Notes

Notes to Guenther, "Fecundity and Natal Alienation"

1. See *TO* 57 on hypostasis as "riveting" me to my body and *TO* 67 on enchainment.

2. See John E. Drabinski, *Levinas and the Postcolonial: Race, Nation, Other* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), chapter 4, on the importance of fecundity in the wake of an historical disaster.

3. Levinas's own racist remarks about non-Western cultures testify to this importance. For example: "I often say, though it's a dangerous thing to say publicly, that humanity consists of the Bible and the Greeks. All the rest can be translated: all the rest—all the exotic—is dance" (cited in Sonia Sikka, "The Delightful Other: Portraits of the Feminine in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Levinas," *Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas,* ed. Tina Chanter (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 188n20). Or, with reference to Asians and Asian cultures: "Under the greedy eyes of these countless hordes who wish to hope and live, we, the Jews and Christians, are pushed to the margins of history…[Russia must not] drown itself in an Asiatic civilization…. The yellow peril! It is not racial, it is spiritual. It does not involve inferior values; it involves a radical strangeness, a stranger to the weight of its past, from which there does not filter any familiar voice or infliction, a lunar or Martian past." Cited in C. Fred Alford, "Levinas and Political Theory," *Political Theory* 32:2 (2004): 159–60.

4. Michael Fagenblat, *A Covenant of Creatures: Levinas's Philosophy of Judaism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 179–80.

5. Ibid., 183.

6. Cf. *TI* 212–14, 278–80. See also Lisa Guenther, *The Gift of the Other: Levinas and the Politics of Reproduction* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006); 141–64 for a fuller discussion of the relation between ethics and politics in Levinas's work.

7. Fagenblat writes: "Ethical solidarity with 'all' requires the heritage of this thinking to be shared, through communication and struggle, in concrete political fraternity with some. But fraternity is not a relation between subjects with properties, or even a relation of identities. It is the sharing of an exposure to a heritage in which an identity comes to pass as co-responsiveness" (Fagenblat, *A Covenant of Creatures,* 194). Political fraternity, on the other hand, refers to "the sharing of a creaturely exposure to the name of the other. But since the

name designates without describing and glorifies without knowing, the political creature is absolutely indifferent to the identity of the other" (194). While ethical fraternity is a relation between the singular and the universal, political fraternity is a relation to a particular identity that both shelters the ethical exposure of singularity and concretizes the universal imperative of justice. Ultimately, this identity unravels, or is exposed to indifference in response to the singularity of the other; but it nevertheless provides a starting point for the concrete embodiment of ethical responsibility, not just as a single individual but also as the member of a community.

8. Jacques Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship,* trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 2005).

9. Saidiya Hartman, "The Time of Slavery," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 101: 4 (Fall 2002), 762. See also Saidiya Hartman, *Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

10. Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 7.

11. Ibid., 5.

12. See Vincent Brown, "Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery," *The American Historical Review* 114 (Dec. 2009): 1231–49, for an elaboration of this point in resistance to Patterson's concept of social death.

13. Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death,* 66.

14. Claude Meillassoux, *The Anthropology of Slavery: The Womb of Iron and Gold,* trans. Alide Dasnois (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 40, 107, 121. See also Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life,* trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 17–29, for an account of inclusive exclusion.

15. Meillassoux, *The Anthropology of Slavery,* 40.

16. Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death,* 5, 40.

17. Ibid., 8.

18. Ibid., 8.

19. Recall, for example, Frederick Douglass's exposure to the torture of his Aunt Hester, Sethe's inability to save her children from slavery except through infanticide in Toni Morrison's *Beloved;* Sojourner Truth's forced reliance on the help of reliable and unsympathetic white women to retrieve her son from being illegally sold to a slaveholder in another state. See Harris, "Finding Sojourner's Truth," 325–28.

20. Cited in Harris, "Finding Sojourner's Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of Property," *Cardozo Law Review* 18 (Nov. 1996), 337; see also Cheryl I. Harris, "Whiteness As Property," *Harvard Law Review* 106: 8 (June 1993), 1707–95.

21. Cited in Hortense J. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book," *Diacritics* 17:2 (Summer 1987), 79.

22. Black men were also alienated as fathers, but they were not *necessary* for the reproduction of slaves; the slave owner himself, or a freeman, could just as

easily impregnate a slave woman. But only slave women could be used to give birth to more slaves within the slave community, short of buying or capturing more slaves from elsewhere. Spillers brilliantly explores the social, political and psychic consequences of this manipulation of black kinship structures (Spillers, "Mama's Baby," 64–81).

23. Harris, "Finding Sojourner's Truth," 328.

24. Ibid., 332.

25. Like slaves, white women were considered the chattel property of their husbands and so relied upon them for their own (limited) rights and civil status. But a white woman was positioned differently from a slave in having recourse, at least potentially, to kin who would come to her aid or advocate on her behalf if her husband treated her unfairly. White women were not natally alienated in the sense that black slaves were; they had at least one other option, one other path for protection and empowerment: their family of birth. This assistance may or may not be offered to them, and it may or may not be effective in curbing a husband's abuse of power, but it was not ruled out in advance by the structure of marriage, as it was for black women by the structure of natal alienation in slavery.

26. Harris, "Finding Sojourner's Truth," 331.

27. Hartman, "The Time of Slavery," 764, 767.

Notes to Drichel, "Face to Face with the Other Other"

1. On the ethics and politics of the other in postcolonial studies, see my discussion in Simone Drichel, "Of Political Bottom Lines and Last Ethical Frontiers: The Politics and Ethics of 'the Other.'" *borderlands e-journal* 6, no. 2 (2007).

