Volume 23, 1999
New Directions in Philosophy
David Zimmerman
Pages 236-266
Bom Yesterday
Personal Autonomy for Agents without a Past
Cited by
- Alfred R. Mele. Philosophical Studies. Moral responsibility and manipulation: on a novel argument against historicism 2020. [CrossRef]
- Ishtiyaque Haji, Stefaan E. Cuypers. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Magical agents, global induction, and the internalism/externalism debate 2007. [CrossRef]
- Alfred R. Mele. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Moral Responsibility and History Revisited 2009. [CrossRef]
- Michael McKenna. The Journal of Ethics. A Modest Historical Theory of Moral Responsibility 2016. [CrossRef]
- Michael McKenna. Philosophical Issues. DEFENDING NONHISTORICAL COMPATIBILISM: A REPLY TO HAJI AND CUYPERS1 2012. [CrossRef]
- Kristin Demetriou. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom's Four-Case Argument 2010. [CrossRef]
- Ishtiyaque Haji. The Journal of Ethics. Historicism, Non-historicism, or a Mix? 2013. [CrossRef]
- Alfred Mele. Philosophical Studies. Moral responsibility and agents’ histories 2009. [CrossRef]
- Michael McKenna. The Journal of Ethics. Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism 2012. [CrossRef]
- Benjamin Matheson. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Towards a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility 2019. [CrossRef]
- Alfred R. Mele. Midwest Studies In Philosophy. Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Manipulation, Luck, and Agents’ Histories 2019. [CrossRef]
- Ishtiyaque Haji, Stefaan E. Cuypers. Acta Analytica. Hard- and soft-line responses to Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument 2006. [CrossRef]