Social Theory and Practice

Volume 38, Issue 3, July 2012

Micah Lott
Pages 407-431

Moral Virtue as Knowledge of Human Form

Cited by

  • Micah Lott. Philosophical Studies. Must realists be skeptics? An Aristotelian reply to a Darwinian Dilemma 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Parisa Moosavi. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Natural goodness without natural history 2022. [CrossRef]
  • The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Ethics 2019. [CrossRef]
  • David McPherson. Virtue and Meaning 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Christoph Halbig. Aristotelian Naturalism 2020: 81. [CrossRef]
  • Steven Hendley. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. Moral Reasoning as Naturally Good: A Qualified Defense of Foot's Conception of Practical Rationality 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Gennady McCracken. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Is Aristotelian Naturalism Safe From the Moral Outsider? 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Richard T. Kim. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Human Nature and Moral Sprouts: Mencius on the Pollyanna Problem 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Micah Lott. Philosophia. Why be a good Human Being? Natural Goodness, Reason, and the Authority of Human Nature 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Jennifer A. Frey. Philippa Foot on Goodness and Virtue 2018: 47. [CrossRef]
  • Nancy E. Snow. Contemporary Virtue Ethics 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Philipp Brüllmann. Aristotelian Naturalism 2020: 265. [CrossRef]
  • Parisa Moosavi. Philippa Foot on Goodness and Virtue 2018: 277. [CrossRef]
  • John Hacker-Wright. Philippa Foot on Goodness and Virtue 2018: 1. [CrossRef]
  • Max Parish. Aristotelian Naturalism 2020: 311. [CrossRef]
  • Casey S. Elliott. Erkenntnis. Is it Good Enough to be Good Qua Human? The Normative Independence of Attributive Goodness 2023. [CrossRef]
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