the one who is to be judged and all the other others as well.

25. See Perpich's discussion of this issue in which she argues: *"there is simply no way to do justice to the singularity of a face in a description"* (Perpich, *Ethics of Levinas,* 47). The tendency is for readers of Levinas to confuse the particular face with the singular one. While Perpich argues against this confusion altogether, it may be that yet again we are entwined in an ambivalence that is irreducible in regard to the relationship of the particular to the singular. The other who is singular, whose face proceeds any characterization in the particular, is always implicated in the emergence of the other's face in the particular. Precisely here in this gap between the singular and the particular, the poetic and the prophetic emerges to speak otherwise than in a language of principles and comparison in regard to one's judgments about others.

26. My translation from the closing words of this sentence: "*Diese Immernoch des Gedichts kann ja wohl nur in dem Gedicht dessen zu finden sein, der nicht vergisst, dass er unter*…dem Neigungswinkel seiner Kreaturlichkeit *spricht*" (Celan, "Merdian," in *Gesammelte Werke,* 197).

27. *Hamlet,* 5.1.

Notes to Cools, "Disastrous Responsibility"

In addition to the abbreviations at the front of this volume, the following are also used: Maurice Blanchot, *The Writing of the Disaster* (*WD)* trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986).

1. See Joseph Libertson, *Proximity. Levinas, Blanchot, Bataille and Communication* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982). The author argues that in the relation between Blanchot and Levinas, "a single configuration of communication insists" and that means: "Blanchotian impersonality is the precise communicational configuration which articulates the meaning of Levinasian substitution or assignation—and *vice versa*" (3).

2. See Leslie Hill, *Blanchot Extreme Contemporary* (London: Routledge, 1997). For instance, the author states: "As far as *L'Espace littéraire* is concerned, it is clear that much the same structure of difference and dependence as obtains between existence and the existent also governs the relation between the work of art and the worklessness that is the concealed origin of the work; and, indeed, Blanchot dramatizes the genesis of the work of art in a manner that very closely echoes, in content if not necessarily in its vocabulary, Levinas's description of the emergence of the human existent from the anonymity of existence" (116).

3. See Simon Critchley, "*Il y a,*" *Very Little…Almost Nothing. Death, Philosophy, Literature* (London: Routledge, 1997), 31–83. The author first identifies the position of Blanchot and Levinas with regard to the notion of the "there is" ("The discussion of the latter essay ["La littérature et le droit à la mort"] will allow me, first, to show how Levinas's notion of the *il y a* can be understood as the origin of the artwork for Blanchot" (35)) and then he uses Blanchot in order to overcome what he calls the linear narrative of Levinas's ethics as first philosophy ("Might this [the return of the *il y a* that is not decisively surmounted] not plot a different itinerary for reading Levinas, where the name of Blanchot would

function as a clue or key for the entire problematic of literature, writing, neutrality and ambiguity in the articulation of ethics as first philosophy?" (77)).

4. Alain P. Toumayan, *Encountering the Other: The Artwork and the Problem of Difference in Blanchot and Levinas* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2004), 6.

5. See with regard to the theme of the *il y a,* my article "Revisiting the *il y a*: Maurice Blanchot and Emmanuel Levinas on the Question of Subjectivity," *Paragraph* 28, no. 3(2005): 54–71. For the elaboration of the divide between Blanchot and Levinas from the event of language, see my *Langage et subjectivité. Vers une approche du différend entre Maurice Blanchot et Emmanuel Lévinas* (Louvain: Peeters, 2007).

6. Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," *The Levinas Reader,* ed. Seán Hand (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 82.

7. *WD* 33 (translation slightly modified), 14, 28.

8. Maurice Blanchot, "Literature and the Right to Death," in *The Station Hill Blanchot Reader: Fiction & Literary Essays,* trans. Lydia Davis, Paul Auster, and Robert Lambertson (Barrytown: Station Hill Press, 1999), 382, 381.

9. Ibid., 385.

10. *WD* 13, 18. Quoted is the sentence on page 18, which differs in the English translation from the sentence given on page 13. In French, the sentence is repeated in exactly the same words, but mentioned between brackets in the second occurrence: "La responsabilité dont je suis chargé n'est pas la mienne et fait que je ne suis pas moi" (cf. Maurice Blanchot, *L'écriture du désastre* [Paris: Gallimard, 1980], 28 and 35).

