Volume 76, Issue 1, January 2008
Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander, Jonathan M. Weinberg
The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions
Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp
A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer‘s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary
according to whether, and which, other thought-experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case first, subjects first presented with a clear case of knowledge are less willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case, and subjects first presented with a clear case of non-knowledge are more willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case. We
contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of these intuitions, such that philosophers who deal in intuitions can no longer rest comfortably in their armchairs.