The Monist

Volume 55, Issue 3, July 1971

British Philosophy in the 19th Century

Mary Hesse
Pages 520-524

Whewell’s Cosilience of Inductions and Predictions
Appendix: Discussion and Comment

Cited by

  • Menachem Fisch. Philosophy of Science. Whewell's Consilience of Inductions–An Evaluation 1985. [CrossRef]
  • William Harper. An Intimate Relation 1989: 115. [CrossRef]
  • Laura J. Snyder. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. It's all necessarily so: William Whewell on scientific truth 1994. [CrossRef]
  • Wenceslao J. Gonzalez. Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in Economics 2015: 79. [CrossRef]
  • Laura J. Snyder. Philosophy of Science. Discoverers' Induction 1997. [CrossRef]
  • Robert E. Butts. Historical Pragmatics 1993: 269. [CrossRef]
  • Malcolm Forster. Inductive Logic 2011: 93. [CrossRef]
  • Aaron D. Cobb. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science. Inductivism in Practice: Experiment in John Herschel’s Philosophy of Science 2012. [CrossRef]
  • Robert E. Butts. Philosophy of Science. Reply to David Wilson: Was Whewell Interested in True Causes? 1973. [CrossRef]
  • John Wettersten. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Rethinking Whewell 1993. [CrossRef]
  • Enzo Campelli. SOCIOLOGIA E RICERCA SOCIALE. «So much the worse for logic»: Notes on William Whewell's methodology 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Claudia Cristalli, Julia Sánchez-Dorado. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. Colligation in modelling practices: From Whewell’s tides to the San Francisco Bay Model 2021. [CrossRef]
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