Volume 12, Issue 1, 1981
Functionalism and the Philosophy of Mind
William G. Lycan
Pages 9-38
Psychological Laws
Cited by
- Andrew Kernohan. Dialogue. Psychology: Autonomous or Anomalous? 1985. [CrossRef]
- William Bechtel, Robert C. Richardson. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Consciousness and complexity: Evolutionary perspectives on the mind-body problem 1983. [CrossRef]
- Nadine Elzein. Philosophical Studies. The demand for contrastive explanations 2019. [CrossRef]
- Louise M Antony. Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science 2006. [CrossRef]
- Robert A. Wilson. Philosophy of Science. Causal Depth, Theoretical Appropriateness, and Individualism in Psychology 1994. [CrossRef]
- Ausonio Marras. Contemporary Action Theory Volume 1: Individual Action 1997: 45. [CrossRef]
- William G. Lycan. D.M. Armstrong 1984: 139. [CrossRef]
- Christopher S. Hill. Synthese. In defense of type materialism 1984. [CrossRef]
- William Bechtel. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Autonomous Psychology: What it Should and Should Not Entail 1984. [CrossRef]
- Mark Bauer. Erkenntnis. Psychological Laws (Revisited) 2010. [CrossRef]
- Daniel Laurier. Interprétations radicales 2008: 251. [CrossRef]
- Brian P. McLaughlin. Philosophical Issues. CONSCIOUSNESS, TYPE PHYSICALISM, AND INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 2010. [CrossRef]
- Robert D. Rupert. Nous. Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects1 2006. [CrossRef]
- Daniel Laurier. L’esprit et la nature 2002: 165. [CrossRef]
- Ausonio Marras. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Nonreductive Materialism and Mental Causation 1994. [CrossRef]
- Donald Davidson 2003. [CrossRef]