Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy

Volume 42, 2008

Philosophy of Mind

Richard H. Corrigan
Pages 43-51

Would I Endorse my Determined Endorsement? Moral Responsibility and Reflective Endorsement

In her recent article ‘Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism’, Lynne Rudder Baker contends that libertarian intuitions can be accommodated by compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility. She proposes a principle called the ‘Reflective Endorsement View’ which she believes is capable of achieving this end. The Reflective Endorsement View holds that once an agent reflectively identifies with his actions in a particular way, he is morally responsible for those actions, irrespective of whether he has the power to do otherwise or the cause of the action ultimately originates in him. I contend that Baker’s compatibilist Reflective Endorsement View is too stringent and exclusive for moral responsibility. I argue this on the basis that the very intuitions that led Baker to formulate the various conditions that must be satisfied for moral responsibility can be used to show the inadequacy of her position.

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