11. See for instance the article "Uniqueness": "For me, it would be to fail in my first-personal responsibility—in my pre-judicial responsibility with regard to the one and the other—fellowman—were I to ignore the wrongs of the one toward the other because of this responsibility, prior to all judgment, of proximity" (*EN* 168).

12. *WD* 21. The same rejection of notions as uniqueness, irreplaceability, and elevation is expressed in other fragments as well, for instance on page 13.

13. Ibid., 13, 18. The translation of the first quote has been modified.

14. "The alterity, the radical heterogeneity of the other, is possible only if the other is other with respect to a term whose essence is to remain at the point of departure, to serve as *entry* in to the relation, to be the same not relatively but absolutely. *A term can remain absolutely at the point of departure of relationship only as I*" (*TI* 36).

15. See *WD* 19, where Blanchot distinguishes between the relation of myself to the Other and the relation of the Other to me.

16. Ibid., 19–20; translation modified, italics added.

17. In France, Jean Wahl first distinguished between *transascendence* and *transdescendence* in relation to the question of subjectivity. See Jean Wahl, "Subjectivité et transcendance," *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie* 37, no. 5 (1937): 161. Wahl refers to a theological and a moral distinction which he puts at the same time in question: "L'être sera angoissé parce qu'il ne sait pas

en face de quoi il est, en face d'une transcendance bienfaisante ou d'une transcendance malfaisante, en face de Dieu ou en face d'une force démoniaque, si le mouvement qu'il accomplit est un mouvement de 'transascendance' ou de 'transdescendance'… On pourrait se demander si la 'transascendance' est forcément bonne, la 'transdescendance' forcément mauvaise."

18. Blanchot quotes Schlegel, "Every poet is Narcissus," and recalls that since the romantic movement poetry is expression of "absolute subjectivity" (*WD* 135).

19. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, who states that "il s'agit, à n'en pas douter, d'un texte ouvertement autobiographique" ("Agonie terminée, agonie interminable," in *Maurice Blanchot. Récits critiques,* ed. Christophe Bident and Pierre Vilar [Tours: Éditions Farrago, 2003], 439). Christophe Bident interprets the scene in *The Writing of the Disaster* as "l'événement, à la fois psychologique, métaphysique et mystique…, ouvrant la voie à toute la portée athéologique de l'œuvre" (*Maurice Blanchot. Partenaire invisible. Essai biographique* [Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 1998], 18). For my interpretation, see my "D'une scène 'primitive' à l'autre. L'écriture et la question de la singularité chez Maurice Blanchot," in *Les Lettres romanes,* special issue (2005): 131–51.

20. *WD* 134; translation modified.

21. Toumayan, *Encountering the Other,* 6.

22. Libertson, *Proximity,* 3.

23. Critchley, "*Il y a,*" 82.

24. See Jacques Derrida, *L'animal que donc je suis,* ed. Marie-Louise Mallet (Paris: Galilée, 2006), for example page 151:"déclarer ne pas savoir où commence le droit d'être appelé 'visage', c'est confesser qu'on ne sait pas au fond ce qu'est un visage, ce que veut dire ce mot, ce qui en règle l'usage.… N'est-ce pas, dès lors, remettre en question toute la légitimité du discours et de l'éthique du 'visage' de l'autre, la légitimité et même le sens de toute proposition sur l'altérité de l'autre, sur l'autre comme mon prochain ou mon frère, etc.?"

Notes to Fox, "The Novelty of Religion"

In addition to the abbreviations at the front of this volume, the following works by Girogio Agamben are also used: *The Coming Community* (*CC*), trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); *Language and Death: The Place of Negativity* (*LD*), trans. Karen E. Pinkus and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991); *The Open: Man and Animal* (*O*), trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy* (*P*), ed. and trans. David Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

1. Martin Kavka contends that earlier phases of Levinas scholarship tended to construe Levinas as simply opposing Judaism to philosophy. By contrast, Kavka argues, "[F]or Levinas, Judaism serves as an expansion of philosophical discourse, by showing that the idealist urge to make God present—to show that God

reigns—can actually be fulfilled in worldly acts, in acts of signification to others." "Religious experience in Levinas and R. Hayyim of Volozhin," *Philosophy Today* (Spring 2006): 72. For Kavka's effort to refigure the relation between "Athens" and "Jerusalem" within Judaism itself, see *Jewish Messianism and the History of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1–8.

