The Journal of Philosophy

Volume 106, Issue 6, June 2009

Alvin I. Goldman
Pages 309-338

Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification

Cited by

  • BJC Madison. Philosophy Compass. Epistemic Internalism 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Andrew Moon. Episteme. THREE FORMS OF INTERNALISM AND THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM 2012. [CrossRef]
  • Matthew McGrath. Philosophical Studies. Siegel and the impact for epistemological internalism 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Paul Silva. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Alvin I. Goldman. Philosophical Studies. Commentary on Jack Lyons’s Perception and Basic Beliefs 2011. [CrossRef]
  • Jacob Berger, Bence Nanay, Jake Quilty-Dunn. Inquiry. Unconscious perceptual justification* 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Job de Grefte. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. Epistemic benefits of the material theory of induction 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Aleks Knoks. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Epistemic Conflicts and the Form of Epistemic Rules 2024. [CrossRef]
  • Gerhard Schurz. Erkenntnistheorie 2021: 43. [CrossRef]
  • Benjamin Bayer. Acta Analytica. Internalism empowered: how to bolster a theory of justification with a direct realist theory of awareness 2012. [CrossRef]
  • Anjan Pal, Alton Y. K. Chua, Snehasish Banerjee. International Journal of Knowledge Management. Exploring the Dynamics of Justification in the Wake of a Rumor Outbreak on Social Media 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Paul Silva. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement? 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Luis R.G. Oliveira. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Massimo Renzo. Journal of Practical Ethics. Defective Normative Powers: The Case of Consent 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Paul Silva. Erkenntnis. On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Alex Worsnip. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Jesper Kallestrup. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Stewart Cohen. Inquiry. Theorizing about the epistemic 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Thomas Kelly. Goldman and His Critics 2016: 43. [CrossRef]
  • Leandro de Brasi. Manuscrito. Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Laurence BonJour. Goldman and His Critics 2016: 22. [CrossRef]
  • Matthew Frise. The Philosophical Quarterly. Reliabilism’s Memory Loss 2021. [CrossRef]
  • SANTIAGO ECHEVERRI. Theoria. Is Perception a Source of Reasons? 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Matthew Frise. The Philosophical Quarterly. Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Kevin McCain. Erkenntnis. An Isolation Objection to Phenomenal Conservatism 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Uwe Peters. European Journal of Philosophy. Introspection, mindreading, and the transparency of belief 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Chris Tucker. Dialectica. If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Kevin McCain. The Nature of Scientific Knowledge 2016: 57. [CrossRef]
  • Andrew Naylor. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Justification and Forgetting 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Anna-Sara Malmgren. Synthese. Goodness, availability, and argument structure 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Paul Silva. Episteme. JUSTIFIED GROUP BELIEF IS EVIDENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE GROUP BELIEF 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Alvin I. Goldman. Episteme. RELIABILISM, VERITISM, AND EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Robert Lockie. Social Epistemology. Perspectivism, Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Gerhard Schurz. Noûs. Optimality justifications and the optimality principle: New tools for foundation‐theoretic epistemology 2022. [CrossRef]
  • David E. K. Smith. Environmental Education Research. Look to the ravens: reconceptualizing communities of practice into ecosystems of practice 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Matthew McGrath. Goldman and His Critics 2016: 69. [CrossRef]
  • Matthew Frise. Believing in Accordance with the Evidence 2018: 91. [CrossRef]
  • Matthias Sonk. European Journal of Futures Research. How to justify beliefs about the future - some epistemological remarks 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Kevin McCain. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. Is Forgotten Evidence a Problem for Evidentialism? 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Vincent Conitzer. Erkenntnis. A Puzzle about Further Facts 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Sven Bernecker, Thomas Grundmann. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Knowledge From Forgetting 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Alexander Dinges. Erkenntnis. Relativism and Conservatism 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Luis R.G. Oliveira. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues. Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia. MEMORY COMPATIBILISM: PRESERVING AND GENERATING POSITIVE EPISTEMIC STATUS 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Robert Weston Siscoe. Journal of Modern Philosophy. Thomas Reid, the Internalist 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Sheldon J. Chow. Mind & Society. How reason confronts experience: on naturalist accounts of reason 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Jeffrey Dunn. Episteme. RELIABILISM: HOLISTIC OR SIMPLE? 2012. [CrossRef]
  • Matthew Frise. Erkenntnis. Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Jack C. Lyons. Goldman and His Critics 2016: 149. [CrossRef]
  • A. Moon. Mind. Knowing Without Evidence 2012. [CrossRef]
  • Jonathan Egeland. Synthese. Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Namjoong Kim. Synthese. A dilemma for the imprecise bayesian 2016. [CrossRef]
There may be additional citations on Google Scholar.