NOTES

1. This article was accomplished during a fruitful period of research as Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation at the University of Freiburg, hosted by Prof. Dr. Günter Figal. I wish to thank Kascha Semon for the careful translation of this paper from its French version. Citations of Levinas's work follow the abbreviations at the front of this volume, in addition to the following: "Is Ontology Fundamental?" trans. P. Atterton, *Philosophy Today* 33, no. 2 (1989): 121–29, IO; *Cahier de l'Herne: Emmanuel Levinas* (Paris: L'Herne, 1986), *EL.*

2. For a comparative analysis of Levinas and Merleau-Ponty, see these works by Agata Zielinski: *Lecture de Merleau-Ponty et Levinas: le corps, le monde, l'autre* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002), and "Le visage, 'corps expressif'? Merleau-Ponty et Levinas interprètes du corps," *Le Cercle herméneutique* (2007): 95–110.

3. See also the following studies: C. R. Vasey, "Le corps et l'Autre," *Exercices de la patience* 1 (1980): 33–42; Bernhard Casper, "La temporalisation de la chair," in Emanuel Levinas, *Positivité et transcendance. Suivi de Lévinas et la phénoménologie* (Paris: PUF, 2000), 165–80; Rodolphe Calin, "Le corps de la responsabilité. Sensibilité, corporéité et subjectivité chez Lévinas," *Études Philosophiques* 78 (2006): 3, 297–316.

4. The English translation, "Some Thoughts on the Philosophy of Hitlerism," is published in *UH.*

5. Translator's Note: This is taken from Abensour's untranslated postface to *Quelques réflexions sur la philosophie de l'hitlérisme* (Paris: Payot et Rivages, 1997), 8.

6. As we shall see, references to idea of emotion will reappear several times in the course of that essay. Abensour argues that this emphasis on emotion must be understood in the vein of phenomenology and the Heideggerian mood *(Stimmung)*. See for example, Abensour, *Quelques réflexions,* 36–39.

7. Abensour, *Quelques réflexions,* 15–16.

8. See Abensour, *Quelques réflexions,* 60–63. According to Abensour, "At this time, Levinas . . . thinks of the body under the sign of ambiguity. . . . The body is not only this unique heat, the opening to the sensible world, the irreducible originality of its presence to me, but it is also opacity . . ., adherence to the ego, certainly, but an irrevocable adherence, from which one cannot escape, a definitive and tragic union: in brief, the brutal fact of existence" (63).

9. This idea is explored more deeply three years later in 1961 in *Totality and Infinity,* in which the philosopher affirms that the I is "the being whose existing consists in identifying itself, in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it" (*TI* 36). Identification with one's own body constitutes only a moment — though it is true, an essential one — of this identification with the self that begins with identification with the world, as in being at home, as in being autochthonous, as belonging to a place and as possession, as home, work and economy (*TI* 37–38).

10. Modified translation above.

11. In his preface, Jacques Rolland emphasizes that the origin of this idea is Heideggerian "being-thrown" (*Geworfenheit*). Cf. Jacques Rolland, "Getting Out of Being by a New Path" in *OE* 12–15.

12. For the brutality of existence, see *OE* 52, 56, 69; for need in a negative sense, thirty years later, in *Totality and Infinity,* Levinas insists precisely on the "naked and hungry body," on the "indigence" of the body (*TI* 128–30); for suffering, "Need becomes imperious only when it becomes suffering. And the specific mode of suffering that characterizes need is malaise, or disquiet" (*OE* 58); for disease, see *OE* 58–60; for nausea, see *OE* 66–68; for satisfaction, in *Totality and Infinity,* Levinas expands on this aspect of enjoyment. See *TI* 110–11; for pleasure, see *OE* 60–63; for shame, see *OE* 63–65.

13. It is not the social aspect of shame that interests Levinas, but the relation between shame and the body: "The shameful manifestations of our bodies comprise us in a manner totally different than does the lie or dishonesty" (*OE* 67).

14. Levinas here introduces the phrase "the nakedness of … being" (*OE* 65), an idea that reappears in *EE* 37–38 as "bare being" (*nudité d'être*) and "bare existence" (*nudité d'existence*). Levinas continues to say, after the quoted passage, "The necessity of fleeing, in order to hide oneself, is put in check by the impossibility of fleeing oneself. What appears in shame is thus precisely the fact of being riveted to oneself, the radical impossibility of fleeing oneself to hide from oneself, the inalterably binding presence of the I to itself [*du moi à soi-même*]. Nakedness is shameful when it is the sheer visibility [*patence*] of our being, of its ultimate intimacy" (*OE* 64).

15. See *OE* 67; also, *OE* 65: "It is therefore our intimacy, that is, our presence to ourselves, that is shameful. It reveals not our nothingness but rather the totality of our existence. Nakedness is the need to excuse one's existence. Shame is, in the last analysis, an existence that seeks excuses. What shame discovers [*découvre*] is the being who *uncovers* himself [*se découvre*]."

16. This aspect returns in the discussion of shame: "In shameful nakedness, what is thus in question is not only the body's nakedness. However, it is not by pure chance that, under the poignant form of pudency, shame is primarily connected to our body" (*OE* 64, translation modified).

17. Levinas himself says this, *TO* 39.

18. "The fundamental structure of existence doubling up into being and having and succumbing under the burden of its having" (*EE* 29).

19. It is due to this association that Didier Franck has tried to affirm the body in Levinas as the body of the ontological difference. See "The Body of Differ-ence," in *The Face of the Other and the Trace of God,* ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 21–22.

20. For weariness, see *EE* 24–25, and cf. Didier Franck, "The Body of Dif-ference," 9–11, 14–15; for indolence, see *EE* 26; for fatigue, see *EE* 29–36; for insomnia, see *EE* 65–67.

21. We thus find here an echo of the reflections made on the philosophical premises of Hitlerism. Levinas describes the relation of the existent to its existence as *solitude*. See *TO* 42–44, 54–57.

22. In this context, Levinas speaks of nausea as particular to shame: in the shameful nausea of vomiting, the other is not repelled, but even wished for, after wresting the "I" from its solitude. Levinas writes, "The sick person in isolation who 'was taken ill' [*s'est trouvé mal*] and who has no choice but to vomit, is still 'scandalized' by himself. The presence of another is even desired, to a certain degree, for it allows the scandal of nausea to be brought down to the level of an 'illness,' of a fact that is socially normal and can be treated, and in regard to which one can consequently adopt an objective attitude" (*OE* 67).

23. "The nakedness of the face is not what is presented to me because I dis-close it, what would therefore be presented to me, to my powers, to my eyes, to my perceptions, in a light exterior to it. The face has turned to me — and this is its very nudity" (*TI* 74–75).

24. In *Totality and Infinity,* Levinas even affirms that the nudity of the naked body *derives* from the nudity of the face, that the nudity of the face is in some way the condition of possibility for the nudity of the body. He writes, "the nudity of the body felt in pudency, appearing to the Other in repulsion and desire . . . always refers in one way or other to the nakedness of the face. Only a being absolutely naked by his face can also denude himself impudently" (*TI* 75, translation modified).

25. "When the body loses this character of intimacy, the character of the existence of a self, it ceases to become shameful. Consider the naked body of the boxer. The nakedness of the music hall dancer, who exhibits herself — to what-ever effect desired by the impresario — is not necessarily the mark of a shameless being, for her body appears to her with that exteriority to the self that serves as a form of cover" (*OE* 63).

26. The idea reappears 20 years later in *Totality and Infinity:* the nudity of things indicates their uselessness, their absurdity, while the nudity of the other signifies the face (see *TI* 74–75). For things, nudity is a privation, while the face of the other as nudity reveals its height.

27. See *TO* 60: "despite the nudity of existence, one must as far as possible be decently clothed."

28. "It [the body] is nowise a thing . . . its being belongs to the order of events and not to that of substantives. It is not posited; it is a position. It is not situated in a space given beforehand; it is the irruption in the anonymous Being by the

fact of localization itself" (*EE* 71, translation modified); "in it is effected the very transformation of an event into Being" (*EE* 72, translation modified).

29. "The relationship with the Other, the face-to-face with the Other, the encounter with a face that at once gives and conceals the Other, is the situation in which an event happens to a subject who does not assume it, who is utterly unable in its regard, but where nonetheless in a certain way it is in front of the subject. The other [*autre*] 'assumed' is the Other [*autrui*]" (*TO* 78–79).

30. See *TO* 89, where Levinas also makes reference to "a phenomenology of voluptuousness" and develops a subtle analysis of the caress as the anticipation of a "pure future [*avenir*], without content." Also, "Eros…can be theme of a philosophy which…will concern us elsewhere" (*EE* 85). This idea reappears where Levinas affirms that heterogeneity and the relations between the sexes "brings us to the material to which another work will be devoted" (*EE* 96).