2. For a critical discussion that places Levinas into proximity with the apologetics of Jean-Luc Marion and Henri Duméry, see A. T. Nuyen, "Phenomenology of religion: Levinas and the fourth voice," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 49 (2001): 19–31. See esp. 21–23.

3. Bettina Bergo observes that Agamben and Levinas employ parallel grammatical strategies to produce the category of the messianic: "Thus the messianic changes the world without altering any factual, *phenomenologically describable* dimension of it… We find a similar tensor in Levinas's examination of the adverbial in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. There the adverb, in its relation to the verb, inflects the active quality of being; but rather than durably changing it, it leaves a trace; the disinterestedness found in justice. Thus messianism in Levinas's late philosophy functions surreptitiously as the modalization of being analogous to the relation of the adverb to the verb." "The time and language of messianism," in *Levinas and the Ancients,* ed. Brian Schroeder and Silvia Benso, with foreword by Adriaan Peperzak (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 182. I agree that Paul's *hōs mē* has the effect of suspending the "now" by posing it against itself, and Bergo rightly goes only so far as asserting that both thinkers employ "a similar tensor." Bergo's case for similarity notwithstanding, I argue that the different messianic endpoints posited by the two thinkers help to preserve the contrast, as does the sense in which Levinasian messianism exits being through the ethico-transcendence of the other, versus Agamben's appeal to no outside.

4. Jeffrey Kosky, by contrast, determines Levinas's ethico-religious project as heterodox, insofar as "Levinas's phenomenology 'saves' the religious notion of creation only by interpreting it outside of its orthodox, dogmatic or traditional context." *Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 150.

5. "Society with God is not an addition to God nor a disappearance of the interval that separates God from the creature. By contrast with totalization we have called it religion" (*TI* 104 / *TeI* 77).

6. Leland de la Durantaye's description of Benjamin's vision of the messianism of the "profane" applies *mutatis mutandis* to his inheritor, Agamben: "Such a world no longer waits for any transcendental consecration or culmination, and what it celebrates, it celebrates *now*. The idea of happiness Benjamin expresses is *profane* in precisely the same sense as his idea of prose, and the same sense as Agamben's 'coming community': in its all-inclusiveness, in that it does not base its rights or its practices on a connection with a sacred or transcendental realm." "*Homo Profanus:* Giorgio Agamben's profane philosophy," in *Boundary 2* 35, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 34.

7. De la Durantaye mentions a conversation between Agamben and Levinas: "Agamben has recounted on several occasions a conversation he had with Emmanuel Levinas about the teacher they had known at different periods. The image of an 'extraordinarily hard' man that Levinas had retained of Heidegger in 1928 and 1929 was offset by Agamben's recollection of a man who, nearly forty years later, singled himself out for what Agamben called the "gentleness" of his demeanor." *Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2009), 307.

8. Jeffrey Kosky argues for the following figuration of religion and the ethical: "My thesis is this: *the analysis of responsibility opens onto a philosophical articulation of religious notions and thus makes possible something like a philosophy of religion* . . . This philosophy of religion gives significance to religious meanings by reducing them to the responsible subject where they appear" (Kosky, *Levinas and Philosophy of Religion,* xix). Kosky's locating of religiosity within ethically determined subjectivity surely is right. But my approach here is to downplay the ethical in pursuit of a more precise determination of what else the religious signifies.

9. Compare this with another famous formulation which reserves the term "religion" for the relation "that results in no community of concept or totality—a relation without relation" (*TI* 80 / *TeI* 52).

10. "For Levinas, then, God is inseparable from responsibility not as the other for whom I am responsible but as an other other, the other whose absence inclines me to responsibility for others" (Kosky, *Levinas and Philosophy of Religion,* 191). Note especially the potential inversion by which the absence of the religious precedes the ethical.