2. I agree with John Drabinski's point that, despite an undeniable emphasis on the other in Levinas's work, Levinas is ultimately more appropriately framed as a philosopher of subjectivity: "Levinas's work has always been about the life of subjectivity, even as his reputation is so tied to the idea of the Other." John E. Drabinski, *Levinas and the Postcolonial: Race, Nation, Other* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 29.

3. Although Robert Young brought Levinasian philosophy to the attention of postcolonial scholars as far back as 1990, in his influential monograph *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), it is only recently that postcolonial critics have begun to explore the potential that might lie in such a conversation. For examples, see: Simone Drichel, "Regarding the Other: Postcolonial Violations and Ethical Resistance in Margaret Atwood's *Bodily Harm,*" in *Levinas and Narrative. Special Issue of Modern Fiction Studies* (2008): 20–49; Jane Hiddleston, *Understanding Postcolonialism,* (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009); Robert Eaglestone, "Postcolonial Thought and Levinas's Double Vision," in *Radicalizing Levinas,* ed. Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010), 57–68, and, most recently and comprehensively, Drabinski, *Levinas.*

4. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Is Levinas 'Use-Less'? A Seminar," *School of Criticism and Theory, Cornell University* (Ithaca, Summer 2004).

5. Thus Susan Handelman, for example, remarks that in Levinas's later writings "the terms he uses to describe subjectivity and responsibility often become disturbing: trauma, wounding, hostage, obsession, persecution, sacrifice without reserve." Susan Handelman, "Facing the Other: Levinas, Perelman, Rosenzweig," in *Divine Aporia: Postmodern Conversations about the Other,* ed. John C. Hawley (London: Associated University Press, 2000), 277. Handelman is not alone in this concern; several other critics have similarly observed that Levinas's idea of substitution, which includes situations where I expiate the other's crimes, may, in Colin Davis's words, take "the argument into murky waters," asking "Should my goodness really extend so far, and does this mean that the victim of torture can be held to blame for the torturer's action?" Colin Davis, *Levinas: An Introduction* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 81. Likewise, Robert Bernasconi worries about the precarious nature of such claims: "What is this but neurosis, mania, obsession?" Robert Bernasconi, "What is the Question to which 'Substitution' is the Answer?," in *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas,* ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 239.

6. Sonia Sikka, "How Not to Read the Other: 'All the Rest Can be Translated,'" *Philosophy Today* 43, no. 2 (1999): 200.

7. In her recent monograph, *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas,* Diane Perpich offers a very similar critique of Sikka, albeit based on arguments made in Sikka's 2001 essay "The Delightful Other: Portraits of the Feminine in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Levinas," in *Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas,* ed. Tina Chanter (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 96–118. See Diane Perpich, *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 177–98.

8. According to Chantal Mouffe, political identities "are always collective identities [that] entail the creation of an 'Us' that only exists by distinguishing itself from a 'Them.'" Chantal Mouffe, *Politics and Passions: The Stakes of Democracy* (London: Centre for the Study of Democracy, 2002), 7.

9. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory. A Reader,* ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 70–75.

10. Karl Marx, *Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte,* Second ed. (Hamburg: Otto Meissner, 1869), 89. *Surveys from Exile,* trans. David Fernbach (New York: Penguin, 1973), 239.

11. Spivak, in *The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues,* ed. Sarah Harasym (London: Routledge, 1990), 108–09.

12. Beatrice Hanssen, *Critique of Violence* (London: Routledge, 2000), 177.

13. Diane Perpich, "A Singular Justice: Ethics and Politics Between Levinas and Derrida," *Philosophy Today* 42 (Supplement 1998): 59.

14. Jacques Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas,* trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 19–20. Echoing Derrida's thoughts, John Caputo, similarly, asks, "How do we draw a politics, which is better than barbarism, from ethics?"—only to point out that, about this question, "Levinas is usually silent, and when he does speak, it is not as helpful as one would hope." John D. Caputo, "*Adieu—sans Dieu:* Derrida and Levinas," in *The Face of the Other and the Trace of God. Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,* ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 294.

15. See Robert Bernasconi, "Who is my Neighbor? Who is the Other? Questioning 'the Generosity of Western Thought,'" in *Ethics and Reponsibility in the Phenomenological Tradition* (Pittsburgh: The Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Duquesne University, 1992), 1–31; Bernasconi, "Wer ist der Dritte? Überkreuzung von Ethik und Politik bei Levinas," in *Der Anspruch des Anderen. Perspektiven phänomenologischer Ethik,* ed. Bernhard Waldenfels and Iris Därmann (München: Fink, 1998), 87–110; Bernasconi, "The Invisibility of Racial Minorities in the Public Realm of Appearances," in *Race,* ed. Robert Bernasconi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 284–99.

16. As the juxtaposition of these phrases indicates, Levinas's position is inconsistent and hides a gender blind spot, for if we truly were to encounter the other in their nudity, as abstracted from the discursive structures of the world, we should have no way of realizing that it is a male other—"*his* eyes"—the color of whose eyes we are not noticing.