31. "The relationship with the other will never be the feat of grasping a possibility. One would have to characterize it in terms that contrast strongly with the relationships that describe light. I think the erotic relationship furnishes us with the basis of an analysis of this relationship with mystery — provided it is set forth in terms entirely different from those of the Platonism that is a world of light" (*TO* 76).

32. "In Plato, Love, a child of need, retains the features of destitution. Its negativity is the simple 'less' of need, and not the very movement unto alterity" (*EE* 85). See also *EE* 96 and *TO* 85.

33. "What is presented as the failure of communication in love in fact constitutes the positive character of the relationship; this absence of the other is precisely his presence qua other" (*EE* 95).

34. On this subject, see Matthieu Dubost, "Féminin et phénoménalité selon Emmanuel Lévinas," *Études Philosophiques* 78 (2006): 3, 317–34.

35. "In the most brutal materiality, in the most shameless or the most prosaic appearance of the feminine, neither her mystery nor her pudency are abolished. Profanation is not a negation of mystery, but one of the possible relations with it" (*TO* 86, translation modified); "Hiding is the way of existing of the feminine, and this fact of hiding is precisely pudency" (*TO* 87, translation modified).

36. "The peculiar form of the contraries and contradictions of eros has escaped Heidegger, who in his lectures tends to present the difference between the sexes as a specification of a genus" (*EE* 96). The course to which Levinas is referring appears to be that of the 1928 summer semester, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (which Levinas audited in Freiburg). This course is now available in volume 26 of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. K. Held (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978). The passage in question appears in paragraph 10, pages 171–75 where Heidegger speaks of the neutrality of *Dasein* in relation to sexuality understood as a "concretion of facticity": "This neutrality also means that *Dasein* is neither one of the two sexes. But this asexuality is not the indifference of a nothingness, the weak negativity of an ontic nothing" (172); "Factical *Dasein* is…each time dispersed in a flesh [*in einer Leib zersplittert*] and…divided into a

determinant sexuality [*in eine Bestimmte Geschlechtlichkeit zwiespältig*]" (173). In any case, we can see here that Levinas's reproach is not entirely justified because Heidegger precisely explains that he does not mean "a large original subject in its simplicity" (*ein großes Urwesen in seiner Einfachheit*) that is dispersed among individuals (ibid.). See also Jacques Derrida's commentary "*Geschlecht*: Différence sexuelle, différence ontologique," in *Cahier de l'Herne. Heidegger,* ed. Michel Haar (Paris: L'Herne, 1983), 419–30. For the problem of body in Heidegger, see Cristian Ciocan, "The Question of the Living Body in Heidegger's Analytic of Dasein," *Research in Phenomenology* 38 (2008): 1, 72–89.

37. For filiality, in a later discussion, Levinas emphasizes that this is a matter of developing the theme of filiation in function of the theme of love. See François Poiré, *Emmanuel Levinas (Qui êtes vous?)* (Lyon: La Manufacture, 1987), 125; "Maternity" reappears in later works of Levinas. Cf. Lisa Guenther, "'Like a maternal body': Emmanuel Levinas and the motherhood of Moses," *Hypatia* 21, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 119–36; Kathryn Bevis, "'Better than metaphors'? Dwelling and the Maternal Body in Emmanuel Levinas," *Literature and Theology* 21, no. 3 (2007): 317–29; for paternity, cf. Kelly Oliver, "Fatherhood and the Promise of Ethics," *Diacritics* 27, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 44–57; François-David Sebbah, "Levinas: Father/Son/Mother/Daughter," *Studia Phaenomenologica* 6 (2006): 261–73.

38. The idea reappears 40 years later, when Levinas emphasizes that the paradox of filiation is that "the son, as well as the daughter, is other and yet also me" (*EL* 125).

39. For this aspect, see Cristian Ciocan, "Les repères d'une symétrie renversée: La phénoménologie de la mort entre Heidegger et Lévinas," *Alter. Revue de Phénoménologie* 12 (2004): 313–39, republished in *Emmanuel Levinas 100,* ed. Cristian Ciocan (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2007), 241–78.

40. See also *EL* 127: "The thematic of my relation to the son is connected with the problem of death, as if his death concerns me more than my own."

41. "The son, in effect, is not simply my work, like a poem or an artifact, neither is he my property. Neither the categories of power nor those of having can indicate the relationship with the child. Neither the notion of cause nor the notion of ownership permit one to grasp the fact of fecundity" (*TO* 91).

Notes to Franck, "The Defection of Phenomenology"

The French original of this essay has recently appeared in an adapted form as chapter 9 of D. Franck, *L'un-pour-l'autre. Levinas at la signification* (Paris: P.U.F., 2008), 97–109.

1. From the essay "Meaning and Sense." Cf. "The Trace of the Other" in *Deconstruction in Context,* ed. Mark Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), hereafter DCC 352 / EDE 194. The second of these texts reproduces, with a few minor variations, a part of the first (cf. "Meaning and Sense," 71 n. 1 / 105), where Levinas explains how the two are related.

2. *OB* 87 n. 22 / 110 n. 22. Cf. "Jean Lacroix: Philosophy and Religion" in *PN* 87 / *NP* 127.

3. Plato, *Phaedrus,* 250d8.

4. Ibid., 251a2–c1.

5. "We write 'ess*a*nce' with an 'a,' like 'insistance,' to give a name to the verbal aspect of the word 'being,'" says Levinas, who nonetheless refused to do this in *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence;* cf. "The Thinking of Being and the Question of the Other" *GCM* 112 / *DVI* 175; *OB* xli / *AE* ix); and *BV* 147 n. 5 / *AV* 178 n. 1.

6. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit,* §187.

7. Cf. "Phenomenon and Enigma," *CPP* 70 / *EDE* 212: "triumphant, that is, primary, truths."

8. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit,* §17, 82; cf. 78. Here the trace is listed among the various types of sign.

9. Cf. "The Name of God according to a few Talmudic Texts," *BV* 122 / *AV* 151, regarding the expression "The Holy One, blessed be He," and 128 / 157 on the illeity "that is perhaps also expressed by the word God."

10. "Enigme et phénomène," *EDE* 209. This phrase is omitted in Lingis's translation; see CPP 66.

11. Cf. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie,* Husserliana, vol. II, 34.

12. In *Existence and Existents,* the same Shakespearian reference illustrated the way in which "being insinuates itself even in nothingness" (*EE* 57 / 101). See *Macbeth* I.3.77–78.

13. Cf. "God and Philosophy," *GCM* 67ff. / *DVI* 112ff.

14. Cf. *OB* 121 / *AE* 155, and "Language and Proximity," *CPP* 124 / *EDE* 234.

15. "On the Jewish Reading of Scriptures," *BV* 111 n. 11 / *AV* 138 n. 10. Cf. "Dialogue," *GCM* 149–50 / *DVI* 228.

Notes to Tallon, "Levinas's Ethical Horizon, Affective Neuroscience, and Social Field Theory"

1. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 25.

2. Samuel Moyn, *Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas between Revelation and Ethics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 3–7, makes the case for getting past the friendly treatment of Levinas (the attitude typified by Derrida, who "never objects to his old teacher" [ibid., 5]), and asking how his ideas hold up when criticized.

3. For some readers no amount of information will get from the social to the ethical (is to ought). For others no argument is needed since they accept that the social and ethical go together from the start, that, in fact, one has to subtract the ethical to get the social, and that that is what a rationalist or voluntarist does.

On the primacy of affection over cognition and volition, see Catherine Chalier, *What Ought I to Do? Morality in Kant and Levinas,* trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Robert A. Hartman, "The Moral Situation: A Field Theory of Ethics," *The Journal of Philosophy* 45, no. 11 (1948): 292–300.

4. Note that in one sense this could be a very modest claim if Levinas were asserting only that ethics is first in social encounters, with nothing said about nonsocial encounters, where ontology could presumably continue to be first philosophy. This whole essay would then be about is/ought, or how the social becomes ethical. But Levinas is saying more, namely, that if ontology is first philosophy across the board for all beings, persons and things, then persons are first beings and known as such, not as somehow infinite and not as totalizable by cognition. I am presuming that the real debate is much more about how persons escape ontology and cognition than about getting from is to ought (which a naturalized ethics hardly takes seriously and which many continental and even analytic philosophers also question). See Todd May, *Reconsidering Difference: Nancy, Derrida, Levinas, and Deleuze* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

5. *Quasi-intentionality* is a more appropriate term to use when consciousness simultaneously stretches out both toward (temporally and spatially) *proximate* or present objects (of consciousness, which may be persons) *and* toward the *remote* (or absent) term of its movement (being, truth, the good), a "term" that is a *non*object that consciousness can never grasp as an object. A nonobject is the transcendental a priori condition for the emergence of objects that consciousness *can* grasp; the horizon is cogiven with those objects. Objects and the nonobject (the horizon) have to be cogiven or there would be no objects: we call the three intentionalities affection, cognition, and volition; they aim at "objects"; we call quasi-intentionality the kinetic transcendence of all objects toward the horizon within and on which objects appear.

