Volume 21, 1997
The Philosophy of Religion
Peter van Inwagen
Pages 225-236
Against Middle Knowledge
Cited by
- E. J. Coffman. The Philosophy of Luck 2015: 27. [CrossRef]
- The Cambridge Companion to Augustine 2014. [CrossRef]
- Michael J. Zimmerman. The Journal of Ethics. Prospective Possibilism 2017. [CrossRef]
- Robert J. Hartman. Erkenntnis. Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck 2020. [CrossRef]
- Benedikt Paul Göcke. Beyond Faith and Rationality 2020: 29. [CrossRef]
- Justin Khoo. Noûs. No fact of the middle 2022. [CrossRef]
- Robert J. Hartman. Philosophical Studies. Against luck-free moral responsibility 2016. [CrossRef]
- Marco Hausmann, Amit Kravitz. Religions. Brief Remarks on Sterba’s Moral Argument from Evil 2022. [CrossRef]
- E.J. Coffman. Philosophical Issues. CAN VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY CAPITALIZE ON JTB'S APPEAL? 2013. [CrossRef]
- Matthew Frise. Synthese. Speaking freely: on free will and the epistemology of testimony 2014. [CrossRef]
- E. J. Coffman. Metaphilosophy. Strokes of Luck 2014. [CrossRef]
- James Dominic Rooney. New Blackfriars. Stumping Freedom: Divine Causality and the Will 2015. [CrossRef]
- E. J. Coffman. Synthese. Warrant without truth? 2008. [CrossRef]
- Guy Sela. Res Publica. Moral Luck and Liability Lotteries 2010. [CrossRef]
- Philip Swenson. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Equal Moral Opportunity: A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck 2022. [CrossRef]
- Robert J. Hartman. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. Concomitant ignorance excuses from moral responsibility 2021. [CrossRef]
- Rik Peels, Hans van Eyghen, Gijsbert van den Brink. New Developments in the Cognitive Science of Religion 2018: 199. [CrossRef]
- Ciro De Florio, Aldo Frigerio. Divine Omniscience and Human Free Will 2019: 155. [CrossRef]
- E. J. Coffman. Synthese. Thinking about luck 2007. [CrossRef]
- Cory Nichols. Synthese. Relevance first: relocating similarity in counterfactual semantics 2021. [CrossRef]