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The Journal of Philosophy

Volume 113, Issue 8, August 2016

Daniel Greco, Brian Hedden
Pages 365-395
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2016113825

Uniqueness and Metaepistemology

We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in forming your beliefs. To this end, we bring in two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. Rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others, and also to help us formulate contingency plans about what to believe in various situations. We argue that Uniqueness vindicates these two roles for rational evaluations, while Permissivism clashes with them.

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