6. See Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955); Paul Ekman, *Emotion in the Human Face* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); *Emotions Inside Out: 130 Years after Darwin's the Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 2003); *Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life* (New York: Times Books, 2003); Leslie Brothers, "A Biological Perspective on Empathy," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 146 (January 1989): 10–19; *Friday's Footprint: How Society Shapes the Human Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); *Mistaken Identity: The Mind-Brain Problem Reconsidered* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); Victor S. Johnston, *Why We Feel: The Science of Human Emotions* (Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Books, 1999); Dacher Keltner, Paul Ekman, Gian C. Gonzaga, and Jennifer Beer, "Facial Expression of Emotion," in *Handbook of Affective Sciences,* ed. Richard J. Davidson, Klaus R. Scherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 414–32.

7. See Paul E. Griffiths, *What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Brothers, *Friday's*

Footprint; Craig De Lancey, *Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about Mind and Artificial Intelligence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

8. For axiological externalism, see Mark Rowlands, *Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003); Sue Campbell, *Interpreting the Personal: Expression and the Formation of Feelings* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

9. Brothers, *Fridays Footprint,* 103, 61; cf. Brothers, "A Biological Perspective on Empathy."

10. See Johnston, *Why We Feel.* On this last point, see Arthur Koestler's works and his notion of "holon," *Beyond Reductionism: New Perspectives in the Life* Sciences, ed. Arthur Koestler and J. R. Smythies (New York: Macmillan, 1970); *Janus: A Summing up* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); and, *The Ghost in the Machine* (New York: Random House, 1982).

11. Besides the well-known works of Scheler, Buber, Marcel, and Schutz, see Michael Theunissen, *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber,* trans. Christopher Macann (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984); John Macmurray, *Persons in Relation* (London: Faber & Faber, 1961); Remy C. Kwant, *Encounter,* trans. Robert C. Adolfs (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1960); *Phenomenology of Social Existence,* trans. Henry J. Koren (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965); Stephan Strasser, *The Idea of Dialogal Phenomenology* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969); *Phenomenology of Feeling: An Essay on the Phenomena of the Heart,* trans. Robert E. Wood (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1977).

12. Sue Cataldi, *Emotion, Depth, and Flesh: A Study of Sensitive Space. Reflections on Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Embodiment* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993). It would be pedantic today to cite in more detail the recent (now popular) neuroscientific work on how essential emotion is to social and especially ethical decisions; let suffice e.g., Daniel Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence* (New York: Bantam Books, 1995); Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1994); *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999); Joseph LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life* (New York: Touchstone, 1998); *Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are* (New York: Viking, 2002); Jaak Panksepp, *Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1998); Owen Flanagan, *The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of the Mind and How to Reconcile Them* (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Nicholas Humphrey, *A History of Mind: Evolution and the Birth of Consciousness* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Arne Johan Vetlesen, *Perception, Empathy, and Judgment: An Inquiry into the Preconditions of Moral Performance* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Tom Kitwood, *Concern for Others: A New Psychology of Conscience and Morality* (London: Routledge, 1990); Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

13. See Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus, "Towards a Phenomenology of Moral Expertise," *Human Studies* 14 (1991): 229–50. This experience has lead to so-called "dual process theory" where examples of basic affects gone awry in modern contexts (such as road rage and "going postal") are analyzed. See K. E. Stanovich, *The Robot's Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), and "Balance in Psychological Research: The Dual Process Perspective," in J. I. Krueger and D. C. Funder, eds., "Towards a Balanced Social Psychology: Causes, Consequences, and Cures for the Problem-Seeking Approach to Social Behavior and Cognition," *Behavioral and Brain Science* 27 (2004): 357–58.

14. Adrian T. Peperzak, *To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1993), 112.

15. At the risk of explaining the obscure by the more obscure (the reader can skip this if it does not help), let me refer to the "anatomy" of an electron (vacuum) tube (duplicated in transistors); a diode has two elements, anode and cathode, and a triode has three, adding a grid (screen) between them as a control: using a small positive or negative voltage, sometimes called a bias voltage, the grid turns the tube into an amplifier or attenuator. The correct model for human consciousness is not a diode by nature but a triode: the cathode's emissions (cognition) are amplified or attenuated by the intervening grid (affection) on the way to the anode (volition); we mammals have evolved a triode from the start as the standard of neural activation; assigning weights (by the affective grid) happens as a native function in consciousness: affect mediates cognitive inputs make possible volitional outputs. Successful evolution depended on evaluative rather than neutral sensing, on rapidly distinguishing friend from foe; hedonic appraisal is nature's emergency way to bypass the cognitive brain's slower track.

16. Levinas's position can be considered personalist, that is, a philosophy for which the first category is not being but person. See Kwant, *Encounter;* W. Norris Clarke, *Person and Being* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1993); John Cowburn, *Personalism & Scholasticism* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2005).

17. On empathy, see Vetlesen, *Perception, Empathy, and Judgment.*

18. John Caputo, "A Phenomenology of Moral Sensibility: Moral Emotion," in *Personalist Ethics and Human Subjectivity,* vol. 2, *Ethics at the Cross-roads,* ed. R. Wolak and G. F. McLean (Washington, D.C.: Publications of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992), 1; my emphasis. Quoted from the online version (21 February 2009): http://www.crvp.org/book/Series01/I-12/chapter_ii.htm.

19. Despite the promising title, Paola-Ludovika Coriando's *Affektenlehre und Phänomenologie der Stimmungen: Wege einer Ontologie und Ethik des Emotionalen* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002) had little on ethical horizons.

20. Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude,* trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 1995), 16; see also, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning),* trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). On these deep moods, see Klaus Held, "The Origin of Europe with the Greek Discovery of the World," trans. Sean Kirkland, *Epoché* 7, no. 1 (2002): 81–105; and "Phenomenology of 'Authentic Time' in Husserl and Heidegger," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 15, no. 3 (2007): 327–47.

21. On affect as amplification see S. Tomkins, *Affect, imagery, consciousness,* 4 vols. (New York: Springer, 1962–1992); on arousal events see Johnston, *Why We Feel.* Quote from, Thomas Sheehan, *Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations,* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1987), 261.

22. Andrew Tallon, *Head and Heart: Affection, Cognition, Volition as Triune Consciousness* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997).

23. See Renée D. N. van Riessen, *Man as a Place of God: Levinas' Hermeneutics of Kenosis* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007); Marie Baird, "Whose *Kenosis*? An Analysis of Levinas, Derrida, and Vattimo on God's Self-Emptying and the Secularizing of the West," *Heythrop Journal* 48, no. 3 (2007): 432–37.

24. See Mark Rowlands, *Externalism,* and *Body Language: Representation in Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006).

25. W. Teed Rockwell, *Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 206; my emphasis. He reaffirms this position in responding to a review ("Reply to Review of *Neither Brain nor Ghost,*" *Education and Culture* 23, no. 1 [2007]: 87–89.). See also "Externalist Axiology," in Mark Rowlands, *Externalism,* 202–16; William D. Casebeer, *Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003); Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, "The Extended Mind," in *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings,* ed. David. J. Chalmers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 642–51; Patricia S. Greenspan, "Moral Responses and Moral Theory: Socially-Based Externalist Ethics," *The Journal of Ethics* 2 (1998): 103–22.

26. We could add a third question: Is Levinas an emotivist, but the time of being cowed by that epithet is past, as though mere mention of it could send philosophers scurrying for cover. Helpful in putting it to rest are: George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Kitwood, *Concern for Others*; Mark Johnson, *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Vetlesen, *Perception, Empathy, Judgment*; Campbell, *Interpreting the Personal;* Flanagan, *The Problem of the Soul;* Casebeer, *Natural Ethical Facts.*

27. Rockwell, *Neither Brain nor Ghost,* 206.

28. Rudolph J. Rummel gives a thorough review: *Understanding Conflict and War,* vol. 1, *The Dynamic Psychological Field,* vol. 2, *The Conflict Helix* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975, 1976).

29. Our earth space is already curved; so it is not curved space or constant motion that gets out attention; both are what Lonergan calls subjects of inverse insight, i.e., the insight that there is nothing to be understood. What needs understanding is *change,* e.g., acceleration or change in velocity, or an amplification in the curvature introduced into our space-time by the advent of another person (an arousal event). Affectivity amplifies. After Einstein we can no longer think of space and time as neutral containers, empty and absolute, featureless in themselves; rather space-time is a gestalt, relative from the start, as a ground produced by its figures (Lefebvre).

30. See Quentin Smith, *The Felt Meanings of the World: A Metaphysics of Feeling* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1986); Johnston, *Moral Imagination,* 4–20.

31. Van Riessen, *Man as a Place of God,* 48–49.

32. James Hatley, Janice McLane, and Christian Diehm, eds., *Interrogating Ethics: Embodying the Good in Merleau-Ponty* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2006).

