Studia Philosophica

Volume 61, Issue 2, 2014

Martin Kovář
Pages 77-90

Byl Berkeley skutečně imaterialista?

In this work I attempt to provide a materialist interpretation of Berkeley’s view of the world. In my opinion, we can already see this view in his early writings A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713). My belief is based on Berkeley’s emphasis on common sense and the concept of God as the guarantor of the recognizability of the world. I also show that Berkeley understands the concepts of real and material as synonyms. I explain why Berkeley refers to things as ‘ideas‘ in his two main metaphysical writings and how to understand Berkeley’s notion that God imprints ideas of the world into our minds. The main question is to how understand the material substance, which Berkeley rejects. Through the rejection of philosophical material substance Berkeley is trying to avoid scepticism in which, according to him, philosophy must fall and at the same time he is trying to re-create a plain view of the world.

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