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Res Philosophica

Volume 93, Issue 1, January 2016

Timothy O'Connor
Pages 289-293
DOI: 10.11612/resphil.2016.93.1.13

Probability and Freedom
A Reply to Vicens

I have argued elsewhere that human free action is governed by objective probabilities. This view, I suggested, is strongly supported by our experience of motivated decision-making and by our having emerged from probabilistically-governed physical causes. Leigh Vicens (2016) criticizes these arguments. She also argues that an account of human freedom as probabilisticallyunstructured indeterminacy is less vulnerable to challenges to the plausibility of libertarian views of freedom. In this article, I explain why I am not persuaded by Vicens’s arguments.

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