33. See Nicholas Wade, "Is 'Do unto Others' Written into Our Genes?," *The New York Times* September 18, 2007; Vetlesen, *Perception, Empathy, and Judgment.*

34. *En* 141–51. Although affections and cognitions differ at the phenomenological level, some writers (like Griffiths and Brothers) deny that emotions form a natural kind and deny them a reality of their own, explaining the difference between cognition and emotion by social construction, which raises the question why accidents (Phineas Gage), lesions, tumors, or other physical damage to the affective brain centers wreaks such havoc upon decision making and other social and ethical performance (as Damasio has documented). Even granting cases where some emotions are best explained as social constructs, there seem also to be differences all the way down (ACC spindle neurons?) between affective and cognitive neural nets beyond location (amygdala, frontal lobes) and the chemistry of hormones and neurotransmitters (serotonin, dopamine, peptides).

35. Walter Isaacson, *Einstein: His Life and Universe* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 220.

36. Technically gravity and gravitation are distinct ideas, the latter more scientific and related to relativity theory; in everyday usage they are blurred. My point here is that moving bodies produce a field that describes their interaction and transcends them.

37. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space,* trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

38. Merleau-Ponty describes embodiment as a general medium for having a world, breaking the hold of the in-itself and for-itself distinction. Instead of conceiving human persons in terms of consciousness, Merleau-Ponty offers a conception based on movement, motion (motility, existence). When he says that subjectivity is intersubjectivity, he implicitly offers a field theory of the person where to become a subject requires dynamic, not static, relating to others. Rockwell is saying much

the same thing from a neuroscientific perspective when he replaces a brain-body model with a brain-body-*world* model. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception,* trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1962), 121, 191, 418.

39. David Morris, *The Sense of Space* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004).

40. Michel Guérin, *L'affectivité de la pensée* (Arles: Actes du Sud, 1993).

41. Morris, *The Sense of Space,* 144–58.

42. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space.* On kinesics, see Ray L. Birdwhistell, *Introduction to Kinesics* (Louisville: Louisville University Press, 1952), and *Kinesics and Context: Essays on Body Motion Communication* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970); on synchronics, see William S. Condon, "Linguistic-Kinesic Research and Dance Therapy," in *American Dance Therapy Association Third Annual Conference Proceedings* (Baltimore: American Dance Therapy Association, 1970), 21–42; "Neonatal Entrainment and Enculturation," in *Before Speech. The Beginnings of Human Communication,* ed. Margaret Bullowa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 131–48; William S. Condon and W. D. Ogston, "A Segmentation of Behavior," *Journal of Psychiatric Research* 5 (1967): 221–35, and "Speech and Body Motion Synchrony of the Speaker-Hearer," in *Perception of Language,* ed. David L. Horton and James J. Jenkins (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), 150–73; Paul M. Churchland "Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues," (37–60) and "Rules, Know-How, and the Future of Moral Cognition" (61–74) in *Neurophilosophy at Work* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

43. Johnston, *Why We Feel,* 61–63.

44. On proxemics, see Edward T. Hall, *The Silent Language* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), *The Hidden Dimension* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), and *Beyond Culture* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976).

45. Vetlesen, *Perception, Empathy, and Judgment,* 214.

46. See also Anthony J. Steinbock, "Affection and Attention: On the Phenomenology of Becoming Aware," *Continental Philosophy Review* 37 (2004): 21–43.

47. Owen Flanagan, "The Moral Network," in *The Churchlands and Their Critics,* ed. Robert N. McCauley (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 1996), 192–215.

48. Roger Poole, *Towards Deep Subjectivity* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972).

49. For an excellent overview of the relation of horizon to intentionality, the infinite, and finite worlds, see Klaus Held, "The Finitude of the World: Phenomenology in Transition from Husserl to Heidegger," trans. Anthony J. Steinbock, in *Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought,* ed. Arleen B. Dallery, Charles E. Scott, and P. Holley Roberts (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 187–98.

50. Sheehan, *Karl Rahner.* Rahner also blended *Vorgriff* with Aquinas's *excessus* (transcendence) and no doubt had in mind Rousselot's *capax Dei* (1997).

Sheehan puts it well: it is excess that gives us access. The unfinished business of neuroscience is to account for this excess, which seems not amenable solely to reduction to pattern recognition in neural nets in one brain (i.e., person) but only to a higher energy social field of brains (i.e., persons) socially networked in such a way that the merging horizons uplift at least some of them to a level that (*noblesse oblige*) increases their responsibility for the rest.

51. Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics,* 61–77; *Contributions to Philosophy,* 9–19; on "deep moods," Held, "Phenomenology of 'Authentic Time'," 339.

52. Tallon, *Head and Heart.*

53. Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics,* 68; my emphasis.

54. "Given that for a long time now a mis-concept of 'thinking' has ruled the opinion about 'philosophy,' the representation and judgment about attunement can in the end only be an offshoot of misinterpretation of thinking (attunement is a weakness, a stray, an unclarity, and a dullness — over against the acumen and exactness and clarity and agility of 'thought').... But grounding-attunement *attunes* Da-sein and thus attunes *thinking* as projecting-open the truth of be-ing in word and concept....The grounding-attunement calls to us startled dismay, reservedness, deep awe, intimating, deep foreboding" (Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy* 1999, 16; his emphases). Attunement is a force in the field, affecting the grounds it opens up to consciousness when self meets other.

55. *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics,* 66–67, #17 on attunement and awakening.

56. Sheehan, *Karl Rahner,* 314–17.

57. Levinas would be more consistent if his ethics included other animals and planet Earth, since an ethical first philosophy would have him personifying everything, as children do, only learning later about (nonpersonal) beings. By insisting on ethics as only for persons, he undercuts the general applicability of first philosophy and leaves himself open to the narrower claim that it applies only to the social, so that indeed ontology would be first philosophy for nonpersons. Heidegger's attunement by the impersonal world, rather than attunement by the ethical other, would then hold for nonsocial situations.

Notes to Vessey, "Relating Levinas and Gadamer through Heidegger"

1. Gadamer studied with Heidegger in the early- to mid-1920s when the themes were being developed in Heidegger's lecture courses. Therefore, when *Being and Time* came out in 1927 it was less an intellectual revolution than the fruition of ideas Gadamer had been engaging for years. Gadamer sees himself as working on the themes most prevalent in the "later Heidegger" — language, art, the intellectual role of the sciences, the revival of Ancient Greek thought — though more in line with Heidegger's early views than Heidegger himself.

2. Adriaan Peperzak, *Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1977), 205.

3. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 132.

4. *Being and Time,* 133.

5. See also "Ethics as First Philosophy" in *The Levinas Reader,* ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 84–85; and "From the One to the Other" in *EN* 146.

6. Martin Heidegger, *The Concept of Time,* trans. William McNeill (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), 17E.

7. *Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas,* ed. Jill Robbins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 47.

8. *Is it Righteous to Be?,* 203.

9. See "Dying for…" in *EN* 207–17, esp. 215.

10. *Being and Time,* xix.

11. Emmanuel Levinas, "Is Ontology Fundamental" in *Basic Philosophical Writings,* ed. Adriaan Peperzaak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 6.

12. Richard A. Cohen, *Ethics, Exegesis, and Philosophy: Interpretation After Levinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 101.

13. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *A Century of Philosophy: Hans-Georg Gadamer in Conversation with Riccardo Dottori,* trans. Rod Coltman (New York: Continuum, 2004), 132.

14. Gadamer does not suggest a wholesale contrast between Jerusalem and Athens, as does Levinas, he simply focuses on the intellectual contributions of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation on Western philosophical thought.

15. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroads, 1991), xxxvii–xxxviii.

16. Gadamer, *A Century in Philosophy,* 130.

17. Ibid., 122.

18. Ibid., 22.

19. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity; Subject and Person" *Continental Philosophy Review* 33, no. 3 (July 2000): 284.

20. Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* 361

21. Gadamer, "Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity," 284.

22. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation" in *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter,* ed. Richard Palmer and Diane Michelfelder (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 26.

23. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gadamer in Conversation,* trans. and ed. Richard Palmer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 112.

24. James Risser, *Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 177, quoting Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* 421.

25. Gadamer, *A Century of Philosophy,* 29.

26. Ibid., 21. A page earlier he writes, "I was trying to do something different at the time [of *Being and Time*], something Heidegger couldn't do at all, and this came out in my book *Plato's Dialectical Ethics,* which served as my habilitation

thesis. I was trying to come to philosophy along different paths, specifically, along the path of practical knowledge. What I later developed in the form of *phronesis* was already taking shape here.... Heidegger wasn't really interested in practical knowledge or *phronesis* at all ... but rather, being" (20–21).

27. In her new book *Aristotle's Ethics as First Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Claudia Barracchi argues that Aristotle's highlighting of *phronesis* makes his view a version of ethics as first philosophy.

28. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Dialogues at Capri," in *Religion,* ed. Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 205. He finds Christianity, which seeks to make death intelligible through positing God's suffering and death, particularly paradoxical.

29. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Enigma of Health: The Art of Healing in a Scientific Age,* trans. Jason Gaiger and Nicholas White (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 67.

30. Gadamer, "Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity," 283.

31. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 41. See also Gadamer's "Concerning Empty and Ful-filled time" in *Martin Heidegger in Europe and America,* ed. E. G. Ballard and C. E. Scott (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).

32. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Western View of the Inner Experience of Time and the Limits of Thought," in *Time and the Philosophies,* ed. H. Aguessy (Paris: UNESCO, 1977), 43.

33. Gadamer, *Relevance of the Beautiful,* 42.

NOTES TO MARDER, "BREATHING 'TO' THE OTHER"

1. I owe the title of this section to a poem by Edmond Jabes entitled "The Word Before the First" in *The Book of Resemblances* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1991), in which the author asks: "Could it be that God is the word before the first, which can be read only after the last?" (11).

2. Gen. 2:18. In "Judaism and the Feminine," *DF* 30–38, Levinas reads the same biblical passages, unequivocally differentiating them from the Platonic (and Aristophanean) tradition of the primordial fusion of lovers. While the notion of breathing is not to be found in the course of his argument, I suggest that this metaphenomenon adds to its strength, since only the other can inspire the same, and only for the other can the same expire.

3. Cf. Jacques Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 92.

4. Analogously, whereas reading is the reader's inspiration, writing is the writer's expiration. The reader and the writer, too, aspire to the Other, in the breath-to-breath relation. These words, for example, are inspired by Emmanuel Levinas (as well as by all of my other teachers) but are also my expiration. The reading/writing and mastery/ elevation always entwine, without dissolving, in the aspiration to the Other.

5. I would contend that the theoretical difference between expiration and inspiration marks the distinction between substitution and fecundity. This is not to deny, however, that an important common thread of transcendence that is not impersonal highlights the functional, for a lack of a better term, proximity between the two concepts.

6. Jacques Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question,* trans. G. Bennington and R. Bowlby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 48, 50.

7. Ibid., 45, 70.

8. Ibid., 76.

9. "The Ego and the Totality," *CPP* 26; *TI* 45. A similar distinction is drawn by Levinas in *Totality and Infinity*'s section "The I of enjoyment is neither biological nor sociological" (120–21). Both biology and sociology conceive of the individual as the individuation of a concept, and therefore, lose sight of the unicity of the I of enjoyment. Interestingly, these two modes of inquiry correspond to the two nontotalizable dimensions of totality as pure life and as pure thought: the two poles between which the animal "roams" and the spirit "hovers."

10. Robert K. Barnhart, ed., *The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology* (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1988), 1047.

11. Ibid., 1047.

12. Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the* Question, 77.

13. Jacques Derrida, "La Parole Soufflée," in *Writing and Difference,* trans. A. Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 176.

14. Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," *Writing and Difference,* 139.

15. Here I am offering a rebuttal to Derrida's criticism of Levinas's concept of exteriority. In "Violence and Metaphysics" Derrida argues, quite astutely, that "*true* exteriority is not spatial, for space is the Site of the Same" (112). However, for Levinas "true exteriority" is found in time (more precisely, in the futurity of death and of the Other) and not in space. This is one of the key propositions put forward in *Time and the Other* — a work with which Derrida was already familiar when he engaged with the writings of Levinas in "Violence and Metaphysics."

16. The Buddhist meditation practice of Tonglen ("giving and receiving") is predicated on a principle whose resemblance to this aspect of Levinasian philosophy is uncanny, to say the least. Performed in conjunction with breathing, this practice requires the kind of respiration that inhales the suffering of others and exhales comfort, healing, etc. Although it may seem that here there is an economic conversion of a set amount of unhappiness into the same amount of happiness, the inordinate and asymmetrical element remains untouched. A practitioner of Tonglen is the site of pure difference and noncoincidence, not of the smooth transition, between the two moments of breathing. (I thank Gad Horowitz for bringing this fascinating phenomenon to my attention.)

17. Emmanuel Levinas, "Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism," *Critical Inquiry* 17 (1990): 65.

18. Please note that earlier we designated the *pneuma* of the spirit as the "originally unifying unity," or as what allows the spirit to carry out its operations of gathering and assembly.

19. One could also diagnose in contemporary liberalism the same predilection for the unjust choice, as the totalitarian regimes. For instance, the Foucauldian analyses of the proliferation of the technologies of biopower suggests that biolib-eralism veers on the side of the totalitarian "unilaterality" of pure living, though it employs different political implements to achieve its goals.

20. Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question,* 39.

21. Ibid., 39–40.

NOTES TO TENGELYI, "EXPERIENCE OF INFINITY IN LEVINAS"

1. In addition to the abbreviations given at the beginning of this volume: *Deconstruction in Context,* ed. Mark Taylor (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986), *DCC.* Different editions used besides those listed: *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990); *Totalité et Infini* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994).

2. Plato, *Republic,* 508b.

3. Cf. Levinas, "The Ruin of Representation," in *DEH* 111–21; *TI* 44 / *TeI* 35.

4. Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné* (Paris: PUF, 1997), 315, 369; 367 / *Being Given. Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness,* trans. J. L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 225, 267; 266.

5. Ibid., 266, n. 29 (on 370) / 367, n. 2.

NOTES TO STEINBOCK, "REDUCING THE ONE TO THE OTHER"

1. In addition to the abbreviated works listed at the beginning of this volume, the following abbreviations will be used in this essay. Abbreviations for Emmanuel Levinas: "Enigma and Phenomenon" (*EP*) in *Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophi-cal Writings,* ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 65–77. Abbreviations for Immanuel Kant: *Critique of Pure Reason* (*CPR*), trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), originally published as *Kritik der reinen Vernunft,* ed. Raymund Schmidt (Hamburg: Meiner, 1956); *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (*RL*), trans., Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), originally published as *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* (*RG*), ed. Karl Vorländer (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989); *The Conflict of the Facul-ties / Der Streit der Fakultäten* (Bilingual edition) (*CF*), trans., Mary J. Gregor (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992). English citations will be given first followed by the French or German. Gender-specific language in direct quotations has been retained to reflect the translations used to prepare this essay.

2. See Jacques Derrida, "Violence et métaphysique: Essai sur la pensée d'Emmanuel Levinas," in *L'écriture et la différence* (Paris: Seuil, 1967), 117–28; *The Gift of Death,* trans., David Willis (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995);

"Foi et savoir: les deux sources de la 'religion' aux limites de la simple raison," in *La religion* (Paris: Seuil, 1996), 9–86. And see Gianni Vattimo, "La trace de la trace," in Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, *Religion* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 79–94.

3. Henri Birault, *Heidegger et l'expérience de la pensée* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 49.

4. See George Schrader, "The Thing in Itself in Kantian Philosophy," in *Kant: A Collection Critical Essays,* ed. Robert Paul Wolff (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968).

5. See Edmund Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic,* trans. Anthony J. Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001).

6. See also *CF* 42–43: "Now the power to judge autonomously — that is, freely (according to principles of thought in general) — is called reason. So the philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the truth of the teachings it is to adopt or even allow, must be conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by the government."

7. The function of philosophy in relation to the three higher faculties (theology, law, and medicine) "is to control them and, in this way, be useful to them, since *truth* (the essential and first condition of learning in general) is the main thing, whereas the *utility* the higher faculties promise the government is of secondary importance" (*CF* 44–45). See also, *CF* 60–61, 122–23.

8. See *CPR* A 685–86, A 580, A 676; *CF* 76–77.

9. See Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling/Repetition,* ed. and trans., Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

10. "The thematization of God in religious experience has already conjured away or missed the excess of the intrigue that breaks the unity of the 'I think'" (*GCM* 62 / *DVI* 104).

11. See my "Face and Revelation: Levinas on Teaching as Way-Faring," in *Addressing Levinas,* ed. Eric Sean Nelson, Antje Kapust, and Kent Still (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 119–37.

12. Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlaß. Dritter Teil: 1929–1935,* ed. Iso Kern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), Hua 15, 631.

13. On the concept of limit-experiences see my "Limit-Phenomena and the Liminality of Experience," *Alter: revue de phénoménologie* 6 (1998): 275–96.

14. Levinas also uses "epiphany" almost interchangeably with revelation (e.g., *TI* 75 / *TeI* 48) as epiphany of the face, epiphany of the Other.

15. "La trace de l'autre," *EDE* 187–202. See also the sensitive study by Renée D. N. van Riessen, *Man as a Place of God: Levinas' Hermeneutics of Kenosis* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007). She also tackles the dimension of the religious in Levinas, and questions the reduction of the religious to the ethical.

16. "The first intelligible is intelligence" (*TI* 218 / *TeI* 194; cf. 96, 98, 208–09, 218 / 69, 72, 183–84, 194).

