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Studia Philosophica

Volume 62, Issue 1, 2015

Dušan Hruška
Pages 25-40

Parmenides and the Disputeon the History of Metaphysics - Nietzsche's and Heidegger's Critique of Metaphysics

The main theme of this article is the dispute on the meaning (destruction) of the history of metaphysics on the background of a reflection of Parmenides’ philosophical message. The leitmotif of the problem relates to the meaning (of destruction) of history of metaphysics considered as Western ontology (Heidegger’s position); with the identification of Platonic (metaphysical) tradition considered as a false knowledge perceiving being existing in truth, which, in the light of the thesis about nonexistence of absolute truth and its explication, becomes a concrete effort of temporal and endless human being (Nietzsche’s position). Nietzsche and Heidegger show that the first moment we must think about is our (metaphysical) ability to ground theoretically the meaning of the universe. This ambition then grounds whole spiritual tradition. Nietzsche’s critique of Parmenides’ thought means most probably his critique of the development of his basic assumptions in Platonic version of metaphysics. This form of critique is acceptable for Heidegger, too. A disagreement develops only concerning the final meaning of the history of metaphysics – while Nietzsche sees them as a completion of the moral perspective of universe and as a problem of critique of metaphysically masked nihilistic dimension of morality, Heidegger sees the completion of history of metaphysics as essential forgetting (more precisely masking) of the question of Being, therefore as an ontological problem. What Heidegger refuses to bring to consequences are the nihilistic consequences of his ontology, uncovered and thematised through Nietzsche’s critique of morality, in which the forgotteness of Being is unmasked in its (finally) nihilistic dimension.