11. Adriaan Peperzak writes, "instead of introducing religion as an ascent of the individual soul to God, he [Levinas] approaches it through human proximity and justice. Since human others are absolute and infinite without losing their finitude, neither the other's commanding existence, nor my unchosen responsibility can legitimate themselves. The enigma of morality suggests an elsewhere or an otherness that is otherwise other than you and me, an other Other from which our relation, including your command and my pre-voluntary obedience, 'comes.'" "Illeity," *Philosophy Today* 42 Supplement (1998): 44.

12. Elsewhere, Levinas offers a gloss on illeity that also implicates the religious: "The detachment of the Infinite from the thought that seeks to thematize it and the language that tries to hold it in the said is what we have called *illeity.* One is tempted to call this plot religious; it is not stated in terms of certainty or uncertainty, and does not rest on any positive theology" (*OB* 147 / 188). Jeffrey Bloechl observes the contemporaneity of the religious and the ethical in illeity: "this will have been the claim staked in Levinas's concept of *illeity:* the authority of the absolute is stated in the mouth of the one it commands." *Liturgy of the Neighbor: Emmanuel Levinas and the Religion of Responsibility* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2000), 247.

13. Levinas, "The understanding of spirituality in French and German culture," trans. Andrius Valevičius, *Continental Philosophy Review* 31 (1998): 1–10.

14. Ibid., 6.
15. Ibid., 6.
16. *OB* 191n6, 194n3 / *AE* 89n6, 128n3.
17. But this way of proceeding should not be taken to suggest that Levinas's positive appropriation of Bergson cannot be historically narrativized. Quite the contrary; the recently released "Hommage à Bergson" pinpoints 1946 as perhaps Levinas' earliest affirmation of Bergsonian spirituality (*Oeuvres—Tome 1, Carnets de Captivité* suivi de *Ecrits sur la Captivité* et *Notes Philosophiques Diverses,* edité par Rodolphe Calin et Catherine Chalier. Préface de Jean-Luc Marion. (Paris: Grasset/Imec, 2009), 217–19). Given Levinas's glowing appraisal in this text, his late-career embrace of Bergson signifies a return to form—notwithstanding the wavering regard for Bergson in between. A full elaboration of this sketch, however, must wait for another time.
18. Jeffrey Bloechl helpfully discusses Husserl's doctrine of time consciousness as the foil against which to understand Levinas's adoption of diachronous time. This requires that I better establish the contrast between "religious novelty" and the intentionality of time entailed in protention, which Bloechl describes as "anticipation, the basis from which to look ahead to the not-yet" (Bloechl, *Liturgy of the Neighbor,* 228). He frames this difference as follows: "is temporalization the pulsing of consciousness itself, or must it be located in an 'irreducible disturbance' beneath it?" (229). And later, in a footnote, he both answers his own question, and helps to substantiate my thesis: "For Levinas, the fact that the beyondness of the other in this sense appears always facing me otherwise and *before* my expressions does not controvert another sense in which his face signifies an otherness which is *always coming*, in the future, *as the very opening of the dimension of futurity*" (293).
19. In the course of asking after the *Il* of Illeity, Bloechl arrives at this conclusion: "In order for responsibility to be infinite, which is also to say for the otherness of the other to be radical, authority will have been removed from any contact with it—*in advance,* or by definition, but in any event not by any act or intention on my part" (ibid., 246).
20. It is true that Agamben's more recent work polemicizes against the Western "anthropological machine" for producing the distance between man and animal, which does put in question his earlier celebration of *adynamia* as the signal feature of humanity: "The division of life into vegetal and relational, organic and animal, animal and human, therefore passes first of all as a mobile border within living man, and without this living caesura the very decision of what is human and what is not would probably not be possible… But if this is true, if the caesura between the human and the animal passes first within man, then it is the very question of man—and of 'humanism'—that must be posed in a new way" (*P* 15–16). And then, circling back to the theme of the present essay, Agamben concludes "and perhaps even the most luminous sphere of our relation with the divine depends, in some way, on that darker one which separates us from the animal" (16).

21. While this theme appears in a celebrated passage in the chapter entitled "Bartelby" in *The Coming Community,* the discussion here draws on the earlier and more fully-elaborated version in "*Pardes:* The Writing of Potentiality." These may be found, respectively, in *CC* 35–37, and in *P* 205–19.