17. Bernasconi, "Invisibility," 290.

18. Quoted in ibid.

19. Bernasconi alerts us to the fact that, because Levinas's emphasis on "the abstractness of the face" structurally aligns the singularity of the (abstract) face with the universality of (abstract) humanism, it is marred by the same risk of homogenization. Having noted Levinas's comment that the face is "without any cultural ornament" (*BPW* 53), Bernasconi proceeds to ask: "Does that mean that one must approach the Other without reference to his or her cultural identity? . . . It seems clear that to encounter the Other one must overlook the color of that person's skin. What could be less controversial than the claims that an abstract humanism makes on behalf of the other as a human being? And yet, while skin color is of itself a superficial marker, is there not a violence implicit in the reduction of the alterity of the Other to the status of a human being *like me*? . . . Does Levinas's claim about the abstractness of the face mark a certain continuity with abstract humanism and its complicity with homogenisation?" Bernasconi, "Who is my Neighbor?," 4–5.

20. Cf. Wendy Brown, "Wounded Attachments," *Political Theory* 21, no. 3 (1993): 390–410.

21. William Large, "On the Meaning of the Word Other in Levinas," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 27, no. 1 (1996): 41.

22. John D. Caputo, *Demythologizing Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 202.

23. Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference,* trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 116.

24. Ibid., 111.

25. Simon Critchley, "Introduction," in *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas,* 17.

26. Perpich, "Singular Justice," 62–63. The quotation refers to Derrida, *Writing and Difference:* 111, emphasis is Perpich's.

27. Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, and Alison Ainley, "The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas," in *The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other,* ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (London: Routledge, 1988), 170–71.

28. Critchley, "Introduction," 17.

29. Robert Eaglestone, *Ethical Criticism: Reading After Levinas* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 142.

30. Whereas most critics accentuate the novelty of the saying and the said, claiming that it "makes *Otherwise than Being* radically different from its predecessor" (ibid., 138), a few isolated voices have drawn attention to this continuity. Thus Robert Bernasconi stresses, for example, that in so far as "the diachrony of the saying and the said is indeed Levinas's response to the problem of thematizing the unthematizable, it would certainly have been open to him to respond to Derrida that it had already been given in *Totality and Infinity* as part of the 'formal structure of language.'" Robert Bernasconi, "Skepticism in the Face of Philosophy," in *Re-Reading Levinas,* ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 154.

31. Adriaan Peperzak, *To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1993), 221.

32. Mark C. Taylor, *Altarity* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 201.

33. William Paul Simmons, "The Third: Levinas' Theoretical Movel from An-archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 26, no. 6 (1999): 88.

34. Tamra Wright, *The Twilight of Jewish Philosophy: Emmanuel Levinas' Ethical Hermeneutics* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), 53.

35. Simon Critchley, *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas,* 2nd edition (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1999), 7.

36. Taylor, *Altarity,* 200.

37. Simon Critchley also alludes to this double meaning of "betrayal," pointing out that the "Saying can be conveyed (*traduit*) only to the extent that it can be betrayed (*trahit*) within the Said." Critchley, *Ethics,* 164.

38. Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, "The Rhetoric of Failure and Deconstruction," *Philosophy Today* 40, no. 1 (1996): 87.

39. Jeffrey M. Dudiak, "Structures of Violence, Structures of Peace: Levinasian Reflections on Just War and Pacifism," in *Knowing Other-Wise: Philosophy at the*

Threshold of Spirituality, ed. James H. Olthuis (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 165. Cf. Davis, *Levinas,* 53.

40. Robert Bernasconi, "The Third Party: Levinas on the Intersection of the Ethical and the Political," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 30, no. 1 (1999): 76.

41. Critchley, *The Ethics of Deconstruction,* 260.

42. Derrida, *Adieu,* 33.

43. Bernasconi, "Third Party," 78.

44. Ibid., 77.

45. Ibid., 77.

46. Ibid., 86.

47. Bernasconi, "Invisibility," 289.

48. Ibid.

Notes to Eisenstadt, "Eurocentrism and Colorblindness"

1. Rudi Visker, "Is Ethics Fundamental?" *Continental Philosophy Review* 36 (2003): 263–302.

2. Robert Bernasconi, "Who is my neighbor? Who is the Other? Questioning 'the generosity of Western thought,'" in *Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers,* ed. Claire Elise Katz and Laura Trout, vol. 4 (London: Routledge, 2005), 5–30.

3. In fact, this statement is even more problematic than I have suggested, and not only because of Levinas's shift from the Bororo and the Indians (perhaps too 'primitive' for him to comment on?) to the Buddhists. To see how, let us venture an experimental restatement, substituting Germans for Jews and Jews for Buddhists: *It is the Germans who, alongside their numerous atrocities, invented the contemporary philosophy of guilt and instituted a vast system of memorialization and remuneration. This represents a victory of German generosity. For me, of course, Luther is the model of excellence, but I say this while knowing nothing of Maimonides.* Though I am not certain the experiment is entirely legitimate, the sound of this restatement is certainly troubling.

4. Levinas, "Peace and Proximity," in *BPW* 162–69; and Levinas, "Uniqueness," in *EN* 189–96.

5. The original interview from which this formulation is drawn is from 1985. The other interview is with Raoul Mortley and conducted in 1991: Raoul Mortley, "Levinas," in *French Philosophers in Conversation* (London: Routledge, 1991), 18.

6. *TI* 79. The face has no body, and therefore couldn't dance even if it wanted to.

