Phenomenology 2005

Volume 5, Issue Part 1, 2007

Selected Essays from North America Part 1

Philip Blosser
Pages 99-125

Scheler and “Values that Belong to the Ethical Sphere”

I respond to Peter Spader’s critique of my dissent from Scheler’s theory that ‘good’ is invariably a moral value generated as a by-product of realizing non-moral value. I review the development of my dissent in earlier articles, argue that the distinction between moral values (as values of ‘persons’) and, e.g., aesthetic values (as values of ‘objects’) is too facile, that some values are essentially moral, while others become moral through a transactional nexus, that the concept of non-moral good is indispensable, and that moral experience calls for more nuanced phenomenological description than the Schelerian conceptualization seems capable of providing.