17. See my "Face and Revelation: Levinas on Teaching as Way-Faring," 126–27.

18. "The negativity of the *In-* of the Infinite — otherwise than being, divine comedy — hollows out a desire that could not be filled…exalted as Desire — one that withdraws from its satisfaction as it draws near to the Desirable. This is a Desire for what is beyond satisfaction.…A desire without end, from beyond Being: disinter*estedness,* transcendence — desire for the Good" (*GCM* 67 / *DVI* 111).

19. Emmanuel Levinas, "Être Juif," *Confluences 7,* nos. 15–17 (1947): 253–64, translated as "Being Jewish," trans. Mary Beth Mader, *Continental Philosophy Review* 40, no. 3 (2007): 205–10.

20. See Jeffery Bloechl, "Ethics as First Philosophy and Religion," in *The Face of the Other and the Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,* ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 140, 148–49.

21. Cf. *ITN* 123ff. / *HN* 139ff.; *BV* 154ff. / *AV* 185.

22. See Jacob Meskin, "The Role of Lurianic Kabbalah in the Early Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas," in *Levinas Studies: An Annual Review,* vol. 2, ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007), 49–77.

23. See my *Phenomenology and Mysticism,* esp. the "Introduction."

24. See *Phenomenology and Mysticism,* esp. chapters 2–5.

25. In this regard, Westphal is correct is saying that this dimension of experience is missing from Levinas, and it has a similar asymmetrical relation to the Other and the same, but distinctive insofar as it issues from the Holy, and must be qualified differently. See Merold Westphal, "The Welcome Wound: Emerging from the *il y a* Otherwise," *Continental Philosophy Review* 40, no. 3 (2007): 211–30. See also the instructive comparison between Levinas and Marion by Christina M. Gschwandtner, "The neighbor and the infinite: Marion and Levinas on the encounter between self, human other, and God," *Continental Philosophy Review* 40, no. 3 (2007): 231–49.

26. See Max Scheler, "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," in *Vom Umsturz der Werte,* Gesammelte Werke, vol. 3., ed. Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1955), 33–147.

27. Santa Teresa de Jesus, *Obras Completas,* ed. Efren de La Madre de Dios and Otger Steggink (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1997), 690 translated as *The Collected Works of St. Teresa of Avila,* vol. 3, trans., Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez (Washington, D.C.: ICS, 1985), "Foundations" 5.8.

Notes to Smith, "The Work of Service"

1. Emmanuel Levinas, interview with François Poirié, trans. Jill Robbins and Marcus Coelen with Thomas Loebel, in Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be?,* ed. Jill Robbins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 34–36; originally in Poirié, *Emmanuel Lévinas* (Lyon: La Manufacture, 1987), 76–78. On the significance of the Davos conference for Levinas, see also Salomon Malka, *Emmanuel Levinas,* trans. Michael Kigel and Sonja M. Embree (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,

2006), 45–52, and Samuel Moyn, *Origins of the Other* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 95, 11 n. 20.

2. On Cassirer and Being, see note 7.

3. For Heidegger against "values," see Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics,* trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 198–99; against "worldview," *Contributions to Philosophy,* trans. Parvis Emad and Kevin Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 26–27. Levinas followed Heidegger in opposing the substitution of an "experience of transcendence" for transcendence itself. "It is not as a . . . *Weltanschauung* that we have tried to articulate the transcendence — wakefulness and sobering up — whence philosophies speak" — Levinas, "Philosophy and Awakening," *EN* 89 / *En* 98.

4. "That an action could be obstructed by the technology destined to render it efficacious and easy, that a science, born to embrace the world, delivers it over to disintegration, that a politics and an administration guided by the humanist ideal maintain the exploitation of man by man and war — these are singular inversions of rational projects, disqualifying human causality, and thus transcendental subjectivity understood as spontaneity and act also" — Levinas, "No Identity," *CPP* 142 / *HAH* 87.

5. Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), 228.

6. Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,* vol. 1, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale, 1955), 83.

7. Cassirer, *An Essay on Man,* 68, emphasis added. Here is how the idea was stated at Davos: "Being is — in my language — no longer Being as substance, but Being, from which there proceeds multifold functional determinations and meanings. And here, it seems to me, lies the essential point distinguishing my position from Heidegger's." "Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger," in Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik,* 4th ed. (Frankfurt-am-Main: Klostermann, 1973), 266, trans. John Michael Krois, in Krois, "Why Did Cassirer and Heidegger not Debate in Davos?" in Cyrus Hamlin and J. M. Krois, eds., *Symbolic Forms and Cultural Studies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 249. Cassirer thought that Heidegger was still substantializing Being, in effect, by making it the final object of inquiry. On the "basis phenomenon" of work, see also the posthumous *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,* vol. 4, *The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms,* trans. J. M. Krois (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 141–43, 182–90. Krois argues in *Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), that Cassirer's later thought was increasingly dominated by an ethical conception of human history, though his leading critics failed to recognize this (31–32, 152–53). In 1936, Cassirer declared, "We have to face the fundamental ethical question that is contained in the very concept of culture. The philosophy of culture may be called a study of forms; but all these forms cannot be understood without relating them to a common goal" — "Critical Idealism as a Philosophy of Culture," in *Symbol, Myth, and Culture,* ed. Donald Phillip Verene (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 81.

8. Alain Badiou, *Ethics,* trans. Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2001), 23.

9. In *The Myth of the State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), Cassirer argues that humanity's mythic relation to the world — sympathetic, emotionally charged, involuntary, magical — is never definitively superseded by rational thinking but remains in force as cultural material and potentiality even if not as dominant cultural form; in the early twentieth century, enlightened politics was blindsided by the effective actualization of this mythical potentiality by totalitarian leaders. Levinas's diagnostic remark on Hitlerism in 1934 implies a similar perspective, yet with a noticeably Heideggerian twist: "The philosophy of Hitler...smolders with primitive powers that awaken the secret nostalgia of the German soul...and that makes it terribly dangerous and philosophically interesting. Because elementary sentiments harbor a philosophy. They express the primary attitude of a soul faced with the whole of the real and its own destiny. They predetermine or prefigure the sense of the soul's adventure in the world" ("Some Thoughts on Hitlerism," *UH* 13 / *IH* 27). The phrase "dimension of the ideal" is found in Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity," *CPP* 56 / *EDE* 174 ("dimension of height" is also used in this text). Note: I am using the 1967 edition of *EDE.*

10. Levinas's first substantial discussion of the *third* is in "The I and Totality" (1951), *EN* 18–25 / *En* 28–35.

11. For this setup see the first sections of the paper as originally published, "Determination philosophique de l'idée de culture" in *Philosophie et culture,* ed. Venant Cauchy (Montreal: Editions du Beffroi / Montmorency, 1986), 72–76, omitted from the *EN* abridgement.

12. Levinas's alterity-compounding strategy here is reminiscent of the heterological argument that the neo-Kantian idealist Heinrich Rickert used to expand his inventory of the "world-all" beyond the physical, the psychic, and the ideal to include the still-more-other being of "irreal" value. Heinrich Rickert, *System der Philosophie* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1921), 102–11.

13. Levinas, "Philosophical Determination of the Idea of Culture," *EN* 185 / *En* 192; elsewhere, e.g. *OB* 182 / *AE* 229; *DF* 6 / *DL* 19; *AV* 140; *Is It Righteous to Be?,* 113 (interview with Emmanuel Hirsch, originally in *Racismes. L'autre et son visage* [Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1988], 101).

14. Levinas is well known for saying that the Other transcends being, but he also said "being is exteriority" (*TI* 290 / *TeI* 266).

15. Levinas, "The Contemporary Criticism of the Idea of Value and the Prospects for Humanism," in *Value and Values in Evolution,* ed. Edward A. Maziarz (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1979).

16. Since an orientation is in question, I am changing the Lingis translation from "a work" to "Work" whenever the French is "[l']Œuvre" (*HAH* 41–43, 45, 56).

17. In another probe of the grounds of community, Blanchot and Nancy later — circa 1983, in fact — deploy a related concept of "unworking" (*désoeuvrement*). Maurice Blanchot, *The Unavowable Community,* trans. Pierre Joris (Barrytown: Station Hill, 1988); Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community,* trans. Peter Connor et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).

18. Compare Levinas's 1954 formulation placing the teleology (though not the inspiration) of work within totality: "We are we because, commanding from identity to identity, we are disengaged from the totality and from history. But we are *we* in that we command one another to a work through which we recognize one another. To be disengaged from the totality while at the same time accomplishing a work in it is not to stand against the totality, but for it — that is, in its service. To serve the totality is to fight for justice [even though] the totality is constituted by violence and corruption" ("The I and the Totality," *EN* 36 / *En* 46).

19. For Habermas's appropriation of Mead, see Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action,* vol. 2, *Lifeworld and System,* trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1987), 1–42.

20. See e.g. "Phenomenon and Enigma," *CPP* 69 / *EDE* 211; "Language and Proximity," *CPP* 125–26 / *EDE* 236; *OB* 5–7 / *AE* 6–9. Robert Bernasconi points out the saying-said parallel in "One-Way Traffic: The Ontology of Decolonization and Its Ethics," in *Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty,* ed. Galen A. Johnson and Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), 77.