7. Bernasconi, "Who is my neighbor?," 8–9. We are all familiar with quotations that will support this. These include not only passages on the featurelessness or non-phenomenality of the face, and on its lack of context or culture, but also

passage like the one cited by Bernasconi from *Difficult Freedom*: monotheism sees that "one man is absolutely like another man beneath the variety of historical traditions kept alive in each case" (*DF* 178, cited in Bernasconi, "Who is my neighbor?," 20–21). Bernasconi points out that this kind of antiracist statement has been known to accompany "acute and violent racism" (ibid., 21).

8. Ibid., 17.
9. Ibid., 17.
10. Ibid., 6.
11. Visker, "Ethics," 288.
12. Ibid.
13. "Accept Levinas's reasoning," writes Visker, "and of course the problem I am trying to formulate is spirited away" (Ibid., 283).
14. Slavoj Žižek, "A Leftist Plea for Eurocentrism," *Critical Inquiry* 24, no. 4 (Summer 1998): 1006.
15. All three previous quotations, ibid., 1007.
16. Ibid., 1008.
17. Ibid., 1006.

Notes to Maldonado-Torres, "Levinas's Hegemonic Identity Politics, Radical Philosophy, and the Unfinished Project of Decolonization"

I wish to express thanks to the editor of this volume, John E. Drabinski, for valuable feedback.

1. For a consideration of various angles of the "ethical turn" see, Marjorie Garber, Beatrice Hanssen, and Rebecca L. Walkowitz, eds., *The Turn to Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack, eds., *Mapping the Ethical Turn: A Reader in Ethics, Culture, and Literary Theory* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001). For the more radical critiques of Levinasian ethics and deconstruction see Alain Badiou, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil,* trans. Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2001); Slavoj Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2003).
2. Badiou, *Ethics,* xxxv.
3. Ibid., 25.
4. Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology* (London: Verso, 2000), 4.
5. Ibid., 211.
6. Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf,* 7.
7. Ibid., 35.
8. I explore Žižek's orthodoxy more in depth in Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "The Regressive Kernel of Orthodoxy," review of *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity*, by Slavoj Žižek, *Radical Philosophy Review* 6, no. 1 (2003): 59–70.

9. I have also examined this issue in Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "Decolonization and the New Identitarian Logics after September 11: Eurocentrism and Americanism against the Barbarian Threats," *Radical Philosophy Review* 8, no. 1 (2005): 35–67.

10. For an elaboration of the concept of the modern/colonial see Walter Mignolo and Arturo Escobar, eds., *Globalization and the Decolonial Option* (London: Routledge, 2009). Walter Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

11. This and related points are discussed in a section on "Threatening Others" in Howard Caygill, *Levinas and the Political* (London: Routledge, 2002), 182–94. See also, for instance, Jason Caro, "Levinas and the Palestinians," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 35 (2009): 671–84.

12. Caygill, *Levinas and the Political,* 182–94.

13. Ibid., 183.

14. Levinas's statement is quoted in Caygill, *Levinas and the Political,* 184. Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire* (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1994), 171.

15. Caygill, *Levinas and the Political,* 184.

16. Also quoted in ibid., 182.

17. Also quoted in ibid., 183.

18. I develop further these problematic elements in Husserl's and Heidegger's philosophies in Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "Post-Imperial Reflections on Crisis, Knowledge, and Utopia: Transgresstopic Critical Hermeneutics and the 'Death of European Man,'" *Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations* 25, no. 3 (2002): 277–315; and Nelson Maldonado-Torres, *Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

19. See Maldonado-Torres, *Against War*, 100ff.

20. See Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks,* trans. Richard Wilcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008); and Lewis R. Gordon, "Through the Zone of Nonbeing: A Reading of *Black Skin, White Masks* in Celebration of Fanon's Eightieth Birthday," *The C. L. R. James Journal* 11, no. 1 (2005): 1–43.

21. See Walter Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).

22. W. E. B. DuBois, *The Souls of Black Folk: Authoritative Text, contexts, Criticism,* ed. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Terri Hume Oliver (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999).

23. For more on this theme see Lewis Gordon, "Shifting the Geography of Reason in an Age of Disciplinary Decadence," *Transmodernity* 1.2 (Fall 2011): 95–103. This is also the motto of the Caribbean Philosophical Association. For more on the Caribbean Philosophical Association see the website of the association (www.caribbeanphilosophicalassociation.org/) and the annotated bibliography "Caribbean Philosophical Association" that is part of Oxford

Bibliographies Online (oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/view/document/obo-9780199766581/obo-9780199766581-0024.xml).

24. For an analysis of how Levinas's view of "sense" is used to establish a substantial difference between European and non-Western culture see Ma Lin, "All the Rest Must Be Translated: Lévinas's Notion of Sense," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 35, no. 4 (2008): 599–612.

25. Emmanuel Levinas, "Ethics of the Infinite," in *Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers*, ed. Richard Kearney (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 54–55.

26. See Frantz Fanon, "Racism and Culture," *Toward the African Revolution,* trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grave Press, 1988), 29–44.

27. Santiago Slabodsky, "Emmanuel Levinas's Geopolitics: Overlooked Conversations between Rabbinical and Third World Decolonialisms," *The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy* 18, no. 2 (2010): 147–65.

28. Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco, "Editors' Introduction: The Third Wave of Levinas Scholarship," in *Radicalizing Levinas,* ed. Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010), x.

29. Ibid.

30. Sonia Sikka, "The Delightful Other: Portraits of the Feminine in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Levinas," in *Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas,* ed. Tina Chanter (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 2001), 114.

