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Midwest Studies in Philosophy

Volume 32, 2008

Truth and its Deformities

Kieran Setiya
Pages 36-52
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.2008.00164.x

Believing at Will

Cited by

  • Kieran Setiya. Philosophical Issues. EPISTEMIC AGENCY: SOME DOUBTS 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Casey Perin. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. Skepticism, Suspension of Judgment, and Norms for Belief 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Rik Peels. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Believing at Will is Possible 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Gregory Antill. Synthese. Epistemic freedom revisited 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Aude Bandini. La reconstruction de la raison 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Elizabeth Grace Jackson. Philosophical Studies. Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Graham Hubbs. Les ateliers de l'éthique. SELF-DECEPTIVE RESISTANCE TO SELF-KNOWLEDGE 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Pamela Hieronymi. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume. Believing at Will 2009. [CrossRef]
  • Nathan Ballantyne, Ian Evans. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Schaffer's Demon 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Lindsay Rettler. Synthese. In defense of doxastic blame 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Blake Roeber. Mind. Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Victor M. Verdejo. Metaphilosophy. Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will 2017. [CrossRef]
  • DAVID HUNTER. Manuscrito. THE METAPHYSICS OF RESPONSIBLE BELIEVING 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Kieran Setiya. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback). XIV-Knowing How 2012. [CrossRef]
  • Matthew Boyle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume. Active Belief 2009. [CrossRef]
  • A. K. Flowerree. Synthese. Agency of belief and intention 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Kieran Setiya. Ethics. Practical Knowledge Revisited 2009. [CrossRef]
  • Carlos J. Moya, Stefaan E. Cuypers. Philosophical Explorations. Introduction: responsibility for action and belief 2009. [CrossRef]
  • Hagit Benbaji. Philosophical Studies. What can we not do at will and why 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Anne Meylan. Erkenntnis. The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation 2019. [CrossRef]
There may be additional citations on Google Scholar.