Volume 85, Issue 3, July 2002
Controlling Belief
Nishi Shah
Pages 436-445
Clearing Space For Doxastic Voluntarism
Cited by
- Sarah K. Paul. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. The courage of conviction 2015. [CrossRef]
- John Turri, David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter. Philosophical Studies. Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology 2018. [CrossRef]
- Heinrich Wansing. Philosophical Studies. Doxastic Decisions, Epistemic Justification, and The Logic of Agency 2006. [CrossRef]
- PHILIP J. NICKEL. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis 2010. [CrossRef]
- Rik Peels. Erkenntnis. Belief-Policies Cannot Ground Doxastic Responsibility 2013. [CrossRef]
- PATRICK BONDY. Dialogue. Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense 2015. [CrossRef]
- Maciej Dybowski. Ratio Legis 2018: 29. [CrossRef]
- Rima Basu. Philosophical Studies. The wrongs of racist beliefs 2019. [CrossRef]
- Nishi Shah, J. David Velleman. The Philosophical Review. Doxastic Deliberation 2005. [CrossRef]
- Rima Basu. Episteme. The Importance of Forgetting 2022. [CrossRef]
- James A. Montmarquet. Philosophy. The Voluntariness of Virtue – and Belief 2008. [CrossRef]
- Brian Huss. Synthese. Three challenges (and three replies) to the ethics of belief 2009. [CrossRef]
- Lindsay Rettler. Synthese. In defense of doxastic blame 2018. [CrossRef]
- Cameron Boult, Sebastian Köhler. The Philosophical Quarterly. Epistemic Judgement and Motivation 2020. [CrossRef]
- Anjan Chakravartty. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. Suspension of Belief and Epistemologies of Science 2015. [CrossRef]
- Paul Silva. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification 2017. [CrossRef]
- Benjamin Kiesewetter. Noûs. Are epistemic reasons normative? 2022. [CrossRef]
- Adam Kovach. Social Epistemology. Epistemic Virtues and the Deliberative Frame of Mind1 2006. [CrossRef]
- Anna Brinkerhoff. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. The Cognitive Demands of Friendship 2023. [CrossRef]
- Hagit Benbaji. Philosophical Studies. What can we not do at will and why 2016. [CrossRef]
- Laura K. Soter. Philosophical Studies. Acceptance and the ethics of belief 2023. [CrossRef]
- Laura Candiotto. Topoi. Epistemic Emotions and Co-inquiry: A Situated Approach 2022. [CrossRef]
- J. Spencer Atkins. Social Epistemology. Defining Wokeness 2023. [CrossRef]
- Elizabeth Grace Jackson. Philosophical Studies. Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters 2019. [CrossRef]
- Rik Peels. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Against Doxastic Compatibilism 2014. [CrossRef]
- Alix Cohen. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback). XIV-Kant on the Ethics of Belief 2014. [CrossRef]
- Chad Carmichael. Synthese. A new problem for internalism 2021. [CrossRef]