21. Levinas, "The Understanding of Spirituality in French and German Culture," trans. Andrius Valevičius in *Continental Philosophy Review* 31 (1998): 1.

22. Ibid., 2.

23. Ibid., 2; in 1983, "Philosophical Determination of the Idea of Culture," *EN* 180 / *En* 186. Yet Brunschvicg represented for him "perfect humanity" (*DF* 39 / *DL* 61). Compare the characterization of Brunschvicg in "Understanding of Spirituality": "for him, the truly human person expresses himself through impersonal, theoretical reason" — with the motto from "Signature": "'*Who can speak clearly about current events? Who can simply open his heart when speaking about men? Who shows them his face?' The person who uses the words "substance," "accident," "subject," "object," and other abstractions*'" (*DF* 289 / *DL* 371). See also esp. *DF* 46–49 / *DL* 69–73. Levinas cited Cassirer's position as "very similar" to Brunschvicg's in the Poirié interview (34 / 77).

24. Levinas, "The Understanding of Spirituality," 4.

25. Ibid., 5.

26. Ibid., 6.

27. Ibid., 10.

28. Levinas certainly had this tendency: "I always say — but under my breath — that the Bible and the Greeks present the only serious issues in human life; everything else is dancing. I think these texts are open to the whole world. There is no racism intended." Interview with Christoph von Wolzogen, trans. Andrew Schmitz, in *Is It Righteous to Be?,* 149; originally in Levinas, *Humanismus des anderen Menschen* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2005), 140. He would also issue a caveat: "I say this knowing nothing of Buddhism." Interview with Christian Descamps, trans. Alin Cristian and Bettina Bergo, in *Is It Righteous to Be?,* 164; originally in *Entretiens avec 'Le Monde.' 1. Philosophies,* ed. Christian Delacampagne (Paris: La Découverte, 1984), 147.

29. "The Living Relevance of Maimonides," *Paix de Droit* (1935), quoted by Jacques Rolland in *OE* 91 / *De* 119.

30. I am plotting a different course than Rudi Visker, "Levinas, Multicultural-ism and Us," *Ethical Perspectives* 6 (1999), 159–68, who worries that the only Levinasian alternative to intercultural violence is an alternate violence of abstraction that makes no allowance whatever for culture or for worldly life in general.

31. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 136, and chapters 3 and 4 generally.

32. Denis Diderot, "Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville," trans. John Hope Mason and Robert Wolker, in *Denis Diderot: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 47–49, 65.

33. Compare Cassirer: "language is only what the…life-giving moment makes out of it. Its meaning and value depend not on what it may be 'in itself'…but on the manner of its use, its spiritual employment." "'Spirit' and 'Life' in Con-temporary Philosophy," trans. Robert Walter Bretall and Paul Arthur Schilpp, in *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer,* ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (La Salle: Open Court, 1949), 878.

34. Bernasconi, "One-Way Traffic," 76–77.

35. Cassirer, "'Spirit' and 'Life' in Contemporary Philosophy."

Notes to Nelson, "Levinas and Early Confucian Ethics"

I would like to thank Terre Fisher for her comments, questions, and sugges-tions, and all those who commented on the presentation of earlier versions of this paper in Chicago and Montreal.

1. On Buber, see Jonathan R. Herman, *I and Tao: Martin Buber's Encounter with Chuang Tzu* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); on Hei-degger, Reinhard May, *Heidegger's Hidden Sources* (London: Routledge, 1996), 4, and Lin Ma, *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

2. Slavoj Žižek argues that such comments reveal the political impracticability of Levinas's ethics by equating Levinas's fear of communist China with Heidegger's fear of the Soviet Union in *Organs without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 106; contrast Howard Caygill's more contextualized — if still problematic — account of this text in *Levinas and the Political* (London: Routledge, 2002), 185.

3. Galia Patt-Shamir, *To Broaden the Way: A Confucian-Jewish Dialogue* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006) and Vera Schwarcz, *Bridge across Broken Time: Chinese and Jewish Cultural Memory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Other recent works include Xinzhong Yao, *Wisdom in Early Confucian and Israelite Traditions: A Comparative Study* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

4. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations,* trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). On Kant and Hegel on the Chinese, see Julia Ching, and Willard Gurdon Oxtoby, *Moral Enlightenment: Leibniz and Wolff on China* (Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Serica, 1992), 220–31. Michael Mack discusses their views of traditional Judaism as part of his argument

for the anti-Semitic character of their thought in: *German Idealism and the Jew: The Inner Anti-Semitism of Philosophy and German Jewish Responses* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 23–62.

5. On Confucianism as a variety of virtue ethics, which admittedly radically diverges from its Aristotelian form, see Bryan W. Van Norden "Virtue Ethics and Confucianism" in *Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy,* ed. Bo Mou (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 99–121. For a more recent extended account of Aristotle and Confucius, see May Sim, *Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

6. I discuss two styles of reading Levinas, one deconstructive and the other religious-communitarian, in the introduction to "The Secular, the Religious, and the Ethical in Kierkegaard and Levinas," in *Despite Oneself: Subjectivity and its Secret in Kierkegaard and Levinas,* ed. Claudia Welz and Karl Verstrynge (London: Turnshare, 2008), 91–92. Compare Diane Perpich's argument that Levinas cannot be reduced to either a religious or deconstructive reading in *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 4–12.

7. See *UH* 118; and *DF* 13.

8. Max Weber's analysis of the various forms of rationalization (religious, political, etc.) at work in Chinese civilization, and their perceived limits in allowing the development of capitalism in comparison with Western rationalization, is unfolded in *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964).

9. Herbert Fingarette, *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred* (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1998), 1–17, 79.

10. Confucius, *Analects*, trans. Edward Slingerland (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 17.17, 15.29. Sometimes the translation will be silently modified.

11. It is still a matter of contention how much of these works can be literally attributed to the historical Confucius or Mencius, yet such questions can be bracketed for the purposes of this paper. I will treat each as the author of their work for the sake of brevity. On the historical formation of the *Analects*, for instance, see E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, *The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and his Successors* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

12. *Ru* "agnosticism" became a justification for both religious pluralism and government control of religion in imperial Confucian ideology. The supposed atheism of *ru* literati became a religious and philosophical controversy in Europe with the Jesuits and philosophers such as Leibniz and Wolff defending the rationality and consequent compatibility with Christianity of Confucian thought. I examine Leibniz's account in greater detail in: "Leibniz, China, and the Hermeneutics of Cross-Cultural Understanding," in *Einheit in der Vielheit: Akten des VIII. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses,* ed. H. Breger, J. Herbst, and S. Erdner (Hannover: Leibniz Gesellschaft, 2006), 2:700–06, and (forthcoming) "Leibniz and China: Religion, Hermeneutics, and Enlightenment," *Religion in the Age of Enlightenment* (*RAE*), vol. 1 (2009).

13. The question whether it was pagan idolatry or morally honoring one's ancestors became a central part of the "Chinese Rites Controversy" that for a time divided the Jesuits from other Catholic orders and Leibniz's approach from that of Malebranche, see Nelson, "Leibniz, China, and Hermeneutics," 704–05.

14. On the ethical exclusivity of monotheism, see *DF* 178. Note Rudi Visker's discussion of these passages in *Truth and Singularity: Taking Foucault into Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1999), 311.

15. Levinas's critique of participation is developed in "Levi-Bruhl and Contemporary Philosophy," in *EN* 45–51.

16. Emmanuel Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be?* Ed. Jill Robbins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 47.

17. *DF* 26; *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred*, 77.

18. Since the early modern Chinese rites controversy, there have been a number of attempts to interpret Confucianism as an implicit monotheism or as containing monotheistic elements, including a rationalistic theism in the cases of Leibniz and Wolff. See Nelson, "Leibniz, China, and Hermeneutics," 700–06.

19. Nelson, "Leibniz, China, and Hermeneutics," 704–05.

20. On Levinas's critique of religion as belief and advocacy for ethical atheism, see *DF* 143–44, and Nelson, "The Secular, the Religious, and the Ethical," 91–109. For a historical overview of the rites controversy, see G. Minamiki, *The Chinese Rites Controversy* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1985), 15–76.

21. A common use of *ren* is to refer to the other person, see David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking through Confucius* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 140.

22. In an argument that should be worked out in relation to Levinas's notion of monotheism, Adam Zachary Newton notes the importance of not conflating Levinas's idealized portrait of Israel with the actual politics of the state of Israel in *The Fence and the Neighbor: Emmanuel Levinas, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, and Israel Among the Nations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 88–89.

