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Roczniki Filozoficzne

Volume 52, Issue 1, 2004

Robert Trypuz
Pages 293-316

The Discussion about the Truth Value of Norms. Logic of Norms and Deontic Logic

The main purpose of this paper was the trial to answer the question if norms can function as premises or conclusions in logical inferences. According to definition of logical inference, the parts of its may be only sentences (in indicative mood) which are true or false. The logic, which accepts that norms are the true and false propositions, can be named the Logic of Norms. Otherwise the logic, which reject that norms are true and false propositions, we name Deontic Logic. The last one, in order to use the logical inference, changes each of norms N into normative sentences: ‘N exists’ or ‘N exists for the sake of set of norms’. The normative sentences are sentences in indicative mood and thereby are true or false. The whole consideration about two types aforementioned logic is preceded by some remarks about variety of the meanings of the word ‘norm’, the linguistic structures of norm and the views of the truth value of norms.

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