The Journal of Philosophy

Volume 114, Issue 4, April 2017

Sebastian Köhler
Pages 189-207

Expressivism, Belief, and All That

Cited by

  • Derek Baker. Philosophical Studies. Quasirealism as semantic dispensability 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Bob Beddor. Philosophical Studies. A solution to the many attitudes problem 2020. [CrossRef]
  • James L. D. Brown. Philosophical Studies. Interpretative expressivism: A theory of normative belief 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Sebastian Köhler. Erkenntnis. Expressivism, but at a Whole Other Level 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Michael Ridge. Synthese. Normative certitude for expressivists 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Stefanie Dach. Synthese. Sellars, we-intentions and ought-statements 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Eduardo P\'erez-Navarr, V\'ictor Fern\'and Castro, Javier Gonz\'ale Prado, Manuel Heras-Escribano. Res Philosophica. Not Expressivist Enough: Normative Disagreement about Belief Attribution 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Bob Beddor. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Noncognitivism without expressivism 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Derek Baker. The Philosophical Quarterly. Deflating the Many Attitudes Problem 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Sebastian Köhler. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Expressivism, meaning, and all that 2018. [CrossRef]
  • JAMES L. D. BROWN. Journal of the American Philosophical Association. Expressivism and Cognitive Propositions 2019. [CrossRef]
There may be additional citations on Google Scholar.