31. Ibid., 116; Diane Perpich, "Levinas, Feminism, and Identity Politics," in *Radicalizing Levinas,* 21–40.

32. Perpich, "Levinas, Feminism, and Identity Politics," 29.

33. Ibid., 32.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 36.

36. A good place to start is Fanon's view of the "Negro cry" and his critique of the Hegelian master/slave relation. See Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks,* chapters 5 and 7, particularly the section "The Black Man and Hegel." I discuss some elements of this in Maldonado-Torres, *Against War,* chapters 3 and 4.

37. For alternative depictions of identity and identity politics see particularly Linda Martín Alcoff, "An Epistemology for the Next Revolution," *Transmodernity* 1.2 (Fall 2011): 67–78; Linda Martín Alcoff, *Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Paula Moya, "Who We Are and From Where We Speak," *Transmodernity* 1.2 (Fall 2011): 79–94; Paula M. L. Moya and Michael Hames García, ed. *Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the Predicament of Postmodernism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

38. Robert Eaglestone, "Postcolonial Thought and Levinas's Double Vision," in *Radicalizing Levinas,* 60.

39. Ibid., 60. Eaglestone is quoting Dussel here.

40. For readings of Levinas in relation to genetic phenomenology see Richard A. Cohen, "Translator's Introduction," in *TO;* and Maldonado-Torres, *Against War.*

41. For a concise summary of Levinas's view of ethics as first philosophy see "Ethics as First Philosophy," in *LR* 75–87.

42. Previous three quotations from Eaglestone, "Postcolonial Thought," 61.

43. Ibid., 62.

44. Previous two quotations, ibid., 63.

45. Ibid., 64.

46. Ibid., 65.

47. Kenan Malik, "Universalism and Difference in Discourses of Race," *Review of International Studies* 26 (December 2000): 167.

48. Slabodsky, "Emmanuel Levinas's Geopolitics," 150.

49. Enrique Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse Of "The Other" And the Myth of Modernity,* trans. Michael D. Barber (New York: Continuum, 1995); Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation,* trans. and ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996).

50. Enrique Dussel, *Etica de la liberación en la edad de la globalización y de la exclusión* (Madrid: Editorial Trotta; México, D.F.: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana—Iztapalapa, and Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1998), 68; Enrique Dussel, *Philosophy of Liberation,* trans. Aquilina Martinez and Christine Morkovsky (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985), 30.

51. The idea of modernity as a paradigm of war that involves the suspension of ethics and the naturalization of war through racialization and dehumanization is the central theme of Maldonado-Torres, *Against War.* I use Levinas's genetic analysis, Fanon's existential phenomenology and sociogeny, and Dussel's philosophy of history and genealogy to articulate this position.

52. The themes of "understanding and loving" appear as early as in the introduction of Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks.* For a discussion of metaphysical desire see *TI* 33.

53. This is the main effort in Maldonado-Torres, *Against War.*

54. Eaglestone, "Postcolonial Thought," 65.

55. See Steve Martinot, "Patriotism and Its Double," *Peace Review* 15, no. 4 (2003): 405–10; Martinot, "Pro-Democracy and the Ethics of Refusal," *Socialism and Democracy* 19, no. 2 (2005). Available at sdonline.org/38/; Maldonado-Torres, *Against War.*

56. Caygill, *Levinas and the Political,* 161.

57. For a development of this point see chapters three and four in Maldonado-Torres, *Against War.*

58. John Drabinski, "The Possibility of an Ethical Politics: From Peace to Liturgy," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 26, no. 4 (2000): 62.

59. See Caro, "Levinas and the Palestinians," 678–79; Caygill, *Levinas and the Political,* 182, 87; *DF* 131.

60. Jason Caro, "Levinas and the Palestinians." *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 35 (2009): 678.

61. Perpich, "Levinas, Feminism, and Identity Politics," 66.

62. Judith Butler, "Precarious Life." In *Radicalizing Levinas,* 18.

63. "Shifting the geography of reason" is the organizing theme of the Caribbean Philosophical Association. For more on this, see note 23 above.

Notes to Gallagher, "Ethics in the Absence of Reference"

In addition to the abbreviations at the front of this volume, the following are also used for texts by Édouard Glissant: *Traité du tout-monde* (*TTM*) (Paris: Gallimard, 1997); *L'Intention poétique* (*IP*) (Paris: Seuil, 1969); *Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays* (*CD*), trans. J. Michael Dash (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1992); *Le discours antillais* (*DA*) (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1981); *Introduction à une poétique du divers* (*IPD*) (Paris: Gallimard, 1996); and *Soleil de la conscience* (*SC*) (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1956). All translations and emphasis for these works, as well as from the French texts by Emmanuel Levinas, are my own unless otherwise indicated.

1. Mary Gallagher, "Relating in theory in a Globalized World: Between Levinas's Ethics and Glissant's Poetics," in *World Writing: Poetics, Ethics, Globalization,* ed. Mary Gallagher (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 86–121.

2. Henry Louis Gates, *Loose Canons: Notes on the Culture Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 79.

3. Interview with Homi Bhabha by W. J. T. Mitchell, in *Artforum* 33, no. 7 (March 1995): 81.

4. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1994).

5. This expression is used and defined by Glissant in *Le discours antillais*, 229, to refer to those parts of the Americas dominated by the plantation economy.

6. James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature and Art* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 173.

7. The concept of creolization is comprehensively discussed in a number of articles in Charles Stewart, ed., *Creolization: History, Ethnography, Theory* (Walnut Creek, Ca: Left Coast Press, 2007).