23. Although focused on later Confucian attitudes toward working with spirits, Donald S. Sutton provides a good overview of the *ru* tradition in general in his "From Credulity to Scorn: Confucians Confront the Spirit Mediums in Late Imperial China," *Late Imperial China* 21, no. 2 (December 2000): 1–39. He points out that as early as the 4th century BCE, "the *Zuozhuan* 左傳 deplored spiritual beings, sacrifices, and cults that they described as *yin* 陰" (3), that is, as morally inappropriate. Sutton discusses how "Another often cited story described how Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (circa 179–104 BCE) clashed with the *wu* 巫 [i.e., spirit mediums] brought from the far south to the court of Emperor Wu 漢武帝. According to the *Fengsu tongyi* 風俗通義, when a contest was organized, Dong routed his opponents in a surprising way. While a *wu* imprecated and cast spells, Dong, wearing his (ritually appropriate) court costume, calmly faced south and read aloud from the Classics — and one or more *wu* fell dead on the spot" (4). The hostility of the *ru* tradition toward spirit ritualists, shamans, and mediums

only intensified over time and was extended to Buddhism and Daoism in Zhuxi (朱熹, 1130–1200 CE) and Neoconfucianism. Zhuxi also did not deny spirits but proposed how relations with them could be morally regulated through ritual propriety and Confucian "spiritual rites." For a detailed discussion of Zhuxi, see Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, "Zhu Xi's Prayers to the Spirit of Confucius and Claim to the Transmission of the Way," *Philosophy East and West* 54 (October 2004): 489–513.

24. Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be?,* 89.

25. Samuel Moyn, *Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas between Revelation and Ethics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 12–14.

26. I examine this issue further in my review of *Origins of the Other* in *Studia Phaenomenologica* 6 (2006): 436–39, and "The Secular, the Religious, and the Ethical in Kierkegaard and Levinas," 91–109.

27. For instance, in "Descralization and Disenchantment" in *NT* 136–60.

28. For example, in his two essays devoted to Kierkegaard: "Kierkegaard: Existence and Ethics" and "A Propos of 'Kierkegaard Vivant'" in *PN;* and in *TI* 305.

29. Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be?,* 77–78.

30. Ibid., 146.

31. Ibid., 168.

32. On the kinship and fraternity of the foreign, note *TI* 214; on not doing onto others what you would not want done to yourself, see *Analects,* 15.24.

33. *Analects,* 15.24. For an excellent discussion of the senses and problems with the Confucian formulation of the golden rule, see Sim, *Remastering Morals,* 41–43.

34. On the unethical character of reciprocity for Levinas, which might be said to exclude acting from reciprocity and equality (morally) but not acting for them (politically), see Hilary Putnam, "Levinas and Judaism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas,* ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 38–39.

35. Respectively, *Analects,* 15.5, 12.20, 1.16.

36. A. C. Graham, "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature," in *Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi,* ed. Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002).

37. On the agricultural context of such ways of speaking, see Joanne D. Bird-whistell, *Mencius and Masculinities: Dynamics of Power, Morality, and Maternal Thinking* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 34–36.

38. Patt-Shamir, *To Broaden the Way,* xv–xxxi.

39. Compare David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking through Confucius* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 86–87.

40. On *li* as a disposition, see James Behuniak Jr., *Mencius on Becoming Human* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 116; on questioning as part of ritual propriety, note *Analects,* 3.15; on changing ritual for appropriate reasons, see *Analects,* 9.3 and *Mencius,* 4B6.

41. See, for instance, *Analects*, 4.13.

42. See Jill Robbins, "Strange Fire" and Claire Elise Katz, "The Responsibility of Irresponsibility: Taking (Yet) Another Look at the Akedah" in Eric Sean Nelson, Antje Kapust, Kent Still, *Addressing Levinas* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005).

43. For a different yet complementary account of *ru* thought as a philosophy of immanence, compare Hall and Ames, *Thinking through Confucius*, 158.

44. As an-archic and ungrounded, Hilary Putnam, in "Levinas and Judaism," suggests, Levinasian ethics operates prior to the categories of ethical theory that are always reductive of the ethical by reducing it to a "because" or reason (35).

45. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 35–62.

46. For example, Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), 68.

47. Kwong-Loi Shun, *Mencius and Early Chinese Thought* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 15.

48. Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung, *The Highest Order of Cultivation* and *On the Practice of the Mean*, trans. A. Plaks (London: Penguin, 2003), 1.

49. Ibid., 9.

50. *Analects*, 4.6, 5.8, 5.19, 7.30.

51. Ibid., 17.7.

52. Some authors interpret *tian* in terms of a transcendent theistic God. It seems more likely that *tian* cannot be separated from the order of the world as its highest instance (if understood as a deity) or principle (if understood impersonally as regulative) or, when understood as equivalent to nature, the world's immanent self-ordering. Compare Sarah Allen, *The Way of Water and the Sprout of Virtue* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 18–22.

53. On the morally secondary character of profit, see *Mencius* 1A1 and 6B4; on the absence of supernatural profit, Ivanhoe, "Confucian Self-Cultivation," 224.

54. *Mencius*, 5A5.

55. On fate (*ming*) in Mencius and early Chinese thought, see the interesting articles by Ning Chen, "The Concept of Fate in Mencius," *Philosophy East and West* 47, no. 4 (October 1997): 495–520; and Ted Slingerland, "The Conception of 'Ming' in Early Confucian Thought," *Philosophy East and West* 46 (October 1996): 567–81. I tend to agree with how Chen distinguishes the different senses of *ming*, only one of which means fate in the ordinary sense analyzed by Slingerland.

56. *Mencius*, 7B24.

57. Bettina Bergo, *Levinas between Ethics and Politics: For the Beauty That Adorns the Earth* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1999), 13.

58. Antje Kapust and I raised these questions in the preface to *Addressing Levinas*, x.

59. Norbert M. Samuelson, *Jewish Philosophy: An Historical Introduction* (London: Continuum, 2003), 132–33.

60. On the moral perfectionism of Levinas, see Putnam, "Levinas and Judaism," 36–37.

61. On Levinas's connections with the French republican tradition, see Caygill, *Levinas and the Political,* 7–10.

62. Such as Gillian Rose, *Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37–38; and Žižek, *Organs without Bodies,* 106.

63. As in *DF* 230.

64. Žižek, *Organs without Bodies,* 106–07.

65. See *GDT* 64–65; Catherine Chalier, *What Ought I to Do? Morality in Kant and Levinas* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 139.

66. Emmanuel Levinas, *The Levinas Reader,* ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 282.

67. Note *Mencius* 5B9 and 1B8, which were used to justify political revolution despite Mencius's rejection of violence. See, William Theodore De Bary and Weiming Tu, *Confucianism and Human Rights* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 8.

68. As in *Mencius* 1A7 and the destitute, who include Levinas's widow and orphan as well as the widower and the childless, described in 1B5.

69. This is a matter of dispute in the contemporary reception of the *Mencius,* compare Philip J. Ivanhoe, "Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi's Notion of Extension," in *Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi,* ed. Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002), 228–31.

70. *Mencius,* 4A9. On the capacity to respond, see ibid., 64–65; on the relative priority of moral appropriateness (*yi*) in relation to rituality (*li*), see Shun, *Mencius and Early Chinese Thought,* 25–26.

71. *Mencius,* 2A6.

72. Ibid., 4A17, 4B6, 6B1.

73. Franklin Perkins notes how the emotions are both embodied in the particularity of concrete relations and provide the basis for responding to the multiplicity of human situations and characters in his "Wisdom in Mengzi: Between Self and Nature" in *Mythos and Logos: How to Regain the Love of Wisdom,* ed. Albert Anderson (New York: Rodopi, 2004), 205–19. Also see his article on wisdom as the cultivation of the emotions: "Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 29, no. 2 (June 2002): 207–26.

74. *Mencius,* 6A6; translation modified.

75. *Xing* (性), according to A. C. Graham, does not mean innate fixed qualities given at birth but the spontaneous unfolding of potential across the course of a life in "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature," 2–3. On the prereflective character of these natural moral tendencies in Mencius, see Ivanhoe, "Confucian Self Cultivation," 234.

76. *Mencius,* 2A6.

77. Ivanhoe, "Confucian Self-Cultivation," 226.

78. *Analects,* 9.11.

79. *Analects,* 1.2. Xunzi (荀子) extended this claim to criticize Zhuangzi for forsaking the human in obsessively pursuing heaven or nature (*tian*) in book 21 of the *Xunzi* (《荀子》).

80. *TI* 203; *DF* 27.

81. On natural and moral spontaneity in Mencius and Xunzi, see Graham, "The Background of the Mencian Theory," 9, 13.

82. Ivanhoe, "Confucian Self-Cultivation," 223.

83. *The Levinas Reader,* 257.

84. Ibid., 151–53.

85. Xu Gan, *Balanced Discourses,* trans. J. Makeham (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 7, 9.

86. Shun, *Mencius and Early Chinese Thought,* 22.

87. *Mencius,* 3A5, 3B9, 7A26.

88. Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be?,* 278.

89. *Mencius,* 4B30 and 6B3.

90. Translation modified from P. J. Ivanhoe and B. W. Van Norden, *Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2005), 155.