22. Analogous to the crisis of meaning experienced within religion, Agamben understands his own productive relation to theology through the model proposed by Benjamin: "My thinking is to theology what the blotting paper is to ink. The latter is completely steeped in the former. Were it up to the blotting paper, nothing that was written would remain" (De la Durantaye, "*Homo Profanus,*" 369). De la Durantaye interprets the figure and the interpretive imperative arising from it thus: "Benjamin's method then became to think and to write through theological figures—but never to do so in 'unmediated terms,' thus keeping the figure of theology concealed beneath the strategic surface of words." Such is the case *a fortiori* as regards Agamben and theology, for whom "it [theology] is present in every word of every line" (ibid., 371).

23. And not merely on Agamben's terms, either, as Bloechl observes: "Levinas similarly targets the Heideggarian 'potentiality-for-Being' (*Seinkönnen; Being and Time* §51)" (Bloechl, *Liturgy of the Neighbor,* 295n68).

24. Agamben observes that St. Thomas treats much the same problem in *Question* 91 of the supplement to his *Summa Theologica*, in the course of asking about the condition of nature after the universal judgment: "What will happen to the animals and plants? The logical difficulty that these questions run up against is that, if the sensible world was ordered to fit the dignity and the habitation of imperfect humans, then what sense can that world have when those humans arrive at their supernatural destination?" (*CC* 39).

25. This claim parallels Agamben's claim in *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* about the state of exception as the permanent condition of the political that only is revealed in the breakdown of the modern era: "Today, now that the great State structures have entered into a process of dissolution and the emergency has, as Walter Benjamin foresaw, become the rule, the time is ripe to place the problem of the originary structure and limits of the form of the State in a new perspective." *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life,* trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 12.

26. De la Durantaye corroborates this when he says that "for Agamben, Benjamin's messianism, like his own, is an attempt to grasp the potentialities of our present situation" ("*Homo Profanus*," 376). And to put a finer point on it, I will apply, *mutatis mutandis,* de la Durantaye's discussion of the endpoint of Benjaminian messianism to Agamben's version: "*Nihilism* is the 'task' of world politics because it represents the effort to see the world as nothing more than it is—to construct world politics not on the basis of a sacred order to come, but instead on a profane order that is already right before our eyes and that is the only world we have ever known" (382).

27. By way of confirmation, as near as I can tell, the topic of substitution goes unmentioned in de la Durantaye's otherwise exhaustive *Critical Introduction*

to Agamben. For a thematic discussion of *The Coming Community,* see de la Durantaye, "*Homo Profanus,*" 158–91.

28. In the section entitled "Theology and the Unthought Constitution of Ethical Metaphysics," Kosky argues for "the necessity of reading *Totality and Infinity* as a disguised or displaced theology," and he enlists in this effort a critical rereading of Derrida's argument in "Violence and Metaphysics" (Kosky, *Levinas and Philosophy of Religion,* 25–46). For another take on how substitution exhibits Levinas's response to Derrida's critique, see Diane Perpich, *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 70–72.

29. Kosky affirms something like this novelty when he declares that if election is assumed to proceed from a phenomenology of consciousness, "it thereby loses the sense of an election which happens before me, without my having intended anything that would merit it or not" (ibid., 153).

30. The philosophy of action implicit in this notion of *inspiration* comes uncomfortably close (for Levinas, at least) to Agamben's characterization of animals as "responsive" to some "disinhibitor," which means they are "without world." Agamben exemplifies this view in Jakob von Uexküll's discussion of the tick: "However, at this point, Uexküll informs us that in the laboratory in Rostock, a tick was kept alive for eighteen years without nourishment, that is, in a condition of absolute isolation from its environment. He gives no explanation of this peculiar fact, and limits himself to supposing that in that 'period of waiting' the tick lies in 'a sleep-like state similar to the one we experience every night.'" Agamben concludes with the following question: "And what sense does it make to speak of 'waiting' without time and without world?" (*O* 47). This brings the animal and the religious *qua* novelty as defined here too close for Levinas's (and perhaps Heidegger's) comfort. Inversely, by assessing against Agamben the remaining distance between human and animal, Kelly Oliver misses the possible connection between the animal and the divine. She instead reads his "return to religious metaphors" as a means of recovering some element of "mystery" for a humanity whose being "biological and medical science" have rendered as "bare life." Kelly Oliver, "Stopping the anthropological machine: Agamben with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty," *PhaenEx* 2, no. 2 (2007): 3, 8–10. This exhibits a number of conceptual problems, not the least of which is that Oliver attributes Agamben's anxiety over the anthropological machine to his supposed fear of what might happen "if science succeeds in turning man into an animal whose every desire can be determined by chemical processes" (10). But in the passage she partially quotes (that if science turns man into an animal, then "neither man nor animal—and perhaps, not even the divine—would any longer be thinkable"), Agamben actually attributes this *disenchantment* (my term) to a "fundamental metaphysico-political operation" within Western philosophy and theology that now has become exhausted, and only secondarily to technoscience (*P* 21). Oliver obviously is right to be wary of biologistic reduction, but Agamben sees technoscience as, at best, a minor player in the production of "bare life." Oliver thus mystifies the theologico-politico origin of the now-collapsing