8. Laura Chrisman, *Postcolonial Contraventions: Cultural Readings of Race, Imperialism and Transnationalism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 138–39.

9. The term's ambiguity is particularly well explained in Stewart, *Creolization.*

10. See Stewart, *Creolization.*

11. "S'il était loisible que le Même se révélât dans la solitude de l'Etre, il demeure impérieux que le Divers 'passe' par la totalité des peuples et des communautés" (*DA* 191).

12. "The cultural realm demonstrates the convulsive anxiety of those intellectual, spiritual, or moral entities brought into spectacular relation with others from which they diverge or to which they are opposed in what is henceforth for us world totality" (*TTM* 247).

13. The qualification is not insignificant. The reference to these exceptional or supplementary closed spaces means that Glissant's *tout-monde* avoids claims to the inclusiveness or closure of a bounded, complete, or exhaustive totality.

14. "Where the ultimate realization of a totalized world makes it possible for the most heterogeneous and distant cultural elements to be, as it were, brought into relation within this totality (where there is no longer any organic authority and where the archipelago is all)" (*IPD* 22).

15. Glissant's 1990 volume of essays is entitled *Poétique de la relation,* and it was followed in by collections entitled *Introduction à une poétique du divers* (1996) and *Traité du tout-monde* (1997). Indeed, Glissant gave the new editions of his 1956, 1961, and 1990 essays new subtitles: *Poétique I, II,* and *III* respectively. *Traité du tout-monde* included the subtitle *Poétique IV,* and *La Cohée du Lamentin* (2005) was subtitled, *Poétique V*. Interestingly, Glissant's latest collection of essays (2006), *Une nouvelle région du monde,* is subtitled *Esthétique I.*

16. "The global world is excess and if we do not take the measure of this lack of measure we risk—and this is one of the touchstones of my poetics—massacres, genocides and intolerance." (*IPD* 91).

17. "Advances in awareness and hope that allow one to say, without being utopian or at least accepting to be utopian, that today's humanities are abandoning with difficulty something to which they had been clinging for a long time, namely the thought that *a being's identity is neither valid nor recognizable as such unless it excludes the identity of all other possible beings*" (*IPD* 14).

18. Peter Hallward, *Absolutely Postcolonial: Writing Between the Singular and the Specific* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 2.

19. Ibid., 7.

20. Ibid., 39–40.

21. Ibid., 123.

22. Ibid., 126.

23. There is a certain distortion of Levinas's thinking in those accounts that gloss over the importance that the thinker accords to the other person (*autrui*) in contradistinction to the Other (*l'Autre*). The distinction between the two terms is illustrated by the mere fact that the other person has a face, and the face is an image or a value central to Levinas's ethics. For this reason, certain approaches to Levinas fall into the trap of thematizing difference in the way that Levinas rejects.

24. The three essays, "Le droit originel," "La notion large des droits de l'homme," and "Les droits de l'autre homme," appear in *HS* but were originally published as "Les Droits de l'homme et les droits d'autrui" in *Indivisibilité des droits de l'homme* (Fribourg : Editions Universitaires, 1985).

25. "A preference even in the human domain, for mathematical identities, identifiable from outside, as against the coincidence of self with self" (*HAH* 96).

26. "The most recent, audacious, and influential ethnography situates all cultures on the same level. The political task of decolonization is thus linked to an ontology, to a notion of being seen through the perspective of multiple, diverse, cultural meanings.... Such a notion of universality betrays a radical opposition, so characteristic of our times, to the expansion of culture through colonization. To acculturate and to colonize are thus seen as being profoundly distinct or separate acts" (*HAH* 33).

27. "It is in fact possible for a Frenchman to learn Chinese and to move from one culture to the other, without the intermediary of an esperanto that would distort the two languages being mediated" (*HAH* 59).

28. Said, *Culture and Imperialism,* 408.

Notes to Prabhu, "Eros in Infinity and Totality"

In addition to the abbreviations at the front of this volume, the following are also used: Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (*BS*), trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967); Frantz Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth* (*WE*), trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1968).

1. One might suggest Levinas had a blind spot, given that he wrote as an essentially "white" (yet Jewish) European but that is not the focus here. Fanon already showed quite clearly the pertinence of lived racial awareness as a scathing critique, in and of itself, of a certain, fundamentally European *Weltanschauung,* which he did in the ways his thought came up against that of his primary interlocutor, Jean-Paul Sartre.

2. See Anjali Prabhu, "To Dream of Fanon: Reconstructing a Method for Thought by a Revolutionary Intellectual," *Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy* 19, no. 1 (2011): 57–70.

3. Jacques Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas,* trans. Pascale-Anne Bault & Michael Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 33.

4. Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference,* trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 106.

5. Cf. Prabhu, "To Dream."

6. Derrida, *Adieu,* 25–28.

7. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 383.

Notes to Sealey, "Levinas, Sartre, and the Question of Solidarity"

1. Frederick Douglass, "To Our Oppressed Countrymen," in *Black Nationalism in America,* ed. John H. Bracey Jr., August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 58.

2. The question of the identity of social collectives is thoroughly pursued by Tommie Shelby in "Foundations of Black Solidarity: Collective Identity or Common Oppression?" *Ethics* 112 (January 2002): 231–66.

3. David Wood, "Things at the Edge of the World" in *Phenomenologies of the Stranger: between Hostility and Hospitality,* ed. Richard Kearney and Kascha Semonovitch (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 79.

