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Philosophical Topics

Volume 12, Issue 1, 1981

Functionalism and the Philosophy of Mind

Sydney Shoemaker
Pages 93-119

Some Varieties of Functionalism

Cited by

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  • Hannes Rakoczy. British Journal of Developmental Psychology. Do infants have a theory of mind? 2012. [CrossRef]
  • Lei Zhong. Erkenntnis. Why the Counterfactualist Should Still Worry About Downward Causation 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Douglas Keaton. Philosophia. Two Kinds of Role Property 2010. [CrossRef]
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  • PAUL AUDI. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization 2012. [CrossRef]
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  • Brie Gertler. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. Functionalism's Methodological Predicament 2000. [CrossRef]
  • MICHAEL J. RAVEN. Theoria. Is Lewis's Mixed Theory Mixed Up? 2013. [CrossRef]
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  • Eric Funkhouser. Philosophy Compass. Multiple Realizability 2007. [CrossRef]
  • Kevin Morris. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. GUIDELINES FOR THEORIZING ABOUT REALIZATION 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Samuel Guttenplan. A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind 2017: 291. [CrossRef]
  • Austen Clark. Philosophy of Science. Psychofunctionalism and Chauvinism 1986. [CrossRef]
  • David A. Barrett. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Multiple Realizability, Identity Theory, and the Gradual Reorganization Principle 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Umut Baysan. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Robert A. Wilson. Philosophical Psychology. Ten questions concerning extended cognition 2014. [CrossRef]
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  • Robert D. Rupert. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Realization, completers, and ceteris paribus laws in psychology 2007. [CrossRef]
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  • Peter Fazekas, Bence Nanay. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Attention Is Amplification, Not Selection 2021. [CrossRef]
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  • Conscience et matière 2019: 515. [CrossRef]
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  • Douglas Keaton, Thomas W. Polger. Philosophical Studies. Exclusion, still not tracted 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Andres Pablo Vaccari. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Against cognitive artifacts: extended cognition and the problem of defining ‘artifact’ 2017. [CrossRef]
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  • Kevin Morris. Philosophia. Against Disanalogy-Style Responses to the Exclusion Problem 2015. [CrossRef]
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  • Stephan Leuenberger. Analysis. Why It Matters Whether You Are a Contingentist 2019. [CrossRef]
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  • Liad Mudrik, Uri Maoz. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. “Me & My Brain”: Exposing Neuroscience's Closet Dualism 2015. [CrossRef]
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  • Umut Baysan. Erkenntnis. Causal Emergence and Epiphenomenal Emergence 2020. [CrossRef]
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There may be additional citations on Google Scholar.