PDC Homepage

Home » Products » Purchase

Faith and Philosophy

Volume 31, Issue 1, January 2014

Robert J. Hartman
Pages 68-90
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil2014265

How to Apply Molinism to the Theological Problem of Moral Luck

The problem of moral luck is that a general fact about luck and an intuitive moral principle jointly imply the following skeptical conclusion: human beings are morally responsible for at most a tiny fraction of each action. This skeptical conclusion threatens to undermine the claim that human beings deserve their respective eternal reward and punishment. But even if this restriction on moral responsibility is compatible with the doctrine of the final judgment, the quality of one’s afterlife within heaven or hell still appears to be lucky. Utilizing recent responses to the problem of moral luck, I explore several Molinist accounts of the final judgment that resolve both theological problems of moral luck. Some of these accounts entirely eliminate moral luck while others ensure that the moral luck involved in the judgment is overall good luck.

Not yet a subscriber? Subscribe here
Already a subscriber? Login here

This document may be purchased

Purchase this article for
$20.00 USD
Enter your confirmation number if you've already purchased this article.