4. To be sure, Levinas's account of the third establishes that others are already implicated in the face of the actual other. It is this, among other things, which would then thwart my attempts to fulfill what I encounter as my radical ethical responsibility.

5. For Sartre, consciousness is an ecstatic nothingness of being. It is upon this structure that it is for-itself, and is forever a negation of being in-itself. Sartre is sure to emphasize that the free movement of (transcending) intentionality is always in situation, which is to say that consciousness must encounter (factical) obstacles as it creates a meaningful world for itself. However, these obstacles ultimately show up for consciousness, taking on meaning for consciousness, which is to say that they are always transcended or spontaneously appropriated by consciousness. Hence, in the end, consciousness is noncoincident with itself not as a troubling and disruptive vulnerability, but rather as a creative spontaneous projection into futuricity.

6. In a book-length analysis, I develop this strain of Sartre's corpus, and subsequently argue for a significant overlap between the Sartrean and Levinasian conceptions of selfhood and alterity. (*Sartre and Levinas: An Encounter Across Disruption,* forthcoming).

7. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Black Orpheus,* trans. J. MacCombie in *Race: Blackwell Readings in Continental Philosophy,* ed. Robert Bernasconi (Wiley-Blackwell, 2000), 115–42. My treatment of Négritude is to the extent that Sartre's *Black Orpheus* highlights certain structures of human identity, which I claim resonates with a Levinasian sense of diachrony. Though the intersections between Négritude, racism, and nationalism is crucial to an understanding of the value and relevance of the movement, I do not address this here in light of my more specific aims concerning the potential affinities between Levinas's and Sartre's conceptions of solidarity.

8. Adriaan Peperzak, "Freedom," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 3 (Summer 1971): 341–61.

9. Certainly, there have been (and will be) instances where individuals, for their own reasons, freely decide to orchestrate physically painful circumstances for themselves. However, the idea behind Levinas's analysis is that the individual always encounters that pain (at the heart of suffering) in avid refusal. For reasons

similar to this, Levinas also claims that suicide—as the *willful* abnegation of one's life—is impossible. Like all cases of approaching death, the suicide victim clings to his or her life at the very end.

10. To reiterate, I ask that the reader anticipate a similar structure *implied* in Sartre.

11. The quotation can easily be construed as coming from Sartre. However, for Levinas, this impossibility grounds a structural interruption that belongs to identity, which ultimately points to a primordial passivity (vulnerability, or subjection) of the human condition. Quite the contrary, for Sartre, consciousness is an unavoidable movement of spontaneous transcendence. It is in *this* sense that I cannot be who I am. The freedom of consciousness is evidenced in its escaping the "ego object" it creates for itself.

12. "Subjectivity cannot be reduced to consciousness" (*OB* 100).

13. "Persecution is not something added to the subjectivity of the subject and his vulnerability; it is the very movement of recurrence" (*OB* 111).

14. I argue, at length, for this reading of Levinas in "The Primacy of Disruption in Levinas's Account of Transcendence," *Research in Phenomenology* 40 (2010): 365–79.

15. I note Jean-Paul Sartre's critique of an "ethics of obligation" in his *Notebooks for an Ethics*. In that account, Sartre reads all notions of obligation or duty toward the other in terms of "pursuing what I have no choice other than to pursue." "Duty", he says, "is the violence of other people but internalized." Jean-Paul Sartre, *Notebooks for an Ethics* (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 254. I address Sartre's position on duty in the last chapter of my forthcoming book, which brings into dialogue the Sartrean and Levinasian accounts of responsibility for the other (*Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Paul Sartre*).

16. This is not to imply that the subject *always* takes up this call to sacrifice. In this account, Levinas explains the grounds upon which that sacrifice (when it *does* happen) is possible.

17. Levinas asks that we do not interpret this as a formalization of empathy. It is because the subject is substitution that experiences (in the proper sense) like empathy, and even self-sacrifice, are possible. In these experiences, I put myself in the other's place. Substitution formalizes the sense in which I am in the other's place prior to freedom to actually *do* so.

18. Y. A. Kang writes, "By detailed analysis it could be shown that being a subject means being ready to suffer for the Other." Kang, "Levinas on Suffering and Solidarity," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* 59 (1997): 485.

19. At the very least, such a narrative is generated to support the viability and legitimacy of such movements.

20. Sartre, *Black Orpheus,* 116.

21. This would contribute to the grounding of Sartre's critique of an ethics of duty, to which I referred above (see note 23).

22. Sartre, *Black Orpheus,* 119; emphasis mine.

23. Ibid., 118.

24. This kind of consciousness is in bad faith, insofar as it is implicated in a self-deceit out of which it exists as though it has not already transcended the 'self' it creates for itself.

25. "Demanding respect for people as blacks and as gays requires that there are some scripts that go with being an African-American or having same-sex desires. There will be proper ways of being black and gay, there will be expectations to be met, demands will be made. It is at this point that someone who takes autonomy seriously will ask whether we have not replaced one kind of tyranny with another.... The politics of recognition requires that one's skin color, one's sexual body, should be acknowledged politically in ways that make it hard for those who want to treat their skin and their sexual body as personal dimensions of the self. And personal means not secret, but not too tightly scripted." K. Anthony Appiah, "Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction," in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition,* ed. Charles Taylor, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 162–63.

