The Monist

Volume 68, Issue 2, April 1985

Knowledge, Justification, & Reliability

Richard Feldman
Pages 159-174

Reliability and Justification

Cited by

  • José L. Zalabardo. Synthese. Inferentialism and knowledge: Brandom’s arguments against reliabilism 2021. [CrossRef]
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  • Jeffrey Tolly. Philosophical Studies. A defense of parrying responses to the generality problem 2017. [CrossRef]
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  • Samuel Kampa. Episteme. A NEW STATISTICAL SOLUTION TO THE GENERALITY PROBLEM 2018. [CrossRef]
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  • JONATHAN WEISBERG. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Bootstrapping in General*† 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Hsueh Qu. Belgrade Philosophical Annual. Hume and reliabilism 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Robert P. Amico. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. Is a Fully General Theory of Knowledge Possible? 2003. [CrossRef]
  • James R. Beebe. Noûs. The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri‐Level Hypothesis 2004. [CrossRef]
  • Frederick Adams, David Kline. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. NOMIC RELIABILISM: WEAK RELIABILITY IS NOT ENOUGH* 1987. [CrossRef]
  • Aaron Z. Zimmerman. The Philosophical Quarterly. PUTTING EXTROSPECTION TO REST 2005. [CrossRef]
  • Jeffrey Tolly. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Reliabilism Defended 2021. [CrossRef]
  • William Edward Morris. Synthese. Knowledge and the regularity theory of information 1990. [CrossRef]
  • Erik J. Olsson. Goldman and His Critics 2016: 178. [CrossRef]
  • Martha Whitesmith. Intelligence and National Security. Justified true belief theory for intelligence analysis 2022. [CrossRef]
  • A. P. Schwab. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. Epistemic Trust, Epistemic Responsibility, and Medical Practice 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Baron Reed. Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa 2013: 205. [CrossRef]
  • S. Orestis Palermos. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. Dimensional Reliabilism 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Martin L. Jönsson. Philosophical Psychology. Linguistic convergence in verbs for belief-forming processes 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Kelly Becker. Acta Analytica. Basic Knowledge and Easy Understanding 2012. [CrossRef]
  • Job de Grefte. Synthese. Epistemic justification and epistemic luck 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Berislav Marušić. Philosophical Studies. Asymmetry arguments 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Anthony Bolos, James Henry Collin. Synthese. A sensitive virtue epistemology 2018. [CrossRef]
  • David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaž Potrč. Acta Analytica. Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism 2007. [CrossRef]
  • Jeffrey Tolly. Synthese. Swampman: a dilemma for proper functionalism 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Keith Raymond Harris. Philosophy & Technology. Real Fakes: The Epistemology of Online Misinformation 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Thomas Kroedel. Philosophical Studies. Mental causation as multiple causation 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Michael A. Bishop. Philosophical Studies. Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Wayne A. Davis, John W. Bender. The Current State of the Coherence Theory 1989: 52. [CrossRef]
  • Carole J. Lee. Philosophy of Science. The Reference Class Problem for Credit Valuation in Science 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Robert J. Howell. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Immunity to Error and Subjectivity 2007. [CrossRef]
  • Michael A. Bishop, J. D. Trout. Frontiers in Communication. The Epistemic Virtues of a Closed Mind: Effective Science Reporting in the Golden Age of the Con 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Mark McEvoy. Dialectica. Belief-Independent Processes and the Generality Problem for Reliabilism 2005. [CrossRef]
  • Matthew Kotzen. Noûs. Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Michele Palmira. Noûs. Higher‐order evidence and the duty to double‐check 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Mark Newman. Synthese. The No-Miracles Argument, reliabilism, and a methodological version of the generality problem 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Harmen Ghijsen. The Puzzle of Perceptual Justification 2016: 93. [CrossRef]
  • Jeffrey Tolly. Episteme. Rejecting the New Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Matthew Frise. The Philosophical Quarterly. Reliabilism’s Memory Loss 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Murray Clarke. Philosophy of Science. Darwinian Algorithms and Indexical Representation 1996. [CrossRef]
  • Erhan Demircioglu. Theoria. Reliabilism, the Generality Problem, and the Basing Relation 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Joseph Thomas Tolliver. Philosophical Studies. Knowledge without truth 1989. [CrossRef]
  • Martin L. Jönsson. Episteme. A RELIABILISM BUILT ON COGNITIVE CONVERGENCE: AN EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED SOLUTION TO THE GENERALITY PROBLEM 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Charles Wallis. Synthese. Truth-ratios, process, task, and knowledge 1994. [CrossRef]
  • R. Bruce Freed. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Reliability, Reasons, and Belief Contexts 1988. [CrossRef]
  • William Edward Morris. Epistemology and Cognition 1991: 199. [CrossRef]
  • Selim Berker. Episteme. REPLY TO GOLDMAN: CUTTING UP THE ONE TO SAVE THE FIVE IN EPISTEMOLOGY 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Robert G. Hudson. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. The Generality Problem 2004. [CrossRef]
  • JAMES MAFFIE. Biology & Philosophy. “Just-so” stories about “inner cognitive Africa”: some doubts about Sorensen's evolutionary epistemology of thought experiments 1997. [CrossRef]
  • William S. Boardman. Synthese. The relativity of perceptual knowledge 1993. [CrossRef]
  • Kelly Becker. Philosophical Studies. Epistemic luck and the generality problem 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Kevin McCain. The Nature of Scientific Knowledge 2016: 57. [CrossRef]
  • Klemens Kappel. Philosophical Studies. A Diagnosis and Resolution to the Generality Problem 2006. [CrossRef]
  • Thomas Grundmann. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Dependent reliability: Why And How Conditional Reliability Should Be Replaced By It 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Julien Dutant, Erik J. Olsson. Erkenntnis. Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem? 2013. [CrossRef]
  • John W. Bender. The Current State of the Coherence Theory 1989: 1. [CrossRef]
  • Gilbert Harman. The Philosophical Review. Reflections on Knowledge and its Limits 2002. [CrossRef]
  • Peter Baumann. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Jack C. Lyons. The Philosophical Review. Algorithm and Parameters: Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism 2019. [CrossRef]
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  • Michael A. Bishop, J. D. Trout. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence. Epistemology's search for significance 2003. [CrossRef]
  • Juan Comesaña. Philosophical Studies. A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem 2006. [CrossRef]
  • Richard Pettigrew. Episteme. WHAT IS JUSTIFIED CREDENCE? 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Jeffrey Tolly. Synthese. Knowledge, evidence, and multiple process types 2021. [CrossRef]
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  • Kelly Becker. Synthese. Why reliabilism does not permit easy knowledge 2013. [CrossRef]
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There may be additional citations on Google Scholar.