boundary between the human and the animal, and this error helps to generate the distorted claim that "nostalgia" for some kind of "mystery" motivates Agamben's turn to the religious. This, along with the under-elaboration of what Agamben means by a messianic end of history, bars Oliver's access to any potential connections between the animal and the divine.

31. To a remarkable degree, this discussion parallels Agamben's use of Benjamin's phrase "the return of the new" as a way to convey the sense of potentiality as impotentiality. In the course of discussing this appropriation, de la Durantaye designates Benjamin's linguistic "gnosis" as the idea of "the reading of what was never written . . . the reading before all languages" ("*Homo Profanus,*" 19). De la Durantaye describes this as "not a reading of a content communicated in language, but the communicativity of language itself . . . precisely that which cannot be said in language—language's true mode of being as potentiality" (ibid.).

32. Levinas also includes this quote as a footnote to an earlier passage (*OB* 192n23 / *AE* 110n23).

33. Levinas opposes himself to Eugen Fink and Jeanne Delhomme when he writes, "to be without a choice can seem to be violence only to an abusive or hasty and imprudent reflection, for it precedes the freedom non-freedom couple, but thereby sets up a vocation that goes beyond the limited and egoist fate of him who is only for himself, and washes his hands of the faults and misfortunes that do not being in his own freedom or in his present" (*OB* 116 / *AE* 148). Agamben, again following Benjamin, also identifies the site of "game" and "play" with the advent of the sacred, though the meaning of games as entertainment now figures as "secularizing [of] an unconsciously religious intention" (de la Durantaye, "*Homo Profanus,*" 39). To this extent, the messianic displacement of sacred politics by the order of profane *ease* perhaps would meet with Levinas's approval by reinstalling the genuinely religious elsewhere than within play.

34. This essay is dedicated to my now-toddler son Eli, my wife Sheaukang, and the nurses and doctors of St. Joseph's Neonatal Intensive Care Unit in Wichita, KS.

Notes to Harold, "Tradition and Its Disavowal"

1. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 150.

2. Jacques Derrida, "Violence et métaphysique," in *L'écriture et la différence* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967), 117–228; trans. Alan Bass as "Violence and Metaphysics," in *Writing and Difference* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978), 79–153.

3. Fred Dallmayr, *The Other Heidegger* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 76.

4. See Aristotle, *Politics,* 1324a5.

5. See Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference,* trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 69.

6. A recent example is Nicholas Dungey, who puts together Heidegger and Derrida: "The Ethics and Politics of Dwelling," *Polity* 39 (2007): 234–58.

7. "With Heidegger's philosophy, we are always engaged in going back to the foundations, but we are left incapable of beginning the movement of return which would lead from the fundamental ontology to the properly epistemological question of the status of the human sciences. Now a philosophy which breaks the dialogue with the sciences is no longer addressed to anything but itself." Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences,* ed. and trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 59.

8. Paul Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1990), 387–93, trans. Kathleen Blamey as *Oneself as Another* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 335–41. For an account of this critique see both Bernhard Waldenfels, "The Other and the Foreign," in *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 21, no. 5/6 (1995): 111–24, and Richard A. Cohen, "Moral Selfhood: A Levinasian Response to Ricoeur on Levinas," in Richard A. Cohen and James L. Marsh, eds., *Ricoeur as Another: The Ethics of Subjectivity* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 127–60.

