Philosophical Topics

Volume 46, Issue 1, Spring 2018

Can Beliefs Be Wrong?

Mark Schroeder
Pages 115-127

When Beliefs Wrong

Cited by

  • Javiera Perez Gomez. Journal of Political Philosophy. Verbal Microaggressions as Hyper‐implicatures* 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Cory Davia. Philosophical Explorations. Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Cécile Fabre. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs 2022. [CrossRef]
  • James Fritz. Inquiry. Ethics and epistemic hopelessness 2023. [CrossRef]
  • George Hull. Synthese. Epistemic redress 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Veli Mitova. Philosophical Papers. Decolonising Knowledge Here and Now 2020. [CrossRef]
  • J. Spencer Atkins. Social Epistemology. Defining Wokeness 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Christine Bratu. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. How (Not) To Wrong Others with Our Thoughts: A Liberal Challenge Against the Possibility of Doxastic Wronging 2023. [CrossRef]
  • J. Spencer Atkins. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Do Your Homework! A Rights-Based Zetetic Account of Alleged Cases of Doxastic Wronging 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund. Politics, Philosophy & Economics. What should relational egalitarians believe? 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Caroline von Klemperer. Philosophical Studies. Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Darren Bradley. Analytic Philosophy. Can we combine practical and epistemic reason? 2024. [CrossRef]
  • Stephanie Leary. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Renée Jorgensen. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Algorithms and the Individual in Criminal Law 2022. [CrossRef]
  • James Fritz, Elizabeth Jackson. Synthese. Belief, credence, and moral encroachment 2021. [CrossRef]
  • James Fritz. Episteme. Encroachment on Emotion 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Z Quanbeck. Philosophical Studies. Belief, blame, and inquiry: a defense of doxastic wronging 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Galen Barry. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. Morally Respectful Listening and its Epistemic Consequences 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Rima Basu. Philosophy Compass. THE MORALITY OF BELIEF I: HOW BELIEFS WRONG 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Gus Turyn. Synthese. Gender and first-person authority 2023. [CrossRef]
  • David Enoch, Levi Spectre. Synthese. Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Eric Beerbohm, Ryan W. Davis. American Journal of Political Science. Gaslighting Citizens 2023. [CrossRef]
  • James Laing. European Journal of Philosophy. The harm of humiliation 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Javiera Perez Gomez. Synthese. Moral encroachment and the epistemic impermissibility of (some) microaggressions 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Anna Brinkerhoff. Synthese. Prejudiced beliefs based on the evidence: responding to a challenge for evidentialism 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Catherine Rioux. Episteme. On the Epistemic Costs of Friendship: Against the Encroachment View 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Stephanie Sheintul. The Journal of Ethics. The Normative Connection Between Paternalism and Belief 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Oliver Traldi. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Uncoordinated Norms of Belief 2023. [CrossRef]
  • James Fritz. Erkenntnis. Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action 2022. [CrossRef]
  • David Christensen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality* 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Renée Jorgensen Bolinger. Philosophical Perspectives. Varieties of Moral Encroachment 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Rima Basu. Philosophical Issues. Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Georgi Gardiner. Synthese. Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Cécile Fabre. Ethics. The Morality of Gossip: A Kantian Account 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Rima Basu. Philosophical Studies. What we epistemically owe to each other 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Randolph Clarke. Ethics. The Source of Responsibility 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Mica Rapstine. Philosophical Studies. Regrettable beliefs 2021. [CrossRef]
  • David Christensen. Noûs. Epistemic akrasia: No apology required 2024. [CrossRef]
  • Sanford C. Goldberg. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Can the Demands of Justice Always Be Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the Prospects of a Normative Clash 2021. [CrossRef]
  • James Fritz. Philosophical Studies. Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Jaakko Hirvelä. Philosophical Studies. The structure of moral encroachment 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Alex Worsnip. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Can Pragmatists Be Moderate? 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Catharine Saint-Croix. Episteme. Rumination and Wronging: The Role of Attention in Epistemic Morality 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Seth Lazar, Jake Stone. Noûs. On the Site of Predictive Justice 2023. [CrossRef]
There may be additional citations on Google Scholar.