26. Responding to Sartre's call for an authentic Jewishness, Levinas writes, "Jewish existence cannot be fit into the set of distinctions by which Sartre, for example, attempts to grasp it." Emmanuel Levinas, "Being Jewish," trans. Mary Beth Mader, *Continental Philosophy Review* 40 (2007): 208. Levinas proposes that, instead, one reads a Jewish facticity, or the positioned existence of the Jew "other than the 'facticity' of a world that understands itself starting from the present."

27. Sartre, *Black Orpheus,* 118.

28. Again, see Levinas, "Being Jewish," 205–10.

29. The scope of this essay does not allow me to expound on the notion of bearing witness. However, I use it to capture the sense in which identity begins in that space in between the sovereign subject, for whom the world can be thematized through intentionality, and the nonfree corporeal abstraction of more biological determinations of selfhood. For an indepth analysis of how the notion of bearing witness can support this account of subjectivity and identity-formation, see Kelly Oliver, "Subjectivity and Subject Position: The Double Meaning of Witnessing," *Studies in Practical Philosophy* 3 (2003): 132–44.

30. Kang, "Levinas on Suffering and Solidarity," 491.

31. All this is to say that, in employing a Levinasian notion of substitution for explicitly political gestures, we do encounter certain limitations. However, this is only to remind us that Levinas's fundamental project was never explicitly political, but more primarily concerned with developing a robust account of metaphysical desire.

32. Elsewhere, I explicitly address the implications of using Levinas's account of the self for re-addressing questions of sociality and diasporic communities. See Kris Sealey, "Nationalism and Ethnicity: Overview," in *Encyclopedia of Race and Racism,* 2nd edition, ed. Patrick L. Mason (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2013).

Notes to Drabinski, "Vernacular Solidarity"

1. Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993), 213.
2. Ibid., 230n81. The quotation is from Levinas, "Useless Suffering," in *The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other,* ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (London: Routledge, 1988), 164.
3. Paul Gilroy, *Between Camps* (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 175–76.
4. Quoted in Gilroy, *Between Camps,* 176.
5. Gilroy, *Between Camps,* 40.
6. Ibid., 41.
7. Ibid., 42.
8. Ibid., 205.
9. Ibid., 205.
10. See the classic essay, "DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation," in *Location of Culture* (New York, Routledge, 1994), 134–70.
11. Ibid., 46–47.
12. Paul Gilroy, *Postcolonial Melancholia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 78.
13. Ibid., 80.
14. Ibid., 79.
15. Ibid., 79–80.
16. This is the argument of the final chapter of my *Levinas and the Postcolonial: Race, Nation, Other* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), where I read Levinas in relation to Édouard Glissant's account of otherness and the rhizomatic politics of Subcommandante Insurgente Marcos and the Zapatista movement.

Notes to Farred, "Rightlessness: The Case of Basil D'Oliveira"

1. D'Oliveira's exact date of birth has long been shrouded in uncertainty. When he first represented England in 1966, the story—which may or may not be apocryphal—goes that Dolly himself suggested he was "closer to forty than thirty."
2. Critics of D'Oliveira's original omission condemned the "pusillanimity" of the English selectors—their refusal to, originally, offend the apartheid state. In addition to D'Oliveira's autobiographies, *D'Oliveira: An Autobiography* (London: Collins, 1968) and *Time to Declare* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1980), see also Peter Oborne's *Basil D'Oliveira: Cricket and Conspiracy: The Untold Story* (Great Britain: Little, Brown, 2004) for the most recent account of the many developments that led up to the cancellation of the tour—and its effects, in Britain, South Africa, and the world at large. There were others, among them D'Oliviera's teammates, who questioned not the cancellation of the

tour, but the decision to effectively break off sporting links with the apartheid state. In this regard, see John Snow's *Cricket Rebel: An Autobiography* (London: Hamlyn, 1976) for a complicated critique of the decision to suspend relations with apartheid sport.

3. Arthur Nortje, "Waiting," in *Dead Roots: Poems* (London: Heinemann, 1973), 90.

4. See Edmund Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,* trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), especially Part I, for a discussion of the apodictic and entelechy, which is closely related to it.

5. A condition, of course, that constitutes the core of Carl Schmitt's argument on sovereignty.

6. Basil D'Oliveira with Patrick Murphy, *Time to Declare,* 59.

7. Ibid., 15.

8. Ibid., 70.

9. However, as is clear from his essay on rights, Levinas never relents in his critique of the state's proclivity for not upholding rights.

10. D'Oliveira, *Time to Declare,* 89.

11. Ibid., 31.

12. Ibid., 1.

13. Ibid., 34.

14. The magnitude of D'Oliveira's achievement, his rise from South African unknown to English international, from playing on the scrubland fields on the outskirts of Cape Town to making his debut at Lords, is what endeared him to many people in the game—and outside it; it is what gives his success its particular political patina. It is this achievement that must not be lost sight of: Basil D'Oliveira's talents were immense, his accomplishments notable; he earned every accolade he got. Not for nothing was he, in the main with a quiet unwillingness, the iconic figure of the antiapartheid sport's movement.

15. D'Oliveira, *Time to Declare,* 35.

16. Ibid., 33.

17. Ibid., 25.

18. Of course, it also assumed other names, including "Ubuntu" (a human being is only human in and because of its relation to other human beings) and, a term coined by the retired Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the "Rainbow Nation of God."

19. This essay is dedicated to my friend Ken Surin: sports afficianado, who watched "Dolly" play for Worcestershire.