9. Paul Ricoeur, "Herméneutique et critique des idéologies," in *Démythisation et idéologie*, ed. Enrico Castelli (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1973), 51, trans. John B. Thompson as "Hermeneutics and the critique of ideology," in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 91.

10. The "best-account principle" is formulated by Charles Taylor, a moral philosopher inspired by hermeneutics. *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 58.

11. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests,* trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 193, 315.

12. "We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would be better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations, and of ages." Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 87.

13. Jürgen Habermas, *On the Logic of the Social Sciences,* trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jerry A. Stark (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 170.

14. Scheler writes: "Authority differs from mere power or force in that a person can possess authority only over one who knows by evidence that this person possesses a deeper and wider moral insight than he does. Moral '*trust*' in an authority is based on this insight, and authority is based on this trust. If this trust is removed, authority becomes non-moral power and force." Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values,* trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 328.

15. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), 11; and, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 361–79.

16. Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics,* 15.

17. Ricoeur, "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology," 93 / "Herméneutique et critique des idéologies," 54–55.

18. "Does hermeneutical good will have the power it claims of looking back on its constitutive prejudices, those which we are as well as those we have—or to put it another way by rephrasing Heidegger's well-known remark on language—those which have us, in all the sense of the word, as well as those which we have? In apprehending unity, doesn't good will suspend precisely the moment of critique, becoming powerless from then on to put under criticism the prejudices that structure understanding (*krinein*: to make a definitive judgment), even though it will inconsistently assume that a clear line can be drawn between good and bad prejudices, that is to say, between productive prejudices and obstructive ones?" Philippe Forget, "Argument(s)," trans. Diane Michelfelder, in *Dialogue & Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter,* ed. Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 135.

19. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests,* 53.

20. Ricoeur, "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology," 99 / "Herméneutique et critique des idéologies," 60.

21. Eric Voegelin describes this process: "In order to degrade the politics of Plato, Aristotle, or St. Thomas to the rank of 'values' among others, a conscientious scholar would first have to show that their claim to be science was unfounded. And that attempt is self-defeating. By the time the would-be critic has penetrated the meaning of metaphysics with sufficient thoroughness to make his criticism weighty, he will have become a metaphysician himself. The attack on metaphysics can be undertaken with a good conscience only from the safe distance of imperfect knowledge." Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 20.

22. Ricoeur, "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology," 99 / "Herméneutique et critique des idéologies," 60.

23. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 243 / *Soi-même comme un autre,* 283.

24. Ibid., 247 / 288.

25. Paul Ricoeur, *Le Juste 2* (Paris: Esprit, 2001), 279, trans. David Pellauer as *Reflections on the Just* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 243.

26. Ricoeur, *Reflections on the Just,* 3, 60, 234–35 / *Le Juste,* 9, 71, 270.

27. On the postponement of a final synthesis see Don Ihde, *Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 13–14. The centrality of the problem of application is spelled out by Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* 2nd ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 307–11.

28. John B. Thompson, *Critical Hermeneutics: A study in the thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 164.

29. Ricoeur, *Reflections on the Just,* 245 / *Le Juste,* 282.

30. Eric Voegelin, *Anamnesis,* trans. Gerhart Niemeyer (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1978), 144–45.

31. Jean Grondin, *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics,* trans. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 140.

32. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another,* 352 / *Soi-même comme un autre,* 406; italics removed.

33. Ibid., 355 / 409.

34. Paul Ricoeur, *Le Conflit des interprétations: Essais d'herméneutique* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1969), 262, trans. Don Ihde as *The Conflict of Interpretations* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 266.

35. "It is nonetheless true that the very relationship of the *saying* cannot be reduced to intentionality, or that it rests, properly speaking, on an intentionality that fails (*échoue*)" (*EN* 71 / *En* 81).

36. In Ricoeur's magisterial work *The Symbolism of Evil* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), philosophy finds itself confronted by symbols. Symbols rise to thought according to Ricoeur, giving thought something to think about. They can move into reflection because they already in the element of discourse. The ethical vision of the world is destroyed by the myth Ricoeur privileges, the "Adamic" myth of the fall of man, which "is the fruit of the prophetic accusation directed against man" (240). Prophetism aims not at ethics, but beyond it: "Ethics is rather the slackening of an impulse that is fundamentally hyperethical" (55). The hyperethical, from which the ethical is an abstraction, is the life and dynamism of the Jewish people, as revealed not in their codes but in their chronicles, hymns, oracles, and sayings. He writes, "The notion of law appears only when the word of command is on the point of detaching itself from the situation of calling, from the dialogal relation" (52). This fundamental relation of the Jewish people to God is *expressed* in chronicles and hymns, and the prophetic word, which "possess the breadth and the depth of the primordial word that constitutes the dialogal situation," is that which "gives rise to chronicles, codes, hymns, and sayings" (53). The prophetic word *gives rise to* the symbolisms Ricoeur analyzes in his philosophical hermeneutics; it is not identified with those symbolisms, but is in fact separated by the same "methodological rupture in the continuity of reflection" (347) that Ricoeur speaks of concerning the difference between pure reflection and reflection nourished by symbols. For the prophetic word must be living and effective; it is not constrained to the mere understanding of past events and symbolisms but in fact inspires speech and action in the present. Were this not the case, Ricoeur's whole philosophical hermeneutics would collapse, predicated as it is on an oriented understanding of myths that participates in the struggle between them. In this struggle, however, Ricoeur applies the criterion of illumination, where symbols are to be judged on the basis of how

much they reveal about a realm of human existence. The revelation at stake is not a simple augmentation of self-awareness, but a searching for wisdom that would end both "the closure of consciousness of oneself. . . [and] the prerogative of self-reflection" (356). However, this wisdom, the openness of discourse over force, an openness to accept that "some things that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so" (Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* 361), which is at the core of both hermeneutics and Habermas's discourse ethics, is opened by the prophetic word, *yet the latter is not exhausted by this opening and this openness.* There is a nonlinguistic residue of the symbol, which is unable to be integrated into reflection, a saying over and above the said, and it is this that Levinas wishes to bring out.

37. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another,* 189 / *Soi-même comme un autre,* 221.

38. See John Caputo, *Against Ethics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 225–26; Phillip Blond, "Emmanuel Levinas: God and phenomenology," in *Post-Secular Philosophy,* ed. Phillip Blond (New York: Routledge, 1998), 213.

39. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another,* 297 / *Soi-même comme un autre,* 345.

40. Ibid., 335 / 387.

41. Ibid., 238 / 276.

42. The quote continues: "It has not become clear to such a man that all criteria are first derived from contact with the things-themselves, that even *the* criteria are to be so derived." Max Scheler, *Selected Philosophical Essays,* 139–40.

43. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another,* 198 / *Soi-même comme un autre,* 231.

44. Ibid., 220 / 256–57.

45. Ibid., 190 / 223.

46. Paul Ricoeur, *Histoire et vérité* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964), 247, trans. Charles A. Kelbley as *History and Truth* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 246.

47. See Ricoeur, *Reflections on the Just,* 2–3 / *Le Juste*, 8–10; Eric Voegelin, *Order and History, Volume One: Israel and Revelation* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1994), 10; Habermas, *Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity,* ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), 160. While maintaining methodological atheism (a posture shared by Levinas in his philosophical work), Habermas does not foreswear a religious inspiration for these ideas.

48. See "The Paradox of Authority," in *Reflections on the Just,* 91–105 / *Le Juste 2,* 107–23.

49. "No State exists without a government, an administration, a police force; consequently, the phenomenon of political alienation traverses all regimes and is found within all constitutional forms. Political society involves this external contradiction between an ideal sphere of legal relations and a real sphere of communal relations—and this internal contradiction between sovereignty and the sovereign, between the constitution and power or, in the extreme, the police. We aspire to attain a State wherein the radical contradiction which exists between the universality pursued by the State and the particularity and caprice which it

evinces in reality would be resolved. The evil is that this aspiration is not within our reach." Ricoeur, *History and Truth,* 259 / *Histoire et vérité,* 261.

50. "An eschatology of non-violence thus forms the ultimate philosophical horizon of a critique of ideology. This eschatology, close to that of Ernst Bloch, takes the place of the ontology of lingual understanding in a hermeneutics of tradition." Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences,* 87. Levinas sees a kindred spirit in Bloch, see *GDT* 92, 105 / *DMT* 108, 122.

51. Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* 344.